Yes, and it's a big issue.
At the end of 2001, when the Taliban fell, there was virtually no functioning apparatus of government as we would take it for granted. There was nobody in the ministries. In fact, there were a few guys in the ministries who actually kept going to work during the Taliban period. They weren't getting paid. They were trained in the communist era and have a very interesting way of understanding public administration. One of the most powerful weapons in the hands of an Afghan bureaucrat is a rubber stamp. They really love bureaucracy, but there was hardly any of it there.
This sort of rush of blood to the head occurred in 2002 to reform all these ministries. All sorts of Afghan expatriates came back. Some were very well educated, some not so well educated, and they started filling these jobs.
There are probably four different rates of pay going in the Afghan civil service right now. People funded by this project get one rate of pay. Expatriates get another rate of pay. If you just happen to be a poor Afghan who has spent his whole time in Afghanistan and joined the public service, you're getting one-quarter of the pay of your buddy who came back from Canada or the United States. The whole thing is a mess.
There is a strategy for Afghan National Army reform. One country is in change: the United States. Everybody else contributes, but there's one guy in charge, and that's the American two-star general.
There is no equivalent program for public administrative reform. There are little programs all over town that the World Bank should be coordinating.