What's of interest to me is that when the CPA was signed there was a strong feeling up in the border regions, which is where a lot of the strife had taken place, that this was kind of the solution that was going to apply to them. They were hearing about oil revenues coming in their direction, teachers, schools being built, and so forth. And I know that many of the CPA donors from the western countries also helped to add to some of that illusion.
What you have now is that the people who are far away regionally, up in the border areas, are looking down at the south and seeing all the development that's happening in Juba, Rumbek, and the other places that I've talked about, and they are now growing resentful of the CPA because it didn't deliver. But they're not only resentful of that, they're resentful of their leadership for not delivering. They're also quite resentful of the fact that Salva Kiir spends a lot of his time in Khartoum. That bothers them as well.
I'm still trying to get an answer to that side of it. It seems to me that regardless of what happens about Darfur, the division in south Sudan between north-south Sudan and the southern part of south Sudan—I'm not including the other regions—is now becoming more and more frayed as the people are not getting their services.
I understand what you're saying, that CPA was never really designed in many ways for that, but they were led to believe that was the case, which is why they supported the CPA in those northern regions. Do you have a view on that?