Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for the opportunity to address the standing committee.
Back in 2006, Ottawa asked that I write a short note on my personal views on North Korea. I started by commenting words to the effect that Stalin would be jealous of what “The Great Leader” Kim II-sung and his son Kim Jong-il have achieved in building a true Stalinist state in North Korea. As far as I'm concerned, it's the scariest place that I've ever had to deal with in my 30 years of foreign service, and I have spent time in the jungle with the Khmer Rouge. They were pussycats in comparison.
As you are aware, I was the Canadian ambassador to South Korea from 2004 to 2007. In 2005, Ottawa decided to transfer accreditation to North Korea to Seoul, to me. Certainly, at last count, there were some 13 ambassadors in Seoul, including Canada, who were accredited to Pyongyang. That includes Norway, New Zealand, and Ireland. At that time we called ourselves “Club Pyongyang”.
I did make four trips to Pyongyang over my time. Before commenting on Canada's foreign policy as it relates to North Korea, I'd like to share with you a few personal observations and conclusions about North Korea from my time there and in discussion with think tanks in Beijing and in Seoul, and in meeting various people.
Now, I said it was the scariest place that I've had to deal with because of the type of total brainwashing that starts with toddlers in North Korea. They are taught that everything flows from the goodness of the Kim dynasty. They're taught historically that North Korea did win the Korean War, that South Korea is an economic disaster, and of course, how the imperialist Americans are ready to invade at any time.
It is my belief that North Korea certainly is a failing state. It cannot even feed its own people. Mr. Kim mentioned its atrocious human rights record.
Songun policy, or military first policy, is not a joke. The Kim dynasty has always needed military support to survive, and certainly it continues to do so. I met with the North Korean military once. They do not normally meet with foreign diplomats. What was supposed to be a 20-minute courtesy call lasted for about an hour and a half. We had one of those frank and fraternal exchanges of view. What is important, what I was left with, was that it was the only meeting in all of my official meetings over four visits where my Ministry of Foreign Affairs minder was not allowed in the room. I think that's fairly significant in terms of a reflection of North Korean military, shall we say, influence.
The military, of course, said to me it's only North Korean nuclear weapons that are stopping the United States from invading us. I, of course, said that's nonsense, and we had, as I mentioned, a very long exchange about this. Very little is known, if anything, really, about North Korea's nuclear command and control structure. That should be of great concern to all of us. It certainly was my conclusion that the North Korean military has no sense of geopolitical reality, but is certainly very powerful behind the scenes and is happy to remain in the background.
Of course, Kim Jong-un is very wise to continue his father's approach if he wants to stay in power. There's always talk of the Ceausescu scenario. But I believe that the possibility of a North Korean military miscalculation is high.
You're all aware, and you probably have the list of the latest incidents over the last six months or so, on North Korea's part: the breaking of the armistice; closing Kaesong; maintaining a war footing; even telling foreigners in Seoul to leave; and then recently announcing that it plans to reactivate the Yongbyon nuclear reactor. Plus, of course, there have been the three nuclear tests and missile testing.
Now this type of vitriol and action has actually been quite unprecedented. During my time, there would always be threats of turning Seoul into a sea of fire, and everybody would shrug that off and life went on, and I think Seoul is going back there. But there have been a number of results, if you like, from these incidents. Certainly North Korea has caused China to lose patience. Indeed, my personal message to Chinese officials over a series of meetings has been that, number one, China is always a very long-term, strategic thinker, and in the case of North Korea, as a failing state it is now a liability to China. Ultimately it's in China's long-term interests to have the best possible political and commercial relations with South Korea.
North Korea has certainly antagonized the United States and provided a reason for additional U.S. military deployment. North Korea gave the U.S. and China an excellent reason to consult more closely. The presidents of China and the U.S., of course, will be talking later this week, and I expect that North Korea is on the list. North Korea has insulted the new South Korean president, Park Geun-hye, and of course North Korea has antagonized Japan.
Now most of this rhetoric appears to be for domestic purposes, a part of Kim Jong-un's continuing consolidation of power. Indeed, none of North Korea's foreign policy objectives have been achieved, i.e., lifting of sanctions, direct talks with the United States, economic support from South Korea and Japan. I don't think they will be achieved in the foreseeable future.
There is, however, no reason to believe that sanctions will work any better in the future, even if China implements them fully. There's also no reason to believe that North Korea will stop its nuclear program. Indeed, it's amazing how long a Stalinist fossil and failing state like North Korea has managed to survive. But this has not happened through madness or any sheer good luck. North Korea's actions have been coldly calculated, and it survives through bombast, bombs, missiles, tyrannical control of its people, clever manipulation of its neighbours and the few friends that it has—and China, of course, is in that category. But the potential for miscalculation by North Korea is there, and it's huge.
With respect to Canadian foreign policy, I think that over the years Canada has had a good record in the humanitarian support of North Korea through the Red Cross and UN agencies, including the World Food Programme. There are numbers that are out there in DFAIT press releases, as far as that type of support. Canada remains fully supportive of UN sanctions against North Korea, but quite frankly that's not a big deal since trade has been insignificant and Canada doesn't bring to bear any pressure by turning off so-called Canadian trade.
Also, there has been no indication that North Korea has been trying to circumvent Canada's export control regime on nuclear or missile technology. Canadian military presence at the UN Command is modest but certainly appreciated by the U.S. and South Korea.
Mr. Kim talked about 2010 and the adoption of Canada's controlled engagement policy.
The current ambassador to Seoul, who I believe is now well into his second or third year there, has yet to present his credentials to Pyongyang. Why? I'm certainly not aware of any lower-level diplomatic exchanges with North Korea, or Canadian visits to Pyongyang.
As Mr. Kim said, there's a symbolism to what Canada has been doing, but I think right now Canada is a marginal player on the North Korean file and is in danger of becoming a non-player.
Again, we're not China or the U.S. or Japan, but we can still make a difference. However, to have that kind of impact we have to engage the North Koreans at a high level. That means the Canadian ambassador has to convey Canada's concerns about nuclear non-proliferation, human rights, cyberspace, and regional security to senior North Korean cadres. I certainly did that when I presented my credentials to Kim Yong-nam, who is the number two in their structure, the president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly. We had a robust, frank, and fraternal exchange of views, as I have had with senior officials in various places in Pyongyang.
By the way, as an aside, it's very unlikely that you're going to change the views of senior cadres, but when I was the ambassador to Vietnam I was usually speaking to the young person sitting in the third row—or in the second row here—who was taking careful notes and listening to what I was saying. It's a long-term strategy.
You have to visit Pyongyang regularly to see what's happening in the streets and elsewhere. You have to take the Beijing-Pyongyang train, which takes about 26 hours, and see what's happening in the countryside. That's the way you can establish credibility and expertise. Only then can you speak with some authority, having been there. Only then can you really engage key players, such as China, on the North Korea file.
Finally, in the bigger scheme of things, Canada has to look at serious engagement with North Korea as one important building block for Canada's political engagement and commitment to Asia.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I will be happy to answer any questions.