Evidence of meeting #5 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 39th Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was afghan.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Vice-Chair, Group of 78, Afghanistan Reference Group
Very briefly, this kind of negotiation would be multi-dimensional. It would take years. The international community has a long history of doing this in Kosovo, in the former Yugoslavia, in the Congo, in Liberia. We know how to do it. The international community as a whole, the diplomatic community as a whole, knows how to implement this sort of thing. In the Congo there were eight countries in combat at one time.
It can be done. It just takes time and it takes patience and a huge commitment.
Bloc
Vivian Barbot Bloc Papineau, QC
In a country like Afghanistan which you described as very complex, how do you get people to sit down together and engage in dialogue?
Coordinator, Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, Afghanistan Reference Group
I apologize, but my French is not very good. So I will reply in English.
If you look at the different groups engaged in the insurgency, the incentives or motives they have are very diverse. Some are in this because of very localized grievances, others need to create insecurity to continue cultivating poppies, and others are in it for ideological reasons.
Depending on what the exact motive of the particular group is, a specific approach will be needed. And as has been mentioned before, you can assume there will be some absolute spoilers, some rejectionists who are simply not interested in dialogue. And we will have to find ways of dealing with those. But you can assume that probably the majority of actors involved in the insurgency will be open to dialogue.
The point is it will take a very long time. It will be a process. As you see right now, the central government in Kabul has strict conditions for negotiations, and also strict conditions have been mentioned by members of the insurgency. And at this stage these conditions are not compatible. Where we are today, we cannot have talks, but this is where we are today. Stakes are being raised, and this is where we have to start from, and as the process takes us forward, I think we will get to a point where we can start talking and negotiating.
Bloc
Vivian Barbot Bloc Papineau, QC
To answer Mr. Patry's question, it seems to me that we are having difficulty identifying these people. So how would this be possible?
Vice-Chair, Group of 78, Afghanistan Reference Group
You must remember that this process will be neither Canadian nor international even, but well and truly Afghan. The Afghans must in effect own the negotiation process. Our role is to support them, to encourage them, to make connections and to serve as a catalyst. We are not necessarily called upon to play the role of negotiator or mediator, particularly given that we are currently combatants.
Things are happening in several ways and on several levels at the same time. The fact that the Afghans will choose to hold discussions will depend not only on the government but also on Afghans, whether at the community level, the national level or some other level.
Conservative
Conservative
Denis Lebel Conservative Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you.
Given all of the information we receive, it is not always easy to take stock of these issues.
We have learned over the last few hours that the Taliban have retaken ground in some parts of the country and that a certain percentage of the population is wondering if it would not be best if they returned to power. In fact, the period between 1996 and 2001 was the longest politically stable period in recent years. That is the information we have and that is what is appearing in the press.
We tell ourselves that we should perhaps reassess the military presence. The Taliban are continuing to regain ground. I actually do not understand why they would want to sit down at the table and negotiate when they are under the impression that they are taking their rightful place back, or at least that is how they would see it, and they can see the possibility of reconquering the entire country.
Coordinator, Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, Afghanistan Reference Group
It's very important to distinguish between the Taliban we saw from the early nineties to 2001, and what we see today as an insurgency. The Taliban you saw in the early nineties were more cohesive, they had stronger support from outside, and the enemy they were facing was a loose coalition of movements that didn't have the same kind of support the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police and the international actors have. So the conflict is different today from what it used to be. That is one point to keep in mind.
Conservative
Denis Lebel Conservative Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean, QC
It is a good thing that they are destabilized. For the moment, we are not managing to get the upper hand. You are telling me that they are not as strong as they used to be?
Prof. Graeme MacQueen
Could I make one quick comment?
This whole idea of at what stage people are open to negotiation is very important. It's been very frustrating to my group, who has been calling for this negotiation for years and who knows the Taliban were open to it at various times. And of course you're right, that as they go from victory to victory they may become less open to it.
To me, this is an argument for acting quickly, for acting now, before there is no opportunity at all.
Conservative
Vice-Chair, Group of 78, Afghanistan Reference Group
I have a brief point.
I want to add that if the military situation deteriorates, the Taliban will be more open. The Afghans want peace after all. In order to ensure sustainability and balance in the country, it would be best to undertake negotiations as soon as possible, particularly given the deterioration of the military situation.
Conservative
NDP
Paul Dewar NDP Ottawa Centre, ON
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you to our guests. You've built on what the previous guests had been telling us.
One of the reasons I brought forward this motion to continue the study on Afghanistan is your presentation today. For the record, I have to say I haven't met these gentlemen before, other than Mr. Ohlsen--he lives in my community, so I see him from time to time. But this is exactly what our committee should be looking at and what our foreign policy needs. That is to say, looking at other steps and to actually dare to use the P word, because we haven't heard that. We've heard three-D, and I guess we're down to one-D now, as we heard in committee the other day, because we don't do that any more.
I want to ask a very specific question, I guess to you, Mr. MacQueen. Earlier I was asking a previous group, in terms of aid, how we would plug in. How would we plug into a dialogue like this? Do we have to go and find the people to dialogue with, as an exercise, or has that work already been done?
Prof. Graeme MacQueen
First of all, I don't think it's very difficult to talk to the Taliban. They're quite accessible in Afghanistan. If you want to talk to them, you can. Secondly, I don't think it would be Canada's job to run off on its own and talk to the Taliban. I would assume this is going to be a UN process and they would have some role in that.
NDP
Paul Dewar NDP Ottawa Centre, ON
Further to that, I know a UN project that's going on right now in Darfur, which is similar, in that they have people.... I know a Canadian who's involved in this, who is actually going to the various ethnic groups and speaking with them. If we do get a comprehensive peace in Darfur, for instance, it matters not, unless it's understood at the local level.
Is that the kind of approach you're talking about? First, deal with the local communities so they understand what's at stake, before we get into this big architecture and stuff?
NDP
Paul Dewar NDP Ottawa Centre, ON
If we follow that through, the present mission we're engaged in with the counter-insurgency--you know my party's stance--to continue that on, even to 2009, what effect would that have on the potential for the process you're posing?
Prof. Graeme MacQueen
I'll start us off.
First, I don't think we have to wait for ceasefires before starting this work. I think that's an important point, because I think that's often a big mistake. The kind of thing we're suggesting here can begin while the bullets are still flying.
Secondly, on the question of whether Canada should continue its current mission until 2009 or should switch before that and so on, I can't pretend to represent the Afghan Reference Group, so I will simply give my own personal opinion. From the polls I've seen, I believe most Canadians want that mission changed now, and I personally feel it should be changed sooner rather than later. That's my personal view.
Gerry Olsen
To add, this kind of transition is moving a relatively large ship. It does take time. What we're suggesting is that Canada immediately begin that discussion with its NATO allies, both formally and publicly and privately. A lot of things go on diplomatically, as we all know, that we don't hear about, and a lot of people say they're doing one thing when they're doing something quite different. That's the real world. So we start now to build the momentum with our NATO allies to shift this thing the 90 degrees.
It will take between now and 2009, perhaps longer, to completely transfer that kind of process from what it is to what it was meant to be, but if we don't begin, if we go on and reinforce this and get more troops to fight, it will fail. It simply will fail.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
Mr. Lehmeier, you'll have the final comment, and it will be short.
Coordinator, Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, Afghanistan Reference Group
Yes, I just wanted to pick up on something that was said in the previous panel.
As long as counter-insurgency is the focus of the military engagement, it would be wrong to say that security is being provided. What we're advocating for is to do just that: use military assets to provide security, and that will be a peace support operation, which is very different from a proactive military campaign to clear areas from insurgents.
So it wouldn't mean end the mission, pull out completely, no military involvement. What we are looking at is a changing mission, with a very different focus. The absolute basis for this is the political framework and a process that takes us there.