In my day there used to be pads provided. I guess too many witnesses stole them when they left, so I've been writing on my sleeves. I'm trying to remember these questions.
Actually Mr. Chan's and Mr. Martin's questions do relate to one another. Oh, here comes a pad. It's too late now. Have you written the answers on them? There are no answers on this; this won't help.
First of all, regarding the degree of the commitment, this is one of the messages in our report and one of the reasons, I think, that it's actually being read outside Canada. We have tried, without exaggerating it or making it too dramatic, to make it clear that the status quo is going poorly. The commitment is inadequate. Afghanistan could be lost. Again, it could be lost. The consequences for the international community and the consequences for NATO are serious if that happens. And it's not good enough to simply say we've got troops in this area and the security situation is permissive and we think it all looks good. We're trying to highlight for the other countries in ISAF, which are more than NATO, that this is not going well and it requires a greater commitment.
Now, on the positive side of that, you mentioned in the first round the commitment to the former Yugoslavia. To some degree I've seen this movie before, because when I became foreign minister and I first went to NATO ministers meetings, the conversation was about the former Yugoslavia. Canada had 1,800 troops in Bosnia at the time, and the recurrent refrain was “Why are the Europeans not more committed to reconstruction and security in the former Yugoslavia? After all, it's part of Europe.” And there were lots of excuses and there was lots of hot air. But I think you would have to say at this point in time that NATO members in the European Union and others have responded to the challenge, whether it's in Bosnia or Kosovo, more recently with a much greater commitment, and Canada is no longer there.
One can hope we'll see that re-created in Afghanistan, if the message could just be heard. There was a concept, you're right. You said—and I'm sorry, we're going to have a hard time getting all these questions done, but let me talk while we're at it. When we went in, in 2001, it was to pursue al-Qaeda. That was the issue of the day. We didn't actually foresee that the Taliban government would collapse like a cheap suit. They weren't defeated; they just went away, and they took their time, regrouped, rebuilt, and waited until the attention of the international community, particularly the west, was distracted by what I call the folly in Iraq. The consequence was that things could get regrouped in Afghanistan. Before we knew it, we had an all-out insurgency on our hands, partly because of neglect. It's a risky place, and it's going to require a degree of concentration.
Regarding rotation, there's no principle of rotation. We rotated out of Bosnia. Should we expect to be rotated back in? We're part of a military alliance. We've got a task to do. We stuck up our hands and volunteered to go to Kandahar, and that's where we are. My own view, and I think this is what's reflected in our report, is that we say we went to Kandahar for whatever reason, because we actually don't know what the reason was when the government took that decision. But I think we do need to look at ourselves as Canadians. I understand that your constituents get tired of this issue. They don't like hearing that soldiers are getting killed and brought home. They want to change the channel. Let's watch something else. Let's watch Darfur. Let's watch something in Southeast Asia.
It's frustrating. It looks as if it's not going well, but we've taken on a commitment, and it's an important one, and therefore we have to deal with it responsibly. We're a senior member of that international community. We'd better be dealing with this that we've taken on in that way.
I've forgotten what the other questions were.