Foreign Affairs Committee on March 2nd, 2009

[James H. Taylor]

We lived for a greater part of the post-war period in the Cold War. The Cold War placed a premium on loyalty to alliances, and it tended to freeze a certain power situation. That contributed to the special position the United States and the Soviet Union, as it was then, occupied. Of course that whole world, that framework, disappeared 20 years ago. Part of the diffusion of power is the consequence of the disappearance of the Cold War.

Power is undoubtedly shifting in the world in the ways Peter Harder has described, but I would think for all that, when we get past the present turmoil--as we all hope to--it will still appear that the United States is the most powerful country in the world. And whether it's relatively less powerful five years from now than it was five years in the past, nothing is going to change the fact that we will still be living next door to it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. Dewar.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I wanted to pursue a bit more some of our strategic relationships with the United States.

Maybe I'll start with you, Mr. Harder. You were talking about the G8 and the G20. By and large, they have been arrangements for economic discussions and trade, but hopefully there are new winds blowing in Washington when it comes to another fairly significant global institution, and that's the UN. Canada is presently seeking a seat on the Security Council, and there's some European competition.

How can we engage--and should we engage--the Americans when it comes to the United Nations? If you think that's a worthwhile project, maybe you can give us a couple of ideas on how to do that. Obviously the advantage for us would be any way they can help us secure a seat on the Security Council, but I'm not sure they're the ones we need to convince. In fact, I know it isn't the U.S., but perhaps you can help us with how we can help re-engage the Americans with the UN.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Mr. Harder.

[Peter Harder]

I'm encouraged by what President Obama said in his campaign and what he has said so far, and in the advisers around him, some of whom have been academics and experts on exactly that question, including his ambassador to the United Nations, who is of cabinet rank. I think that reflects his view that the United Nations is the high table of multilateralism. It has huge challenges in exercising that role, but that's only because it reflects the world.

I think it's very important for Canada to seek the Security Council seat. I hope we win. If we do not, I think we should take some time to reflect on what is it and why is it that we haven't been successful, but let's operate on the assumption that we ought to be successful in that campaign.

I would argue that to be successful in that campaign, we have to be global, realist, and internationalist. That is to say, we will beat out Portugal if, in the candidacy, we bring to the table ideas for the United Nations, just as we did last time. We ran it as a campaign, where it wasn't just “vote for Canada because every 10 years we're on the Security Council”. We came with some issues that we wanted to deal with, one of which was blood diamonds in Africa. Bob Fowler, whom we are all remembering, was very active in his tenure.

You must have ideas and you must have the global network of foreign policy engagement to secure the votes and to be listened to. You have to be realist in what the agenda is that you would wish to put forward. I think it will be important for Canada, in its campaign, to be very clear about why we want to be on the Security Council and what issues we want to bring leadership and Security Council focus to in our two-year period, and to make that transparently known and broadly reflective of our foreign policy approach.

You don't get it just for a good past.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Mr. Taylor, please.

[James H. Taylor]

I was one of the representatives who did the arguing the last time we campaigned for election to the Security Council. It was a very carefully orchestrated affair. It took a lot of effort. I think that's an essential part of what we've embarked on. There are good models to work on, because we had considerable success the last time, so I'm sure that the basis on which the government is working now has been well laid. That's one point.

Another point is that while I don't know quite what the politics are this time, one of the difficulties about persuading some of our European friends the last time was that they have a commitment to vote for each other. You argue Canada's case against that with as much success as you can muster. I was the one who had to do the arguing, and I didn't win them all.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

Thank you, Mr. Dewar.

We'll go to Mr. Abbott quickly and then Mr. Goldring.

[Jim Abbott, Conservative, Kootenay—Columbia, BC]

Considering some vexatious reports about where many of the countries in the world are going—Latvia to name one, and then go down that list—considering the limitations we now know the IMF and the World Bank have, comment.

[Peter Harder]

The economic crisis that we are working ourselves through is, in my mind, the first economic crisis of the modern globalized era. You get up in the morning and the first news you hear is what the Nikkei did last night and what's going on in Europe. And they wake up to what has happened in North America. The markets are a 24/7 phenomenon, and the supply chains that we have come to understand are global have, in the downturn of the economy, ricocheted back through that global supply chain. So you see what has happened in China as exports to the United States have fallen and they're doing some things to stimulate domestic demand.

But my comment is that we are not through this. Everything is linked, and therefore the chain is still reverberating around.

When it comes to Latvia and Iceland—and people are talking about Greece, and there's a bit of a list of countries whose fiscal capacity is reaching its wall—there is a lot going on at the G7 and at the G20 finance level to see how we deal with this with the tools we have. The IMF has, I think, spent around $50 billion and probably has reserves of about $350 billion. To know whether that's adequate in the face of what we will see, speak to some of the financial guys. Canada has been a proponent of IMF reform, and for an institution that was thought to be less relevant today than it once was, its relevance is back, because of the situation being faced in a number of countries.

The final point I'd make is this. It is interesting how many of the countries at risk are European countries, are members of the European Union or aspirants to the European Union. That at least would provoke some question around what is happening in the neighbourhood to stabilize the economic institutions, in the first instance anyway. We're talking about banks that are not domestic banks, but out-of-country banks and the like.

So my bottom line is that we don't know, and we are working our way through what will be a series of perhaps surprises and reverberations through various aspects of the economy, from financial to manufacturing to fiscal. I think it is in our interest to be actively engaged not only in monitoring but in working on some of the policy solutions with like-minded economies.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Harder.

Mr. Pearson.

[Glen Pearson, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you.

I have two quick questions for Mr. Harder. Mr. Taylor talked about, with the coming of the Obama administration, a kind of going back to first principles on this Afghanistan mission and focusing and doing it more. I would like to ask, since that is the case and Canada is trying to think of what its next role will be on the development model, how we have to walk that line, considering they're narrowing it down. That's one question.

The second is this, Mr. Harder. You talked about how the foreign policy infrastructure we have here in Canada at the moment is deficient. There are some breakdowns to it. I wonder if you have some pointers you could give us as to how to build that back up.

[Peter Harder]

On Afghanistan, I think we, along with the other countries engaged in the development work, are learning an awful lot about what works and what doesn't work. That is going to help inform, as we move forward not only in Afghanistan but perhaps in other similar situations of fragile states, the criteria that we need from the host government.

My concern in post-2011 is what the security environment will be like for development to take place. It's all very good to say we will continue to have a development presence and a diplomatic presence, but the precondition of that being effective is a security situation that allows development to take place. I think we have quite an agenda between now and 2011 to provide that assurance.

The Afghanistan Compact envisaged reports, and those reports are being prepared and what not. I think we need to perhaps strengthen our capacity to look honestly at what is working from a national perspective and from a multi-national perspective and what isn't.

With respect to the institutions, I guess I am one who would argue—and I know it's a cliché, but I believe it's really important—that we need to be more whole-of-government in our international engagement. That requires, by definition, more players than there have been historically on issues of “foreign policy”, because issues that are domestic have become those of foreign policy. But you also have to have leadership that is able to exercise coherence and help achieve that whole-of-government approach. I believe that we have to strengthen our presence abroad. We have to have language capacity in the countries of the future and not just the countries of the past. We have to have the capacity to deal with the issues that will speak to our security and economic well-being for the future and have greater intelligence capacity in terms of failed and fragile states.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much.

This is quite odd. Today everyone has been able to ask a question.

Go ahead very quickly, Mr. Goldring, because I do have one question I would like to ask as well.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

Okay, I will be very quick.

It's back to the nuclear weapons. Of course we know that Canada had nuclear weapons on our soil. We didn't make them, but we had them. We have now rejected nuclear weapons, and so has the Ukraine, and other countries have too. You mentioned that you can develop this type of policy for the recognized countries and the recognized states. I'm wondering if you have some thoughts on how you would foresee that there could be any type of control for third party use, for the non-state actors who might acquire these weapons. What can you possibly do about that?

[James H. Taylor]

You're saying for non-state actors?

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

Yes. We know, for example, with regard to Afghanistan that the Taliban really cross borders. Are they of a particular state or not? Are there other terrorist groups or sub-elements that really are not countries per se but are organized groups that could come into possession of these?

[James H. Taylor]

This goes to the question of a better control system. There really is quite a good basis in the system that exists under the IAEA, but as proliferation risks increase to keep weapons out of the hands of, for instance, non-state actors, you'd have to envisage even stricter and more careful controls than we have at present, and it's going to mean more money and more intrusion into national affairs. To give you an example, in a number of countries a civil nuclear power program, which you must assure is just that and not being abused for the purpose of clandestine production of nuclear weapons, might well be in the hands of the private sector. So if you have an international control system, you have to have one that envisages controlling not only governments but the private sector in some countries as well. And there a set of problems arise, additional complications and so on.

That's just one example. But in order to keep weapons out of the hands of non-state actors it really has to be an airtight system, and what we have at the moment, as the history of proliferation originating in Pakistan, for instance, would demonstrate, is by no means airtight.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you. I do have a couple of questions.

First of all, Mr. Harder, I think it was you who talked about the lobbying or the campaigning for the Security Council and how we have to be global, how we have to be realist and we need ideas. What would be your top three ideas for a campaign toward the Security Council, remembering that some of the main issues that we campaign on here may not win approval somewhere else. So what are the three major campaign ideas that you would come up with?

And second, earlier in your presentation you talked about the quarterly meetings between George Shultz and our foreign affairs minister at that time, who probably was Mr. Clark, if I'm not mistaken. Was that an initiative of Mr. Shultz, was it just something that bilaterally was worked on? You talked about the personalities. We have different personalities now. Secretary Clinton and Minister Cannon had a very good meeting last week, and I think there could be some very positive things that come out of it. Is this something we should really push? And back when President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney, I guess it was, met, as you said, we didn't have the same dynamic with as much provincial involvement as we have now. Would we diminish the provinces' role by expanding our federal role bilaterally with them? How can we work with our provinces to build on that relationship?

[Peter Harder]

Let me start with the first question.

Just off the top of my head, in terms of what are the ideas we could build upon, we're coming to the testing point at the Security Council—if we win—of the end of the MDG goals, the millennium development goals. I would think we ought to have a strategy of how we are going to contribute to closing the gap on the MDGs, which can speak to global health issues. And we have a good record on which we can advocate and build, speaking to some of the work we have done over the last number of years in Africa and have continued in the last while. So I would say, what are we going to say about the MDGs?

The second is how we would articulate the Security Council's role in the new paradigm of global security, of non-state actors, fragile states, and the like. Again, I think we can come to that discussion informed by our experience in Afghanistan and Haiti, where Canada has had a number of years of active engagement.

Perhaps as a third volley, I think we could speak with some credibility on issues of transparency and governance within the United Nations itself—remember Canada chaired the subcommittee of the General Assembly that dealt with administration within the UN—but also transparency and governance issues within global institutions. And here I go back to Mr. Abbott's question with respect to the IMF and the like. How is global governance altering, and what is the Security Council's role in it?

Those are three. I'm sure there are others, and perhaps better ones, but I do think the member's question was a very useful one to sharpen up the question, what's our campaign? Why do we want to be there? And it's not just because historically we've been there, but what do we want to contribute?

With respect to Mr. Shultz and my comment about tending the garden, he certainly, in my recollection.... I couldn't tell you where the idea came from, but I suspect that wherever it came from, it only worked because Secretary Shultz said he wanted to do it, that they would respond. I believe it happened not just because of the personalities, but also because of the agenda. I've talked to Mr. Shultz about it, and he said he got irritated when they were talking about South Africa or differing views on Central America. But he said he learned a lot. I would point out that we let quiet diplomacy take its part. I'm not saying we shied away from saying what our view on South Africa was, but I don't think we publicly went and said, well, I think we'll beat up Mr. Shultz on South Africa today.

So the relationships are important; the regularity of them is. I think Canadians sometimes forget that the European foreign ministers and line department ministers see each other.... If a week goes by without their seeing each other, it would be rare. An American Secretary of State does not have to worry about being in question period and does not have to seek permission for whether or not an aircraft is available.

I'm only making the point that we have constraints on our foreign ministers—and I'm not just talking about the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but also the ministers active in a global approach to Canada—that prevent us from being as active and as present as we ought to be. Minority Parliaments actually make that even more constraining, by virtue of votes and the like, and that actually makes Canada less of a player. Ministers have to be engaged outside of Canada for the global agenda, or it's just talk among the bubble of Ottawa.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

The provincial role there is mainly trade, and so the discussions that--

[Peter Harder]

Sure. The provincial role is actually quite important. We've had premiers' visits and they've become quite global. Premier Campbell has made I don't know how many visits to China in the last number of years, and I think that is really an important contribution to sustaining our political relationships in China. The Canada China Business Council took a delegation of five premiers and business people to China in the fall as part of that. And I referenced earlier how premiers are active in the U.S.-Canada relationship, not just with trade missions, but they are invited by northern governors, western governors, the Great Lakes governors--all important fora for Canadian causes to be advanced.

There may well be occasions when we would want to be a little more coordinated in the message we're sending. I would advocate, for example, regarding the working group on energy, that Alberta should be there in respect of its interests in energy in the North American context, which are quite unique.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Harder.

Mr. Taylor.

[James H. Taylor]

On provincial participation, it's a difficulty, of course, because of the nature of our Confederation. We've struggled with it from the beginning, how best to accommodate provincial responsibilities and provincial interests. We had to do this, for instance, from the time UNESCO was formed, because of provincial responsibilities under our Constitution for education, and a formula was found for dealing with that. In the same way, in la Francophonie, for a long time there was a serious issue about the ability of provincial representatives to speak at the table, and finally a formula was found for that.

Our institutions have, over time, proven flexible. One of the most difficult cases, though— maybe the hard case that makes bad law, I don't know—is always relations with the United States, because there you really do see the possibility. And we can think of historic examples where, if you have separate provincial representation in Washington, you risk running two foreign policies, one being run in Washington with the administration and the Congress by a province, and the other by the federal government. They're not necessarily congruent, and it's an invitation to be whip-sawed. You expose yourself to manoeuvring by the other side to take advantage of your weak national position.

So one of the morals of the story is that we have to make up our own mind about national policies and try to arrive at a unified position.

So far as mechanisms are concerned, there have been attempts in the Canada-U.S. context, again going back many years, to create standing ministerial committees, and for some reason or other, that formula never quite seems to last. You get a group of ministers together under a particular government and they're prepared to give it a go, and they do for a while. Then over time it fades away. I think that is just the practical matter, as much as anything else, that it's very hard to get three or four ministerial schedules to coincide.

So one of the morals of the story is that you're perhaps better off not to attempt anything as ambitious as that, and if you could have, above all, regular meetings at the highest level, at the level of the President and the Prime Minister, and then perhaps at the level of Secretary of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs, if they were regular consultations, that's about the optimum structured formula you can hope for.

When it actually comes to negotiating something with the United States, the lesson is that we have to sometimes, if it's an important issue...and we are confronting some important issues, the whole energy-environment complex, for instance. If it actually comes ever to negotiating with the United States about that, my own view is that will take the re-creation of special machinery. It would be machinery that breathed the whole of government philosophy, but it would be set up specifically for the purpose of the negotiation, and it would involve mechanisms for regular provincial participation and, indeed, for participation on a regular basis of all interested groups that could claim a place. I think the model for that was the free trade negotiation machinery.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much. We've gone the full two hours and a little bit. We do appreciate your coming. On behalf of the committee, we want to thank you for your candour and for your wisdom. We appreciate it very much.

We are going to adjourn. I would remind those members of the steering committee that we do have a meeting. I believe it is at 11 o'clock, so keep that in mind.

The committee is adjourned.