Foreign Affairs Committee on March 11th, 2008

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Bonjour, chers collèagues. Welcome.

This is meeting 18 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, Tuesday, March 11, 2008.

I would remind everyone today that these proceedings are televised. I would also ask our guests at the back of the committee room if they would please turn off their cellphones, and to each one of the participants here, as well, disable your ringing devices, including cellphones and BlackBerrys.

Today our committee continues our work on the study of Canada's mission in Afghanistan. For this report that we're in the process of drafting we have spent many months studying Canada's role in Afghanistan, both the security aspect as well as the developmental aspect. To that end today, we will have before us witnesses representing the independent panel on Canada's future role in Afghanistan.

We will have to ask our media friends to avail themselves of the opportunity right now to leave the room. We appreciate your willingness to be here.

As already mentioned, we have three members of the panel on Canada's future role in Afghanistan here, three individuals who really need no introduction. First of all, the Honourable John Manley is back with us today as chair of the committee, and with him are two panellists, two members of that committee, Mr. Derek Burney, as well as Ms. Pamela Wallin.

We welcome all of you here today to the foreign affairs committee.

There are no opening statements from our panel. We will proceed immediately into the first round of questioning.

We want, as a committee, to thank you for your work and your time and your dedication in bringing forward your report. It's a report that we have looked at, that all Canadians have had the opportunity to look at. It's caused a lot of debate, and we appreciate that. I think all parties, all Canadians, want to be well educated as to what you've learned while you were there and while you met with others, so we appreciate the hard work you've done.

Without further ado, we'll go into the first round. Because we do have unanimous consent, we will have ten-minute rounds.

I'll welcome comments from Mr. Wilfert.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'll be splitting my time with my colleague, Bernard Patry.

I'd like to welcome the members of the independent panel on Canada's future role in Afghanistan, and I'd particularly like to welcome John Manley, my former boss when I was a parliamentary secretary to the minister of the day.

Mr. Chairman, one of the main recommendations of your report was that Canada's continued military presence should be contingent on obtaining from NATO an additional battle group of about 1,000 soldiers. How did you arrive at that, given the fact, for example, that in testimony before this committee on February 14, retired General Lewis MacKenzie said he would recommend 4,000 additional troops in Kandahar Province alone, and 10,000 more in southern Afghanistan? Other military experts have suggested 5,000. These numbers are drastically higher than what the panel has recommended.

Can you assure this committee you're confident in this 1,000 additional troops? Because we have asked the government on repeated occasions for clarification on the 1,000, and they have basically suggested that we ask you.

I'll turn that over to members of the panel.

[John Manley, Chair, Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan]

I'm glad to know that nothing has changed since I left.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

I know you'd be disappointed if it had.

[John Manley]

I thought, when question period was going to be hot, that you should come as parliamentary secretary and answer the questions.

First of all, maybe I could preface answering your question by saying that coming to the conclusion that Canada's continued engagement should be conditional was something that we reached over a long period of deliberation. It really was based on a first conclusion that Canada's role in Afghanistan was one that was just and noble and right, and an appropriate extension of Canadian foreign policy, but it should not be done in a naive way, and neither should we be putting our young people at risk if there weren't a reasonable likelihood that they would be able to succeed in the task that they were taking on with great courage.

We then began to look at some of the conditions. Quite frankly, we're not military experts either. NATO itself published numbers with respect to what troop levels should be. If my memory serves me, in the south generally, not specific to Kandahar, it was published that the additional increment should be in the order of 4,000 troops, which made the recommendations we received from our military, particularly generals Hillier and Laroche, that what was required in Kandahar province was an additional battle group of 1,000 soldiers. In our report we recommended that this should be the minimum that Canada should be looking for.

What I'll do, Mr. Chairman, if it's okay, is invite my colleagues to say something, if they want. I found over the weeks we worked together that they were rather shy, but they may feel that they would like to add something to my responses. So if that's agreeable, Mr. Chair, I would just invite them to say what they feel they wish to say.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Yes, thank you, Mr. Manley. We welcome any comments from any of the panellists.

Mr. Patry.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Manley, Ms. Wallin and Mr. Burney.

Mr. Manley, your second recommendation on the deployment of additional combat troops, as my colleague has just mentioned, does it in some way imply a rotation of Canadian troops?

You acknowledge that no insurgency can be defeated through military force alone, and you emphasize the importance of the other Ds, development and diplomacy.

On the development plan as such, you say the following: "CIDA's internal procedures should be altered as necessary to facilitate this shift in emphasis." (p. 36 in the English version).

As I understand it, this could mean that CIDA has failed in Afghanistan. What are the procedures that CIDA should alter?

[John Manley]

Certainly, we rotate troops back to Canada. Normally, it is for a period of six months, but with regard to the rotation of troops in other roles in the NATO force...

Yes, we would like to see roles rotated, because things are more difficult in the south. But there is no real rotation principle. NATO needs to insist that, as an organization, it has made important decisions for Afghanistan. All member countries have the obligation to participate. We cannot just say that there should be a rotation. Canadians decided to go to Kandahar. There are advantages because, after a number of years there, we have a better grasp of the situation in Afghanistan. We have already made an investment there.

It has been said that CIDA is important for our activities in Afghanistan. The mission has to change. We must put more effort into reconstruction and development in order to help the population and to improve their situation. While it is good to help international and multilateral groups and the Afghan government, in Kandahar province, CIDA and the non-governmental organizations working with it must be able to put projects in place. It is not just a question of having programs, it is a question of projects that the population can see. This is the change we recommended.

[Derek Burney, Panellist, Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan]

I would just add in answer to the second part of your question, Mr. Patry, that I think, first of all, the most essential ingredient for development in Kandahar is security. Without security, there can be no development.

Rather than being critical of what CIDA is doing, I think what we were emphasizing is that this is, after all, a war zone and that normal procedures for the kind of development assistance that is normally conveyed by CIDA is not directly applicable to the situation. So what we were recommending, in essence, was that there be a change in procedures that would enable a quicker response to some of the more basic needs of the people in Kandahar whose area has been made secure by our military activity. That's what we were concerned about, the ability of CIDA to react quickly, to provide assistance such as wells for drinking water, health care centres, very basic needs of the people, so that the full strategy of secure, hold, and develop in a war zone is applied in an efficient manner.

The change in procedure that we were emphasizing and the change of emphasis that we were recommending was to key it more to the reconstruction effort, the immediate needs of the people in Kandahar, as opposed to the longer-term needs of the Afghan government to develop capability and competence to run a government.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Burney.

Ms. Wallin.

[Pamela Wallin, Panellist, Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan]

I just want to emphasize that point, because we heard from Afghans themselves that while we are spending huge sums of money on the aid and development front, many people weren't aware of it. It wasn't visible to them. While they have generous feelings towards Canadians and believe that we're there helping and for all the right reasons, they didn't know when we were helping with education or health care, or those things, because a lot of the money is diverted through other delivery mechanisms. So there wasn't credit where credit was due.

We also heard from our soldiers, from our troops, that to have a more complete image and not be just the soldiers, the troops who are tackling the enemy, but to be the people who are providing an answer to the problems that the Afghan people face makes their job on both fronts easier. It makes the soldiers' job easier, and the development and aid workers' jobs, if those are seen as an entire package, and not the military and the development seen as separate forums.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

Mrs. Barbot, you have 10 minutes.

[Vivian Barbot, Bloc, Papineau, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

In your report, you make no mention of an end date, a date by which Canada should withdraw from Afghanistan. By so doing, you are, in a way, flying in the face of the majority of Canadians who have said that they want Canada to withdraw its troops.

So not only have you not stuck to 2009, you have not really indicated the date by which Canada would leave the country. But we are part of this coalition with a number of other countries—38 countries, if memory serves—and we do not understand why Canada must maintain its presence in the most dangerous part of the region, when there are other countries, in our view, who could also do their part. Canada could then become involved in other aspects of the mission with which we are more familiar, such as aid.

Other countries have set an end date. The Netherlands, for example, has recently stated that it wants to leave Oruzgan on July 30, 2010. So why could Canada not do the same thing? Why does this responsibility of being in a war zone fall to us entirely? Does it mean that Canadians should look forward to being in Afghanistan indefinitely?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mrs. Barbot

Mr. Manley.

[John Manley]

First of all, I would say that it is important to understand that we are not alone. We have no partners in Kandahar province, but there are others in the south and they are conducting very difficult operations. Next to us, in Helman province, we have the British and the Danes. The Netherlands is in Oruzgan with the Australians. The Americans are in the south with the Romanians.

We have chosen a difficult task, but we are not alone. We are certainly working with others, and we think that NATO should find a partner to work with us in Kandahar.

Why did we not recommend a withdrawal date? We discussed it, and we said that our mission "should not be half-hearted nor open-ended". But we found it impossible to determine the date by which we could state that our mission would end. We can, however, say which tasks we need to accomplish. We felt that we would be able to leave the region when the army and the police were in a position to provide security for the Afghan people, and that is not a date that we can specify.

Now, as I understand it, Parliament is going to decide on an end date. In my view, this is Parliament's role, not our panel's. So it must now decide which tasks we must accomplish and by when, so that, in 2011, we will be able to say that we can withdraw our troops and that our task will be complete. That is the role of our officials.

[Vivian Barbot, Bloc, Papineau, QC]

Given the job that needs to be done and all the criticism that the Manley report has levelled at the mission up to now, do you really think that 1,000 more soldiers could really be an effective addition to Canadian troops? In fact, we are seeing very limited results. So 1,000 soldiers in just one part...You said yourself that there are other soldiers elsewhere, but I imagine that they have the same problem. There are about 58,000 troops in total. To what extent could 1,000 more soldiers in one part of the country make a difference?

[John Manley]

That is a good question. First of all, I will say that our task was not to decide how many soldiers are needed in Afghanistan as a whole. That is something that we did not try to determine. We expressed no opinion on the matter. We must understand that about 2,500 members of the Canadian Forces are in Kandahar, of whom 1,000 are in combat roles. So when we say that we need a combat group of 1,000 soldiers, that would effectively double the number of soldiers on the ground in Kandahar, which would help us to implement the strategy that Mr. Burney has just explained. This consists in holding the land that we have won so that reconstruction and development can continue. So we will be able to increase our efforts to train the security forces, the army and the police. Because if it is our goal to leave Afghanistan in a few years, the Afghans will have to be able to carry on. We are training them at the moment, not in a military college, but in the field with our troops, in quite difficult situations. But if we increased the size of our force, we could also increase the training.

[Pamela Wallin]

And nobody is more motivated than the Afghans themselves. We heard this from a huge variety of political people--governors, leaders, and tribal council members. They believe they are and will soon be capable of taking the lead, and they want that role.

Many of them apologized to us for the loss and sacrifice of our own troops there to help them. They are highly motivated. They are a very proud and dedicated people, and they want to take control of their own country. They said to us, “We want you to be able to go home as soon as you can, and we are working as hard as we can to get up to speed so we can take the lead and be in charge”. When you're working with people like that who are so motivated and committed, you don't want to walk out on them until they're ready.

[Vivian Barbot, Bloc, Papineau, QC]

Of course I understand the Afghans' motivation; we would be doing the same thing if we were in their shoes. But in our effort to help them, we must not lose sight of our own reality. How long will Canada be able to keep 2,500 soldiers there? We are getting more and more casualties. So all Canadians should be asking ourselves the question. How long can our war effort continue? In the Manley Report, you call for additional effort, you say that there should be 1,000 more people. But there is nothing that says that we should have achieved such and such a result by such and such a date. Up to now, there have not been many results. That concerns me a little.

[Pamela Wallin]

I don't think you can just put dates on those things. I was trying to impart that they are motivated to make this happen as quickly as possible, but they are dependent on us, and we are dependent on our NATO partners and allies. That's why we have asked our NATO partners to step up to the plate.

Yes, we asked to go to Kandahar. We took on that assignment willingly, but we need assistance and help. We think that because this is a UN-sponsored, NATO-led mission, we should be able to turn to our NATO partners and say “Send in a little help, because that will help us get the job done more quickly and effectively”.

[Derek Burney]

We did recommend a specific date for the conditions we set. We did say we should get this support in terms of troops and new equipment for the Canadian Forces by February 2009. Otherwise, Canada should serve notice of its intent to transfer responsibility for security in Kandahar to somebody else.

We're not in a position to know whether those conditions are being met. That's not our responsibility. But we did set a precise date for the conditions to be met.

It's a very different issue to talk about when the mission is going to be completed. You can either assume that you can put an arbitrary timeline on a mission as complicated as this.... As the chairman said, we spent a lot of time debating this, to see. We knew Canadians would have loved to have heard from the panel, you know, that by December 31 in such-and-such a year, our mission would be accomplished. We found no operational logic that would lead us to a time certain for the completion of the mission. We saw the mission being performance-based, not time-based.

We fully expect that the Afghan security forces will be taking the lead responsibility for security to some extent in the coming year and in the coming two to three years. But when the point will be that they will be able to take full charge for security in Kandahar, there's nobody who could give a guarantee about that today, as far as we can see from an operational standpoint. Politically, that's a different matter. We were not making a political recommendation.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Burney.

We'll move to the government side. The parliamentary secretary, Mr. Obhrai.

[Deepak Obhrai, Conservative, Calgary East, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank the panel for coming in front of the committee. As you know, we have a debate going on, and you're part of the debate. We have the debate in the House. It took this side of the House quite, I should say, some persuasion to have my colleagues, my friends on the other side, to agree for you to come. Initially, they were reluctant for you to come. I don't know why. But anyway, you are here.

[John Manley]

So we were well announced.

[Deepak Obhrai, Conservative, Calgary East, AB]

We are very happy you're here as part of the debate that's going on.

As you know, since your report was released the government has taken concrete steps to implement a number of the recommendations you have stated. Of course, even this motion that is in front of the House to be debated with input from the Liberal Party as well.... I want to tell my colleague from the Bloc, that motion does have an end date in there that she's seeking. So she should read that motion, which is going to be coming up for debate.

As you know, from what you have recommended, as well, the Prime Minister has called NATO allies looking for the 1,000 troops. He's going to Bucharest for their thing. He's also done a cabinet committee on that. Mr. Mulroney, sitting in the back there, is part of it. What do you think of the government steps so far in achieving the objective of what you have recommended to the government? That's question one.

Question two is that recently a British parliamentary delegation came to Canada looking at their role. One thing they were really surprised about was that Canadians do not go to Afghanistan to see the level of progress, to understand what is happening and how the progress is ticking on, so they can come back and report to Canadians. I'm talking about Canadians in general; I'm not talking about one panel like yourselves or somebody. This would help Canadians understand the tremendous sacrifice and the involvement of Canadians in Afghanistan. Don't you think that would be a good recommendation to have?