Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 27th, 2012

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Order, please.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are studying Canada's Arctic foreign policy.

I just want to welcome our two witnesses. We have Donald McRae, who's a professor at the University of Ottawa. Welcome, Mr. McRae. It's nice to have you here this morning. We also have Michael Byers, who is a professor and Canada research chair in the department of political science at the University of British Columbia. Mr. Byers, welcome to you, sir, as well.

As we continue our conversations on the Arctic, we're going to start with you two gentlemen, with some testimony for about 10 minutes each, and then we'll move around the room and go for some questions back and forth.

We could probably do this for about an hour, an hour and a half, depending on what we're doing, and then we have a little bit of committee business that we could deal with after that point in time.

Mr. McRae, why don't we kick it over to you. You have 10 minutes, sir.

[Professor Donald McRae, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair. I'd like to thank you and the members of the committee for inviting me here this morning.

I'm going to talk about the international legal regime for the Arctic. It's a topic on which I think there's some public misunderstanding. Speculation about the need for a new legal regime and imagined disputes over territory and resources I think ignore the legal reality that actually exists in the area. Let me provide some fairly basic clarification.

When I'm talking about the Arctic, I really mean primarily the waters and seabed of the Arctic Ocean, not the land territories of the states that surround the Arctic, although I'll say a few words about the land a little later on. The Arctic Ocean is just that; it's an ocean, water that historically for most of the year was covered with ice. As an ocean it's governed by the regime set out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which largely reflects customary international law. The fact that the U.S. is not a party of the treaty is for the most part of no real significance.

In legal terms, the Arctic is like any other ocean around the world, whether we're talking about the Pacific, the Indian, the Atlantic, or even the Mediterranean Sea, except that it has been historically covered by ice. As a result, each coastal state in the Arctic is entitled to the living and non-living resources of a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone and the resources of the continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles, to the limits of the continental margin.

These are rights that belong to the coastal state automatically and don't have to be claimed by the state. That's why the Russian flag-dropping incident of a few years ago, while amusing and scientifically interesting, was of no legal significance whatsoever, and the Russians themselves recognized that.

Just as the states within the region cannot enhance their positions by making claims, rights over the continental shelf within the Arctic cannot be claimed by states from outside the region. The continental shelf, in legal terms, is the prolongation of the land territory. If you don't have any land in the area, then you cannot have a continental shelf.

There are, of course, five Arctic coastal states: the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark, in respect of Greenland. The other states that are often referred to as Arctic states—Iceland, Sweden, and Finland—all of whom are members of the Arctic Council, do not have any rights over the waters or of the continental shelf that extends into the Arctic Ocean. They are blocked by the Arctic five, whose EEZs, exclusive economic zones, essentially surround the Arctic Ocean. This means that access to the Arctic Ocean has to be through the EEZ of at least one of the Arctic states.

The distance to which the continental shelves of the Arctic states extend beneath the waters of the Arctic Ocean is a matter that is of course being investigated by all of the Arctic coastal states. There's a complicated formula under the Law of the Sea treaty involving distance and sedimentary depth, and it is to determine these outer limits that these large-scale scientific investigations have been undertaken in the last few years by most of the Arctic coastal states. Canada, as you know, has been engaged in collaborative research with both the United States and Denmark.

Canada must submit its view on the limits of the continental shelf to the United Nations body, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, by the end of 2013. But one must be a little cautious about this. Given the backlog in the commission's work, it may be 20 years before the commission will actually express its views on Canada's submission. That would be 20 years before we could be confident that the limits of the continental shelf in the Arctic had been finalized.

Although it may be some years before we know the precise outer limits, I think most predictions are that most of the seabed of the Arctic Ocean will be subject to the continental shelf jurisdiction of the Arctic coastal states. There will not be much left there that will be international seabed, and that means that boundaries will have to be drawn between the continental shelf jurisdictions of these states.

There are rules for determining maritime boundaries based on the Law of the Sea treaty. They are not very clear—they are somewhat vague—but they have been developed in state practice and in the decisions of international tribunals. The Arctic states have indicated in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration that the Law of the Sea regime will apply to the Arctic, so the rules for maritime boundary delimitation will apply when they have to come and determine the continental shelf boundaries beyond 200 nautical miles.

Let me turn to another aspect of the Arctic Ocean, and that is navigation. The bulk of the Arctic Ocean is high seas, and thus there is freedom of navigation through it. But as I mentioned earlier, access through the Arctic Ocean must go through the exclusive economic zone of at least one Arctic coastal state.

Under article 234 of the Law of the Sea treaty, Arctic coastal states can establish within their exclusive economic zones—in areas that are ice-covered for much of the year and where there are exceptional hazards to navigation—non-discriminatory rules relating to marine pollution from vessels. They can enforce those rules. An attempt is being made, through negotiations in the IMO, for the development of a binding polar code that would establish binding international standards for navigation in Arctic waters, and it would therefore make national rules uniform.

There are, of course, two more specific navigation questions in respect of the Arctic. Russia claims that parts of the northern sea route are the internal waters of Russia, and Canada claims that the waters of the Northwest Passage are the internal waters of Canada. We solidified that claim when we drew straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago in 1985.

Because the United States and some European states object in principle to the treatment of the Northwest Passage's internal waters and regard it as an international strait, there is a dispute over this. I would suggest that as a practical matter this dispute is overblown. The United States does not object in practice to the actual jurisdiction being exercised by Canada, although if you raise an issue with the United States, such as the NORDREG extension, it makes an objection in principle. This objection, in my view, is more about the implications of Canada's position for other waterways around the world than concern about what Canada does or might do.

Moreover, because of the 1988 icebreaker agreement between Canada and the United States, U.S. government ships will pass through the Northwest Passage with the consent of Canada. The issue again, as I say, is a matter of principle, not really a matter of practice.

The real test for Canada's authority—or Russia's, for that matter—will come if Canada has to arrest a foreign flag vessel in the Northwest Passage and the flag state challenges Canada's right to do so. In my view, such a challenge would fail, either because the internal waters claim would be upheld or because Canada's exercise of jurisdiction, in any event, will be justified under article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Given the hazards of navigation in the Arctic, which will no doubt remain into the foreseeable future, the most likely scenario is that vessels transiting the Northwest Passage will need the kind of coast guard support that Russia provides in the northern sea route. We see this with the current vessel, the LNG carrier Ob River.

I think the greater openness of the northern sea route may suggest that passage through the Arctic Ocean in the near future will more likely take that route. Northwest Passage navigation may be more to provide access to and from resource development activities on land or to coastal communities. I would suggest that practical challenges to Canada's jurisdiction of the Northwest Passage seem unlikely, but of course one can never rule them out.

I would suggest the consequence is that Canada's position in respect of the Northwest Passage is best enhanced by simply going ahead with treating it and managing it as internal waters and retaining it as open to international navigation. I think repeated attempts to try to get the United States to agree with us are counterproductive. The U.S. has good geopolitical reasons for not agreeing with Canada. At the same time, it has good reasons not to object to what Canada is doing in practice. I would suggest that long-term acquiescence in the management that Canada exercises may be more important than an objection in principle, and therefore we should not encourage the United States to object in principle to what we're doing.

I will mention a couple of other legal issues with respect to the Arctic. First, title to land territory in the Arctic is not really an issue, except with respect to what we might describe as the Lilliputian question of sovereignty over Hans Island, which has no strategic geopolitical and probably no resource implications, and no doubt can be managed between Canada and Denmark. Second, there are a few outstanding maritime boundary issues within 200 nautical miles. There are some minor ones with Denmark in the Lincoln Sea and a major one with the United States in the Beaufort Sea.

Again, there are principles of law to resolve these issues. In the case of the Beaufort Sea, Canada and the United States could send the matter to international arbitration, or the ICJ, as we did in the Gulf of Maine case. I would suggest that—given the inconsistency between a boundary that is good for Canada within 200 nautical miles and what is good for Canada on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles—further thought needs to be given to the Canadian position before entrusting it to international dispute settlement.

There is a major gap in the international legal regime, and that is the involvement of Arctic indigenous peoples. The Law of the Sea Treaty was negotiated before any real concern was given to indigenous rights. Major instruments recognizing those rights, such as the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, came later. The Arctic is an area that has historically been, and in many respects still is, predominantly occupied by indigenous peoples. The Arctic Council provides for permanent indigenous participation. The legal rights to land and maritime territory rest with the Arctic Five, not with the full membership of the Arctic Council. When the Arctic Five have met, as they did in Ilulissat in 2008, there was no indigenous representation.

There is a broader policy concern, and this is where I'd like to finish on the appropriate level for Arctic diplomacy. The Arctic is often seen by countries in Europe and around the world as an area of international interest and concern. It is true that many issues affecting the Arctic have to be dealt with on a multilateral basis—global warming, atmospheric pollution, and some aspects of marine pollution. They can't be resolved by the Arctic coastal states acting alone. Title to territory in the Arctic and ownership of the mineral resources and fisheries within 200 nautical miles and beyond, as far as the continental shelf is concerned, is national. It rests with the Arctic Five states. What's the balance to be effected between Arctic diplomacy at the level of the Arctic Five coastal states, at the level of the broader Arctic Council, or at the broadest level of the international community? That is a major issue for Canada in trying to implement an Arctic foreign policy.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I look forward to any questions you may have.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much, Mr. McRae.

We're now going to turn it over to Mr. Byers.

[Professor Michael Byers, Professor and Canada Research Chair, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, As an Individual]

Thank you very much. Mr. Chair.

I speak French but, today, I will stick to English.

I agree with almost everything my friend and colleague has just said, which enables me to stand on his broad shoulders and venture into a couple of specific areas.

First of all, I'd just like to explain to the committee members where I'm coming from in general. I regard the Arctic as an area of broad political agreement within Canada, so partisan views are not particularly important here. I certainly come to this issue on the basis of academic expertise. Among other things, I am a principal investigator with ArcticNet, which is a federally funded consortium of Arctic scientists from 27 Canadian universities and eight federal departments. I think it's also relevant that I advised former Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon on his Arctic foreign policy statement two years ago and was very pleased with that document. So I'm here to give my best advice to this committee in the hope that all parties can work together to come up with the right answers here.

It's highly appropriate that this committee is considering this issue because many of the challenges concerning the Arctic are quintessential foreign policy challenges. The Arctic Ocean is surrounded by continents, and of course across that ocean you have the former Cold War divide between Russia and NATO. You have some very significant challenges coming up with melting sea ice, shipping, potential threats from non-state actors. There's a dynamic here that is really very much a foreign policy dynamic. Just to give you one example, the Russian military has most of its strategic nuclear deterrents based on the Kola Peninsula, which happens to be north of the Arctic Council. The moment you start talking about the Arctic, you're talking about the relationship between Russia and the United States; you're talking about Mr. Obama's effort at a reset of that relationship. We can't divorce these issues from that larger geopolitical dynamic, and one needs to recognize that there are forces at work—including Mr. Obama's major diplomatic push—that should affect Canada's approach as well.

The other thing to say is that there's a general recognition that there's little prospect of military conflict between nation-states despite that Cold War history. Thanks to WikiLeaks, for instance, and a cable from Ambassador David Jacobson to Hillary Clinton in January 2010, we know that the Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, told the Secretary General of NATO that there was no role for the alliance in the Arctic because, and I quote, “relations with Russia are good”.

So behind closed doors, certainly, there's a very strong recognition that this is not a sphere where there's any likelihood of military conflict. In the Arctic, if not elsewhere, Russia has embraced and is implementing a policy of international cooperation. That is something that is quite significant. It was in that spirit that Foreign Minister Cannon crafted the foreign policy statement that committed Canada to resolving, through negotiations, its Arctic boundary disputes, and we are now in active discussions on the Beaufort Sea boundary with the United States, in active discussions on the link and sea boundary dispute with Denmark. Our scientists and our diplomats are talking with the Danes and the Russians about possible disputes—not yet disputes—in the central Arctic Ocean once submissions are made by those three countries to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

So, generally, it's a pretty positive scene: international cooperation, recognition of this by the Canadian government, and now, with our upcoming chairmanship of the Arctic Council, an opportunity to lead that cooperation further, to build on the government's Arctic foreign policy statement from two years ago. The challenges are enormous, obviously, and so too are the opportunities.

Speaking of challenges, it needs to be emphasized that the Arctic is on the very front lines of global climate change.

In the western Canadian Arctic, we have already seen a five-degree Celsius increase in average annual temperature. That is phenomenal, and it has all kinds of consequences. The Arctic Council has played a lead role in the past on this issue. In 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment was the definitive study of climate change in the Arctic—its causes, mostly man-made, and its various consequences, some of them quite severe for indigenous peoples, ecosystems, and adaptive challenges.

There are things that Canada and other Arctic countries can and should do with regard to this challenge. There is the global issue of reducing our carbon dioxide emissions. One cannot divorce that from Arctic foreign policy. There are also specific Arctic causes of climate change. I would mention black carbon and Arctic haze, which are short-lived climate forcers. There's an opportunity at the Arctic Council to move on those issues—to partner with the United States and Russia in reducing black carbon emissions from diesel generators and diesel trucks to deal with the challenge of Arctic haze. These things are accelerating and exacerbating the larger climate changes resulting from other greenhouse gases.

The other issue that arises in terms of adaptation is shipping. We have seen a record-breaking melt of Arctic sea ice this past summer. I remember six or seven years ago, when I was warning that we might see seasonally ice-free waters through the Northwest Passage, I was assured by very many people, including a number of distinguished scientists, that my concerns were overblown and that we wouldn't actually see any significant melt-out of the Arctic Ocean ice pack until at least 2050, and probably not until 2100. The leading scientists are now predicting that we could see a total late-summer melt of Arctic sea ice as early as 2015 to 2020. That is truly astounding—not only for what it says about the pace of climate change, but also for the consequences. We could be seeing hundreds if not thousands of international ship movements through the Northwest Passage within the next couple of decades. We need to get on top of that.

In the Q and A, if people are interested, I would like to talk about the possibilities for diplomacy with the United States and Russia regarding the Northwest Passage issue and its link with the northern sea route. I would also appreciate a chance to talk about the U.S. concerns about precedents. An important article has just been published by Frédéric Lasserre at Laval University and Suzanne Lalonde at the University of Montreal, suggesting that there are only two straits significantly affected by a potential Northwest Passage precedent—one is between the island of Hainan and mainland China; the other is the northern sea route. In practical terms, no one is going to challenge either China or Russia over their claims.

Another adaptation issue is oil and gas development. There is a lot of excitement about Arctic oil and gas. There is not enough appreciation of the challenges and the risks. Shell just spent $4 billion failing to drill wells north of Alaska. Cairn Energy just wrote off $1.4 billion drilling dry wells just west of Greenland. Part of the cause for these high numbers is that the remoteness, the challenges of ice, and the short drilling season pose real limitations. Then there's the fact that oil dissipates and disperses very slowly in cold water. Your security measures have to be ramped up several times over as compared with other regions. I would like to talk about that in Q and A. I would like to talk about what the Arctic Council is doing on this. There is going to be a new treaty on oil spill preparation and response. We need a new treaty. Canada could lead on a new treaty on oil spill prevention.

I would love to have a question about fisheries management and protection in the central Arctic Ocean. The United States has been making a real push for the creation of a regional fisheries organization for the central Arctic Ocean. Canada knows all about regional fisheries protection because of our experience with Spain off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland back in the 1990s. The United States is looking for leadership here. I believe Canada could step up to the plate and help the Americans protect the Arctic Ocean fisheries to the benefit of everyone.

Thank you very much. Merci beaucoup.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you, Mr. Byers.

Mr. Dewar, you have seven minutes, please.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you.

And thank you to both of our guests today. You complement each other. You also reinforce some of the testimony we've already heard.

Mr. McRae, the notion that we need to understand what is at play legally and what isn't is important. We heard that from department officials: don't create a conflict where none exists, and we welcome that.

Mr. Byers, department officials were here at the last meeting. They were talking about the four pillars the department has when it comes to the Arctic and our foreign policy. They are exercising our sovereignty—we've talked about that a bit—promoting economic and social development in the region, protecting the Arctic environment, and improving and devolving northern governance by empowering northerners. That's not hugely controversial.

I want to focus on the issue of climate change. I brought this up in questions to the department officials, and you touched on it. It seems to me there is no controversy anymore about the science of climate change. Even the skeptics recently admitted they were wrong. The evidence is there. The question is, what are we going to do?

When it comes to our agenda for the Arctic Council, which is.... By the way, we should mention this to all our guests. This committee report is to give, if you will, our advice and perhaps instruction, as best we can, to our chair and to the government when we take the chair in May.

Tell me what you think is the best way to advocate for the need to realize that climate change not only has happened, but is also something we are behind on, and how the Arctic Council, working in this multilateral way that you've indicated, can best address climate change in partnership.

[Prof. Michael Byers]

The place to start here is to address a mistaken assumption that's often made with respect to the issue you've identified. Some people see the impact of climate change in the Arctic as creating opportunities, and they talk about access to resources and new shipping routes. There's excitement about all the untapped oil and gas in the region.

As someone who spends a lot of time in the Arctic and a lot of time talking with Arctic scientists, the risks and the costs associated with climate change in the Arctic greatly exceed the opportunities.

Let's just speak here of the impact of climate change on melting permafrost and the absolutely massive impact on infrastructure, roads, pipelines, and communities. We could talk about the erosion of coastlines, especially along the Arctic Ocean, the impact on communities as a result of that erosion caused by the melting of the sea ice, allowing weather and waves to impact on the coastline. Then, of course, there's the increase in extreme weather events that we see linked with climate change. There was a massive Arctic cyclone last summer—an unprecedented climatic event. It accelerated the melting of the ice and may well have had an impact on weather systems farther to the south.

The costs are greatly in excess of the opportunity, and it's important for northern countries to realize that.

That doesn't mean we shouldn't seize the opportunities that arise. Yes, we should. But let's not be naive about what's happening and about our need to do something.

In terms of Arctic countries dealing with climate change, I've already mentioned the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment from 2004. It was a massive study initiated by the Arctic Council, tapping into the world's top Arctic climate researchers, tapping into indigenous knowledge and making it part of the science report, and coming out with a very clear picture as to what was happening. It was assumed that the Arctic Council countries would meet and decide on real action to address climate change. Unfortunately, that next step of real action was essentially vetoed by the Bush administration.

My message to you on this is that the Arctic Council has been ready before to act in concert. It was prevented by an administration eight years ago that didn't realize the full impact and potential consequence of climate change. We know better today, across party lines, that this is a real problem, and the Arctic Council is a place.

In terms of regional impacts, I mentioned black carbon, Arctic haze, places where we could lead specifically at the Arctic Council. We shouldn't think that these things can be done informally. We all know that when it comes to the most important issues in the world, countries negotiate binding treaties because they can be enforced. These issues are of such importance that we need to be talking about law-making.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Mr. McRae, in terms of the legal aspects we have to deal with, you touched on the fact that there are opportunities for certain countries to make certain claims. I hesitate to use the word “claims” because we were instructed earlier not to claim something that we already have.

When it comes to the issue of China, where do you stand on this? There are those who suggest that it's better to have them in some way at the table—obviously not at the decision-making table, but at least to be recognized as having a role. Are there any perils to that, legally speaking, if you have them in the tent, so to speak?

[Prof. Donald McRae]

I don't see any perils, legally speaking, for that. If “in the tent” means being a member of the Arctic Council, as long as the Arctic Council is not seen as essentially legislating matters that are within the jurisdiction of the Arctic coastal states but dealing with matters that collaboratively they want to put before the council, then that seems to me to be worthwhile.

If there's navigation of the kind that Professor Byers mentions is a strong possibility, it's going to involve China. We're going to want China there to deal with issues relating to navigation. Climate change and atmospheric pollution are all affecting large numbers of countries. They have to be involved in that. My concern is to know when you want to deal with the Arctic Five alone and when you want to deal with the Arctic Council.

There is a suggestion coming out of Europe that we need to have a new regime dealing with matters that are essentially under the domestic jurisdiction of the Arctic coastal states. I think to allow that impression to continue is actually not a good idea.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

We'll now move over to Mr. Dechert for seven minutes.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here this morning and sharing your expertise with us.

To start with, I'd like to ask some questions to Professor McRae.

Professor McRae, you mentioned the passage that's apparently occurring right now by the Ob River, which is a Norwegian ship that's transiting the Russian Arctic passage between Norway and Japan, carrying Russian gas, I think. I understood from an article that I read yesterday that taking that route saves 20 days of shipping between Europe and Asia. Apparently, it's being escorted by a Russian icebreaker.

Do you see that as becoming a very significant passage for ships carrying that kind of cargo? You mentioned that Russia provides coast guard support for that passage. If, for example, the Canadian Northwest Passage were opened up to similar kinds of shipping, what would be the costs and benefits of providing that kind of coast guard support in the Canadian Arctic, and is it feasible? In your opinion, would there be benefits to helping open up development in the Canadian north, if the Canadian government were to pursue opening up that route? Could you compare the Russian route to the Canadian route for us?

[Prof. Donald McRae]

I think it's something that perhaps Professor Byers, who knows a lot more about the practical aspects of these things than I do, will also want to comment on.

The immediate advantage, of course, is the one you mentioned, and that's the time. Compared with the Panama Canal—or going the other way, through the Suez Canal—there's a substantial saving in time. Therefore, that has to be attractive to anyone shipping.

The Russians have developed fairly substantially their ability to provide protection for shipping. One of the problems for shipping going into unknown areas is if they have a problem, what do they do? If you go though the Panama Canal and you run into a problem, you have all the way down the coast of the United States and up the coast on the other side with ports you can go into. The problem in the Arctic is there may be nothing. That's what the Russians have done in having ports and having protection, and that makes it very attractive.

I don't know what the current state is now, but Russia, for a period of time, was asking for a very substantial fee for that kind of service. That does raise difficult legal questions about the extent to which you can charge a vessel going through your internal waters and whether you can charge for a service that you provide. If, of course, it's an international strait, as the United States would argue, then you would not be able to make that kind of charge to vessels. As well, of course, that would add to the cost.

On the Canadian side, at the moment it appears that the northern sea route is an easier route. It does not have the navigational difficulties of narrow channels that are involved in the Northwest Passage. Frankly, I don't think we have the infrastructure to provide the kind of current support that the Russians provide to ships going through there. I think they've tried to make it attractive for shipping, but if they put a fee that's too high, it will make it less attractive for shipping.

There are other factors that still have to be worked out. The vessels going through are very much a trial. But what is the long-term insurance cost of having to do something like that?That's a factor that's going to be taken into account, and because of the unknowns...there may be no surface ice, but there may well be ice under the water and hazards that vessels will have to take into account. Those things will have to be worked out to assess the viability of it. But at the moment, I think it would be for a vessel....

Depending on where you go, if you're leaving from Norway, as they were, the northern sea route would be more attractive. If you're leaving from further south, in terms of distance the Northwest Passage might be a more attractive route, if you're comparing distances.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Interesting.

Professor Byers, do you have a comment?

[Prof. Michael Byers]

Yes.

I think one needs to see the provision of infrastructure and services in the Northwest Passage in terms of several possible benefits. One is obviously in relation to having a presence to provide environmental protection and protection against non-security threats. Think about smuggling or illegal immigration coming from ships that may be entering our waters.

The other thing is that in terms of our sovereignty, our claim that the Northwest Passage constitutes internal waters, the more we can get foreign shipping to accept our jurisdiction, the better off we will be. The best way to get foreign ships to accept our jurisdiction is to provide them with necessary services: to provide them with ports of refuge, to provide them with world-class charts, world-class weather forecasting, world-class ice forecasting, to provide them with world-class search and rescue—in other words, to make Canada an absolutely essential component of their shipping plans.

I have been to conferences with the executives of major Asian shipping companies who are almost desperate to partner with the Canadian government in building up this kind of infrastructure. They don't want to work against us, because they know their ships and crews will need us in some instances, so I'd like to see us step forward on this.

Further to this, because you spoke about Russia and the northern sea route, our legal position in the Northwest Passage is identical to the Russian legal position in the northern sea route. I think as part of our diplomacy in the Arctic more generally, we should seek to identify those commonalities with the Russian government, while of course being cautious about the Russian government in other domains. There was an American president who said “Trust, but verify”. I think there's an opportunity for that with Russia in the Arctic.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Thank you for that.

Professor McRae, you mentioned the indigenous people of the region. I understand there are six different indigenous peoples' organizations that are permanent participants in the Arctic Council. How important is the participation of indigenous people of the region to the Arctic Council, to Canada's term as chair of the Arctic Council, and what are the benefits for indigenous people of development in the region? What should we be doing in terms of the Canadian government approach and the international approach to the Arctic Council to ensure that whatever development takes place in the Arctic region accedes to the benefit of the people of the region?

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

That's all the time we have, but, Mr. McRae, I'll let you answer the question quickly if you could, please.

[Prof. Donald McRae]

I'll quickly answer the question.

I've had the benefit of attending two of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference meetings recently, one when they developed an Arctic sovereignty statement and one when they developed a natural resources....

Their concern is partly the one I've been expressing. Participation in the Arctic Council is fine, but if the Arctic Council is not having any say on how resource development is going to occur, and resource development is something that affects them directly, then that participation is not very fruitful. If matters are going to be dealt with by the Arctic coastal states acting independently of the Arctic Council, I think they have to make some provision for indigenous involvement and participation in that.

That can happen in a variety of ways. It's all very well to say it happens in the Arctic Council, but if the Arctic Five get together and agree among themselves and then present things as a fait accompli to the Arctic Council, that's not really involvement of the indigenous people.

There is a serious question about how they can be involved in decisions affecting the resources and affecting their livelihood more directly than just being permanent participants in the Arctic Council.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

We're now going to move over to Mr. LeBlanc, for seven minutes.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for what is clearly very interesting evidence you're giving this committee.

Professor Byers, I'll take the bait—no pun intended. My father was the Minister of Fisheries when the 200-mile fishing limit was proclaimed in the 1970s. I'm curious to hear what you would answer if somebody were to ask you about Canada's fisheries management jurisdiction in the Arctic.

[Prof. Michael Byers]

The answer there is that within 200 nautical miles from shore, we obviously have exclusive jurisdiction. There is the issue of the disputed sector in the Beaufort Sea, 6,250 square nautical miles, but the legal dispute essentially means there's a de facto moratorium in place in that area. Within 200 nautical miles from shore, it’s not an issue.

The challenge is that as the sea ice melts, access to waters further north becomes possible. Indeed, there's an area beyond 200 nautical miles—north of the Bering Strait, north of Alaska and the far east of Russia—that has become ice-free in summer already. It's closer to South Korea, to Japan and China, than some of their fishing areas off Antarctica. You can expect that long-distance fishing trawlers will go into the Arctic Ocean relatively soon.

This poses a real challenge for Arctic coastal countries because we have straddling stock issues, just as we've had off the east coast of Canada. We might want to develop a responsible fishery within 200 nautical miles in the Beaufort Sea, but if the South Koreans or the Chinese are syphoning up fish just outside of 200 nautical miles, there goes our fishery.

The United States has taken the lead on this, starting with a Congressional resolution put forward by the two senators from Alaska, signed by President Bush, that has been taken up by President Obama. They are pushing for a regional fisheries organization for the central Arctic Ocean.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Sort of like NAFO maybe.

[Prof. Michael Byers]

Exactly like NAFO.

The beauty of such arrangements is that quotas are signed based on science, using the precautionary principle, and subject to negotiations obviously. The other beauty of it is that such organizations are open to membership from states outside the region. China, for instance, participates in several regional fisheries organizations, so you deal with that challenge of long-distance fishing countries to some degree. This best practice we've learned how to do elsewhere in the world is readily transferrable to the Arctic.

As I understand it, the Americans were looking for partners on this initiative and have been working closely with Russia, but Canada for some reason has been missing in action. I don't think we would oppose such a thing, but in terms of opportunities for leadership, this is it.

Finally, some people say that the Arctic Council is the wrong place to do this, because Sweden and Finland are at the Arctic Council and they are subject to the common fisheries policy of the European Union. Therefore, the Arctic Council is the wrong place because of that EU connection.

My response is that we need the European Union onside with any regional fisheries organization, just as we need China, just as we need Japan and South Korea. If we don't have those Spanish trawlers subject to this agreement, then we're in a problem right from the start.

Let's do it in the Arctic Council, or at least try it at the Arctic Council. It's a major item for Canadian leadership. We know how to do this. We have our experience from the Atlantic. Let's show the other countries how to work together in the north.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

I think that may be an opportunity for Canada's chairmanship to focus on the NAFO equivalent in terms of Arctic fisheries. It's an interesting approach. Thank you.

In 2011, Professor Byers, you published an article in Policy Options that, fast-forwarding to the re-election of the Obama administration, may even be more or as relevant today as it was a year ago, in terms of saying there is a pretty broad willingness to treat issues like search and rescue, like environmental stewardship among Arctic nations, as a cooperative foreign policy effort. And I think Professor McRae said the same thing.

There has not been a great deal of confrontation or certainly dramatic discord. If the Obama administration has previously shown a willingness to negotiate or discuss with Russia and Canada issues like search and rescue, access, policing—a whole series of these potential areas of overlap—can Canada use its Arctic Council chairmanship to perhaps drive a multilateral agenda further, to use the goodwill from the American administration and not lose any momentum? Or do we run into what Professor McRae I think correctly noted, that you don't look for too many international fora to resolve it, as you may not like the conclusion? You're perhaps better to simply occupy the space properly, functionally.

You said the same thing yourself with respect to Asian shipping companies.

[Prof. Michael Byers]

I may disagree with my friend and colleague a little bit on this. The changes are happening so quickly in the Arctic that having a wait and see policy and allowing time to work to our advantage might result in our missing opportunities and ending up in crisis.

Let's take the Northwest Passage. The Northwest Passage dispute, for all practical purposes, was dealt with by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1988. It was an incredible diplomatic accomplishment. He himself cites the Arctic cooperation agreement with President Reagan as one of his signature accomplishments.

Were it not for the subsequent changes resulting from climate change, we wouldn't be talking about the Northwest Passage. The problem is that commercial vessels are entering in increasing numbers, and this agreement, which applied to U.S. government vessels, doesn't cover the new challenge. So we need an updated Arctic cooperation agreement. We need to take the work that Mr. Mulroney did and update it to the 21st century.

I know there are American diplomats who would welcome such a conversation, because they realize that having the longest coastline of North America seasonally ice-free is not in their interest if it's a wild west zone, with only international jurisdiction, as opposed to being part of a North American states' internal waters jurisdiction. They want to have that conversation. It will be a tough negotiation. There will have to be compromise.

In 2008 I did a model negotiation with Paul Cellucci, the former U.S. ambassador to Canada, on this very issue. In a day and a half we didn't solve the sovereignty dispute, but we came up with nine concrete recommendations as to how the two countries could work together. This is a moment where we should be talking with our ally.

As I said, we should also be talking with Russia and the other Arctic countries. But this dispute, the Northwest Passage, will be resolved when Mr. Obama and Mr. Harper sit down together, just like Mr. Reagan and Mr. Mulroney did. They should talk about it and come to some kind of new arrangement soon.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

We will now start the second round for five minutes of questions and answers.

Ms. Brown.