Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 27th, 2012

[Lois Brown, Conservative, Newmarket—Aurora, ON]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Byers, I am going to let you carry on with that for a little bit. You said you would like a question about diplomacy. I watched your YouTube video, your TVO interview. I have two pages of notes and questions. Perhaps we will pursue this diplomacy issue.

You talked in that video about the terrorist threat the United States felt after 9/11, about the northern flank being exposed—I think that was your term. Then you talked about sitting down with Mr. Cellucci and having this discussion, and you said there were nine concrete steps to improve cooperation with regard to the Northwest Passage. I wonder if you could talk about some of those concrete steps. Give us an idea of what some of them were.

[Prof. Michael Byers]

Yes, thank you.

I was pleased with that interview, in large part because the interviewer was so good. Allan Gregg is really quite exceptional, so I was able to tease out a few ideas that I hadn't clearly articulated before.

I personally don't think the terrorist threat in the Arctic is all that substantial. Among other things, strangers are very easily spotted in small northern communities. Mr. Bevington will know this. It takes about three seconds for news to get around town that someone new has arrived. Add on the fact that they might have an accent and all of a sudden the local RCMP know about it. The terrorist threat is perhaps not so much.

But in terms of the challenges that come with an international shipping route, in terms of smuggling or illegal immigration, or the transshipment of illegal goods, potentially including weapons of mass destruction or other things that we try to regulate in ports and shipping lanes around the world, yes, there are issues. Mr. Cellucci picked up on this in 2004 and 2005, saying that for the Americans the terrorist issue was important. And even if we in Canada don't think it's as pressing in the Arctic as they do, it does provide a reason for getting them to the table. If our concerns are protecting our citizens and protecting our environment, and if their concerns are about terrorism, and if it leads to the same result and a negotiated agreement, that's good.

In terms of specific recommendations that came out of our mock or model negotiation, perhaps the most important one is that we should encourage both countries to raise their game in the Arctic. We should encourage the United States to adopt a mandatory ship registration scheme, like NORDREG, for the waters north of Alaska. It's impossible for them to criticize us if we're doing something that they're doing themselves. It also provides the notice and the communication that is appropriate for both countries.

In similar respects, back in 2006 Canada and the United States modified the NORAD agreement, the North American aerospace defence agreement, to include the sharing of maritime surveillance. It was clarified by then Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor that this included the Northwest Passage.

Some people think that I would be opposed to sharing maritime surveillance with the Americans concerning the Northwest Passage. I'm certainly not. We live in a shared continent; NORAD is about protecting the continent from external threat. Maritime surveillance, like air surveillance, is an important component of that. One of the recommendations in our model negotiation is that we implement that fully so that we actually do have shared maritime surveillance and response in places like the north, and get on with that essential job, raising the confidence of the Americans.

If we want to have an updated Arctic cooperation agreement with the United States, we have to recognize that their concern is that if they sign an agreement and recognize our legal claim—internal waters—the risk is that we then do nothing, that we get the legal jurisdiction but don't step up to the plate in terms of the policing, the infrastructure, and the surveillance. If they leave it to us and make that legal commitment, we might drop the ball. So we need to show them we're serious about this, that we want to raise our standards, and we want them to raise their standards too. We're ready to implement; show us that you're ready to implement too. Let's get serious about this space in a way that makes sense for both countries.

This is the final recommendation I'll touch upon. We said we should create a bilateral commission on northern shipping modelled on the international joint commission that manages transboundary waters between Canada and the United States, or modelled on the St. Lawrence Seaway, where the two countries together use their national jurisdiction to create an international shipping route that works to the benefit of both countries. That's what we need in the Northwest Passage, that kind of vision, where it's not Canada versus the United States, but Canada and the United States, using Canada's status as the coastal state to the benefit of both countries.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

We'll start with Mr. Dewar, and then Mr. Bevington for five minutes.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

I'll be very quick. I actually just want to underline a point that comes, Chair, from the meetings we had informally with our friends from Iceland. You'll recall their testimony. I just want to make sure we don't lose this.

They had referenced in their informal testimony—it might be a good idea to request it from them formally, and we'll figure out a way to do that—the changes in the fisheries there. You'll recall they said that all of sudden they have an abundance of, I think, mackerel. I would like to know from them what they've done in terms of surveying their waters and any science from that that might help us in light of what we've heard today.

I'll turn it over to Mr. Bevington.

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

Thank you.

I didn't really want to spend a lot of my time on the Northwest Passage, because I kind of agree with Mr. McRae and some of the evidence coming out—especially with the passage of the Snow Dragon icebreaker through the North Pole area this summer—that the likelihood of massive shipping through the Northwest Passage is diminishing because the ice is very temperamental in the route through the Northwest Passage. Anyone who's been in the north working on ships over the last number of years knows that the movement of ice is critical to shipping, and with open water there's more movement. We've seen that this year with the blocking of Iqaluit harbour, with the blocking of one of the straits of the Northwest Passage. In the High Arctic, what we're seeing is that there's very little multi-year ice. That was evidence that was presented by Shelagh Grant at a forum I attended earlier this year, that the multi-year ice is very limited in the High Arctic, in the North Pole region. The distance through the North Pole is 12,000 kilometres—Europe to Asia—versus the North Sea route at 15,000 kilometres. Those are the options that are now open for shipping, taking into account the likelihood of the ice melt continuing in the Arctic.

Should we be focusing on...? The extra movement in the Northwest Passage is mostly of a tourist nature. We're seeing more tour ships, more private vessels moving through the Northwest Passage.

I want to put that in context. You talked about that a little. Could you expand your thoughts on that?

[Prof. Donald McRae]

Where I would agree with Professor Byers is that one cannot rule anything out, so to make the assumption that we'll all be in the northern sea route or in the Arctic Ocean and not on the Northwest Passage would be a dangerous assumption to make. On the other hand, in terms of planning, it seems that the likelihood at present would be that the shipping initially will be more in the northern part, in the Arctic Ocean.

But even if there are tourist vessels coming through, that, it seems to me, requires the same kind of domestic planning to be able to manage that waterway as it would if you thought there were going to be larger ships coming through or commercial LNG carriers and so on. That's why I said we should simply go ahead and manage that as internal waters. If what Professor Byers suggests happens, I think it would be wonderful. Having been Canada's negotiator on the Pacific salmon with the United States over two years, I'm not so sure that the Americans necessarily see their best interests as what we perceive to be their best interests. They're very difficult people to deal with, as we found with the Pacific salmon negotiations for a number of years. So as you said, it would be a tough negotiation.

But in terms of priority, I think our priority should not be trying to get the Americans to agree. Our priority should be developing the infrastructure to manage the Northwest Passage for whatever vessels are coming through, and to treat it as our internal waters, not as though we have to ask anyone else for authority to do it.

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

But you've admitted that the likelihood is more in the international waters.

[Prof. Donald McRae]

That would be my assessment, yes.

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

Wouldn't the priority then be to set international agreements on shipping, on the types of vessels that are transiting the Arctic? Those international agreements would apply to international waters. If we focus on our internal waters as the prime object area for shipping, then we're talking about something different from setting up large international agreements with countries such as China, or Singapore, which has a large merchant vessel fleet, and all the countries of the world that might be interested in shipping through the Arctic.

Isn't the first priority to get the big agreement rather than the little agreement?

[Prof. Donald McRae]

They're parallel. I don't think you can say one rather than the other. I think you have to work on both. The forum for doing the other is the attempt to make a binding polar code, through IMO, which is where you get all the countries in the world that are interested in shipping, and ideally you get that polar code to establish the standards, the same sorts of standards we're trying to apply in the Northwest Passage as well, so you don't have a domestic-international divide.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Grewal, we're going to turn it over to you for five minutes.

[Nina Grewal, Conservative, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

My question goes to Professor McRae, and it follows up on Mr. Dechert's question, except with specific regard to Russia.

Last week we heard testimony from Department of Foreign Affairs officials that Canada's overarching priority as Arctic Council chair will be to focus on development for the people of the north. Recently, however, Russia suspended the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, an aboriginal group representing more than 250,000 northerners. Given that Canada has signalled that northern peoples are a priority for chairmanship, what impact do you anticipate this new development in Russia will have on our objective?

[Prof. Donald McRae]

I think the first thing I'd say is that it is one thing for the Canadian government to suggest that its objective is development for indigenous peoples. I think the question might be put to the indigenous peoples themselves as to whether they see that as something that will benefit and help them.

In respect of Russia, I think the problem with Russia at the moment is unpredictability. I mentioned attending the Inuit Circumpolar Council conferences. One of those conferences the Russian indigenous people were able to come to; another one they were not. It was a matter of visas at the last minute. So you can never tell whether their representation is going to be there or not. There may well be serious problems about the way in which Russia treats indigenous peoples. There's a problem with the way many countries around the world treat indigenous peoples. I'm not trying to single out Russia.

I don't think it's a consequence of a decision by the Russian government to prevent them from attending. Some kind of particular issue at a particular time has caused that reaction. I think the difficulty with indigenous representation from the Russian Federation is that you're never going to know exactly whether they'll be there, whether they'll be able to have their say. When they did come, it was clear that they were acting with the Russian government, against the Russian government, with domestic industry, against domestic industry. They were vibrant and active in trying to deal with the interests and issues in Russia, but the overall political situation is sufficiently unstable to make it complicated.

[Nina Grewal, Conservative, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

My other question is for Professor Byers.

Professor, you explained in your report on circumpolar challenges that the Arctic Council is in the process of adopting a new treaty on oil spill preparedness and response. This treaty closely resembles the 1990 Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness. It provides for signatories cooperating in the event of a spill, in such things as providing equipment and developing cleaner plants. You suggest, however, in the report that this is not adequate and that beyond preparedness we need to look at prevention. You suggest that what is really needed is an Arctic-wide treaty that focuses on oil spill prevention.

Can you speak a little bit more on how Canada might pursue an agreement on prevention and what such an agreement would provide for within the Arctic Council?

[Prof. Michael Byers]

If I could just start with one sentence in your question for my colleague on the suspension of RAIPON by the Russian ministry of justice, I do think that was likely an example of two government departments not talking to each other within Russia.

It was noteworthy that the Russian senior Arctic official, Ambassador Anton Vasiliev, participated in the Arctic Council's expression of concern about that action by the Russian ministry of justice. So just as in Ottawa, when sometimes departments don't talk enough to each other, there is a benign explanation as to what might have happened. There are also less benign explanations, but we shouldn't jump to conclusions.

On the issue of a new treaty on oil spill prevention, I have a couple of things to say. If an oil spill occurs in the Arctic, it may well be transnational in implication. The Beaufort Sea is an example. A major oil spill would have consequences for both Canada and the U.S. An oil spill in Baffin Bay? Same thing—Greenland and Canada. Around the Arctic, a massive spill would be transnational in consequence, and therefore we should be looking at this as a transnational challenge.

In terms of oil spill prevention, I think it's also important for us to have a level playing field in terms of safety and regulations, so there's no race for the bottom to try to not have regulations, because the Arctic is such a risky place for such activity. Canada should embrace the drive for higher standards. We all know what happened in the Gulf of Mexico. We all know that ultimately the consequences for both oil companies and governments are extreme if this is not done.

A final example of that.... There's an issue as to whether countries should retain the requirement for same-season relief well capacity with regard to the Arctic. As exploration moves into deeper and deeper water, this becomes an issue of pressing concern. Other countries, like Norway, Greenland, and Denmark, are maintaining the standard. I think we should do so as well here in Canada.

The consolation to us is that there's increasing evidence, particularly in the Arctic, that the major oil companies want to have a high degree of regulation and safety with regard to these issues, because they've seen the BP spill. They've seen the consequences for that oil company, and we saw this last summer in Canada. We opened up five new lease blocks in the Beaufort Sea and none of the majors bid for them. The majors in the last couple of years have shifted their attention to places like Russia, Norway, and Greenland, perhaps because Canada's been behind in terms of adopting tough standards.

So let's get with the momentum and show leadership, and raise our standards collectively with other Arctic states.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much. That's all the time we have.

We'll turn it over to Mr. Dechert.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to go back to Professor McRae for a moment. If you had to boil it down to three to five items to be put on the agenda for the Arctic Council over the next two years, what would be the three that you would suggest to the government?

[Prof. Donald McRae]

I certainly would suggest the protection of indigenous peoples and the reflection of their interests in development. I would certainly suggest the issue and how broadly you put it is a matter of perception, issues relating to environmental protection, which can move into climate change or move down to narrow issues like oil pollution or pollution from ships, but broadly the environmental issues in the Arctic.

One issue that I know indigenous peoples really want on the agenda, which is refused, is with regard to security issues in the Arctic. I know that's an issue that they would be particularly concerned to be able to have a say on in the Arctic.

I think the related issue is in respect of shipping and essentially being able to monitor shipping on a regional basis, and not simply have everything being dealt with by the IMO, the International Maritime Organization, and treated as a regional issue within the Arctic Council as well.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Professor Byers?

[Prof. Michael Byers]

On the same question?

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Yes.

[Prof. Michael Byers]

I have four. Oil spill prevention in addition to oil spill preparedness and response—that's number one.

Number two would be the short-lived climate forcers. I've already mentioned black carbon and Arctic haze. I think we could make real progress there in two years with strong Canadian leadership.

Number three, I mentioned a regional fisheries organization for the central Arctic Ocean. The U.S. is ready. Russia is ready. Canada has a huge opportunity to have a diplomatic victory that we could call our own and contribute to that issue using our experience.

The fourth issue, and this is going to be controversial, is that I think we should push for the admission of both the European Union and China as permanent observers at the Arctic Council—not members, not voting members, not members that can be at closed meetings, but permanent observers. The reason I say this is that any international organization, any international forum, is only as important as the people in the room. We want the Arctic Council to be the centre of Arctic diplomacy, Arctic governance. It is a compliment to us that the European Union and China want to be there.

Additional to that, there are some issues here that can't be dealt with in the absence of cooperation from those major players. If we want to deal with black carbon, we need to have China in the room. If we want to deal with regional fisheries management, we need to have the European Union in the room.

Now, there are indigenous groups that are hostile to this suggestion, and they have reasons for that, including the European Union's ban on the importation of seal products. That's an opportunity for diplomacy, to actually say to the European Union, “We want you in the room for all these good reasons, but you have to help us here. How are you going to compensate the Inuit of Canada for the impact upon their economies as a result of your policy on the seal hunt?” Instead of yelling at them and litigating against them, here's the opportunity. They want in on the Arctic Council. They're causing problems for some of our citizens; let's work it out.

Across all these Arctic issues, the age-old mantra that you need to talk is centrally applicable. If there's one thing that perhaps we haven't been doing enough of—not just in the last six or seven years, but in the last couple of decades with regard to Arctic policy—it's that we haven't been talking enough to our neighbours.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much. That's all the time we have.

We're going to move over to Madame Laverdière for five minutes.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you very much. Mr. Chair.

First, I want to thank the witnesses for their presentations and comments, which were very interesting.

To pursue my education, as someone said a while ago, I have a very short question for you, about something I do not really understand.

What is a same-season relief well?

[Prof. Michael Byers]

I mentioned it. If you have a buildup of pressure in a well or a blowout in a well resulting from an accident, as occurred with BP in the Gulf of Mexico, one of the main ways you seek to control that development is to drill a parallel well to extract oil and relieve the pressure. You want to drill such a well as quickly as possible.

In Norway, including in the Norwegian Arctic, companies have to demonstrate that they can begin to drill a relief well within 12 days of an accident occurring. In Canada, when we were pioneering Arctic oil and gas development in the 1970s and 1980s, we introduced world-leading regulations that said you have to have a same-season relief well capacity. In the Arctic you can only drill for two, three, or four months each year. It's longer and longer as the ice melts, but it's two, three, or four months each year. You have to be able to get that relief well in to stop the blowout before the winter closes in and the ice re-forms, because otherwise you're not going to be able to do anything for 10 or 11 months, and you have this blowout continuing through the winter season. That was our policy.

Under some pressure in the last few years we've hedged away from that policy a little bit, and I don't think we should. I think it should be very firm to the oil companies. Yes, this means you'll have to have a second drill ship close by. Look at the United States. This last season in Alaska, there were two drill ships precisely for this reason.

We shouldn't back away from this in Canada. The fact of the matter is that Arctic oil and gas will be attractive as prices go up, but we cannot lower our standards to the disadvantage of our environment, our indigenous peoples. Let's hold to the standard we put in during the 1970s, at a very basic minimum.