Foreign Affairs Committee on April 17th, 2007

[Marc André Boivin]

However, things did work out in some countries. At the beginning of the 1990s, several civil wars were raging in Latin America, and had been ongoing for many years. However, these wars came to an end with the help of UN missions which had received fewer resources than anticipated. Nevertheless, the key is to think long-term. It is obvious that we cannot evaluate the situation by only counting the number of Canadian dead.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

No, but—

[Marc André Boivin]

Ultimately, that is what makes headlines, and it is what leads people to ask questions.

We have never talked about this, but the Canadian Forces are currently undergoing a vast transformation program. There's been mostly talk of acquisition programs, but these did not happen in a vacuum. The Liberals had begun a vast transformation program of the Canadian Forces to turn the page, if you will, on the cold war, and the Conservatives continued that policy. So Canadian Forces are undergoing major change at the same time as this extremely demanding deployment is happening. We are seeing the signs of the kind of pressure the Canadian Forces are under.

[Pierre Beaudet]

As a Quebecker, I am offended when the media and other sources imply that we are genetically programmed to oppose the military participation of Quebec. Some people have even said that we lack courage. I am offended by this and by the fact that people think that Quebeckers are a little dim and misinformed, or that they don't know what is going on. I completely object to that.

I think that Quebeckers are well informed and that they are very skeptical and critical, and justifiably so, of the current deployment and the way it is being managed. Further, I do not believe that the deployment in Afghanistan will be successful with the help of a couple of spins—pardon the expression—that is, with a little more help, with a few more Leopard tanks, helicopters and 5,000 troops. No.

I don't believe that the situation will succeed with that approach because it was badly thought out since 2001, and even before then. We have to honestly recognize this and look at the root causes to adopt a completely different strategy from what is currently the case. That will be extremely difficult, because everyone knows full well that the major players are the Americans. So let's stop kidding ourselves.

However, as I said earlier, in some cases, Canada has, in certain circumstances and with certain allies, objected to American strategies which did not make sense, such as supporting the Apartheid regime throughout the 1980s. So we did stand up to the Americans and force them to back down on that issue. In this case, we need to show the same courage. That would take real courage.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

Mr. Goldring.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

Mr. Beaudet, through all of the meetings, I haven't really heard witnesses characterizing the Taliban as being not nice people. We see what our troops are doing over there and what the cost is to bring about the improvements. You say there has been no serious improvement, yet even our troops returning from there—to a person—are saying they agree with what we're doing because we're making substantive gains on the ground there.

We look at the projects and the seven million children who are now in school. When they began there were fewer than 700,000. That's a tenfold increase. We look at the number of mines that have been cleared. There's some 1,000 square kilometres of land that has been brought into use because the mines have been removed.

We know we need security there. Whether it's in Haiti or it's in any country that has internal strife and turmoil, you do need the security and the police, and you do need the troops to bring things about. These improvements are happening, and they are moving. I find it curious that you would say there has been no serious improvement.

Monsieur Boivin, you said that it's very complex and that there's a long-term requirement. I think that's understood by the committee. It is a long-term commitment. As we are improving and going through the education of the children—it is inter-generational and it will take time.

So I do agree with your comment. It's complex and it's long-term. But I disagree with your comment that we haven't made serious gains, Mr. Beaudet.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Goldring.

Maybe we'll hear from Mr. Khan and then you can answer both of them.

[Wajid Khan, Conservative, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

My question is for Mr. Boivin. You mention Pakistan. Could you tell me how many kinds of Taliban there are? Is there one kind, or two or three groups? Are they scattered? Are they within Afghanistan? Are they part of al-Qaeda? Do you have any knowledge of that?

Also, would you like to tell me if you have any knowledge—because I want something new. What you gentlemen have both said is true: historic perspective is very valuable, but we've heard that many times before.

What do you know about the previous president of Afghanistan, Mr. Rabbani, and Tajik Islamists, who have announced the united national front? These are the issues I want to know about from you. Would you please reflect on that?

I also want to make one quick comment. Troops, whether they are from Quebec or they are based anywhere else, they're all Canadian troops and we feel exactly the same respect for them.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Khan.

Mr. Boivin, I think most of them were directed to you.

[Marc André Boivin]

I thought they were for Mr. Beaudet, regarding the gains, first off.

[Pierre Beaudet]

I think there's still a lot of investigating to do. I repeat that I'm not happy with the fact that those retaining this information are keeping it. If we had it, we could make a more nuanced judgment. There are, however, some macroindicators. It's not just because some schools are built that you can make a final judgment.

By the way, a lot of these schools that were built have been destroyed. In a lot of villages where the kids were put in school, the kids are out of school. It's terribly in flux.

It would be very premature and a bit audacious to conclude that there has been substantial progress. What is more striking and more evident are the setbacks. There have been setbacks in terms of the huge increase in opium production, meaning that the agricultural sector has not started. There have been setbacks in terms of rights and laws. The impunity law, which allows people who committed atrocities to get away with it, is really questionable. There's the situation in Bagram and the situation in many official and non-official jails, where there's heavy use of torture. Unfortunately, there was a little Canadian story a few weeks back, etc.

So I think the situation is very serious.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

Have you visited Afghanistan recently to see for yourself?

[Pierre Beaudet]

Yes, I have visited. I went to Kabul, because when you end up in Kandahar, you are locked in the Canadian bunker.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Mr. Boivin.

[Marc André Boivin]

As to how many kinds of Taliban there are, and where, when the Taliban were forced out, they obviously had to go into a clandestine mode. That makes it all the more difficult to say who's who.

From the reports I've read—and you probably have access to more secretive ones than I do—there are actually about four groups that have splintered off, with different regions of responsibility where they have almost independent actions. There have been reports that in some regions the Taliban has said they will not attack the schools because the schools are popular with the population and they don't want to alienate the population. In some other sectors, you've had the Taliban shooting teachers and attacking the schools.

Actually, to say “neo-Taliban” is probably a better way of differentiating them from the actual movement that was in power first off. Secondly, it's very fragmented.

What you obviously know already is that the Pashtun population is on both sides of the border, the Durand Line. There is a big Pashtun population in the tribal agencies and in the autonomous regions where Pakistan's government sway is very limited. These tribal populations are interconnected, and be it for insurgent activity or for economic activity, there's a lot of activity going through that border and it's very hard to control.

What we do know is that the leadership of the Taliban operates openly from Quetta, Pakistan. The week after Vice-President Cheney was in Pakistan, you all of a sudden had your first arrest of a major Taliban figure.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

We're way over the time already.

[Marc André Boivin]

There's one example there. Pakistan has its own set of problems. It has very complex governmental dynamics. To what extent Musharraf is involved, to what extent it is former ISI—

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Boivin. We have to conclude it there.

Madam McDonough, please.

[Alexa McDonough, NDP, Halifax, NS]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Beaudet, I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I'd like to ask for a clarification. You've referred to internal CIDA reports that you think are being held back or not shared. As a member of Parliament who shares the responsibility of trying to make decisions about what is going on and what should be going on, I find that alarming. I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit on that.

Secondly, with respect to Pakistan, I'd like to ask both of you whether you're familiar with the conclusions and observations that have been widely shared over the last few days by Haroon Siddiqui, a highly respected journalist—I think you'd say “editor emeritus”—at the Toronto Star. On his recent return from Pakistan, he basically had a lot to say, in that we really need to stop blaming neighbouring Pakistan. I quote directly:

Pakistan admits there are hundreds of thousands of Taliban sympathizers among the millions of Pushtun tribesmen straddling the Afghan-Pakistan border, nearly 300,000 of whom criss-cross it every day.

The point is that it's not controllable. He made the point that the U.S.–Mexico border isn't controllable, so who are we kidding and why would we think that's the solution? He's basically suggesting that we had better understand that the full engagement of both the Taliban and of the Pakistani government in a regional peace-building process is the only way to go.

I wonder if I could ask for your comments on those two things.

[Pierre Beaudet]

Just briefly, my colleague from the faculty of law, Amir Attaran, professor, has been on that hot pursuit for the last six months. He's battling with CIDA bureaucrats to access the documents. So that's the situation that I know, and I hear urban rumours on the other side of the river that they are problematic cases. That's not to say, by the way, that nothing is being done and there are no valid, valuable, and genuine efforts, but you have to look at the macro business.

On Pakistan, I agree with you that it's a complex situation. Pakistan has not been in crisis for the last two weeks. It has been, I think, under military dictatorship for most of its history. Recently, one would notice that the United States, which had supported Pakistan militarily for many years, is now moving towards a strategic alliance with India, including in the nuclear area. So the Pakistani government is very concerned, afraid. You don't need to be Einstein to imagine that they are keeping some hot irons in the pot. If this U.S.-India strategic alliance is being built, it is likely and it would be rational, so to speak, that the Pakistani government will continue to use various tricks.

So without defending them, because I don't think they're defendable, there are a lot of dirty games in that region. Therefore, if you focus or pinpoint on, ah yes, them, I think you miss the global picture. That's how I feel about it.

[Marc André Boivin]

Regarding pointing fingers at Pakistan, the thing is, the Musharraf government, in order to sustain itself, has allied itself with Islamist parties, Islamist parties who were backers of the Taliban. There's a direct link there. But to go with Mr. Beaudet on this, the bigger picture is that the governance problems in Pakistan have an impact on governance problems in Afghanistan. The two countries are interlinked in so many ways, and to the Pakistani government, it's quite clear that they have to have some sort of influence and some sort of satisfaction with whoever is in power in Afghanistan.

Karzai was exiled in India, was educated in India. You say “India” to Pakistan and they see red. There's a very confrontational situation there. Both countries are playing all sorts of dirty tricks. India has opened a consulate in Kandahar, in Peshawar, which are Pashtun lands, which Pakistan saw as an obvious insult to their sway over Afghanistan.

There's another game being played with Iran, which controls lots of parts of Herat. You spoke of the Rabbani coalition; that's also interlinked with Iran's influence on Afghanistan. The basic idea is that these players see it as a zero-sum game, meaning that either I control Afghanistan completely and nobody else has any control, or somebody else will control it completely. It has been like this for the last few decades. So it's to change that mindset and say please leave Afghanistan in peace and try to come to some sort of agreement on this.

[Alexa McDonough, NDP, Halifax, NS]

Thank you very much. Most of this doesn't get talked about.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, Madam McDonough.

Also, thank you to our guests for your presence today. We appreciate your input into this issue, an issue that is, I think, of very great relevance, but an issue that is of very great concern as well to all Canadians as we try to deliver the best possible answers to a country that so desperately needs them.

We will now adjourn this part of the meeting. Maybe the members can stick around for a little bit in regard to committee business. Are we going to have time for that?

[The Clerk of the Committee, Mrs. Angela Crandall]

Maybe the subcommittee can discuss it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

All right. We will adjourn. Committee business will be put off and we'll talk about it at our steering committee.