Foreign Affairs Committee on Jan. 31st, 2013

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), our briefing on the situation in Mali will begin. I want to introduce our witnesses today.

We have Kerry Buck from DFAIT, who is the political director and assistant deputy minister of international security, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean branch. Welcome, Kerry. We have Patricia Malikail, who is the director general of the African bureau from DFAIT, and we have Lisa Helfand, who is the director of peace operations and fragile state policy division. We have a group from DFAIT.

From the Department of National Defence we have Major-General Jonathan Vance, director of staff, strategic joint staff. Welcome, sir.

From CIDA we have David Morrison, who is the senior vice-president of the geographic programs branch, and Leslie Norton, who is the director general of the international humanitarian assistance directorate. Welcome to our friends from CIDA as well.

Ms. Buck, we'll start with you with an opening statement. Then we'll go to Mr. Vance, and then Mr. Morrison for opening statements before we get to questions and answers.

Ms. Buck, the floor is yours.

[Kerry Buck, Political Director and Assistant Deputy Minister, International Security, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for the opportunity to address the committee and provide you with views on the subject of Mali.

The situation in Mali presents an example of the complex challenges facing many African countries. The country grapples with three crises, each distinct but interrelated.

The first is the political crisis stemming from the coup d'état of March 22 of last year.

The second is the occupation of the country's north by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Salafist movement Ansar Dine, and the Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest that has destabilized Mali and is a threat to the Sahel region and the entire international community.

The third is an ongoing humanitarian crisis stemming from the 2011 Sahel drought and the subsequent food and nutrition crisis.

As background, Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world. The government has had limited ability to control the northern part of the country, and in the past decade terrorist groups have begun to operate more freely in the region. The north is the poorest area of the country, and the ethnic Tuareg have a history of grievances and rebellions against the central government.

In January 2012 the main rebel Malian Tuareg, supported at that time by extremist groups, attacked Malian forces and started to advance from the north. The Malian army collapsed.

On March 22 soldiers dissatisfied with the Malian government's support to quell the northern rebellion took control of their barracks, leading to the successful coup in Bamako by a Captain Sanogo, thus ending 20 years of democratic rule.

The various groups finished driving out Malian government forces from the northern two-thirds of the country. The terrorist groups then defeated the main rebel Malian Tuareg group and took control of a large geographic area, an area that is a little larger than Alberta.

The takeover of the north worsened the already precarious dynamics of the humanitarian crisis in northern Mali that to date has affected more than four million, including almost two million in the north.

Canada has interests in Mali.

Regarding development assistance, my colleague David Morrison will tell you about Canada's commitment implemented by CIDA.

Canada has some commercial interests in Mali, and we have a firm interest in the re-establishment of a democratic Mali. We have been calling for a return to constitutional order and the adoption of a road map in order to lead to free, fair, and credible elections.

Last year the international community witnessed with great concern how terrorist, extremist, and other armed groups took control of nearly two-thirds of Mali's territory. The entrenchment of these groups in northern Mali was accompanied by violence, human rights abuses, and oppression of the local populations, threatening the stability of Mali, its neighbours, and the entire Sahel region.

On December 20, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085 authorized the deployment of the African-led international support mission in Mali, AFISMA, en français, MISMA.

The mission is mandated to take all necessary measures in compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law, and respecting Mali's sovereignty, to contribute to rebuilding the Malian defence and security forces; support national authorities in recovering areas in the north under the control of terrorist, extremist, and other armed groups; help to stabilize the country and consolidate state authority; support authorities in protecting the population; and finally, contribute to creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the return of displaced populations, and to protect its personnel on missions.

While the UN Security Council authorized AFISMA in December, in the first week of January the Islamist groups advanced towards the capital, Bamako, in an effort to secure their control over the whole territory of Mali. This would have enlarged the sanctuary for terrorists around the world to train, plan, and effectively launch attacks against our closest allies and our global strategic interests.

At the request of the Malian government and operating under the mandate of resolution 2085, France launched a military operation to support the Malian defence and security forces in their efforts to drive back the heavily armed Islamist groups and to prepare the ground for the deployment of AFISMA. Canada immediately joined the international community in supporting France, which acted promptly to halt the Islamist offensive.

The Prime Minister stated the following: “We are very concerned about the situation in Mali. The development of essentially an entire terrorist region in the middle of Africa is of grave concern to everybody.”

Canada heeded the call from one of its closest allies to provide logistical support to their operations with a large-capacity transport aircraft. My colleague Major-General Vance will give you some details about that.

Canada's direct support to France will contribute to the efforts to stabilize Mali, weaken the enemy and facilitate the transition towards the effective deployment of AFISMA.

Moreover, the Prime Minister specified that Canada had no intention of becoming directly involved in combat operations.

On the margins of the African Union summit this week, and in Addis Ababa, the international community pledged $455 million to support the international effort against Islamists in Mali and the Sahel region. Canada was represented by the Honourable Julian Fantino, Minister of International Cooperation. Minister Fantino announced an additional $13 million in humanitarian assistance. This new funding will be channeled through NGOs and international organizations to assist the most vulnerable.

Members of the committee, I outlined the three interrelated crises. Canada is addressing each of these. We are actively engaged in supporting Mali's return to an elected government. A road map was adopted by the Malian national assembly on Tuesday of this week. The interim president has called for elections to be held by July of this year. Canada will be following closely the implementation of this road map. As well, we are addressing humanitarian needs through our support to UN agencies, the Red Cross movement, and NGOs.

Finally, we are addressing the security front through logistical support to the French operation—as I said, my colleague, General Vance, will be speaking to you about this—through the deployment of a C-17, but we are also providing training equipment, and technical and legal assistance. As we have been doing for quite a while for other states in the region, that includes training on international humanitarian law and military ethos to enhance their operational capacity to prevent and respond to terrorist activity in a manner consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law norms.

For instance, some of our current projects in West Africa include military training with Niger on armed forces in the context of exercise Flintlock, provision of training by police, and regional training projects for law enforcement and border security through Interpol.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is coordinating a whole-of-government effort that will respond comprehensively to the crisis in Mali and the Sahel region with targeted assistance that has value added for Canada. Canada's efforts will be coordinated with international partners, including the United Nations, and respond to the peace and security needs of the Malian people.

Mr. Chair, I will now pass the microphone to my colleague, David Morrison from CIDA, to briefly outline CIDA's engagement on development assistance and humanitarian assistance.

[David Morrison, Senior Vice-President, Geographic Programs Branch, Canadian International Development Agency]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, everyone.

For a number of years, Canada has been one of the major partners in Mali's development. On average, since 2007, Canada has provided over $100 million annually to support Mali's development. Until recently, Mali was moving ahead on the road to development in a number of areas, especially in education and management of public finances, thanks in part to Canada's support.

For example, Canada's support has increased the percentage of infants under one year old who are fully immunized against five childhood diseases from 69% in 2007 to 92% in 2010. Malian school children have had access to textbooks which they never had before. Canadian assistance has put 1.2 million new textbooks in the hands of Malian girls and boys over the last few years. Following the suspension of aid programs involving direct payments to the Government of Mali in March 2012, CIDA has continued to provide critical support to help the most vulnerable Malians in the areas of food security, nutrition, immunization, and access to basic health and educational services.

For instance, CIDA is currently providing funding through international and Canadian organizations working in Mali to ensure the continuation of critical services, such as health and education services to vulnerable populations in the south of the country.

Those initiatives are aimed at both strengthening the country's stability and preparing Malians to withstand any future shocks. This kind of support is key for avoiding social unrest in the south of the country, where 90% of the population lives and where the transitional government's seat is located. Stability in the south makes it possible to focus more on the country's north, where the security situation is worrisome.

CIDA is also providing substantial support through its humanitarian partners to respond to the needs of people affected by the ongoing food and nutrition crisis and the more recent conflict in Mali. In the last year, Canadian funding has helped our humanitarian partners achieve the following results: food and nutrition assistance to some 1.3 million people in Mali, as well as to 142,000 refugees in Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso; life-saving water and sanitation assistance to more than 49,000 people; life-saving activities, such as the screening and referral of children suffering from malnutrition, as well as activities designed to protect livelihoods and enhance resilience, such as the distribution of seeds and tools to 58,000 people; and finally, cash transfers and cash for work programming for 3,000 vulnerable households affected by both the food crisis and the conflict in northern Mali.

As my colleague from DFAIT mentioned, earlier this week, on January 29, at the African Union Donors' Conference on Mali in Addis Ababa, Minister Fantino announced an additional $13 million for a number of initiatives aimed at the most pressing of these humanitarian needs. These include support for emergency food and nutrition assistance and shelter, primary health care, water and sanitation to people displaced by the conflict.

In conclusion, the deployment of the African-led international support mission and efforts to address the security situation must be considered as part of a broader process of restoring the legitimacy and stability of the Malian government, and with concerted efforts to address the current situation in the country.

Although our suspension of direct aid to the Government of Mali remains in effect, we will continue our significant development programming working with partners to address the needs of vulnerable Malians, particularly women and children. We will also continue to respond to the humanitarian situation as appropriate.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

We'll now turn it over to General Vance.

[MGen Jonathan Vance, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence]

Mr. Chair, honourable members of the committee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Canadian Armed Forces contribution to operations in Mali.

My statement will focus on three main areas. I will begin by describing the Canadian Armed Forces mission in support of operations in Mali. I will then provide a timeline of key events associated with the Canadian Armed Forces contribution to this mission. Finally, I will give you some basic statistics highlighting the Canadian Armed Forces contribution and achievements to date in this mission.

The Canadian armed forces' mission is to provide strategic logistical support for France's efforts in Mali in support of our allies and to demonstrate the Government of Canada's support for the requirement to stabilize the situation in Mali. To achieve this mission, the Canadian armed forces is contributing one CC-177 Globemaster heavy-lift aircraft. This strategic lift capability, commonly referred to as a C-17, is helping the French transport military equipment and personnel between France and the Malian capital, Bamako.

The following timeline summarizes the key events pertaining to the Canadian Armed Forces contribution and, more specifically, the deployment of the C-17 transport aircraft in support of our French allies.

On January 14, the chief of the defence staff received a letter from the Minister of National Defence directing the Canadian armed forces to provide one C-17 transport aircraft, to support France's strategic lines of communication, for an initial period of one week.

The first flight of the C-17 transport aircraft from France to Bamako occurred on January 17. So the above-mentioned period when the Canadian Forces provided air mobility support ended on January 23.

The next day, the Government of Canada announced the extension of its air mobility support for an additional three weeks, bringing the total duration of this support to 30 days, with an end date for the mission of February 15.

Currently there are approximately 40 personnel from the Canadian armed forces deployed on this mission. They are operating from Le Tubé air base located in Istres, France. As of today, the C-17 transport aircraft has flown 13 missions and has moved over 775,000 pounds of cargo from France to Bamako, such as armoured vehicles, medical supplies and ammunition, as well as French military personnel.

For our C-17 to be deployed for one month, the projected full-cost estimate is $18.6 million. The incremental estimate is $11.7 million. Please note that the actual costs will only be available approximately 60 days after the full completion of the operation.

The C-17 transport aircraft has made a significant contribution to the transportation of essential supplies between France and Mali. Moreover, the success enjoyed by the Canadian Armed Forces during this mission has been underpinned by the efforts of our members, who have been working closely with their French counterparts to ensure seamless support throughout Canada's current commitment.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

We're going to start with the opposition. Mr. Dewar, the floor is yours. You have seven minutes, please.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to our witnesses.

I will start off by mentioning how we ended up with the committee briefing. The opposition wanted to make sure that we had some parliamentary oversight so Canadians could be aware of what we're doing in Mali. To that effect, we had asked the government, and it complied, to have some parliamentary oversight through committee. Hopefully, we'll have a debate as well. I just wanted to note that.

Just as a polite criticism, we had been concerned about the information sharing. Since that concern was raised, we have had briefings, and we have this committee briefing today.

Mr. Chair, I'm going to start on the diplomatic side. I'll start maybe with a wider lens. I think, Ms. Buck, you and others have mentioned that we're not dealing just with a concern around Mali, per se, that in fact, this is a regional concern. We certainly heard that from Mr. Fowler, for instance. He was quite clear about the concern he had when he was a captive about the plans afoot for what we'll call the extremists to gain a foothold in places like Mali and certainly beyond. Obviously, you would see this as not just a Mali concern, that this is a regional concern.

[Kerry Buck]

It's both a Mali and a regional concern.

In terms of Mali, prior to the coup there had been 20 years of democracy, a democracy with some weaknesses, but a democracy, and one of the most vaunted democracies in Africa. The political instability in Mali and the bifurcation of the country meant that.... It was a geographic bifurcation, a geographic split of the country, but also ethnic and increasingly religious, about a year ago. That's not good for Mali's return to democracy. There have been some important developments on that front, as I mentioned in my opening statement, with the Tuareg in the north no longer siding with the Islamist extremists, and some important steps to go back to democracy in the south as a road map.

It's a Malian problem, but it's part of a broader Sahel problem in that across that region of northern Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and the parts of Algeria running across that part of Africa, over the last few years it has become increasingly a haven for some terrorist extremist groups.

There have long been very porous borders in that area. There are long histories of certain ethnic groups moving freely through the Sahel, certain smuggling enterprises through the Sahel, but the rise of terrorist groups that have been increasingly emboldened is alarming to the whole international community, emboldened partially because of some money and outflow of arms in the context of Libya, but that predated the Libyan military intervention. The arms and money have been coming out of Libya for a while, and from other sources starting to fuel the Islamist extremist groups.

As a terrorist haven the Sahel has caused concern to the international community for a while. I won't get into great detail, but as I said in my statement, we have been active for a long time on that front in security and counterterrorism programming.

At the same time there's a humanitarian crisis in the Sahel, and a food crisis in the Sahel, which I mentioned, and I think Mr. Morrison mentioned, that exacerbated the vulnerability of the population as well.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you for that overview.

One of the concerns we've raised in the recent past is the fact that whilst this is a regional concern, as you mentioned, and a very localized concern as well with regard to Mali, the government has decided to close embassies, as you're aware, including, I think, in particular interest for people, next door in Niger.

With the closing of our diplomatic capacity in Africa generally, but particularly in Niger, could you explain why that decision was made? How is that hindering us? As was mentioned, we are doing work in Niger and it is a regional issue. How has that affected our capability to act?

[Kerry Buck]

Canada is very much engaged in Africa. There has been no stepping away from our engagement in Africa. You'll see that in the frequency of ministerial engagement over the last while. Minister Baird has been there five times now. The Prime Minister has been there. Minister Fast is in Africa right now on a trade mission, and there have been other ministers, including Minister Fantino. There's a high degree of engagement.

We are constantly making decisions about where our diplomatic presence will be most useful. Part of our calculation is to focus our diplomatic engagement in countries where we have significant Canadian interests and where we can bring significant Canadian value.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Time is running out. I'm concerned about the decision to close the embassy in Niger. With due respect to Minister Baird and Minister Fast, we're not talking about trade deals here, we're talking about this regional threat.

How are we making up for the loss of capacity in Niger when it comes to dealing with this particularly difficult scenario?

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Ms. Buck, you have 45 seconds.

[Kerry Buck]

It's a regional threat, and we have taken a regional approach to addressing that regional threat.

For instance, Canada co-chairs the counterterrorism working group on the Sahel, and that is like a clearing house for contributions of countries in the regions and for partners to move forward programming, to build capacity to stop terrorism, to be able to detect bad guys and bad things going across borders. We're taking a regional approach that way. We use our African diplomatic resources to also send that message and help mobilize those programming resources.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

I'm simply making the point that we have fewer of them on the ground.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you, Mr. Dewar. That's all your time.

We're going to turn it over to Mr. Dechert. Sir, you have seven minutes, please.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'll help my friend Mr. Dewar by reminding him that Canada has a very significant diplomatic mission in Mali itself.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today and sharing this very important information. Canadians are very interested to know about the situation in Mali and how it affects the stability of the entire region.

We've learned in the last couple of days that the French have made some significant progress in pushing back the rebels in northern Mali. I'm wondering if you could share with us the composition of those rebels and what we know about them. Maybe you could describe some of the recent reports that we've heard that the Tuareg have welcomed the idea of dialogue with the interim government. Is that true? What dynamics exist among the various factions in the north?

That's a question for Ms. Buck and perhaps General Vance.

[Kerry Buck]

I can lead, and then General Vance will come in.

First, I'll give you the backdrop. A year ago, prior to the declaration of northern Mali as a separate Islamist state, one of the main Tuareg groups, the MNLA, had affiliated itself with al Qaeda and a few of the other groups. Immediately after the declaration of the north as an Islamist state, the Islamist extremist groups parted company with the MNLA, pushed them out of the cities, and took over. I'll deal with the MNLA in a second.

There are four main armed Islamist extremist groups or terrorist groups loosely associated with each other to varying degrees. There's al Qaeda in the Maghreb, listed as a terrorist entity by Canada and the UN. There's MUJWA, also known as MUJAO, which is the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa. This is an AQIM spinoff, which also has an ideological aim to spread jihad across West Africa. There's Ansar Dine, which is a Tuareg-led salafist movement seeking to impose sharia across Mali, but we understand that faction is splintering right now. Then there is a group called Signataires par le sang established by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, which is again a splinter group. I want to make the point that this is very distinct from the Tuareg nationalist group, the MNLA, which seeks an independent homeland for the Tuareg, but which is primarily secular.

In terms of what's happened politically recently, it is very important. The MNLA came out on the weekend saying that they supported the French military intervention. Also, they have begun to say they want to come back to the table with the Malian government to seek reconciliation. From southern Mali, the president of Mali has clearly indicated two things: he's willing to sit down with the MNLA; and he and Islamic leaders and other members of the Malian population have also indicated that the other extremist groups are not welcome at the table, including Ansar Dine, which had been at a previous mediation effort about a year ago. It's an important split between the groups representing some of the Tuareg and the extremist groups; it's an important political signal to bring the political track together. A mediation effort has been supported by ECOWAS in Burkina Faso, and this will be key in moving forward to a reunification of the country.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

General Vance, could you tell us about the six tests the French military has had?

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

Yes, sir. I think generally speaking we can say that the French offensive operations were mounted extremely quickly, very professionally, and indeed have been very effective to this point in time.

Over a very short period they have served to do two things: primarily to stop the southern advance of the rebels, as Ms. Buck has indicated; and actually to reverse that such that they are now being pushed above the Gao-Timbuktu line, in fact all the way up to Kidal, a city where the MNLA are prominent.

To be sure, there has been some attrition of hardened terrorist elements, AQIM and others, and some attrition of Islamist extremist rebel groups. But largely speaking, from the very beginning of the operation, the rebels started to melt back and were pushed out of the towns. There's been some attrition, but lots remain, particularly in the mountainous region bordering Algeria.

The French would intend to take advantage of any political rapprochement that would occur and use this period to then support the arrival of AFISMA forces that would then start to conduct operations in Mali, both to secure Mali and to set conditions for a training mission, and while the EU training mission mounts, such that they can be effectively rebuilding the Malian forces.

The one thing I would leave you with is that the description of the intertribal, inter-group relationship is one thing that's extremely complex, as we know. I think we've done a very good job of understanding to this point in time, but it would be impossible for us to say at this point in time what the regional Islamist radical threat will do as a result of what's happened in Mali.

I think there's a very sound plan and approach. We have yet to see what the response is. If you think of all-up numbers, generally speaking the trend is a growth of Islamist extremism in the area. If that trend continues, this will help Mali, but of course there remains the regional concern.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Thank you, General.

I have one quick question for Ms. Buck.

You mentioned the road map transition back to democratic elections. Can you tell us a little more about that? What are the challenges facing the Malian government as they prepare for those elections, and what are the benchmarks that Canada will use to monitor their success in the lead-up to those elections?

[Kerry Buck]

Canada pushed the Malian government very hard to adopt a road map to bring back constitutional normalcy at all levels. On Tuesday the Malian national assembly did adopt the road map for transition. The president also came out and announced that he intended to hold elections before July 31, 2013.

These are very, very important steps. The road map includes some very important elements. It confirms that the interim president and interim prime minister can't run in the next elections, and confirms a number of other elements to ensure fair, credible, independent elections.

We are going to be watching very closely in the lead-up to the elections that those elements of the road map are being respected, but as I said, over the past week this has been a very important move. The return to a full civilian authority and constitutional rule is something for which we've been pressing for a long time.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

Mr. McKay, you have seven minutes, sir.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to all for your participation.

My first question is for General Vance, and it's a very simple question.

General Vance, what is Canada's military goal?

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

Our military goal is to provide effective C-17 support to France until February 15.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Isn't that simply a supply of an asset rather than a goal? Do we actually have a specific goal as a nation, our nation?