Thank you.
It's a pleasure to be here, Mr. Chairman, and it is a pleasure to be able to speak in front of this committee and take, having listened to the last group, somewhat of an alternative perspective on the issue of this Radarsat-2 question and also on the general issue of the sale of what I call the space systems division of MDA to ATK.
In my view, there are three interrelated but separate elements involved in this issue. One is the question of ownership of Radarsat-2 and in effect of Radarsat-1 as well. Second, there is the question of the space systems division's technology production capacity or capability, which ATK seeks to purchase. Third, of course, is the larger issue of a national space policy and strategy.
Beyond the specifics of the sale itself, the common denominator is the United States: U.S. ownership of a Canadian capability, U.S. ownership of Canadian technology and production capacity, and the U.S. place in Canada's national space policy and strategy, if one can say there is one.
Unfortunately, too often in such debates the U.S. is used in a sense as a whipping boy, a characteristic of any debate in Canada in which emotional nationalistic sentiments come into play. As a result, in my view assertions are made that are somewhat misleading, to say the least.
First of all, there's an implicit assumption, particularly if you read the press, that the U.S. government is behind the sale, seeking to acquire capability and technology to the detriment of Canada: the U.S. government will use the sale to block Canadian access to its own technology and in so doing undermine Canadian security and sovereignty, especially with regard to the Arctic.
In reality, however, this is a business decision being made on business grounds by both parties. That ATK is interested in acquiring cutting-edge technology and an integrated production and engineering capacity is not surprising, but I do not see how this acquisition would necessarily block the ability of the Canadian government or the Canadian Space Agency to work in a public partnership in the future with ATK in Canada and procure, for example, the next generation of radar satellite technology.
In terms of the ability of the United States government to prevent such a possibility, U.S. concerns about technology, as embodied in the ITARs, and its own export controls issues--which confront U.S. industry as well--will affect the space systems division whether it is owned by a Canadian firm or an American firm. The reality is that the Canadian and U.S. technology industry is highly integrated. It has been that way for over 40 years now. Radarsat-2, for example, employs several critical pieces of U.S. technology, and this fact played a role in the launch dispute several years ago that led to Canadian legislation on remote sensing, or shutter control.
With regard to shutter control, two points stand out. First, MDA--and thus ATK, if the purchase were to go through--operates Radarsat-2 out of the CSA facility in Saint-Hubert, Quebec. It is on Canadian soil and subject to Canadian law, regardless of whether a Canadian or an American firm owns the operation.
Whether the contract explicitly prevents the company from moving its flight operations elsewhere I do not know, but even if the company were to move its operations to the United States, the question would become whether U.S. legislation is much different from Canadian. I doubt this is the case, given the Radarsat-2 dispute and the fact that any crafting of legislation in Canada on remote sensing no doubt looked at other people's legislation to try to create some basis of harmony, particularly given the integrated nature of the Canada-U.S. relationship.
With regard to priority access for tasking Radarsat-2, I am not privy directly to the details of the contract, but I would suspect, and it is generally the norm, that such contracts contain a priority for national security and emergency tasks. These would not change, regardless of ownership.
In addition, I'm not sure that the contract portion governing the experimental national defence ground moving target indicator on Radarsat-2 provides security insurances for Canada, but I'm confident those would have been negotiated in the original contract.
As far as the idea of the U.S. blocking Canadian access goes, under what circumstances and for what reasons would the U.S. government undertake this step, if it were legally able to do so in Canada? Canada and the United States are close allies and cooperate across a range of defence and security functions, including intelligence sharing. The implicit circumstance, it seems, is the issue of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, but this emotional issue is misunderstood.
For example, the U.S. does not dispute Canada's ownership of the Arctic Islands, agrees to disagree with Canada on the status of the Northwest Passage, and has a legitimate disagreement with Canada--as we do with them--on the drawing of the ocean boundary in the Beaufort Sea. In my view, Radarsat-2 technology is really not of much value there, but if the U.S. did want to dispute Canadian sovereignty up north, it certainly would want to be seen to be doing it, rather than hiding it. That's how you dispute a sovereignty claim.
In terms of activities the U.S. might wish to keep out of Canadian view, the only reasonable one I can think of, which is an old one dating back to the Cold War, is U.S. submarine activity. This takes place under ice and water, and as far as I know, Radarsat-2 cannot look underneath ice and water, so I'm not sure what value it would have that would lead the United States to block its use. It is also relatively easy for submarines to avoid detection, simply because Canada does not possess a 24-hour, seven-days-a-week surveillance capability. Besides, the United States has cooperated and worked with Canada on elements of Project Polar Epsilon, and I'm confident that such open cooperation will continue, regardless of who owns Radarsat-2.
As far as the Arctic goes, Canada and the U.S. share a range of common interests supporting greater cooperation rather than conflict, and a future Canadian-funded Radarsat-2 constellation or an American-funded one will be beneficial to both parties, regardless of who owns it.
Finally--and I noted this was mentioned at the end of the last session--there is the question of ATK's motives, of Radarsat acquisition versus the technology for future market opportunities. If the Canadian government and this committee are so concerned about Radarsat ownership--and this would also include the question of operating Project Sapphire, the national defence satellite due to go up shortly--then perhaps the answer for the government is to simply purchase the capability from MDA.
There is an argument, and I would support an argument, that Canada should own and operate a national space capability. This may be one of the reasons behind the decision. However, as far as technology and production capacity go, one must ask why this capability is of such a significance as to undo decades of Canadian policy in this regard, why there is such national security importance relative to other industries in a long-standing close relationship with the United States, and what the government plans to do to invest to keep this critical capability functioning. These questions have not been answered, but in the end I am not sure why the question of U.S. or Canadian ownership is really essential to the answers.
In the end, this is not to suggest that the government's decision to block the sale is necessarily wrong. This can only be evaluated once the government releases a comprehensive and much-needed national space policy and strategy that places the current decision--assuming there's no change--in a specific policy and strategy context.
Thank you.
