Evidence of meeting #56 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 41st Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was council.
A recording is available from Parliament.
9:15 a.m.
Conservative
Bob Dechert Conservative Mississauga—Erindale, ON
Would opening up the Northwest Passage, in your view, be helpful to resource development in Canadian territory?
9:15 a.m.
Associate Professor and Chair, Department of History, St. Jerome's University, As an Individual
Again, that's an internal waters issue; I'm not sure it's a Northwest Passage issue.
9:15 a.m.
Conservative
Bob Dechert Conservative Mississauga—Erindale, ON
Infrastructure investment would presumably also help those companies that are interested in achieving the resources, or bringing the resources—
9:15 a.m.
Associate Professor and Chair, Department of History, St. Jerome's University, As an Individual
I agree very much.
9:15 a.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Dean Allison
Thank you, Mr. Dechert. That's all the time.
Mr. Eyking, sir, for seven minutes.
9:15 a.m.
Liberal
Mark Eyking Liberal Sydney—Victoria, NS
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you for coming today.
I have a couple of things. Of course, we're talking about this mainly because of global warming, and that all of a sudden we have more routes and passages. It's also well noted that the north has locked in a lot of hydrocarbons; it's one of the biggest sources in the world.
There's a statement from our government, which is a good statement, I guess, that says we have to create the conditions for dynamic economic growth, vibrant communities, and healthy ecosystems. That's a very good statement, but the challenge is how you do that with what is happening. Some of the challenges have already been discussed by my colleagues.
I have two questions. One is that sometimes it's not an advantage to be chair of something because you have to put your self-interests to the back of the table. You have to be diplomatic and see the greater picture. I think it was stated that we're going to be chair for the upcoming couple of years.
I think you alluded to how we have to make our decisions on the state or the nation and they have to go from the bottom up. Are we left at a bit of a disadvantage because we're the chair? Are we at an advantage to achieve what we want to achieve? How do you see us in that role? As with being the chair of anything, you have to take your hat off a bit and look for the greater good. What are the advantages and disadvantages of being chair at this very important time?
9:15 a.m.
Associate Professor and Chair, Department of History, St. Jerome's University, As an Individual
That's an interesting point and an interesting question.
In terms of hydrocarbons, once again, this is all tied to global supply and demand. The fracking in shale oil and gas and how we've seen that explode onto the scene in recent years may be a game changer. Some predictions are suggesting that the continental United States might be energy self-sufficient relatively soon. It really changes the equation about how much push there's going to be for offshore oil and gas in the Arctic, where a lot of the attention has been devoted to Arctic resources.
There's always a balance when we're looking at hydrocarbons and resource issues. The real centre of gravity is mining, right? This is in the NWT, and Mr. Bevington can speak to that with more knowledge than I can. In the Yukon, you look at what's changed in those territories, thanks to clearly Canadian resource on land. This is really pushing economic growth.
In terms of the chair, it's a really interesting point. It's always striking the right balance. I mean, the Arctic Council has been operating for 16 years to this point. There's a lot of work, research, issue areas that are already in the pipeline. Part of being a chair is that you can go in and celebrate what's already being done. A few of those things will become ripe while you're in the chair, so you can claim some of the credit for them. That's one approach to being a chair.
The other approach is to come in and say, “Here are some issues that we pushed for at the forefront.” For example, Canada was adamant that the Arctic environmental protection strategy, the precursor to the Arctic Council, had a social development component to it—a social development working group.
It's not necessarily about being the shining light of the Arctic Council. If Canada were to go in as chair, and there are some murmurs that we might, and say we're going to emphasize responsible development and health—after all, it's a health minister and a northern economic development minister who's also Arctic Council minister—these are ways of taking something that resonates with the Canadian national agenda but is also important to our circumpolar neighbours.... I think there are opportunities to harmonize.
I'm hopefully not leaving you with a sense that this should be a callous, self-interested, self-aggrandizing notion, where we go in as chair and start to broadcast to the world how great we've been for creating the Arctic Council. We're a mature, confident player on the international stage. Go in there and the world will draw that attention. It's much better if everybody else trumpets Canada's contributions to all of that. Approach the council with confidence and see this chair as a celebration, a culmination of 16 years.
Everybody knows the Arctic Council was largely a Canadian brainchild. In some way or another, whatever comes out of that chair, you can pitch it as a celebration that has been thriving. To me, that's a win-win. I think every party has a vested interest and a stake in being able to claim a constructive part in the creation of the Arctic Council.
9:20 a.m.
Liberal
Mark Eyking Liberal Sydney—Victoria, NS
Well, this present government will be in power for those couple of years. I don't see them ever doing shameless self-promotion in anything they do, so we won't see that.
9:20 a.m.
Voices
Oh! oh!
9:20 a.m.
Liberal
Mark Eyking Liberal Sydney—Victoria, NS
A hundred years ago the Americans did the Panama Canal. Of course, they had a lot of control over Panama, but they opened up the canal. And it wasn't only for Americans; it was for the world trade, or whatever. This Northwest Passage could be the next Panama Canal, where all of a sudden trade is going to move fast, so we can't simply say it's Canada's and nobody can go through it. We're going to have to come to some sort of agreement.
Do you see us having some sort of a treaty protocol for ships coming through there?
It's noted that if there's a spill in the Arctic, the enzymes or the bacteria in the water do not break down those hydrocarbons as they would in, say, the Gulf of Mexico or somewhere like that. That's the biggest problem. It gets locked in and it gets spread around for decades. If we're going to embark on letting that route be more of a great economic opportunity for the world, because there's going to be a lot of countries investing in these mining.... It's simply a given. I mean, Canada can't do all of the investment, so you have this very international area that we technically own.
Do we need to start looking at some sort of treaty protocol for anybody coming through?
9:20 a.m.
Associate Professor and Chair, Department of History, St. Jerome's University, As an Individual
No. I think the key message is that these are our internal waters. This means we get to control access. It's always been very clear. I'm sure you've heard from Foreign Affairs. One of our big messages is that Canada is open for business. We're a coastal state. We're also a maritime nation. We access the waters of other countries around the world; they access ours. The key is that they must do so according to Canadian regulations.
If we choose to regulate our domestic laws regarding passage through Canadian waters, including Arctic waters, with those of the International Maritime Organization—if they get around to a mandatory polar code—that's our prerogative as a sovereign state with sovereignty over the Arctic waters. In that sense, it precludes a treaty. The big question is, a treaty with whom? Again, it's not an issue of ownership of the waters or the islands. That's crystal clear to all of us now. There were so many misconceptions perpetuated about that at one time that it leaves lingering doubts in some people's minds. Those doubts should not be there. These are Canadian waters.
Now, there's a question about transit status, not in Canada but—
9:20 a.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Dean Allison
Mr. Eyking, I'm sorry, that's all the time we have. Thank you very much.
We'll now start our second round of five minutes for questions and answers with Ms. Grewal.
9:20 a.m.
Conservative
Nina Grewal Conservative Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC
Thank you, Chair.
The north has a very unique ecosystem that has been affected by the impacts of climate change, and northerners have had to learn to adapt to these impacts since their traditional trades, such as hunting and fishing, have been affected. One of the four pillars of Canada's Arctic foreign policy is to protect its environmental heritage through actions such as pollution prevention legislation. Can you explain how Canada is helping northerners to adapt to these changes in the spirit of protecting its heritage?
9:20 a.m.
Associate Professor and Chair, Department of History, St. Jerome's University, As an Individual
It's an interesting question from a foreign policy standpoint because there are a lot of domestic aspects to the question you're posing. Certainly, we've done it in terms of maritime protected areas, national parks, and environmental regulations more generally. I'm not even sure how to approach that question.
From a foreign policy standpoint, we have made moves toward Lancaster Sound to be recognized internationally as a unique and special ecosystem. That's very progressive on Canada's part.
I think we might look at trends in Antarctica and some interesting developments in recent weeks, with China stridently opposing, at the last possible minute, the creation of green protected areas off the coast of Antarctica, and then Russia doing a 180-degree turn and all of a sudden finding itself backing China, to say that it wasn't going to proceed forward. We all understand how much preparatory work goes into getting agreements over areas like that in place, and for China to come in and basically veto it at the 11th hour and 59th minute is very disconcerting.
I think we're going to face big challenges in terms of getting international buy-in to carve out marine protected areas and the like, and this relates to the reality that the Arctic Ocean is fundamentally different from Antarctica. Antarctica is a continent. It's a land mass surrounded by water, and the Arctic Ocean is an ocean surrounded by nation states, with sovereignty and sovereign rights to parts of that sea basin. In this particular case, a lot of the instrumentation—a lot of the tools—is what we're going to undertake as a nation state. I think we can continue to build. Again, we have sovereignty. We exercise our sovereignty. These are functions of having the right to govern activities within our jurisdiction, like the creation of parks, and I think it sends a confident message to the world. Also, when we're invoking mechanisms under, say, the Nunavut land claims agreement, that helps to reaffirm the internal sovereignties within Canada and the connectedness between northerners and the Canadian state. I think all of this sends helpful messages.
I do applaud the government on their approaches to dealing with the expansion of Nahanni National Park, a very appropriate way of balancing the interests of development and ecosystem management to accommodate multiple stakeholders who otherwise might have found themselves in conflict. I believe there are models there that can be applied elsewhere.
9:25 a.m.
Conservative
Nina Grewal Conservative Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC
The search and rescue agreement negotiated by the Arctic Council in 2011 has a highly collaborative spirit for each party involved. It defines an area of the Arctic where they will have some responsibility in responding to search and rescue incidents as well as a commitment to provide assistance to the growing search and rescue needs in the Arctic regions.
Do you feel that this agreement can serve as a model for future binding agreements?
9:25 a.m.
Associate Professor and Chair, Department of History, St. Jerome's University, As an Individual
It may serve as a model, for sure.
There's an oil spill response instrument being developed under the auspices of the Arctic Council. It's the Arctic states and other states that are the signatories to the agreement. It's not an Arctic Council agreement; it's not governed by the Arctic Council per se. There is a certain collaborative spirit that came out of it to suggest that the Arctic Council, in certain areas like search and rescue, can help to facilitate agreements.
My message is to set the expectation that the Arctic Council should be doing that—that's its primary goal, and that's the primary metric of determining whether the Arctic Council is relevant and successful. But that is problematic.
In fact, there are of lot of things the Arctic Council does on a regular basis. There is monitoring; there is core research that informs not only Arctic issues but also international issues and has been very useful in setting international agendas on things like persistent organic pollutants and mercury. I don't want to throw out the baby with the bathwater by saying this model is the one that should be followed in all situations. But there's certainly some good spirit there.
A search and rescue treaty shows that a lot of the investments in military capabilities have a purpose that is very civilian friendly. It helps to create a stable region that's going to be attractive to investors. And the spirit that animates most of the Arctic countries is one of recognizing that collaboration and cooperation is going to get us further than all of this sword-waving that's been going on in media circles.
9:25 a.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Dean Allison
Thank you very much. That's all the time we have. Thank you, Ms. Grewal.
We're going to start over with Madame Laverdière, and then go to Mr. Bevington again.
9:25 a.m.
NDP
Hélène Laverdière NDP Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you for your presentation. It was very interesting.
You mentioned one thing that we come back to from time to time, and that was…
the need for a place for northerners in our overall vision. If you could, I'd like you to expand a bit on that.
9:25 a.m.
Associate Professor and Chair, Department of History, St. Jerome's University, As an Individual
Northerners are involved in our foreign policy processes on multiple levels. As permanent representatives at the Arctic Council meetings and also at the working groups, we see it.
The permanent participants, in many cases, don't only operate within the Arctic Council; they're also representing themselves in other venues, too, which is key. We have northerners representing themselves through territorial governments and through land claim governments, which is very key. They're doing this not only internally but internationally, on an increasing level.
Also, within the machinery of government and decision-making, we also see northerners involved in things like the Arctic Council Advisory Committee, which is key. One of the misconceptions that is sometimes out there is that unless northerners are representing themselves, northerners aren't being represented by the Canadian state. In particular, this came up during the Chelsea meeting and the Ilulissat meetings in 2008 and 2010, when there was quite a bit of blowback.
If one looks at even the Inuit Circumpolar Council's Inuit declaration on sovereignty, there's a really interesting formulation up front that Inuit are Arctic peoples, Inuit are Arctic aboriginal peoples, and Inuit are aboriginal peoples, but Inuit are also citizens of states, so in some cases northerners are being represented by the Canadian state. When we're dealing with issues like extended continental shelves and sovereign rights to resources beyond 200 nautical miles—I've yet to see any indigenous claim to traditional use of resources beyond 200 nautical miles—the systems to delineate those jurisdictions are actually state-based processes through the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. There, I think, it's appropriate that northerners be represented by the Canadian state.
But what that means is that within our own machinery, within Canada, it's imperative that we have conversations and dialogues. Again, I applaud the process. I was in Europe on a speaking tour for the last number of weeks and felt a sense of frustration from Europeans about what is Canada's agenda for the Arctic Council chair. The response I was giving, which I think was a fair one, is that in Canada we have dialogues before we announce our agendas.
The minister responsible for the Arctic Council is up in the north, in all three territories, having dialogues and speaking with northerners to help shape that agenda. Again, I wasn't part of those dialogues, so I don't know how substantive they were, but in terms of process, it's very important when Canada is going to present an agenda that it be done in a way that's based upon conversations. Some of them are going to be informal and some of them are going to be very formal. Some of them are going to be institutionalized.
But I think it's very helpful if we keep a very flexible approach and continuously reinforce the message internationally that one of the things that makes us such a responsible actor is that our northerners are front and centre, always keeping in our minds the Inuit motto: Canadians first, first Canadians. It's one that warms my nationalist soul. This is really a positive thing that Canada should be broadcasting to the world: that we are at the forefront of true engagement and dialogue, and this is something that I think animates the policies of all of the parties in Ottawa.
9:30 a.m.
Conservative
9:30 a.m.
NDP
Dennis Bevington NDP Western Arctic, NT
Well, that's going to be tough.
Certainly, the dealings with social development are really about dealing in our territories. Our governments are really responsible for that. I don't want to see that diluted in any way, shape, or form.
I think there are a number of things that you have to clarify. One of them is that this region is a new ocean; it's not an ocean that has existed. It's changing rapidly. It's a crisis situation when you consider the degree of geographic differentiation that is occurring in a period of decades, rather than centuries, as we first thought when the Arctic Council was set up.
As we think of the future.... The changes in the Arctic are a result of the global human presence around the globe. That's why we have changes in the Arctic. When we talk about how we deal with the Arctic, we have to recognize that. The fact that Singapore came with a delegation to the conference of Arctic parliamentarians to say that they were concerned about the Arctic says that the world is concerned about the Arctic—
9:30 a.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Dean Allison
Thank you. That's all the time we have. I'm sorry. We have to move on to the next round. Maybe you can fit it into another answer.
Mr. Schellenberger, I believe you're splitting your time with Mr. Williamson. We'll turn it over to you for five minutes.
9:30 a.m.
Conservative
Gary Schellenberger Conservative Perth—Wellington, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you very much for all the information that you've given us this morning. I've found it very educational.
In general, does your view of the future international relations of the Arctic foresee a greater potential for conflict or for cooperation, and why?
9:30 a.m.
Associate Professor and Chair, Department of History, St. Jerome's University, As an Individual
My answer is that I'm unambiguously expecting cooperation. One hopes for cooperation, the desired end state to accomplish all of the objectives of our northern strategy—and of northern strategies that preceded the latest one going back to the northern dimension of Canada's foreign policy in 2000, even.
This doesn't have to be looked at in a partisan way. To achieve the objectives of everyone, we should be aspiring towards cooperation; that goes without saying. It doesn't mean that we can pretend there isn't the potential for a flare-up of some sort of defence issue—more likely it's going to be a security or safety issue in the region that requires an immediate Canadian response—for that would be naive. But to treat the Arctic as though the threats we face there are more acute than in other parts of the country is part of the problem of this alarmist mindset.
In that sense, I think the region is already rich in cooperation. What has happened is that cooperation has broken out all over the place since 1990. Since the end of the Cold War, there really has been an opportunity to have a lot of agreements reached on a bilateral basis—things that are often overlooked.
With the United States, we have a very deep, longstanding relationship, which goes back to the end of the Second World War, to figure out ways of accommodating different grand legal positions on international law—not about the Arctic per se; they manifest themselves as or are about global positions of the U.S. Navy and the right to freedom of navigation, or force projection.
The reality is that on a functional level, Canada and the United States are incredible partners and cooperate regularly in the Arctic. There isn't a lot of true friction in that particular relationship when it comes to some of these core issues.
At the end of the day, I think cooperation is the norm. Maybe this ties back to the question about what is new about the Arctic. No, it's not a new ocean by any stretch of the imagination. It's water; it's an ocean. Whether it's in a frozen state or in a liquid state doesn't change the fact that it's an ocean. Yes, there's more and more interest in it, not in terms of legal status—no way. The only change relates to Article 234 of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.
No, it's an ocean; it has always been called the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic Sea. The rapid change, I think, is the issue. Does rapid change portend uncertainty and therefore set up the groundwork for conflict?
Conflict in some scenarios may be possible. My suggestion is that it's highly improbable. International interest in a region doesn't mean that we should inherently feel threatened. We can look at it as an opportunity to educate countries such as Singapore about where they can make appropriate targeted investments in conformity with Canadian goals and regulations to achieve circumpolar effects.
To me, it's all about mindset. If one wants to see this as a threatening place where everything is changing overnight—forget about history; we need to react immediately because, by God, if we don't act now, things are going to change 16 years from now.
What I'm trying to say is, and my general message is, take pause. We have some time to lay the proper foundation, and a solid foundation is key to building the right sort of house on top of it.