Thanks for this opportunity to discuss Canada’s current role in Mali.
Let me start by saying that the cautious approach being taken by the Canadian government is welcome.
In the detailed briefing I have sent to you, I propose five principles to guide Canada’s decisions on how to contribute to the creation of sustainable peace in Mali. Specific initiatives can be tested against these principles.
The first three, dealing with humanitarian assistance, democracy and restoration, and building peace between the south and the north, have been spoken to very eloquently by other people who have appeared before this committee. I want to focus on the fourth and fifth principles that deal more directly with the military mission in Mali.
The crucial decision from my vantage point isn't boots on the ground or not boots on the ground, but what those boots do when they're on the ground. This applies to boots whether they're from Canada, France, Chad, Mali, the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, or the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
Canada should press Mali and other military forces to make protection of vulnerable citizens their primary mission, displaying the highest respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. Protecting vulnerable civilians will win and maintain the support of the local populations and should be the primary mission of Malian and international troops. Concrete military operational implications flow from this principle.
It's worth remembering that al-Qaeda and affiliated groups have a clear strategy for drawing western militaries into debilitating fights in inhospitable terrain. They use asymmetric tactics to exhaust the will and resources of their opponents. Why let them set the agenda when alternative frameworks for restoring security in Mali and the broader Sahel region are available?
The actions of Canada and others in Mali should not be characterized as being part of an anti-terrorism struggle. Instead, we should see Mali’s current challenges as the culmination of political, military, and ethnic breakdown in Mali, which various groups have exploited.
The initial success of the French, Chadian, and Malian armed military forces in dislodging al-Qaeda and other insurgent forces from various urban areas is a welcome development, but as you well know, it's not definitive. In the vast countryside, AQIM and some Tuareg factions have reportedly established bases and supply lines that will permit them to carry out asymmetric attacks well into the future.
It is tempting for French and other military forces with advanced technological weaponry to now engage in search and destroy missions in the desert using air and drone strikes and to send special forces on raids to kill insurgents. This is a whack-a-mole strategy that has actually been counterproductive in other settings. As they say, for every insurgent killed, another 10 brothers or cousins step forward to repel the apostate enemy.
Instead, the military mission in Mali should continue to focus on protecting civilians in main population areas and along travel and trade routes. Keep open humanitarian assistance corridors. Patrol the borders as well as possible to disrupt supply routes for insurgents. Contain those who use terrorist methods, and then capture and submit them to democratic processes of justice. Military capabilities may be needed on an interim basis for these tasks, but the function is more akin to policing and should in fact devolve over time into a policing mission rather than a military mission.
The Malian military is reportedly engaging in human rights violations and targeted killing of civilians, particularly people identified as Tuaregs and Arabs. These actions are morally reprehensible and contrary to international law. Such behaviour also deepens the alienation of local populations and makes the tasks of re-establishing democracy and negotiating south-north peace much more difficult.
Robert Fowler, who appeared before this committee earlier in the week, said in his book that during his captivity in northern Mali, on a regular basis he and his colleague, Louis Guay, were subjected to al-Qaeda propaganda loops on laptops.
Always part of the show were pictures and videos of Abu Ghraib in Iraq and Guantanamo in Cuba, where western human rights standards were sacrificed on the altar of the great war on terror. Fowler bitterly detests and denounces these violations of fundamental human rights.
The deployment of ECOWAS troops to Mali under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 2085 is welcome. The problems in Mali threaten a broader range of countries than just Mali.
As a general principle, Canada should support policies and provide assistance that encourage and enable regional and sub-regional bodies like the African Union and ECOWAS to directly engage in peace operations in their own territories, assuming, of course, that the mission is properly authorized and implemented. Neighbours know the problems better and likely are more attuned to cultural and other dynamics.
Canada should strongly consider providing financial and technical assistance to the African-led international support mission to Mali, AFISMA, and to its UN successor, if AFISMA is re-hatted in some way as a UN mission. It should then address the problem of illegally circulating small arms and light weapons in Mali and its neighbours, and implement, as soon as possible, a program of disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation of fighters on all sides of the conflict.
Controlling and reducing the number of small arms and light weapons in Mali and the broader Sahel region should be a pressing priority for Canada and other new national actors in Mali. ECOWAS has enacted a convention on small arms, light weapons, their ammunition, and other associated material. This legally binding sub-regional instrument can provide the framework to attack this menacing reality. Canadian police and military have expertise in weapons stockpile management and control of guns in civilian possession and would make an important contribution to Mali’s long-term stability.
Finally, peace agreements, when they're reached, often fail when combatants are not disarmed, properly demobilized, and reintegrated into the social and economic life of their communities. DDR programs have been established in many countries after peace agreements were reached and, again, Canada could provide leadership to define both the need and the plan for implementation in the medium and longer term. There is a range of non-combatant but military contributions that Canada can make to Mali’s long-term peace and stability.
In closing, allow me to agree with Major-General Jonathan Vance, who appeared before this committee last week and said:...there is a tendency sometimes to see military kinetic action as being the silver bullet on the Islamist threat. In fact, kinetic action does not address root causes. An appropriate balance between hard military and all of the other things that have been mentioned here is what actually stops the Islamist threat. You simply are unable to use kinetics to stop this.
Thanks very much.