Foreign Affairs Committee on Oct. 20th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Does anyone else have a question?

I would like to suggest that we recess a little early. On our next panel, we have three different groups. Even though we spoke about waiting for committee business till Thursday, there is one issue that I think we need to discuss, either that or call a steering committee meeting. So I'd like to leave about five minutes at the end for some committee business.

Mr. Lunney.

[James Lunney, Conservative, Nanaimo—Alberni, BC]

Thank you for a clear presentation on Canada's comprehensive approach. In your opening remarks, you mentioned that, according to Stats Can, Canada has over a thousand mining and exploration companies in 100 countries, encompassing about 5,000 projects. You are Natural Resources, our point people on this. Could you give us an idea of how Canada stacks up in relation to other countries? The United States is 10 times larger than Canada. Are we number two in the world? Are we number six? I am referring to mining capacity and the number of countries participating in international extraction efforts.

[Dr. Stephen Lucas]

Canada is, on many measures, number one. We have well over 50% of the global exploration and mining companies. About a third of the global capital for exploration and mining investment is raised on the Toronto Venture Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange. Next in the size and reach of its mining sector is Australia, and it's concentrated in several large corporations.

[James Lunney, Conservative, Nanaimo—Alberni, BC]

I have a follow-up to Mr. Goldring's question about paragraph 5(2)(c), a part of Bill C-300that calls on ministers to issue guidelines to ensure that corporations operate in a manner consistent with international human rights standards.

Mr. Goldring raised this point with you. That's a developing issue, international human rights standards. There are all kinds of things out there, some of which many nations, including Canada, do not fully endorse. Was it clear that you were to get back to us on this issue, with respect to whether it would be problematic?

[Dr. Stephen Lucas]

Those conventions and their implementation within various countries or states articulate the relationship and responsibilities of individuals with respect to that country or state, and so aren't intended for corporations. This is an area of active work. The UN Secretary General mandated that work to John Ruggie, and he has produced an initial report. There's further work going on. What does exist—and it is part of the government strategy—is the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, together with the Equator Principles, which EDC has adopted.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Lucas.

[Dr. Stephen Lucas]

We will follow up more fulsomely with a response from DFAIT.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Mr. Pearson has a quick question.

[Glen Pearson, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

I'm still trying to get my head around the ombudsman. These round tables were serious work, with a lot of people from the industry as well in on them. One of the things they coalesced around in the end was an ombudsman with enforcement capabilities.

I'm just trying to understand why, since the industry agreed with that, the government would come in with a position that is beneath that. It would seem to me that industry wanted something that was higher, at least as a result of the round tables. I wonder why we're not striking higher.

[Dr. Stephen Lucas]

In response, Mr. Chair, what the round tables recommended was a broader policy-based approach, to which the government has responded substantively. The ombudsman function was essentially a fact-finding function that had mediative powers in many regards, very similar to what the government has implemented through the CSR counsellor.

There was an additional support recommended through the round table report in that process, through a tripartite advisory committee, but it would not itself have sanctioning power; it would provide recommendations to the government. We believe, again through the fact-finding and mediative work of the CSR counsellor and their commitment both in specific instances of each complaint received and in their annual reporting, that transparency in the information provided to the Minister of International Trade will substantively respond to many of the considerations identified in that round table report in regard to that area of dispute resolution.

[Glen Pearson, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Pearson.

Just very quickly, again, a quick comment.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Following the question of my colleague Mr. Pearson about the new poste de conseiller, what were you doing before when you received a complaint coming from a group in any country, say in Central America? What were you doing with this? Nothing? Were you responding? Were you fact-finding? What were you doing?

[Dr. Stephen Lucas]

I'd note several things, Mr. Chair.

The government has had in existence a national contact point for the OECD guidelines, so that's an existing mechanism that has been used. In addition, as issues arise, the mission in that country is often involved in support with the host government, the company, and other parties in establishing the facts. It can lead in many cases, through early identification of issues, to proactive and positive approaches.

I think what the CSR counsellor will do as part of, again, this multi-faceted strategy is create a more formalized mechanism for those complaints to come in, and that complements existing or prior missions along with the national contact point and mechanisms that EDC and the pension plan have in place.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

I think Madame Deschamps has a question. Do you have a very quick question?

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I would like to continue in the same vein as Mr. Patry.

You know that the majority of corporations have facilities in Latin America and Africa. Most of the reported cases of human rights breaches, forced population transfers and environmental catastrophes occur in those countries. It might also be said amongst ourselves that most of these states cannot manage their own resources.

Concretely, what can be done when you are told of cases of blatant violations on the part of mining companies in those countries? I am referring to the Great Lakes Region of Africa, Peru, Mexico and Colombia; a multitude of cases were reported to us. You talked about measures and strategies. Can the government take concrete action against these delinquent companies?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, madame.

Mr. Lucas.

[Dr. Stephen Lucas]

Mr. Chair, I would like to reiterate some of the points I've made. A first key step and a fundamental role of the CSR counsellor will be establishing facts, undertaking fact-finding. In addition, the mission on the ground can work with the host government, which has the legal frameworks to address violations of their codes and standards, and look for ways to proactively address concerns.

We also—and in particular in my role—are very regularly approached by many of the governments of these countries in terms of working positively and proactively to build their governance capacity. They have the sovereign right as states to design, implement, and enforce their laws and regulations. I've routinely worked with Colombia. Last week I had a delegation in from Ecuador that is looking to do that. They've had challenges and they have turned to the Government of Canada for expertise to address those. We've looked at sharing practices and experience from Canadian aboriginal communities with their indigenous communities.

So there are a number of facets and approaches that can be taken to proactively avoid and prevent challenges from arising—in particular, in a host country, capacity building and increasing awareness and uptake with CSR, performance expectations that the government has outlined of our corporations working abroad. And then through the national contact point, CSR counsellor, the work of the missions abroad, EDC, and the pension plan, there are measures for finding out what exactly is happening and seeking to mediate or resolve those and taking measures, including EDC through its compliance officer and adoption of alternate principles, that would have implications for the corporation in question.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Lucas. We are going to suspend now. We very much appreciate your coming and bringing your perspective on Bill C-300.

We'll suspend, and then we'll call our other guests to make their way to the table.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

In the second half of our meeting today, we're going to continue our committee's business study of Bill C-300. Today we are going to hear from Rights and Democracy: Rémy Beauregard, the president of Rights and Democracy, and Carol Samdup, senior adviser, economic and social rights. Also, we'll hear from OTD Exploration Services: we have William McGuinty, the president of that group. And from Harvard Law School, we have Tyler Giannini, lecturer on law, International Human Rights Clinic.

Most of you sat through the opening hour and you probably understand how we proceed in this committee. We look forward to your comments, and then we'll proceed into the first round of questioning.

If we do have five minutes at the end, basically to talk about direction on the treatment of Canadians abroad, that is what we need a theme on in order to invite guests on that theme. At that point maybe we could get a few ideas from the committee.

I'll open the floor to Mr. Beauregard, please.

[Rémy M. Beauregard, President, Rights & Democracy]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I wish to introduce to you my colleague Carole Samdup who is the program officer responsible for this file at Rights and Democracy.

I would like to begin by thanking the chair, Mr. Sorenson, as well as the committee members for their attention to the issue of corporate accountability and for inviting us today.

As you know, we were created by an act of Parliament back in 1988 to promote and defend human rights and democratic development internationally. For more than 20 years, we've been implementing this mandate on behalf of Canadians and have reported to them through Parliament. We will have an opportunity, about two weeks from now, to appear in front of you to discuss our five-year review.

We promote and defend human rights and democratic freedoms around the world. We support individuals, communities, and democracy activists. And we assist in the building of democratic institutions and processes that give effect to universal human rights.

One of the greatest economic challenges in the 21^st century consists in seeing to it that the increased movements of international investments and the activity of large corporations not stand in the way of our commitment to respecting human rights. This is not a rhetorical issue. It affects millions of people throughout the world. The arrival of a foreign business in a community can be a good thing for the population but it can also be a very bad piece of news.

Sometimes the project incorporates all of the components of a complex spectrum that goes from sustainable development to the respect of human rights. In those specific cases, local populations can derive a great deal from such an experience, and the investment then becomes a positive for their development. In other cases, things take a less fortunate turn. When projects are developed in countries where human rights are not always taken into account, investments may be made to the detriment of the host populations. Numerous cases of violations have indeed been reported and documented in several developing countries.

Moreover for a number of years the practices of businesses that breach human rights standards have been exposed by the media. In certain cases, the companies concerned were directly involved in breaching fundamental rights, for example by working conditions that run counter to the standards of the International Labour Organization, or by forcibly moving populations. In other cases, they became the accomplices of a system set up by authoritarian states by resorting to the use of government security forces to repress any opposition.

That is, in a nutshell, the debate behind the bill that is before you. How do we see to it that foreign investment by Canadian companies make a positive contribution to the host populations? How do we ensure the accountability of those businesses when international human rights laws are not respected? How do we ensure that the people and communities concerned have access to measures of redress when their rights are violated?

Since 1994, Rights and Democracy has been actively involved in various projects concerning corporate social responsibility as well as the impact of foreign trade and investments on human rights. As a member of the advisory group, we took part in the National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility and Canadian Extractive Industry in Developing Countries.

In 2005, in cooperation with several civil society organizations in five countries, we assessed the impact of foreign investment projects. In doing these studies, we realized that the communities affected by these projects were often poorly equipped to make representations to the state, negotiate with the businesses, participate in decision-making and influence it, or even understand the national and international redress mechanisms at their disposal.

On the basis of those observations, we have developed a methodology that the communities now use, from Cameroun to Ecuador, to advocate for their rights in the face of foreign investment. More than ever, we have to see to it that the increased movement of international investments and of the activity of large corporations not stand in the way of our commitment and obligations.

As you debate Bill C-300 and the issue of corporate accountability more broadly, we hope to provide you with some of the principles we have come to view as essential for effective corporate responsibility over the last decade and a half. These principles can be divided into three categories, which John Ruggie, the UN Secretary-General's special representative on business and human rights, applies. They are called “protect”, “respect”, and “remedy”.

The first principle deals with the state duty to protect against human rights abuse by third parties, including business.

In our experience, developing countries have often ratified key international human rights treaties, but are either incapable or unwilling to fully implement them. This is particularly true for less developed countries or countries in conflict or under the control of dictators. Businesses operating in this environment are susceptible to being complicit in human rights violations or, more often than not, benefiting from violations committed by state authorities. In these situations, in which the host state is weak or corrupt, foreign companies and their home states bear an added responsibility to avoid infringing on the rights of others.

The Government of Canada and Canadians can and do contribute to building capacity in developing countries, and they encourage the implementation of human rights obligations, but this is not a substitute for ensuring our own actions abroad to not contravene human rights laws.

The second principle deals with the responsibility of business to respect human rights. This means that companies must take every precaution to avoid committing human rights violations or benefiting from them. In our experience, most companies are law-abiding and respect human rights, but some companies are in fact responsible for human rights violations. We cannot hide this fact. For these companies in the minority, regulations are needed based on human rights; voluntary measures are often not enough. They have some usefulness as a statement of intent, but they are not sufficient.

As John Ruggie recently stated:

A pure model of self-regulation beyond compliance with national laws lacks prima facie credibility. We live in a world of 192 nations, 80,000 multinational corporations, millions of affiliates and suppliers, and countless other firms, large and small. There is not enough magic in any marketplace, real or imaginary, to overcome the staggering collective action problems.

Human rights provide the framework of international standards that have been negotiated and adopted by states. As such, they serve as an international consensus. In addition, human rights norms are also directly binding on non-state actors. Human rights offer a well-established governance and monitoring framework through the various activities and procedures of the UN human rights system. Human rights provide a set of procedural principles that serve as a due diligence checklist for companies when evaluating potential future projects. These include non-discrimination, transparency, participation, and accountability.

Importantly, human rights do not impose any new standards or commitments other than those that are stated and agreed to already. It should not, therefore, be difficult for countries like Canada to build a regulatory framework based on human rights principles, nor prohibitive for companies to adhere to them.

Finally, the third principle deals with the need for greater access by victims to effective remedies. Those most affected by foreign investment projects are rarely, if ever, consulted. When things go bad and their rights are violated, they have no recourse to obtain justice.

Victims must be able to submit a claim to an adjudicating body when their rights are violated, and they must be able to do so without fear of persecution or reprisal. Complaint mechanisms or fair and impartial judicial processes are non-existent in many developing countries, but this must not be a licence for a company to operate in this vacuum and escape responsibility.

In this respect, the Government of Canada can play an important role. Our government has a shared responsibility under international human rights law to ensure that human rights are protected, even outside its own territory. Once Canada allocates public funds to an investment project, it has responsibility for its impact, no matter where the impact is experienced. Canada has a moral obligation to ensure its funds are not used in a manner that would be illegal in domestic law as a violation of human rights.

By instituting an enforcement mechanism with a mandate to investigate claims and make binding decisions, and to which victims can seek remedy for violations committed by Canadian companies overseas, Parliament would be taking an important step toward fulfilling the promise of corporate social responsibility. Consulting local communities before undertaking foreign investment projects and ensuring that the human rights risks are mitigated would be far more effective and beneficial to all actors. In order to level the playing field, an effective enforcement mechanism is required.

These three principles should guide your deliberations on legislation to ensure that Canada's actions abroad favour rather than hinder universal human rights.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Beauregard.

Next we'll move to Mr. McGuinty from OTD Exploration Services.

Welcome.

[William McGuinty, President, OTD Exploration Services Inc.]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for sharing your time with me today.

I come as an individual to present my concerns regarding the effects of Bill C-300. OTD is a family business. My wife and I have been working in the mineral sector for the last 20-plus years and have experience in the management and support of Canadian junior exploration companies working as corporate enterprises in Canada, and effective exploration operators in Canada and offshore.

As the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade points out on their website, there are about 7,000 to 8,000 mineral exploration projects in the hands of Canadian explorers in over 100 countries. This represents a large globally distributed number of communities where at least one Canadian plays a role in local development. The images from many of these places are striking, whether they appear on an exploration company's website or one belonging to an aid agency or to a civil society. They span the same range of natural environments, from pristine to overstressed, and they span that same range of human conditions. These are places where we would hope the mineral sector, civil society, and the Canadian government would consider mineral development to be part of the solution to improvement in the conditions of a host community and a host nation. They are also places where no other Canadian economic investment or development leadership may be available. They are also places where perhaps no other international or domestic leadership exists.

You might ask why I'm concerned if I work for junior capital exploration companies. Junior companies do not in general avail themselves of the financial mechanisms that are at risk of sanction from the minister. As an exploration geologist, I could work most of my career in mineral development and never see a project that would have to consider the financial facilities that Bill C-300 proposals to withhold. I am concerned because many of the examples being used in public positions taken on Bill C-300 are situations where junior exploration companies are identified at various exploration stages.

Bill C-300 doesn't outline a link between the minister's review of a claim and a candidacy for financial support. Any allegation can be submitted, regardless of the project's potential fiscal relationship to the Canadian government. The sanctions on a bad actor at the production stage are clear enough under Bill C-300. They will come at the end of what will be a long and difficult investigation and a decision by the minister. It also happens at the end of a longer process of development at the mine project. The company has a large historic investment and future measured benefits to defend, as well as its reputation.

A sanction may interfere with a host nation's plans or its development opportunity. It may force the company to abandon its intentions. However, a sanction at this point still will leave a project that someone may develop in the future, within the life of the affected community or that of a future generation.

The effect of what amounts to non-monetary sanctions on exploration projects will be more immediate. In many cases, due process might never reach the planned end in the Gazette. I used the word “project” and not “company” specifically here because the junior exploration company is usually shorter-lived than the project. The company may move on or possibly dissolve. It has component technical, financial, and administrative pieces that will come apart and eventually recombine somewhere else in the sector. This would not be out of the ordinary. It's a function of exploration and of financing exploration. Bill C-300 just provides another catalyst for it to happen. It kind of adds a 300-pound gorilla into the mix. The junior company may not survive the time of the minister's investigation, regardless of the merit of the claim against it. It may decide the dispute is not worth the time and effort, or that the defence will cost more than the current exploration value of the project. Perhaps that is the desired outcome of a claim in the first place.

Regardless, there is still a mineral project there. The minister's decision will be a beginning, and not an end, to a larger Canadian involvement in human rights claims in the resource sector. If Canada has decided that Canada should prevent an activity by a Canadian company or remove it from contention to operate a project, Canada must understand that by doing so it has an obligation to ensure that the situation we leave does less harm than the one we acted against. By taking action against a company, Canada will have picked up the reins of responsibility, and we must see that those we seek to protect are no worse off for our intervention.

The debris left behind after a minister's decision, either supporting or dismissing a claim, will remain with the project, that point on the planet where the company, two nations, civil society, and all those in the host community who took stands and fought for their interests and rights played out. It is hard to imagine that upon resolution the host community will feel the same closure as the minister may in his or her annual report. They may feel further abused by the externality of the process, especially if the adjudicator offers no suggestions or solutions to improve the company's position over its previous situation. If Bill C-300 were about justice, it would contain mechanisms to ensure this.

What would Canada offer to a host community to replace the lost opportunity and guide them to a better outcome once the fight is over?

Claims against Canadian exploration companies and projects at the early stage of enterprise will be numerous, hard to investigate, and often rooted in all-too-human frailties such as greed, ambition, and plain old politics. It is not presumptuous to say that 5% of 7,000 projects have a local complaint that could make its way to the minister. That would be a new briefing note for the minister every day, a new investigation beginning every day.

From my own experience, mining operations, especially those represented by a foreign actor, can attract suspicion and hostility on principle. Companies I have led through exploration projects have been accused of dumping cyanide in a river and exploring with helicopters at night to avoid protesters in El Salvador, stealing gold and damaging water tables in Argentina, and corrupting officials pretty much everywhere. All of these are untrue. I was not undertaking any work where my level of activity matched the accusation, even in theory. Despite the lack of any factual supporting evidence, these accusations appeared on the Internet, linked by Canadian and American sponsors who made no attempt to verify the claims or even speak to me before assisting in the dissemination of the accusations, nor have they since.

This is what the entry point can look like for the minister when a claim is made, if it has merit or it doesn't.

My personal favourite was being accused by the wives of my employees in Madagascar of making 70 of their men impotent. I will admit there was a lack of cultural acumen on my part. I was able to resolve it, but I'm sure it would have made a great sound bite on one of the CBC Radio morning shows.

I've tried to describe what I think are challenges for Canada in the decisions about Canadian exploration companies and host communities under Bill C-300. I'm going to try to be slightly cynical here for a moment.

In my weaker moments, I don't think Bill C-300 is about extractives at all. I think it's about challenging the Government of Canada's policies and actions on the international stage. This is about any member of society from anywhere attacking what they feel is a want in Canada's moral policy. This is about driving the interpretation of subclause 5(2), which was talked about earlier, about what is “consistent with international human rights standards” to where someone thinks Canada should be going. This could be about a weak foreign government sponsoring the removal of a Canadian company to replace it with one of its own, or one from another country with better state-to-state incentives.

In a weaker moment, I would ask the Canadian government if they were satisfied with the results of the previous ouster of Talisman in the case of the Somalis who were involved and what the minister's action would have looked like had Bill C-300 existed then.

Bill C-300 will make Canada liable for the results of the vacuum created by the exercise of our enlightened human rights determinations, while at the same time removing its best available tool, a fully engaged extractive company. Although designed to create another layer of accountability in Canadian actions abroad, this bill neither practically nor effectively accomplishes that, nor does it offer to define mechanisms for assuring justice for host communities.

In closing, members of the committee, I would refer you to the tools that my colleagues in the extractive sector will present to you during these hearings: the Prospectors and Developers Association's e3Plus, the Mining Association's Towards Sustainable Mining, and the Equator Principles. It is my impression that the extractive sector as a whole, including my piece of it, is coming to embrace their operational aspects and, more particularly, the motivations that created them in the first place. In fact, it was the operational aspects that were lacking. I participated in the development of e3Plus, and the shared concern for its design was that it place good operational tools in the hands of field personnel working with our host communities.

Now, e3Plus was designed during the time the industry and civil society waited for the government's CSR position paper, Building the Canadian Advantage, and for its policy, which is now on the DFAIT website. They're both in place. They're both still evolving. Being new initiatives, both are largely untested as bodies of practice or mechanisms to improve CSR. However, they're both aimed at improving performance of Canadian extractives in all aspects of their activities, including human rights. They will persist in doing so, while at the end of the day Bill C-300 will obstruct Canada's and the extractive sector's efforts to successfully resolve societal issues and mediate disputes in communities where they originate. It will do so in places where host communities will need it the most.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, Mr. McGuinty.

Finally, we're pleased to have Tyler Giannini, who is visiting from Harvard; and Sarah Knuckey, from New York University's Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, who is visiting us as well today.

We welcome you, and I apologize for not introducing you earlier. You are going to share your time.

[Tyler Giannini, Lecturer on Law, International Human Rights Clinic, Harvard Law School]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and committee members, for giving us the opportunity to speak before you today. My name is Tyler Giannini, and I head the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School. I'm joined today by Ms. Sarah Knuckey of the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at the New York University School of Law.

Before I begin, I wish to state my understanding that my presentation and my statements to this committee are covered by the parliamentary privilege, and to the extent I need to assert such privilege, I hereby do.

Ms. Knuckey and I are human rights lawyers with some two decades of combined experience documenting human rights violations. Since 2006 Ms. Knuckey has traveled to Papua New Guinea, or PNG, three times, and I twice, to investigate personally the impact of the Porgera Joint Venture, or PJV, mine, majority-owned and operated by Canadian mining interests since its inception.

Today we speak about security and human rights at the PJV mine and discuss why Bill C-300 is particularly important when independent investigations have failed to materialize despite consistent allegations of abuse. First, I will illustrate how Bill C-300 gives the Canadian government a critical role in promoting accountability by offering a venue for victim complaints when other actors fail to do so. This is especially true when host countries like PNG and corporations may have an inherent conflict of interest that inhibits the likelihood of independent investigations from taking place.

Secondly, Ms. Knuckey will discuss the serious allegations of violence that have persisted during the life of this mine in light of the failure to investigate the abuses adequately. The PJV mine began operations in the 1990s in a remote area of PNG, pursuant to an agreement between the PNG government and Placer Dome, a Canadian corporation. In 2006 Barrick Gold purchased Placer Dome and acquired the mine.

Dating to the 1990s, there have been reports of serious human rights abuses associated with the mine. Individuals we have spoken with have detailed allegations of the following grave abuses: rapes, including gang rapes; physical assault; and killings. The PNG government and the PJV mine have responsibilities to investigate such allegations; however, based on interviews and documents obtained in PNG, independent investigations by these parties appear unlikely.

First, according to many witnesses and victims, local police have repeatedly failed to investigate adequately allegations of abuse by PJV personnel. Police officers have also indicated that their investigative efforts have been hampered by PJV security officers who have restricted immediate access to crime scenes within the mine and, in their view, may have tampered with evidence.

In 2005, in the wake of local pressure and company acknowledgement of mine-related deaths, the PNG government created a committee to investigate the situation. However, despite completing its work in 2006, the committee report has not yet been released.

Secondly, we have concerns about the independent investigations because mine security forces are comprised largely of police reservists. Many of the abuses alleged to have been committed by mine security forces are attributed to these police.

During our March 2009 fact-finding trip to the country, we were able to view and transcribe a memorandum of understanding between the mine and the police force, which we have included in its entirety for the record. This document, which was shown to members of the Harvard team by a senior police official in PNG, authorized “the deployment of an agreed number of Reserve Police (who are employees of the PJV)”. The MOU also specifies that the mine is responsible for “all costs and expenses associated with the Reserve Police, made up of authorized PJV employees, including remuneration, training and the provisions of uniforms and equipment”.

Law enforcement offices we spoke with also indicated that the police reservists comprise the majority of the mine's armed security officers and take day-to-day orders from mine officials.

We were further told that the weapons and equipment used by the reservists--the weapons and equipment that may have been used to commit the alleged abuses--are purchased by the mine. On its face, the MOU raises significant conflict of interest concerns.

As it stands now, given that, one, the PNG government's failure to act or even make public its government committee report on deaths related to the mine; two, the existence of the MOU, which creates inherent conflicts of interest; and three, the consistent inaction on the ground, there is little possibility of a comprehensive, independent, and fair investigation of alleged abuses by the actors in PNG. In such a situation there's a clear need for an external party to conduct an independent review. That's exactly what Bill C-300 does. It establishes a mechanism that makes such an external review possible.

With what, I now turn this over to Ms. Knuckey, who will detail the gravity of the allegations and further demonstrate the need for a bill like Bill C-300.