Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 20th, 2014

[Marc Garneau, Liberal, Westmount—Ville-Marie, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to both our guests today.

Dr. Momani, you talked about the need to win hearts and minds, and you talked about a national guard. You've said that the military side of it was very important as well. I would like to focus my questioning on the other part, which is that ISIS needs three things: it needs people to come to fight for it, it needs money, and it needs weapons.

Mr. Sanjabi talked about the fact that the retaking of Baiji is probably going to have an effect on revenues because of the loss of oil there. I'm very curious about the oil revenue. Who is buying this stuff? We hear about trucks going out through Turkey. Somebody is obviously buying it and it's a source of revenue. There's obviously funding, we hear, from some countries. I won't name them, but they seem to be feeding money to ISIS as well.

I'd like to hear you on both those things. I'd also like to ask about weapons. You need weapons. Yes, they've taken a lot from the Iraqi army and others, but eventually you run out of weapons. Where do they get access to these weapons? Is it on the black market?

If you could both address those issues, perhaps starting with Dr. Momani.

[Dr. Bessma Momani]

I think a lot has been said about the oil. The number one source of where ISIS gets its money is ransom paid by western governments and western companies. That's really important. You know, oil has been inflated. In fact, there's been a re-evaluation; that $1 million-a-day revenue, a number from oil, was actually reassessed because that was based on oil being sold at $100 per barrel, which is not really the true price. The price is more like $20 per barrel, because it's not refined oil. It's crude and can work in some cheap cars, but it's not necessarily the good stuff, so to speak.

In terms of where that oil is going, it's being primarily sold to Kurdish middlemen. The Kurdish middlemen have been historically buying oil on the black market for a decade, so it's not new. Let's say its simply new people who are pumping it out. Much of that oil goes either into Kurdistan or into Turkey. Keep in mind that it's hard to track, because from some reports we've gotten, some of that literally goes straight into the cars themselves. There's not necessarily a sophisticated pipeline being used; it's literally from car to car to car. So it's hard to identify from the air, which is really the problem.

In terms of fighters, fighters are definitely global, and I think the recruitment process online—at least from the reports I've seen and some conversations I've had with people who understand this a lot better in terms of recruitment of these fighters—they're being self-radicalized online. That is an enormous pull.

I hate to put a stereotype to this, but it is primarily young men, disenfranchised, who are finding all of this violence very appealing. Medieval cutting of throats looks very appealing online to a certain segment of a society that, perhaps, has become jaded and I think no longer sensitive to the kind of violence that we see. I don't want to blame it all on video games, but my point is that there are a lot of factors here in explaining where they're getting this recruitment from.

Weaponry—absolutely a lot of this is from the Iraqi army, from the Syrian army. There are people who are willing to give up their bigger cause for the sake of feeding their family, so there are a lot of people who are willing to trade in this business. Yes, I think there are some weapons being smuggled through Turkey. It's a very long and porous border. The Turks have gotten a really bad rap for this, but it's really not their fault. They don't have the manpower or the surveillance capacity to really man this 800 kilometre or...I lost track, 800-something kilometre border. I mean, it's really porous and long, and mountainous, I should add, which makes it more difficult.

[Marc Garneau, Liberal, Westmount—Ville-Marie, QC]

Thank you.

Mr. Sanjabi.

[Rod Sanjabi]

It's worth noting the oil revenue was largely supposed to make up for the loss of funding from the Saudis and the Gulf states, because as international attention ramped up, ISIS started receiving less and less funding from private individuals.

To go back to what I was pointing to before, which is relevant to the question of recruitment, it is that these were multi-generational investments into radicalizing the Sunni world, across the Sunni world. Basically, in more immediate terms, yes, the recruitment is largely occurring online and I think there's really not much way of stopping that.

I would also point out that in addition to what Professor Momani pointed to, there are a lot of small refineries in Syria that are under ISIS control, and those have been targeted by U.S. air strikes I understand. I don't know what the capacity from those is, but yes, it is definitely worth mentioning.

This isn't to say that they don't have control of oil wells, but without refining capacity they're not going to be able to sell oil that anyone wants to buy. That's a little bit too sweeping, but generally speaking this is definitely going to lower revenues. As I said, it's likely to result in more pressure on minorities and also on foreigners in ISIS-controlled areas.

[Marc Garneau, Liberal, Westmount—Ville-Marie, QC]

Thank you.

I'd like to ask a question about Haider al-Abadi and his supposed attempt to try to find some balance in his cabinet. I realize it is much more than that. Dr. Momani, you talked about the need to go across Sunni tribes, and of course there are different factions of Shias as well. How well do you think he's managing compared to Maliki before him? Do you think there is some hope that there is a perception of balance in terms of the composition of that government and the other outreach efforts?

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Please make a quick response because we're pretty much out of time.

[Dr. Bessma Momani]

He's definitely done a lot better without a doubt. He's saying all the right things. He's definitely a better person in his thinking about Iraq. But the challenge is, and legitimately so, the Shias of Iraq have been screwed over for much of history. They paid a heavy price historically, so to bring back a lot of these Sunni tribes feels like an injustice to them.

I think this is where you need Iranian support. Abadi has been able to come to power, because Khamenei made it very clear that Maliki's time was up. That's really important. I think they are still looking at Iran for endorsement. Iranians can be very helpful in making sure that Abadi comes through and in lowering the sectarian language.

I say this all from the fact that the Iraqi Shias have paid the heaviest price in history for much of Saddam Hussein's rule, so I understand why they feel that since they were always the majority, always treated so terribly by the previous government, that the time is now to put all of that international support. Because Abadi also faces the challenge that much of his government is still the old cronies who are very much waiting for the same pay cheque and the same system. He is a very honest and respectable individual, but he's faced with the fact that he's surrounded by a whole bunch of inscrutable fellows.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

We're going to start the second round of five minutes with Mr. Hawn.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you to both our witnesses.

Dr. Momani, I want to carry on with the training side a little. First, I agree with you about the requirement for an air campaign. I also agree with you about “no western boots on the ground”, which means we need regional boots on the ground, which leads to training.

Canada and others were pretty successful in Afghanistan, training the Afghan National Security Forces, so we do have a lot of experience at that. I'm told by people who have been in the region that there are about a division's worth of Iraqi soldiers or Iraqi army who would be relatively easily trained—and that's a relative term—into a cohesive force. That it would take a training force of about 350 or so Canadians or anybody with experience at that to carry that out and in perhaps a period of about six months they would be ready to make a serious contribution.

I'm going to ask a very specific question that you may not be prepared to answer, but do you think that would be something that the Government of Canada should investigate, an additional commitment, a non-combat commitment but an additional commitment to that whole operation?

[Dr. Bessma Momani]

Yes, absolutely. I think we have a lot to give and I would also point out again, it's a shame, because the Americans did this once already to help the Iraqi army professionalize. How do you run a sophisticated army that lives in a multicultural society? That is one of our great comparative advantages that we don't utilize enough.

I hope the Canadian military can bring some of those really fantastic hard skills of understanding and explaining some of the logistical and tactical techniques that they have been able to perfect, but more importantly, how you have an army that is inclusive and very much comes from a multicultural society. Those are really important factors in a country that has been rocked by sectarianism. There is an example, like the Lebanese army. The Americans have put a lot of money into the Lebanese army to do just that; to elevate this army away from all the sectarian dimensions and that includes training them to talk about defending the nation first and foremost and not succumbing to these parochial identities like Sunni, Shia, Christian, and Kurd.

That's a challenge, but that requires training and I think we are absolutely the best international force to do that because of our comparative advantage as a multicultural society.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you very much.

We talked about the need for financing and weapons and all that kind of stuff. Right now, ISIS or whatever we want to call them, needs financing and right now they're paying a lot of money. We've seen recruiting in Canada and elsewhere where they're offering a lot of money for people to become radicalized or to go and fight. If their source of funds was substantially cut, do you think that would impact the level of radicalization that people seem to exhibit?

[Dr. Bessma Momani]

They're paying about $1,000 per month to their local forces, and there's everything from.... There are cheaper amounts if you're not in the high-risk force. There are some forces that may be called on to do suicide bombing or to do the grunt work. They're paid a lot more than some of the foot soldiers who are more administrative and backup.

I think there are two parts to this. That $1,000 per month is not going to attract a westerner who is being beckoned to go to fight for ISIS. That's not going to convince them. The radical ideology or the gruesome images are what's attracting them. That's the self-radicalization. But if you're asking if $1,000 per month is enough money to convince a local force, absolutely. That's where you need to pay. You have to basically use the market to your advantage and pay the local national guards enough money so that it no longer looks attractive.

Again, this is a situation where people are really quite desperate for money. This is not all ideology; some of it is just plainly being able to support your family.

That money is going to go down because they are having less access to it. The west is finally not paying some of those ransoms, and there has been a lot more high profile scrutiny of that. We still need to put pressure on the French, who, by the way, still continue to pay under the table. That's the number one source. The French and some of the other European countries are paying to get people out.

They're also using extortion and kidnapping of individuals who may have a relative anywhere in Canada or the United States. We need to do something about that. The number one source of money is ransom and not oil. That, I think, is part of the long-term strategy, if you really want to stop this.

Also I'd point out that, yes, there are sympathizers who were in the Gulf sending money, but it was never the states. I think we need to really make that clear. It wasn't the Saudi government or the UAE government that was sending money. They were individuals primarily in Kuwait, not even in Saudi Arabia, who were sending money. Often this was linked to those YouTube videos. That money was fuelling basically an online campaign whereby donors were given the proof that their money was being put to good use, to kill, for example, this or that individual who's deemed to be the enemy.

There's a lot of this that can be done online. Some of the strategies of fighting hate speech, for example, the holocaust museum in Washington, have done some of the best work on this. How do you counter hate speech online?

There is a technique and a way that we can do this. It includes everything from advertisements and YouTube videos. Before you actually see the YouTube video of this awful beheading, you can get actual ad space that talks about.... You can get a prominent imam, and there are many out there who are dispelling the religious fervour of this, saying, “This is completely unethical. You're not going to go to heaven. You're going to rot in hell.” That needs to be on there. That requires finances.

I actually spoke to someone who does this kind of thing and has been doing this quite effectively in other countries. It does work, so there are some techniques that can be used to counter this type of violence such as messaging, but it needs ad dollars.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

That's all the time we have, thanks.

Madam Laverdière, please.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you very much.

Thank you very much to both witnesses and for very interesting presentations and comments. I think I've taken a couple of pages of notes already, including how to combat hate speech.

As a follow-up to some previous questions, and very briefly, Ms. Momani, you mentioned that the Turkish border is very difficult to monitor, both for petrol coming up and weapons going into Iraq. Is there any way to increase that border protection, and would that be useful at all?

[Dr. Bessma Momani]

It would be very useful, and I would just point out that Turkey is a NATO member. That's really important. That's a very valuable connection.

The Turks are obviously very concerned, more on their western border with Syria, because that's the most populated in terms of both Turks and Syrians. You can see why they've put most of their investment into monitoring the western part of their border. Their eastern border is pretty much a no man's land, and people do cross very easily, especially locals. Those individuals, on both sides of the border—again, Kurds and Turks—are complicit in this trade. They benefit. There are a lot of middlemen and a lot of warlords who are gaining money out of this.

I think it's important to understand that the Turks would be willing to have.... It's not in their interest and I don't think that despite a lot of the media's unfavourable portrayal of the Erdogan government, which is warranted for other reasons, that it's in Erdogan's interest or in Davutoglu's interest to have this border being so porous. The challenge is simply manning it. They don't have the resources to do that, and more importantly, they are consumed with the threat of the two million to three million Syrian refugees who are going to trickle over their border, and that's on the western side. They are more focused on that.

They've been calling for a buffer zone inside Syria. It's an absolutely fantastic idea. We need to do more to provide a safe space for Syrians in their own country, which I think is vital if we're going to talk about long-term security. I remember testifying to this very same point. You need to put these humanitarian buffer zones within the border of Syria. Doing that will protect the long-term stability of not just Turkey but also Lebanon and Jordan, which increasingly—and I say this having come back from the region just a few weeks ago—are really under strain. We cannot afford to lose those three allies.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you very much. That's very interesting.

I would like to ask one brief question if I have time.

What do you see as the potential dangers associated with the possible expansion of a Canadian military mission into Syria?

[Dr. Bessma Momani]

I look at it this way. There is a danger in the narrative, because you have the Assad regime that has killed 200,000 people. It's responsible, I think, for the 200,000 or maybe it has blood on its hands for at least 150,000 of that. The reality is that there are many within the region who are very skeptical about the western intervention against ISIS. They say, “Why is it that suddenly you're rushing here because of two unfortunate and horrible and horrific decapitations of these two western journalists, yet the blood of 150,000 Arab Muslims was basically cheap and valueless?”

ISIS has killed 1,200 people. That's not to discount the fact that those are 1,200 people that matter, but in the big scheme of things, people see the real devil here as being the Assad regime. So you're really losing the hearts and minds, and we need to make sure that it's emphasized. I'm all for military support in countering ISIS, but you need to also have this not being in sectarian language. It is not useful for us to talk about us countering ISIS because they're hurting minorities. No. If you do that, you perpetuate the myth that this is a war against Sunni Islam, which is not true. We need to talk about ISIS being a medieval, horrible organization that is at risk of engulfing the region. I would say, having come from the region, that from the Gulf to the Levant, people keep saying to me, “I don't see the threat of ISIS, but I do see the threat of the Assad regime, because the Assad regime is sending two to three million people our way.”

That really reverberates if we're talking about Canadian reputation in the region.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Madame Laverdière.

We're going to finish up with Mr. Anderson for five minutes.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Thank you again, Mr. Chair.

One of the things we've talked about this morning is the objective of degrading ISIL over time here.

I'm just wondering if you could give us an idea of how you would measure and assess that. If that happens, what will it look like? How can we measure and assess that as it takes place?

[Dr. Bessma Momani]

What would degrading ISIS look like? Obviously, it would mean having its military units obliterated. There are 30,000 to 40,000 people, which is not a lot in the big scheme of things. You need to stop the recruitment to add to that, because the recruitment, much of it foreign, is making that number go up and up. The recent estimates of the CIA are that it's now at perhaps 50,000, and much of that has been through online recruitment. So you need to stop the recruitment.

I think you also need to change the tide domestically, and that means filling the political vacuum. I would say there are still people who despise the ideology, despise much of ISIS's rule, but who are saying, “If we get rid of ISIS tomorrow, what will come in its wake? Who's going to do the things like pick up the garbage, like provide electricity? More importantly, does this mean that we are now going to be under the rule of both the Abadi government and the Assad government?” That's not necessarily fathomable either, so you need to give them an alternative. That's really important in creating a narrative, and a real political option the day afterwards.

I really focus on this: what's the day after degrading ISIS? If you don't provide sustainable institutions that can fill that vacuum, it will just be another acronym that will fill that space.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

I want to talk a little bit about some of those institutions, other than just the military. In Iraq, do the police and judiciary have the strength to provide effective protection? You said this issue isn't about religious minorities, but minority communities are definitely being targeted and hit with this. Do the police and judiciary have the strength to deal with this?

I guess I'd also be interested in a comment about the Syrian institutions that will exist if ISIL is degraded.

[Dr. Bessma Momani]

There aren't a lot of Syrian institutions left in the region. They've been gone for four years, and I dare say, they pretty much neglected that region when they did rule.

On the Iraqi front, you asked about the police and the judiciary. I think they're a far cry from being professional forces in both cases. The police have become very much dominated by the Iraqi Shiite as well as the judiciary. This is all Maliki's work, not that of Abadi, who I think has done a good job of trying to combat this. But this has become so entrenched, because we've had, under Maliki, four or five years of ensuring that only his cronies, those who come from his particular ideological orientation within the Shia community.... There are plenty of secular, centrist Shias who don't support Maliki's perspective. I'd even point to some who are not centrist people, like the Sadrists, who don't support Maliki's view. That's another untapped resource in Iraq, which would very much be willing to...in the name of a more national narrative. Maliki is seen as a puppet of the Iranian regime, even within Iraq among some of the more radical Shiite forces, who are very much Arab and not Persian.

I'd let my colleague, the other witness, talk about that because he's much more of an expert on Iranians, as I mentioned.

[Rod Sanjabi]

I'm not sure what kind of policy ramification this has. It is somewhat counterintuitive and interesting. It's exactly what Professor Momani was pointing to, which is that, in fact, the more politicized Shiite clerics tend to be more open to cooperation with Sunni forces. Traditionalist, quietist Shiite clerics, who may reject the role of clergy or even the role of religion in government, tend to be more anti-Sunni. That's something to keep in mind.

I don't know exactly how that can be reflected in policy, but it is certainly worth noting that some of the forces that you would think to be more radical, and which possibly even played a role in radicalizing the Sunni population in Iraq, are more likely to be useful, you could say, co-belligerents going forward.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

To our two witnesses today, Dr. Momani and Mr. Sanjabi, thank you very much for your time.

We're going to suspend just for one second while we change out and get our other video conference set up.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Welcome back.

I want to welcome Father Mallon, who is joining us via video conference from New York City. He is with the Catholic Near East Welfare Association and is the external affairs officer.

Welcome, Father Mallon and thank you very much for being here today.

Joining us here in Ottawa we have Mr. Hétu, who is national director for Canada for the Catholic Near East Welfare Association.

Mr. Hétu, welcome here today.

We're going to start with our friend in New York City, Father Mallon. We're going to turn it over to you for your opening remarks.