Foreign Affairs Committee on May 28th, 2009

[Jim Abbott, Conservative, Kootenay—Columbia, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for your expert opinion.

I'd like to briefly explore the issue of oil. First, I wonder if you could express to us your opinion on the impact of oil revenue on the--I guess this will be a play on words--“fuelling” of the ability of all the players to continue all of the bad stuff that's going on.

Secondly, I'd like to key in on the exodus of Talisman. I'm just curious; obviously oil has continued to be pumped, but what change, if any, positive or negative, has happened post-Talisman?

[Fabienne Hara]

Thank you.

Oil is a subject of discussion everywhere in Sudan, but it's the most difficult subject because there's very little information coming out. It's not a very transparent business.

Right now the economy is governed by the wealth-sharing agreement, which is part of the comprehensive peace agreement. This basically says that the income from oil pumped in Sudan, particularly in south Sudan, will be shared 50-50 between the north and the south. Most of the oil is in the south, but it is exported through the north.

Recently the prices have come down, which have caused an economic crisis both in the north and in the south. That's significant because it means that the government will have even less capacity to render the services to the population that they do now.

In the last few years, especially after the end of the year 2000, a lot of new investors have come to south Sudan, including China, India, and Malaysia. They are not the exclusive actors of the oil business or oil economy, but they are the main ones. China, in particular, has come under a lot of pressure for its role in supporting the Government of Sudan, mainly because they have an oil deal. It is true that China has protected, shielded, the Government of Sudan from the most robust resolution on the Security Council for a certain time. But they have also changed gears to a certain extent. They have reacted to pressure and they have started actively encouraging the Government of Sudan to stabilize Darfur. They are the ones who actually gained consent from the Government of Sudan for the deployment of the UN-AU mission. If the Chinese had not got involved, we would not have this agreement on deployment. So they are starting to play a more constructive role. I think they have also understood that south Sudan may secede in 2011, and if that is the case, they will need to establish relationships with the government of south Sudan.

Clearly, the actors of the oil industry are not western. This is also a factor, obviously, for us to consider.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much. We'll come back to Mr. Abbott.

Mr. Dewar.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you, and thank you to our guest for her overview and update.

It's interesting that as Canadians we share a long history of Sudan. In fact, we go back to 1884, when there was a picture taken on Parliament Hill of a group that set off under the leadership of Garnet Wolseley to go to Sudan to actually rescue and bring back General Charles Gordon, who had been left there. So we actually went back, and on that escapade, I think, there were lumbermen and Mohawk first nations--quite a crew. I'm not sure they all knew what they were getting into, and I think that's maybe similar to what we do sometimes.

I think right now we have to establish what our goals are as a country. I think one of them is very obvious to me--you mentioned it already--and that is, the provision of helicopters. It's certainly been an issue in our House of Commons that we actually have the capability to do that. There was a rather interesting debate as to whether we actually had them physically here, never mind that there were ways of securing them. So one of the things that makes infinite sense is to provide the helicopter capacity.

I know in the case of Sudan and in the case of Congo, there has been an ask to Canada to provide for that coordination piece amongst the UN missions, respectively in Congo and in Sudan. That is because we have an expertise there. So it's not deploying thousands and thousands of troops, but providing the coordination piece.

I'd like your take on that as something that would be helpful.

I also found your point about the consolidation around state-building very interesting. I guess this is hopefully what's happening in Doha right now, in looking to the horizon of how we support the post-conflict piece. My question would be this. How can Canada help with the consolidation part?

So I would just like your comments on those three questions: the equipment; the coordination ability for Canada to help out with that in the military mission; and also how we can help out with the consolidation of state-building and governance.

[Fabienne Hara]

Thank you very much.

On the helicopters, it has become a media story that the Darfur mission is looking for helicopters. So if Canada were able to provide those helicopters, you would become heroes immediately to the international civil society, at the very least, and certainly to people in Darfur too. But now the question is, of course, what will the mission do, even if it does have helicopters? The mandate is still limited. The security environment is still extremely challenging. So helicopters would not be enough to make a real difference on the ground.

As I said, and I come back to my main message, as long as there's no prospect for peace, what will the UN peacekeeping mission do? We've seen in many places in the Horn of Africa that there's a lot of peacekeeping being decided and shaped in a vacuum. So what will the UN peacekeeping mission do in a vacuum? There's no regional strategy, and yet we know that the problems in Darfur—and here I come to your second point—are very much Sudan-Chad related, or very much regional problems. There is no strategy to deal with the local conflicts at all. There is not even a real strategy to look at the national conflicts in a very coherent way.

So the capacity of the mission is important. The mandates are also very important. The goals and the objectives that the council would give this mission are key.

As for coordination of the UN mission, as I said before, there's almost no coordination at all. It's reflected in the Security Council agenda. You have one item, the north-south; one item, Darfur; and one other item, Sudan-Chad. It's unbelievable, really. It absolutely needs to change. I suggested, for example, joint reporting of the three missions—at least the two Sudan missions—or joint reporting between the Chad mission and the Darfur mission on the Sudan-Chad issue. Why is the Sudan-Chad issue not really considered a threat to international peace and security by the Security Council? That's a big mystery, and it should change.

In other words, it's a very good idea. Military coordination should be established between the missions, and political coordination. There should be a request for a cross-border strategy.

On the last point regarding consolidation of state-building, as I said to your colleague earlier, there is no process to discuss this at this stage. There's a lot of discussion on institution-building, helping the government in Juba right now, and the delivery of peace dividends and all of that, but there's no formal process to discuss international aid. Maybe we should look at a strategic framework for south Sudan. This is what the UN peace-building commission is supposed to do, by the way. Some similar process will have to be invented for south Sudan, but it doesn't exist yet. My fear is that the south Sudanese will not necessarily be in the lead in designing that process. They should be, and they should be encouraged to be.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

You mentioned the peace-building commission, which Canada has a vested interest in—and certainly given our history. Well, first of all, it's nascent, and hopefully it will be seen as a viable institution for the post-conflict period.

So your hope would be that in the south, where there is some peace, if you will, to build upon, we should also be putting our resources in that through the commission. Is that what you are saying, or are you just hoping it's going to go ahead and it's fine as is? How do they fit into the rubric here?

[Fabienne Hara]

Well, if south Sudan becomes independent, which is a big if, it could become a client for the peace-building commission. But there are also other configurations being discussed right now. I don't know if you're aware of the initiative on early recovery and stabilization, but there are various configurations being shipped right now. The peace-building commission is only one of them. This would need a serious discussion to look at what's most appropriate for south Sudan, and also a discussion with the south Sudanese authorities. If they are a client of the peace-building commission, then it means they will get money for what I call “politically incorrect” activities; for example, DDR, SSR, and so on. But at the same time, most of the post-conflict countries don't want to be under political scrutiny, and the peace-building commission is an instrument that keeps governments under scrutiny.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

I have one last question. It is in regard to the elections. I'm not sure where you come down on them. Are you saying they are to be encouraged and should go ahead? Obviously countries like Canada can play a role in ensuring they're done as fairly as possible and certainly that a lead-up to them is done in a fair way.

[Fabienne Hara]

I don't have an answer at this stage, but I think my recommendation would be that a very serious political evaluation needs to be done about the elections, expectations of elections, conditions of elections, and then the fairness of the process. If the elections end up marginalizing the Darfuris more, then perhaps they need to be reconsidered. If elections end up triggering more violence in the south, then perhaps they should be postponed until peace consultation has happened in the south.

But I think the question now is, who will do this political evaluation? Who will be responsible for doing that political evaluation? I think that's a key question, but we won't be able to determine that if we don't have an overall strategy for Sudan, based on the CPA but also based on the day after the CPA. What are the scenarios: secession; violent secession; peaceful secession? Where are we now? What do we really want to see in the next few years?

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Dewar.

I have a couple of questions, and then we'll go back to Mr. Abbott.

People put different tags on the situation in Darfur to describe it, but it is certainly one of the worst humanitarian crises ever. The international community has been criticized for being slow in responding. Measures they've put in place have not worked. I know when you're in opposition you like to point at the government and say, “You aren't doing enough.” When you're in government, you like to say, “This is what we're doing. We're doing this bilaterally, we're doing this multilaterally, we're working with the UN.”

I had a group of students come into my office about a year ago, and I was very impressed with them. It was a group of university students here in Ottawa, and again, back in Alberta, that came to mind. The group was called STAND, Students Taking Action Now: Darfur. Back then, the issue was about helicopters. But where do these helicopters go now? Back then, there was a larger contingency of NGOs. You say they've been mostly expelled. Even some of the UN has been expelled. There is no security there. This was a big issue back then with the students, that we just needed to get helicopters in. Even if you send helicopters, there's really no strategy, no plan--or is there? That's the first thing.

The other thing I recall from a year ago is that they talked about disinvestment. We did a little study on that last year, I think, before the election, and we found out that there wasn't much investment at all in Sudan, and in the Darfur area specifically. Yet students and politicians from opposition and from governments all wanted to really do something.

You talked about the elections. You said the question is, what will bring peace to Sudan? Obama had some ideas.

I guess my question is, what can a government do bilaterally, not just send money to the UN but what can our country do bilaterally, Canada-Sudan? What do you think? Are there any ideas you have specifically on some of those things?

[Fabienne Hara]

As far as the humanitarian situation in Darfur is concerned, there are 85 NGOs operating in Darfur, 13 UN agencies, and only 13 have been expelled. Most of them will probably come back in one form or another. There is a huge humanitarian assistance operation in Darfur. Even if some NGOs have been expelled, others stay, and there will be this big operation for some time to come. I don't think we should be completely worried about that. It's a very difficult environment to operate in for humanitarian NGOs and UN agencies, but it's one of the largest crises. It's also the largest humanitarian operation in the world right now. Four million people are on food assistance and 2.7 million people are in camps serviced by NGOs and so on.

In terms of the helicopters, I think the dilemma goes way beyond this particular mission. There is an increase, or an inflation, of mandates given to peacekeeping missions that include the protection of civilians and the responsibility to protect philosophy. These are robust mandates. Missions are sent into situations of conflict, active conflict sometimes, that really border on war fighting. The mandate is not peacekeeping, but it's very robust peacekeeping. It's almost war fighting. We see that in Sudan and other places. For example, we see that in the eastern Congo. We could have seen that in Somalia. There was even a discussion that a mission should be sent to Somalia.

The question really is, what does the international community want? It's either robust peacekeeping, in which case we have to make the mission's effective fighting forces capable of protecting civilians, helicopters have to be sent, and missions have to be supported, or--

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

I don't want to interrupt, but there are others wanting questions.

However, on that, years ago, back in 2004 or 2005, there was a discussion amongst different political parties. I think at that time it was amongst two people in the Liberal Party who I think really had good intentions towards making a difference. David Kilgour brought forward some very good suggestions, but his own government at that time said that it may not be the best.... These were both sides that maybe wanted to see a change. Then they were talking about sending troops, but the African Union said not to send any troops unless they were black because they'll simply be looked at as outsiders. All these groups are here, but I want to get back to specifically what can be done bilaterally.

I'll play the devil's advocate here. The government on the one hand can say that we're doubling aid and all this, but sending it through the UN or sending it through in multilateral ways. Then we have African nations saying that we're pulling out our focus and aren't focused on some of Africa anymore. We are still sending much money through the UN. But they say it isn't focusing in. What is it bilaterally that a country like Canada can do?

[Fabienne Hara]

Thank you.

The Government of Sudan dictated conditions for the composition of the peacekeeping force, not the African Union. It was the Government of Sudan that asked that the troops be African. This is a specific situation related to peacekeeping.

I think there's a lot that can be done bilaterally, for example, on justice and the rule of law in both north and south Sudan. The discourse on justice has been monopolized by the ICC issue, and it's all about international criminal justice, but there are many other forms of justice. There are many other ways of addressing human rights problems in Sudan, especially in the context of the democratic transformation brought about by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, that could be looked at--for example, reform of the justice system; for example, support to civil society in north Sudan.

We are talking about free and fair elections, but the opposition parties are not well trained and not well supported. Also, the international civil society is extremely weak and very often manipulated by government. A program of support for democratic transformation would be very welcome I think from a bilateral perspective. It's the same in south Sudan. We've just discussed that there's a huge amount of work to do on institution building.

Canada will be seen by the northerners, and this is where it's politically interesting, as an ally of the U.S. What the Government of Sudan, the NCP, really wants more than anything else is normalization of relations with the U.S., including economic relations. Engaging in a constructive dialogue with Canada on democratic transformation, for example, on justice, on rule of law, would be seen as an entry point into a dialogue that they really want. They want to have normalization of relations with the west, not under any conditions, but they want to get there at some stage, and I think there is an opening.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

Mr. Abbott, I have taken up a fair bit of your time, but you still have two and a half minutes left.

[Jim Abbott, Conservative, Kootenay—Columbia, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

I would like to finish up with your impressions. You had mentioned, correctly, that it's not just the absence of Talisman, but that in fact there are no western companies involved. From the time Talisman left until today, I would like to know if there has been any impact--positive, negative, or none--in terms of two things.

The first is the impact on the ground--in other words, the number of unofficial under-the-table things that might be flowing to the governments. Second, you did mention something that I can honestly tell you hadn't crossed my mind, and that was the influence of China on Sudan in the world.

On the basis of there being the change from western companies to no western companies, I have those two questions. First, has there been any change whatsoever on the ground, and if so, what was it? Second, was there any change in terms of the international picture, and if so, what was it?

[Fabienne Hara]

Thank you. I would mention perhaps two things here.

One is the impact on human rights. I think the behaviour, if I may say so, of international oil companies has changed a little bit. In the past, just to open oil fields, a population would have to be cleared forcefully, so a lot of people in south Sudan have just been pushed to the swamps. It's a very inhospitable environment, as you may know, and it was done without compensation, without anything like that. A lot of human rights were violated just for the sake of oil exploration.

It has become a little more visible now, and most of the companies--including Chinese, Indian, and Malaysian companies--are now trying to compensate the population for dislodging them from their region. More infrastructure is being built. More roads are being built. Schools are being built for communities. Now there is more dialogue with communities than there was in the past. It's not perfect--far from it, and there is still a lot of progress to make--but I think there is awareness among the big players that they need to be accepted by the local population. It's not enough to have a deal with Khartoum, and the Chinese have realized that very quickly, or even a deal with Juba. It's not enough to have a deal with the leadership; they also have to be accepted locally.

In recent times, some of the installations have been attacked by JEM in south Kordofan, one of the transition areas. One of the rebel groups in Darfur attacked these installations because they see Chinese installations as supporting the budget of the government they are fighting, so they are targeting the nerve of the war, to be explicit. This is an issue, and that's why, to come back to the question of the gentleman here, it's important that oil revenues be shared and that the government of south Sudan be seen as sharing the revenues quite fairly with the population and with the various regions. This is not the case right now.

China in particular, I think, has generally changed its attitude towards the population and government of south Sudan. They have invited the leader of south Sudan to Beijing to discuss the future post-referendum. Interestingly, they have also contributed peacekeepers to UNMIS in certain regions of the south. It's basically a show. They're trying to show that they're doing some good for the local population, so there's a lot of marketing happening, more now than before. There are a few western companies. There's a Swedish company there in south Sudan, and of course they are the avant-garde of compensation packages and so on for the local population.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much.

Go ahead, Mr. Pearson.

[Glen Pearson, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Following up on this idea about the oil revenues, I know that when Talisman was there—I was at Bentiu and I was there in the fields—the reflections of Canada by the locals were very negative. They were terribly negative. I think people tried to pressure Talisman into doing more to speak to the government. Talisman refused to do so because it felt that wasn't its place. I also realize that the war was going on and it was more complicated.

But I have met with the Chinese ambassador, both the old one and the new one, as well as others, and it seems to me that having somebody like China there, which is also on the Security Council, is a very, very important thing. Canada did not have that. There was nothing that Talisman could do about that.

It seems to me that we don't want to be involved in any operation that's going to get the people on the ground in Sudan to think that we as a country don't care about human rights. I think that's what Talisman got us into. It's difficult. I know. I met with the Talisman board. It was just difficult.

But now that we're in a new day and we're kind of past the CPA, do you think there is a way in which Canada can engage the Chinese government on issues around Sudan and around Darfur? Are there ways that we could maybe get them to use their position on the Security Council to continue to open up and to continue to try to do more in Sudan, as they have done? They've been more responsible in that way--in many ways--than we have. I know that's not popular to say, but I just think that's the reality of late. Do you have any views as to how Canada might be able to influence the Chinese?

[Fabienne Hara]

One of the reasons why the Government of Sudan has chosen to partner with China is that China buys the oil without conditions. There are no conditions attached to their business. There are more conditions now, especially in the last few years, because they are responding to the pressure they're under on Darfur. But there were no conditions.

I think the Chinese are also getting quite a good deal. The price of oil is cheaper for them in Sudan than anywhere else, which is also one of the reasons why the SPLM is not happy. They're getting 50% of the deal, but they're getting less money, of course, than if the oil was sold to U.S. companies or other international companies.

And absolutely, I think Canada can engage the Chinese government. I think they are receptive. I think they're willing to play a relatively constructive role. You should look at Chinese foreign policy over the years. It has now evolved, dramatically I would say. They are willing to be engaged on Sudan. Really, the issue that they've insisted on all along is the consent of the Government of Sudan. There is no chapter 7, no peace enforcement mission, and no imposition of force on Sudan, and there is respect for the consent of the government.

If you look at the situation in Sudan from the human rights perspective, it may not be acceptable, but if you look at it from a pragmatic political perspective, there was no way around it anyway. I think their position, in any case, was quite reasonable and reflected a certain reality.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Ms. Hara.

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I would like to comment on what you were about to say a little earlier. You asked what the international community wants. You mentioned stronger peacekeeping. So, let me ask the question, who are the international community?

To link this issue with the one Mr. Pearson just raised, someone has to take the leadership in that community and there has to be a real political will to define a political framework that presently does not exist. Even if we bring in more “robust“ peace missions, they will be tilting at windmills if the international community’s decisions are not made within a real political framework.

[Fabienne Hara]

The United Nations is only what its members want it to be. If the members want a political strategy, there will be one. The trend we have seen recently is for the Security Council, on behalf of all the members, to check off the “peacekeeping” box when there is nothing else, when there is no political strategy. It is a strategy by default, in a way.

So can we be surprised when missions like UNAMID or MINURCA find themselves in extremely hostile situations and are unable to have any effect on the ground? If there is no genuine support for a clear political strategy from the major countries, including Canada, none of the parties in the conflict are going to respect United Nations missions. Support for a political strategy has to be visible.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much.

I don't know if anyone else has questions. It's more of an informal meeting today.

Ms. Hara, we certainly want to thank you for being here.

Someday I hope we can sit here and say this worked, this worked, and this worked. I think everyone hopes and prays that we will see effective change in Sudan and the countries around it. Somehow those countries immediately around Sudan need to have a certain place in the solution as well, when we see the drift of population, and stronger democracies and governance models in some of those countries. When you have a successful neighbour, some of those things tend to rub off.

Thank you for being here.

This meeting is adjourned.