Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb. 14th, 2008

[Gen Lewis MacKenzie]

Well, Mr. Martin, ever since we started training the police, I believed it was not going to work. The reason I think it's not going to work is because they're trying to establish a national police force. The national army is working, but the national police force has problems, because even when they're paid, they have to hitchhike 1,200 kilometres to get the money home to mother, that type of thing, although they are working on some electronic transfer now. Nevertheless, there's a loyalty within the tribe. There's a loyalty within the region, within the province.

I personally--and I'm no expert--would see this organized as a minimum on a provincial basis as opposed to a national police force. The way the police have been paid in the past--and I ran across this in my three tours in the Middle East--is to have a little share. If you're broke, you put up a roadblock in front of your police outpost and when people go by, you charge them a toll, and that's how you have enough money to eat. If you pay the police chief, in most places where I've been involved, the chief takes half of it and then shares the rest with the police.

So it's a problem that I think is better addressed at the provincial level as opposed to the national level.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. MacKenzie.

Mr. Chan.

[Raymond Chan, Liberal, Richmond, BC]

Mr. Bokhari, based on what the generals have said, that we only have 50% of the troops we need out there, and with all the caveats and so on, I guess we don't have to argue, well, we're now south. Everybody knows that the NATO commitment isn't there and they can all predict that sooner or later we have to leave. You said it's going to take a long time for the institutions to be established such that they could carry on with the rebuilding.

How long do you think, with the current commitment we have, that would take?

[Kamran Bokhari]

It's very difficult to actually give a date or a timeline arbitrarily like that, because there are a lot of variables involved, but what I can tell you is that if we are, at this point in time--and when we say “we”, we mean NATO member states--still debating as to what needs to be done. That alone tells me that it's going to be some time before we can actually invest and spend that time, instead of debating what needs to be done, implementing a more or less coherent policy.

Once we start implementing, then we'll see the results. Right now we're not in that situation. Again, I'll repeat that by 2011 I hope the ANA and the ANP can begin to increasingly take responsibility. As they stand up, we can stand down, using the words of George Bush in the case of Iraq. That's the model that I see.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Bokhari.

We'll move to Madame Barbot.

[Vivian Barbot, Bloc, Papineau, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon, gentlemen. Thank you for being here today.

General, you mentioned at the outset something that I didn't know: this is the first time that a mission has involved soldiers from different countries and that those countries have determined the conditions in which they are going to work. Obviously, as we noted, some countries say, for example, that their soldiers won't go out at night, and so on. I imagine that's having an impact on the present mission.

Can that be changed? Is it necessary? What effect is that having on the mission? It's all the more important to know this since we, as politicians, are accountable to the Canadian public, which is telling us that it does agree that we should take part in this war, for the reasons that were given us at the outset and that have not been confirmed. People have trouble understanding what our soldiers are doing there. For the average person, if Canada wants to withdraw, it should give advance notice, and it should be able to do so. That has nothing to do with the mission as a whole, since Canada is one of a number of countries. It's up to NATO to find soldiers elsewhere.

What you're saying about the formation of the mission seems to me important for our understanding of the mission as such. As an army general, what is your vision of this question? How can we continue in what is clearly a war with partners who don't feel more bound by an obligation to continue? I understand that was the situation at the outset, when people made the commitment. In any case, what we were told was that it was for a certain time and for a certain purpose. Can you explain to us something of your understanding of the mission currently, from that standpoint?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mrs. Barbot.

Mr. MacKenzie.

[Gen Lewis MacKenzie]

We are currently fighting for a draw, and with NATO it's unacceptable. The trick is how to change it, and so far that hasn't happened all that much. It's totally unacceptable that NATO nations put caveats on how their troops will be employed.

I trained with NATO for almost my entire military career in what they called “interoperability”, in the central front in Germany. Everybody followed the same rules, and there were no restrictions. Everybody showed up to bomb a sovereign nation from 10,000 feet, no risk, everybody was there, no restrictions.

Now we have risk, and we have blood and gold being expended and all kinds of restrictions are showing up. In Turkey, 700,000 troops who could be there helping us are sitting on their hands--just 1% of them, for heaven's sake. Some of them are busy in northern Iraq, but not that many, and they're outstanding soldiers. I just don't understand it.

For over a year I've said, look, if we don't get additional troops in Kandahar, I won't be at the head of the parade in 2009 saying Canada should stay behind. The trouble is nobody much has shown up, and therefore if we leave, we lose Kandahar province, we lose southern Afghanistan. I'm backed into a corner. God bless our people for what they're doing and their families and the government for supporting them.

The wash-up when this thing is over is not going to be pretty. I see a new alliance of like-minded nations to deal with problems that are in our interest, and they're nations like the U.K., U.S., Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. I am very disappointed in NATO, and I never thought I'd have to say that.

[Vivian Barbot, Bloc, Papineau, QC]

To what extent can adding another 1,000 soldiers, which Canada is currently requesting, change anything in the present situation?

[Gen Lewis MacKenzie]

I recommended 4,000, but with 1,000 more there would be more secure areas in which you could maintain security. Our problem up until now is that we move into an area, we secure it, and then we have to stay there and stop securing more areas. They were turning it over to maybe 10 Afghan policemen who were hanged by their heels and had their throats cut. It would allow you to have more soldiers to stay and secure. People don't trust you in the first couple of months or year. You have to show them they can count on you to be there.

One thing I've never understood—and I'll inject this very quickly into the conversation—is why the Taliban just doesn't stop fighting and just disappear from the battlefield. Could you imagine what would happen in NATO? Within six months all of us would be screaming for our troops to be brought home. We'd bring them home, and then they'd come back and occupy.

Academics have told me it's because of the macho attitude. It's why when they pick on a convoy they don't pick on the fuel bowser, the most valuable target, but they'll take on the most heavily armoured vehicle in the column because it's macho. At night you can't get them to sneak around and be quiet and cut a few throats. No, they'll scream and holler and fire their guns because that's the macho thing to do. They're great fighters, they're warriors, but if they just stopped fighting, NATO would collapse within a year.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Madame Barbot, for bringing those questions.

We'll move to the government side, to Mr. Khan and then Mr. Goldring.

[Wajid Khan, Conservative, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for being here, gentlemen. I'm delighted that we heard some views that reflect the practical experiences on the battlefield, as well as your analysis, Mr. Bokhari.

I'll touch upon a couple of things. Mr. Weera is not here, but my friend, Mr. Dewar, is here. This gentleman is the senior advisor to the Independent National Commission on Strengthening Peace and senior policy advisor to the minister of education in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. I'm sure he was being paid from both organizations. He was here giving us some advice. I wonder what advice he gave to his government, which has not been adhered to?

Getting back to the subject at hand, I'd like to point out some of the developments that have taken place, which could not have happened without our being in Afghanistan as part of NATO: over six million kids are in school, one-third of them girls; 83% of the population has health care services; there are 40,000 fewer infant deaths per year; we have 600-plus projects in Kandahar; 530 councils have been elected; total projects, 16,500; and 19,200 community councils to tell us what projects to do.

I also want to touch upon some of the military operations that we currently call “war”. If the troops are there to secure a situation, as with the Kajaki Dam producing electricity, they have to take action to secure the area, fix the dam, and provide support to businesses and individuals. I am very surprised that we have taken our eyes off that aspect of this mission. The last combat casualty for our troops was in September of 2006. The rest of the casualties since then have not been in combat.

I would also like to ask you, General MacKenzie, what the effect is of the debate we are having at home—and there should be a debate—about whether we should pull our troops out or put caveats on them. Also tell me, please, because I've been searching and I have not found anywhere in the history of the world that we gave an exit date to the enemy: “Look, if we don't beat you by then, we're going to leave.”

Could you answer that question, sir?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Before you do, I'm going to have Mr. Goldring very quickly--

[Wajid Khan, Conservative, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

I have one quick question.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Well, you won't get it in, if there's an answer.

Mr. Goldring, quickly.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

General MacKenzie, here is one quick item. You were on a TV program the other night where you corrected one of the reporters when he left the impression that the enemy was really up to as many as 40 million of the Pashtuns, and you corrected that because it gave an impossible kind of answer to it.

The second one is that an earlier presenter here said--and he brought politically biased commentary into it--Canada's commitment was a demonstration of an alliance with the United States rather than a response to a demonstrated need in Afghanistan. Yet he followed this up in his closing remarks by saying that there was sufficient military support by other governments to replace Canada's and calling for Canada to reduce its own military, which I suppose, by extension, would mean that the replacement government also would be sharing an alliance with the United States rather than responding to a need in Afghanistan. My point here is that we're having a bit of political obscuration going on, as well as some other comments that seem to need to be corrected.

Could you comment on those two?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

Mr. MacKenzie.

[Gen Lewis MacKenzie]

I would just say that it is disappointing to me when I hear this referred to as “Bush's war”, because just maybe he did something right in his presidency and maybe Afghanistan was one of those things. Not only that, I think half the Canadian population genuflects in the direction of UN headquarters in Manhattan on a daily basis, even though the only characteristic of most UN operations in the last 12 years has been the apology that follows the Srebrenicas, Rwandas, Bosnias, Croatias, and Somalias. They don't have a sterling record. Nevertheless, there's a UN resolution and the NATO charter was called, and that's 26 nations. They might not be doing a great job, but it is very much a multinational organization.

Did the Americans reduce their number of soldiers too much and send them to Iraq? Yes, but they should have been able to predict the future, I guess, and that's unfortunately the way it's turned out.

As for the end date, it's this damn UN resolution. That's what it is, the mandate--it's always been six months. UN mandates were always six months, from 1956 until now. Why? Because the Security Council only votes funds for six months and the UN Assembly only approves them for six months. So we all get used to six months. It doesn't apply to non-peacekeeping operations, but it is sort of in Afghanistan. Some troops are there for six months, some for nine, some for twelve. Nevertheless, to predict an end date.... I was asked that on television the other night: “What's going to happen in 2011?” I said, “I don't even know if I'm going to be here.” Who the hell can predict what's going to happen in the world, let alone Afghanistan, in 2011? At least word it in such a way that we'll take a look at it a year before 2011, but not in 2008.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. MacKenzie.

We'll move to Mr. Dewar.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our guests.

You've already declared your financial interests; I actually wasn't going to go there.

And I didn't mean to upset our guests. I was simply providing for the record where people receive their moneys from. There is a screening process for the moneys received, and part of the screening is the degree to which the activities give clear evidence that they support Canadian Forces policy.

[Gen Lewis MacKenzie]

You'll have to check with my wife for mine.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Same.

I want to just direct the committee back to what we're studying at this committee, and perhaps remind our guests. I'm not sure if they were given our motion, but our motion says that we're to conduct a study that is to assess, among other aspects, CIDA's participation in Afghanistan, also making sure to investigate possible approaches to establishing a lasting peace in Afghanistan.

As I hear both your testimonies, I guess I'm understanding that you would support what seems to be the direction of the Manley recommendations in saying...and maybe, Mr. MacKenzie, you would say that there needs to be more troops, not less. He says 1,000 and you're saying 4,000.

Am I correct in saying, to you first, Mr. MacKenzie, that you would follow not the Manley report but...?

I think it's interesting, when you look at the Manley report and the recommendations, that one could argue they certainly don't flow; certainly I would make that point.

So would it be correct to say that you support the recommendations but you say go further, that instead of 1,000 it should be 4,000?

[Gen Lewis MacKenzie]

I'm on record as saying that the force should have been doubled two years ago. In southern Afghanistan we needed 10,000 more, with 3,000 to 4,000 of those in Kandahar.

But perhaps I can address the CIDA issue. I have maybe a different opinion on that.

I think CIDA gets unnecessarily beaten up. They're very much long term, and they move the money through other institutions, that sort of thing. If we build these projects--as we did, as many of you who were there will know--and we have a Canadian flag on them, they're destroyed. Of 200 projects where we came in the back door and provided the project management, empowered the local people, and gave them the money, only one has been destroyed.

I know that the signature project with the Canadian flag is a popular idea. I just don't think it would last very long.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Well, this might be worthy of reporting somewhere, but I couldn't agree with you more. I think it's absurd—a 1950s, perhaps pre-colonial attitude—to say that we have to have signature projects.

For that matter, I think we look at CIDA as going and making everything well. Someone gave the analogy that CIDA is like going to a gym where they're going to deal with your physique: it's going to take a long time. We're looking at them as if they're going to be able to do triage, and they can't do that. We don't understand, really, what they're there to do. So I would agree with you on that. The question, I guess, is that....

You certainly know where we stand as a party, but it's one thing to say “Troops out”; I don't want you to leave with the message that this is our party's proposition. The proposition is that perhaps people should look at other ways of dealing with this conflict, this war, and of resolving it.

I note you mentioned many UN missions that didn't work, but some have. I was in El Salvador in the eighties, and we know that was counter-insurgency. The UN was involved there eventually, and the same with Cambodia and Timor, as you mentioned in your opening.

And I agree with you on NATO—for maybe different reasons—but do you not see any possibility of the UN...? The cart and the horse are mixed up here; you have NATO as a lead, and we believe—maybe you would disagree--that in fact the UN should be at the lead.

Do you see that as a no-win situation at all?

[Gen Lewis MacKenzie]

I don't see it as the ideal solution, because the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, who handles the military side in the UN, admitted a year and a half ago what the numbers have been saying for years: they're incapable of conducting military operations.

What I would see the UN doing, though, is that as they've now reappeared in Iraq.... There's too much emphasis on the military, but that doesn't mean you reduce the military. That means you increase the diplomatic side and the development side, as possible.

Right now, on the diplomatic side, I was delighted with what the Manley report said to the Prime Minister: grab this file and start phoning around to other NATO countries, as opposed to--with all due respect--just the ministers doing it.

That has been done, and it's had some modest--