Thanks very much. Thank you for having me. I would only stress before I begin my comments that my work primarily focuses on Iran so the impressions I'll be offering will be general.
Historically it's just worth pointing out a few things. One is that this degree of radicalism is not ingrained. It's not something that's existed for generations. It's largely the result of the investment in radicalization of Islamic education over the course of the last couple of generations by the Saudis and the Gulf states. What I'm speaking about of course is a little bit broader than simply the recent investment over the last ten years in AQIM and ISIS. That kind of cultural substrate is an important thing to keep in mind.
Also, it's worth mentioning that recently Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former President of Iran, pointed out that in his belief some Shiite practices, including the burning in effigy of the Caliph Umar, whom for Sunnis is some import, and such discrimination has led to the rise of ISIS. To the degree that this represents a widespread belief in Iran—and I can't say that it necessarily does—there is some sense I think among Shiites as well that this is an issue. I'm going to come back to that later.
I'd also point out that this degree of radicalism, as I said before, wasn't evident in the Sunni population of Iraq or Syria prior to 2011 and Bashar al-Assad's rather brutal crackdown and especially also prior to 2003 in Iraq. This takfiri ideology that the professor pointed to wherein all members of society who do not subscribe to the radical Salafi ideals of ISIS are considered to be non-believers and deserving of state violence is a new and very troubling development. I think that's not a very controversial point. So in the current context with ISIS having been expelled from Baiji and the refineries, it's worth noting that the $30 million or so a month it was predicted that they were going to be making is likely to go down. It's difficult for them to sell crude oil. It's much easier to sell refined petroleum products.
I'm not an expert but I think their ability to pay their forces will be significantly diminished and as a result I think their fighting ability may also be diminished over the coming months. From what I know of the Iranian context I can say that careers have been made in the IRGC. The IRGC's role in regaining Amerli has been significant. It's made some propaganda points in Iran. It's worth mentioning that this has had quite an effect in the Iranian context. The IRGC, who no one would have thought in 2009 would have ever had a chance at gaining significant popular support, is now considered to be something of a force for national unity and defence. It's unlikely that Suleimani, the head of the Quds Force, will stay in command for very long. The supreme leader has a record of removing generals from power once they accumulate a certain amount of influence, especially in the IRGC.
It's nonetheless worth mentioning that this has provided a significant opportunity for them. All of this aside, I wanted to comment on the reprise that we hear a lot that there needs to be a political solution in Iraq to address the ISIS presence in Iraq. I think that's true. It's difficult in the context though, because for generations, always, the Shiite population of Iraq was marginalized. The relative radicalization of the Shiite population, especially after—well, radicalization might be strong. Obviously Maliki was unable to compromise. I don't think that will be forthcoming in a meaningful way. What you're more likely to see is a fig leaf and a facade of cooperation rather than anything else.
To finish, I wanted to point to some of the findings of the Syrian COI, the commission of inquiry. They published a report on human rights under ISIS very recently. There are a few interesting points. Victims are consistently describing acts of terror, aimed at—as the professor pointed out—limiting the exercise of religious freedom, freedom of speech, assembly, and association, and this goes quite far. There's testimony indicating that some children have been pressured to inform on their parents. There are a number of reports of ISIS attacking social and cultural events, including weddings. There are plenty of reports—and this has entered the media—of lashings and amputation for offences such as smoking and theft. Victims have described a presumption of guilt until innocence is proven, to the degree that there are legal proceedings.
It's also worth mentioning, yes, minorities are targeted significantly. They've been more or less faced with the choice of assimilating or fleeing. Forced conversion is quite regular, especially among people who have been kidnapped. There are reports of churches having been destroyed, and obviously, forceable displacement has created a massive humanitarian disaster throughout the region.
I'll end there. I'm open to answering any questions, but once again, I would urge you to remember that I am an Iran specialist so this isn't quite my field.