Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and honourable members, for inviting us here to talk today about Syria. It's my pleasure to provide an assessment of the situation in this country, where, frankly, conditions have deteriorated markedly since my predecessor last talked to you in February.
While the number of deaths remains difficult to confirm due to lack of access, it is believed that more than 29,000 people have been killed, and many more are missing. The number of refugees receiving assistance from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has now surpassed 258,000, with tens of thousands more awaiting registration. An estimated 2.5 million Syrians are in need of assistance, including 1.2 million internally displaced people—that is, those who have had to leave their homes within Syria.
Bashar al-Assad plunged his country into chaos and despair in a vain effort to cling to power. He now finds that his own days are numbered. The question is not whether he will fall but when, and, more importantly, what next? The Syrian regime is slowly collapsing. It's no longer able to maintain control of all of its territory at once. Victory in one location results in loss elsewhere. Meanwhile, the armed opposition is gaining strength, holding its own to an unanticipated degree in Aleppo, and even capturing strategic locations.
Yet the opposition remains fragmented. Without a unified command and control, it is unable to defeat the regime, and the regime itself still has considerable firepower—unused firepower so far—at its disposal. Neither side can achieve a solely military victory at this point. It thus seems likely to result in a prolonged battle with Syria's suffering civilian population caught in the crossfire. Neither side is willing to negotiate seriously and in good faith to achieve a political solution. Both sides fear that the other side seeks its annihilation, and thus they're engaged in a fight to the finish.
The inevitable fall of President Assad is unlikely to mean an immediate end to the bloodshed. Regime remnants will continue to fight. The regime has to some extent lost control of the private shabiha militias it has been deploying against restive communities, and armed opposition actors are deeply divided and increasingly entrenched. As a result, it looks as though the post-Assad phase will continue to be violent. Syria also risks becoming a stage upon which a wider geopolitical and sectarian competition plays out as regional powers back rival forces on the ground.
As a former Canadian ambassador to Syria, I'm heartened but not surprised by the spirit and resilience of the Syrian population. In rebel-held areas, we're seeing opposition and other grassroots actors rise to the challenge of providing local administration and services to their communities. The external opposition is attempting to overcome its fragmentation, but it remains unable to coalesce around a strong leadership and a clear vision for a post-Assad Syria. It has little credibility with Syria's internal opposition and has yet to address the concerns of Syria's ethnic and religious minorities.
Meanwhile we're seeing a number of disturbing trends. Terrorist jihadi networks are taking root on the ground. It's not clear how much support these more extreme actors enjoy amongst the local population, but they are increasingly well armed and organized. This is particularly troubling given Syria's considerable chemical weapons stockpiles.
We don't believe the regime would deploy these weapons against the opposition, and we believe they currently remain under regime control, but a partial loss of control of these stockpiles could have disastrous consequences for the Syrian population and for Syria's neighbours.
The situation in Syria is also posing a growing threat to the stability of its neighbours. Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq are all feeling the strain as they endeavour to meet the needs of a growing Syrian refugee population, which is expected by the UNHCR to surpass 700,000 people by the end of this year, if current trends continue.
Tensions in Syria have resulted in sporadic violence in Lebanon, although all of Lebanon's main political actors, including Hezbollah, have so far shown themselves to be committed to maintaining domestic stability.
Fatal incidents of cross-border shelling recently raised tensions with Turkey to worrying levels, but Turkey, to its credit, has demonstrated considerable restraint in its response.
Canada has taken a strong position on Syria in international fora, including the United Nations and the Friends of the Syrian People. We contributed financially to the mission of former UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan, and we support the efforts of his successor Lakhdar Brahimi to achieve a negotiated end to the crisis. The Canadian government has always been vocal in urging the UN Security Council to impose binding economic sanctions and an arms embargo on the Assad regime. And just yesterday, our ambassador to the UN again reinforced Canada's position during a UN Security Council Open Debate on the Middle East.
The fact that the Security Council remains paralyzed more than a year and a half after this crisis began is tragic. As long as tough measures are not taken, those who want to protect the Assad regime with Syrian blood will benefit from the political and legal cover this impasse provides.
Canada actively continues to call upon countries like Russia, which have influence with Syria, to play a more positive role, cooperate with international efforts and use their leverage to help achieve an end to the violence and an inclusive, Syrian-led political transition.
Minister Baird recognizes that this is a central pressure point and uses every available opportunity to raise the issue with his international counterparts, as he did at the APEC summit in Russia. Departmental officials have also raised the situation in Syria numerous times with Russian officials, both here, in Ottawa, and in Moscow. In the absence of a Security Council resolution, Canada continues to work with our regional and international partners to isolate this brutal regime and increase the pressure on it. We closed our embassy in Damascus on March 5, all of Syria's diplomats in Canada were expelled on May 29, and the Canadian government has imposed 10 rounds of tough sanctions on the Assad regime. We are calling on all states outside and, especially, within the region to do the same.
To this end, we co-chaired a meeting of the sanctions working group of the Friends of the Syrian People with the Netherlands and Tunisia on September 20 in The Hague, placing a particular focus on the effective implementation of financial sanctions.
Canada is also committed to helping the non-violent Syrian opposition gain the skills and resources to achieve a free and democratic Syria, including a contribution of up to $1 million for pro-democracy initiatives. The funding was announced on April 1. We are considering additional projects to support the Syrian opposition—both inside and outside Syria—and help it prepare for a post-Assad transition.
In order to help meet urgent humanitarian needs arising from the crisis, Canada, through CIDA, has already provided $12 million in assistance this year. United Nations agencies and the Red Cross are currently delivering it. This support has been directed to address pressing humanitarian needs both inside Syria and in neighbouring countries. Canada will continue to closely monitor the humanitarian situation in Syria and in the region, and stands ready to respond further, as appropriate.
My CIDA colleague joining me today will be pleased to answer any questions you might have about Canada's humanitarian contribution.
As I mentioned earlier, Canada is also extremely concerned about the impact of the conflict on Syria's neighbours. Consequently, during his visit to the Zaatari refugee camp on the Jordan-Syria border in August, Minister Baird announced $6.5 million to assist Jordan in coping with the massive influx of refugees from Syria. Canadian funding will enhance the capacity of the Jordanian Armed Forces to transport refugees efficiently and safely from border crossing points to reception centres and the Zaatari camp in Jordan.
We are also exploring options to provide additional assistance to Jordan, which would include increasing donations to the Jordanian Armed Forces for the transport of refugees and providing protective equipment to the Jordanian Armed Forces to deal with incidents involving Syrian chemical weapons.
We should be under no illusions, and I can assure you, the government is not. The road ahead for Syria will be long and fraught with difficulty, but Canada remains actively engaged in efforts to assist the Syrian people in their struggle for their democratic rights. We will continue to work with them to bring an end to the crisis and to promote stability in the region.
With that, I'll stop here and be happy to respond to your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
