Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 22nd, 2012

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

We have about a minute and a half, but we also have the next round. Why don't you get started? I'll let you know when the time is up and see how you guys want to proceed.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

Sure.

Thank you for coming. I'm going to jump right into this because time is short.

I hope you're right, and I think you largely are, when you talk about sovereignty over the land and over the resources. But as this part of our country changes, as right as you sound today, if an American came in from the State Department, or a naval official, they might claim innocent passage and that they can put through anything they please in those waters.

Do you dispute that—the innocent passage—or where would you...?

[Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

I think Canada's position is strong legally, that these are internal waters. I think we've built it up effectively over a long time. It was almost an étapiste, step-by-step approach to doing it.

We weren't bold; we didn't come out of the gates when people were talking about it in 1946. In that sense, I think the U.S. could in theory do that. There are a whole bunch of eminently practical reasons why it wouldn't be in the U.S. grand strategic interest to push it.

So it's possible, but improbable.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

That's true, but as has been noted before, Americans will do the right thing once they've done everything else, so who knows what their first inclination will be?

You think there could be a dispute, then.

Then I question your introductory comments about its being possibly counterproductive to take some of the actions the government has taken to have a presence there and about the notion of “use it or lose it” being something we should not be concerned with. I would argue that if the Americans can claim just on the notion of innocent passage, then we need to be there, as a country and as a government, exerting sovereignty over our land.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

John, that's all the time.

We're going to start the next round, but why don't you answer the question? Then we'll come back here to—

[Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

It raises a very important core question. I think the key is not to confuse sovereignty as the legal right to control activities in a region with those instruments and capabilities that we develop to actually assert that control. I have been a supporter, right from day one, saying that these are smart, targeted investments. What has been invested in defence is dealing with capabilities that were allowed to atrophy during the 1990s. That was identified by Paul Martin's government as well, so this is something that doesn't have to be cast in partisan terms.

The key at the end of the day is that we have very rich arrangements with the United States, some of which are on service-to-service levels between our militaries. NORAD has a maritime surveillance component to it as well.

Again, at the end of the day there are possibilities. But I don't see Canada as ever winning, if we push the United States into a situation—which I think is what we would have to do—of taking some dramatic step such as you're suggesting. Realistically, our relationship is too strong and our friendship is too solid, and we get one another's respective legal positions at the level where it counts. Those are not the issues we should be worried about.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

Ms. Brown, you will probably have just one question. You still have about three and a half minutes left, but I think we should cut it off. So put one question, and then we'll get—

[Lois Brown, Conservative, Newmarket—Aurora, ON]

Thank you.

And thank you, Professor. It's been most interesting this morning. I think we could keep you busy here for the rest of the day.

I am interested in the whole aspect of observer status. We were provided in our notes with a list of the criteria that would be used to assess whether or not a country had the right to observer status. There are about seven or eight of them in it. I won't read them all, because I'm sure you know them, but we have states such as China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore that have already expressed an interest in observer status. The European Commission applied. It was rejected by Canada.

My question really is, where does it stop? Everybody can say they have an interest, but Singapore? What is Singapore's interest in the Arctic? Why would it want to be there?

And is this really, then, essentially the start of the creation of another United Nations? How do we control it and hold it back?

[Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

First is to emphasize the language that we're not interested in reforming the Arctic Council; that we don't want to make it into a treaty-based organization. In fact, it works fine the way it is. Instead, it's a case of strengthening what's already there.

China and the European Union are already sitting as ad hoc observers, so their being granted permanent observer status doesn't necessarily change the practical look of the room itself. They're still sitting in the back rows watching what's going on during the main meetings.

But at the end of the day, those criteria setting up the possibility to put conditions on permanent observer status—“If you're going to be here, you must be contributing money”—which helps keep the Arctic Council functioning at the practical working group level, but also on the part of the permanent participants being able to represent the north at these meetings.... That's very key.

There's also a very tricky line, in terms of those criteria, saying that any permanent observer must recognize the legal rights of the coastal states. That's challenging, when we come back to the questions about the Northwest Passage. Which legal interpretation do you side with? If there literally is a difference in legal position, how do you navigate that and still meet the criteria?

Again, as I was suggesting, when Canada is chair...just because we have the Nuuk declaration, where these criteria are set out, I don't think the permanent observer issue has been settled, and as much as those criteria are taking us a couple of steps towards clarity, it's still as fuzzy as heck for me at this point.

[Lois Brown, Conservative, Newmarket—Aurora, ON]

Just as a comment, as we see the emerging markets become more and more interested in getting their commodities through to other markets.... Right now we have the BRIC, so at what point does Brazil establish an interest in saying they want observer status? They have no connection to the Arctic per se, but they have an interest.

That's my question. At what point do you...?

[Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

It is an issue that's emerging, and it's one that I think warrants attention. This is where one has to be able to measure in a substantive way what contribution we bring and also hold countries that are being granted permanent observer status accountable, to say they're being constructive contributors to the Arctic Council, not only financially but in terms of substantive contributions to the research that's being conducted under its auspices.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Lackenbauer, we asked you originally if you could stay for the second hour, didn't we? Are you able to stick around?

[Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

I am, yes, absolutely.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Okay. Here's what the plan was originally. Our next guest could only make it for the second hour, so we're going to cut to our next guest.

I'm going to suspend to get set up. We'll hear 10 minutes of testimony from our new witness, and then we'll be able to ask questions of both people. We'll continue back and forth, just as we are on the list, and of course we'll make time for the Liberals to ask a question.

Even though we are in rotation back and forth, we'll make sure, Mark, that you get another chance to ask a question.

Is that all right?

So let's suspend for one second. We'll hook up the video conference; we'll ask you to stay.

We'll get the testimony and then we'll continue to ask questions of both people.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Can I have the members back at the table? We'll get back at it here.

I certainly want to welcome, from Manitoba, Ms. Charron, an assistant professor of political studies at the University of Manitoba.

Welcome. Thank you for taking the time to be here.

Just to let you know where we are, as you know, we started our meeting about an hour ago. We have with us P. Whitney Lackenbauer, associate professor and chair of the history department at St. Jerome's University. We've been asking him questions for the last hour. He's going to stick around and field questions into the second hour as well.

What we'll do now is cut to you. We'll give you 10 minutes to give us your testimony. We'll then spend the remaining 45 minutes or so asking questions of both witnesses.

Welcome. It's great to have you here. We look forward to hearing your testimony.

The floor is yours.

[Dr. Andrea Charron, Assistant Professor, Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual]

Thank you very much. It's an honour to be able to speak to you today.

I heard only the final comments of Dr. Lackenbauer, so I apologize if there's perhaps repetition in our comments.

I want to start with an anecdote of a public meeting that I attended last night about the Arctic—from this, I think it's symptomatic of two criticisms of Canada's current foreign policy that I would like to raise—and end off with a possible solution.

Last night here in Winnipeg, there was a big public event to discuss Canada's Arctic. In the title it had the words “true north” and “final frontier”. There were approximately 200 members of the public. It was extremely predictable in its message, both for what it did raise and for what it didn't raise. Four academics were asked to speak about the Arctic. There were themes that they did raise: there are opportunities in the north, but we must be very concerned about who has those opportunities; the U.S. is our greatest challenge; and our sovereignty is under threat. There were lots of maps of the Durham map, which shows the potential conflict as a result of the continental shelf.

What was not raised was Canada's actual northern strategy. There was no mention of the living conditions in the north. There was absolutely no mention of the Arctic Council or the fact that Canada will chair it. I might add that there was no mention of the Canadian chapter chairing the ICC from 2014 to 2018.

I think this is symptomatic of the two main criticisms about our current foreign policy, which I want to raise. The first is a follow-up from the discussion you had on Tuesday with the DFAIT representatives. That's in reference to Canada's current northern strategy, and specifically its four pillars. For me, three of the four pillars are not actually foreign policy issues; they're in fact domestic issues.

The one foreign policy issue, which is the sovereignty card, I think is outdated and very jingoistic. Our sovereignty is not questioned, nor is it under threat. True sovereignty is vibrant, healthy, sustainable communities, and we don't have that right now.

I might add that the map we have in Canada's current northern strategy evokes the sector principle, and that, I had thought, was outdated and long since abandoned. I'm surprised it's still there.

What this criticism is about, in short, is that I think there's a chasm between the rhetoric and what Canada actually wants to and is trying to achieve when it comes to the Arctic, and especially on the world stage.

My second criticism, which is very much related, is that I think Canada suffers from what I call “ADD”, the Arctic distraction disorder. We tend to be very concerned, and panic, when there's any hint of a possible—quote, unquote—threat to the north, but at the same time we forget about our Arctic on a regular basis. I would point to our 1981 dollar coin, which is missing most of the north for aesthetic reasons.

This brings me to our potential solution. I think maybe we need a reset. The fact that Canada is about to chair the Arctic Council is a propitious time to do so.

With regard to our current northern strategy, I think we need to put it away. I think if we're talking about foreign policy, we need to separate out those issues that are in fact within the foreign policy purview and separate them from the domestic.

I have four areas that perhaps our foreign policy could take on. I might add that I think this is actually what Canada is trying to do, but it's perhaps language that's more reflective of that fact.

I've chosen four words that begin with “c”, for one thing because it reminds us about Canada, but also because I think they're truly in the foreign policy realm.

The first would be cooperation, and I think Canada is cooperating with the Arctic states, with the permanent participants. It's in our best interests.

The next is commerce. There are opportunities in the north, and they will be on an international level.

Next is the culture. Culture is extremely important for Canada, especially our northern culture and our indigenous and aboriginal peoples.

Finally, we need to talk about climate change. The whole point in being members of international fora like the Arctic Council is to try to work on common problems, and climate change is a problem that no one state can solve. We need everybody's assistance.

I think the Arctic Council does a lot of good, and Canada has a great opportunity in being the chair of the second round of state chairs. There are going to be challenges, no doubt. For example, what do we do with observer applications, such as Greenpeace?

But there are also observer issues to do with who is consistently missing from the table and who perhaps should be there—for instance, the International Maritime Organization.

That's where I'd like to leave you—with those two criticisms, really observations, about the chasm between perception and reality, and about the Arctic distraction disorder that Canada suffers from, and I'd suggest that now is the time for a reset.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

Just to let the members know how we'll proceed, we're going to continue from where we were, with five-minute rounds. We're going to start with Mr. Bevington, and we'll go back and forth. There is probably enough time for two actual rounds, so six interventions. Then we'll look at trying to wrap up at about 10:30 to look at some committee business. Does that make sense?

Go ahead, Bob.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Mr. Chair, I see from the agenda that we have a full two hours to deal with these witnesses. I think the first round with Professor Lackenbauer shows that people are very interested in what our witnesses have to say.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Okay, so we want to go a little bit longer?

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

I'd like to continue, if possible.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Okay, so let's—

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

My only reservation is can we deal with committee business and the motion that we agreed last meeting to deal with?

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Do you want to save five minutes for that, then? Is it possible?

Okay, why don't we get going, and we'll go from there?

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

This is just a reminder that I need to leave at 10:45.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

We'll be done by then, for sure.

Mr. Bevington, let's get started with you for five minutes, sir.