Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I really appreciate the invitation, since I started my career here 19 years ago during the Gulf War. I was doing an internship at the foreign affairs committee.
My remarks will essentially focus on one aspect of Canada-U.S. relations, the issue of Arctic governance. This is an important issue. I believe that, at this moment, Minister Cannon is making a statement on the subject in Yellowknife.
I want to emphasize that the thoughts I will be sharing with you today stem in large part from research that I have conducted with my colleague Samantha Arnold of the University of Winnipeg. However, I accept full responsibility for making them.
By way of introduction, I would say that the problems facing the Canadian government in the Arctic are of three kinds. First, it must manage the immediate consequences of climate change on wildlife, plant life, human communities and the environment.
Second, Canada is facing four land challenges, and thus four instances where sovereignty is involved. Two of those conflicts are absolutely insignificant: they are the conflicts with Denmark, one over Hans Island and the other in the Lincoln Sea. However, the other two conflicts are more significant and involve the United States. One concerns the Beaufort sea, and the other, more important, is the quarrel over the status of the Northwest Passage.
The third type of problem facing Canada is the potential growth of human activities in the region, particularly increased navigation, the exploitation of natural resources and even the potential increase in criminal activities. Here I want to emphasize the word “potential”. We are dealing with scenarios here. We do not know what will happen in the next 15, 20 or 30 years. These are threats or problems that may eventually arise. I will mainly focus on these last two problems because they are related to the greatest degree to governance issues.
Since 2004, the Canadian government has taken a number of initiatives to reinforce its presence in the High North, particularly by building ice-breakers, buying helicopters, building port and training infrastructure, increasing the strength of the ranger corps and the conduct of regular military exercises in the High North. These are welcome initiatives. Canada has long been too absent from the High North. They will enable the government to ensure an effective presence in this region and to meet its responsibilities.
However, I will take the liberty here of making a comment. I am cautiously optimistic in this regard. Obviously, all the announcements that have been made are still announcements, not yet concrete measures deployed in the field. It takes 10 to 20 years to put an ice-breaker in service. The problem is that the financial crisis we are currently facing could well lead the government to reduce its efforts and make cuts to some of the programs announced, as was the case in 1989 in particular.
The other problem is that the war in Afghanistan requires considerable financial, human and material resources. I do not believe in the current context that Canada can afford to intervene in both Afghanistan and the Arctic. Sooner or later, the government will have to make important choices.
However, even assuming that these initiatives will in fact be implemented, another question arises: are these essentially unilateral measures enough to achieve the objectives the Canadian government has set in the North? In my opinion, these unilateral initiatives will not be enough if they do not include a diplomatic offensive. They must be accompanied by the signing of agreements with other governments so that Canada's claims are recognized and government services are offered in the most efficient manner possible.
A number of my colleagues and I feel that there is a window of opportunity. Colin Robertson clearly expressed this. There is probably a possibility of improving relations with the U.S. government and, in particular, of establishing new institutions. The diplomatic initiatives I was referring to can be of two kinds: there are multilateral initiatives, which I won't discuss here for the moment, and bilateral initiatives.
Canada has excellent relations with the United States, which we tend to forget when small conflicts arise between the two countries. In the past, the two governments have shown considerable ability to resolve their conflicts in a satisfactory manner and to reach compromises that serve their mutual interests. There is thus reason for moderate optimism in this instance as well over the possibility of resolving conflict in the Arctic.
However, I want to emphasize one thing. The most important factor in Canada-U.S. relations is the bilateral institutions put in place by the two countries. In defence alone, there are more than 850 agreements between the two countries. In my view, those institutions have gone a long way to improving and maintaining good relations between the two countries.
In the past two years, many researchers have suggested establishing a new bilateral Canada-U.S. institution to manage problems and challenges in the High North.
Very briefly, those proposals are consistent with three existing models in Canada-U.S. relations. The first model is that of the organizations for managing and maintaining marine transportation corridors, such as the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation, the U.S. counterpart of which is the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. This is a Crown corporation responsible for maintaining navigation infrastructure in the St. Lawrence and ensuring the safety of ships that use the seaway.
The second type of organization is NORAD, a joint defence organization of the two countries. Two years ago, NORAD was given a marine mandate. I am quite skeptical about the possibility of NORAD being able to provide adequate services in the High North, but this model is often referred to.
The third model—which is perhaps the most promising and useful for our purposes—is that of the conflict and cooperation management institutions. The two best known examples are the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the PJBD, which was formed in 1940, and the International Joint Commission, founded in 1909. These two organizations work very well. They are responsible for making recommendations to both governments in their areas of jurisdiction. They conduct studies and can avoid overpoliticized issues.
If one model were to be adopted to manage Canada-U.S. relations, both conflicts and joint challenges in the High North, it should be the PJBD model.
In closing, we will have to meet a certain number of conditions if we want to establish this kind of bilateral institution in the High North.
First, we must set aside sovereignty issues, which poison Canada-U.S. relations and give rise to needless debates. There is no urgent need to resolve the sovereignty issues immediately. On the contrary, merely raising them can cause discussions between the two countries to break down.
Second, this institution must be functional and very technical in nature. It must focus on problems that are not political, but rather concrete, such as surveillance and aids to navigation, search and rescue and environmental protection.
Third, we must favour a gradual approach. We should introduce limited initiatives which could eventually serve as a basis for building a more ambitious organization.
Fourth, we absolutely must ensure that local governments, that is to say the government of Alaska, the representatives of the Canadian territories and those of aboriginal groups, are adequately represented in that institution. They are the parties most concerned by what goes on in the Arctic.
Lastly, we must ensure that the mandate of this future organization does not conflict with the multilateral commitments of Canada and the U.S. government in the High North. That mandate must be worded in such a way as to enable other players to be invited or to add other areas of cooperation. The organization must therefore be flexible in both its membership and scope.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.