Foreign Affairs Committee on Dec. 4th, 2014

[Matteo Legrenzi]

No, I think it would be counterproductive. It's not by listing organizations that have a large following in places like Egypt, for example, that you get rid of the problem.

I want to also make a broader point that I think is very important. I would be very wary of Iraqi politicians when they start blaming outside forces. Look at al-Maliki's rambling resignation speech in Baghdad, where he's blaming outside forces. That is a sign of trying to deflect responsibility.

In general, once you get regional players on the ground into a situation, they bring their own agendas. The question stops being, “How do we get out of this and how do we get an Iraqi solution?” They then risk prolonging the conflict.

One thing is to have people who come in and train Iraqi forces, for example, under strict conditions so that we avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. But the idea that you could have Egyptian or Jordanian forces fighting is not only fanciful, because it's not going to happen, but it would also be very dangerous. We have also seen this in Syria when outside players brought their own agendas. That then makes reaching a solution even more complicated.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Mr. Tabler, specifically on the Muslim Brotherhood, what's your view?

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Very quickly, because we're over time.

[Andrew Tabler]

No, I don't advocate listing the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. However, it is important to point out that members of the Muslim Brotherhood and certain aspects of it I think do have ties with Salafist and other jihadist groups and members and extremism.

I think it would be better, though, to try to work with them to isolate those more extreme members, to work with us into the future in a general sense. Perhaps we should focus more on individuals and less on organizations as a whole going forward as we address this problem.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

We're going to start our next round, which is round four.

Mr. Dewar.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

For our guests, I want to follow up on this point. We had talked earlier about the idea of convening an international conference that would look at bringing different parties, disparate groups, frankly, together. We do now have a coalescing variable here, which was not the case before, and certainly al-Maliki was part of the problem.

I really want to underline this point to my colleagues. ISIS didn't just fall from the sky. They were preying upon the alienation that was happening, and al-Maliki and the Shia militias associated in horrific crimes. That should be noted, but I want to underline this notion that we can pull people together. The opportunity is in front of us right now. I'm a little concerned around timing because we have certain groups who before were alienated from Baghdad.

There is a new opportunity because there is a new prime minister who, again, I hope will change things, and there is some evidence that is already happening. You mentioned the MB, but what about other Iraqi groups that we could invite, obviously Sunni-affiliated groups, to look at being part of the national dialogue again? I note that there are some who are now in Turkey. They aren't part of ISIS; they were alienated by al-Maliki.

Who would they be? Can you tell me that? Second, would it be opportune right now, while the opportunity is in front of us, to engage, and probably not with a conference? That's not ready to go yet, but through, certainly, individual diplomatic engagements. Maybe that's happening, I don't know, but would that be the first step in terms of building confidence?

I'll go to our friend in Venice first on that.

[Matteo Legrenzi]

Yes, technically that's a good idea. I don't think the time is mature for a conference. You're absolutely right.

My only advice would be to try to deal as much as possible with the people on the ground. Exiled groups, I remember, quickly develop an agenda of their own, and it's very difficult and murky then to try to establish what exactly they control on the ground in Iraq, particularly in areas that are controlled by the Islamic State. So as much as possible, you have to work with the people on the ground.

I remember, before the fall of Saddam Hussein, these people in Oxford claimed to represent the true Iraqi opposition in exile and so on and so forth, assuring us that in the event of a regime change, they would have everything under control. They said that they were very much in charge of many opposition groups, and then look at what happened right afterward.

It's a worthy effort. It's the right thing to do, but always be very skeptical and realistic about exiled groups who do not interact directly with the people who are on the ground.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

That's a very good point.

Mr. Tabler, I want to go to you on Syria, on the engagement with al-Assad. I note that Brahimi had tried to give him an opportunity to leave early on when Mr. Brahimi was in Damascus, and that failed, unfortunately

On air strikes in Syria, we as the opposition party have some concerns about the fact that we would actually have to get permission to engage in Syria because we'd have to go to Damascus through al-Assad.

Could you comment on whether that's something that is a wise thing to do? We think it is unwise to do that simply for reasons you've mentioned with regard to the configuration of things on the ground in Syria.

[Andrew Tabler]

I would not advise it. I think the current policy of uncoordinated deconfliction, or whatever it's referred to as, is when we fly over Syria and President Bashar al-Assad pretends not to mind. The reason why he's doing this is of course that it is coordinated with the Iraqi government, an entity we coordinate with extensively. The Iraqi government has spoken with the Syrian regime, and it speaks to them all the time about this. It's because President Assad benefits and has overwhelmingly benefited from U.S. air strikes on Syria to date.

That means that, yes, we're degrading ISIL, but we're making that settlement in Syria—a real settlement that solves this problem and doesn't generate more terrorism, extremism and suffering—that much more illusive.

I would say that for the moment it seems wise to focus activities in Iraq, to look at Syria, and look at not only what we're doing there. I think it's important to protect individuals along the way, but we need to protect all individuals, as many civilians as we can, minorities and majorities.

The problem until now has been that for the United States in particular and the western countries, their policies have been held up by extremists who say, “If you watch very closely since September 11, 2001, the west only kills Sunni Arabs. If you're anything else but Sunni Arabs you get every break and you receive even direct military assistance in exchange for a de facto alliance with the west.”

Such policies don't benefit the people of the region and they don't benefit western countries. It would be one thing if the Sunni-Shia or Sunni minority balance in the Middle East was 50-50. It's not even close to that. We need to be much more understanding of the political balance inside these countries and come up with a real solution that protects majorities and majority populations.

In Syria, unfortunately until now, I see that the bombing of ISIL has only strengthened and made more illusive that final settlement that truly takes care of this problem.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

We move over to Mr. Anderson for five minutes.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to go in a little different direction than we've talked about this morning. I think it was Mr. Tabler who said that people and governments don't change without a reason to, and you need to create a necessity for change.

There are two ways that can happen. One is by pressure and the other one is by reward. I'm wondering if there are any kind of fiscal, financial considerations that some of these nations and governments would take into consideration that might lead to an end or at least a lessening of the hostilities. I'm interested in that. Is there anything that would be of enough benefit to some of the players in this area that they would say, “We need to find some solutions here because we're going to benefit in some ways that we're not benefiting from right now”?

Anyone can take it.

[Andrew Tabler]

I'll just make a comment. In terms of financial arrangements, one aspect of this that was pursued early in the Syrian conflict but was not followed up on in any kind of real way concerned sanctions on the Assad regime. Those were taken in tandem with increased sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran. While those two sanctions regimes took care of the problem of where Syria in particular sold its oil, they actually did not take care of the fact that Iran and Syria trade extensively in oil products and other products as well and support each other.

I think we'd have to think a little bit about how we would interrupt that assistance going forward, at what time, and how useful it would be. Obviously we're having conversations with the Iranians over what to do in Syria, but the question is, are the conversations going in the right direction?

Until recently—or until now—I don't think the Iranians would like to go with anyone else but Assad. It doesn't mean that they're married to him, but they don't see the necessity of getting rid of him in the midst of this crisis and in the midst of the threat from ISIL, but how could this be incentivized along the way?

If negotiations with Iran fail, then we would to look at stronger measures to isolate both the Assad regime as well as the Islamic Republic, but that is in the distant future and the subject of a long homework assignment for us all, I'm afraid.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Professor.

[Matteo Legrenzi]

I take this cue from the latest comment. I think that an understanding with the Islamic Republic of Iran would really help in the short term and the medium term from a practical point of view. I like to use the word “understanding”. I don't really like the word “agreement” because then people can seize on an agreement and can take it apart, and so on and so forth. If anything, when discussing the situation in Iraq and in Syria, I think it will be beneficial to reach an understanding with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I know this is a much broader question because the main fault was there. There is no proliferation, which is a global strategic issue, and we're not yet to talk about that. We should take an entire.... If you want, we can have one next week or so on Iran in particular. I want to stress that it would be quite beneficial because otherwise we come up with this fairly whimsical formula like the one that was...big conflict, whatever it was, and non-cooperation deconfliction. So that even when our interests align, we cannot be seen as working together. That's a bit perverse.

So I know it's a much broader question but I just want to send the message that it's crunch time right now in the negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, without going into the whole issue of proliferation, an understanding with the Islamic Republic of Iran, or even an agreement would definitely help the situation in Syria and in Iraq.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

So it seems like that agreement is quite some ways off, or do you think it's reasonable to see that something may be reached in the short term?

[Matteo Legrenzi]

Well, I'm fairly pessimistic but maybe that's because I've been at this for too long. The part where the negotiations were prolonged was good. What we do not have to expect is a “Nixon in China” moment by which we do reach a technical agreement and then trade starts flowing, and so on and so forth. It's a lot more complex. There is a lot of history there, but if we find an agreement, or even if we do not find an agreement but we keep negotiating and we can find an understanding on Syria and on Iraq, that would be very beneficial.

How many countries are we trying to contain? We do need to start finding an understanding. It's beyond even our reach and our capability. We are putting our soldiers on the ground and our men and women in the air.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thanks, Mr. Anderson.

Mr. Schellenberger.

[Gary Schellenberger, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

Thank you. I have another question. I agree with Mr. Legrenzi of the terror the Iraqi army has brought on the citizens of Iraq in the past, some of those atrocities. I sit on the human rights committee also. I look at former Camp Ashraf and Camp Liberty: the atrocities of these camps, like no sanitation, or at least not regular sanitation, no food, no regular food deliveries, no fuel, no medical; taking down any protective barriers and indiscriminately firing on these camps, killing many over the years. These were former Iranian refugees in Iraq who were protected by the Americans while the Americans were there. Once the Americans left, that's when these atrocities happened.

Do you think that a new government has the will or the desire to change their support or safety to minority groups without being overseen, say, by an overseeing force like a UN peacekeeping force, or something of that nature?

[Matteo Legrenzi]

I fear that they do not. I hope they do, but I fear that they do not. I'm not sure what a UN contribution could be to this. I think it would further add to the entropy. But I think you said it all. Everything you said is absolutely accurate, and you correctly described what effect the withdrawal of American security overlaid had on the lives of these refugees.

So I think it's very good that you actually sit also on the human rights committee and that you hear testimony about this. We have to be hopeful, but at the same time we have to be very diligent and very skeptical so that we do not go back to the patterns that have prevailed in the last six years when we were spending in large part our taxpayers' money to then subsidize these human rights violations and extortion that you correctly described.

[Gary Schellenberger, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

There's one thing that bothers me a little. You've said that Iran and Syria have an understanding, or they trade with each other and so on. That same understanding was not with Iraq. Am I correct?

[Andrew Tabler]

Well, there has been trade between Iraq and Syria going back even to when Saddam Hussein ruled, especially, in his later years. It was illicit trade that violated UN sanctions. Then after that there was some trade between Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the new Iraq. Also, Syria was a transit point for supplies going into Iraq during its rebuilding.

Since the beginning of the uprising, a lot of those more formal and regularized networks have been broken and now there is simply a lot of cross-border trade between Iraq and Syria, because the border between Iraq and Syria no longer exists. That also complicates any kind of effort to strangle or to isolate or to de-incentivize or incentivize either the Syrian government or the Iraqi government when it comes to areas that are controlled by ISIL.

[Gary Schellenberger, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

My thing was primarily that there's no trade between Iran and Iraq. Am I correct or is it done kind of through Syria?

[Andrew Tabler]

Oh, no, there is extensive trade between Iran and Iraq as well as between Iran and Syria.

The question many people ask is how did we get here, how did this happen? What we're looking at overall, beyond the uprisings and the localized reasons and demographic reasons for the uprisings, is that the Islamic Republic has been expanding its influence in the region militarily and in terms of investment for decades and it has been building slowly in fits and starts. That has then oftentimes angered elites among traditionally Sunni Arabs but also in Sunni countries. So in the context of the uprisings, Iran has involved itself in these environments militarily through proxy forces and the Quds force to back up regimes that oftentimes have little legitimacy but have legal legitimacy in the international community.

I think overall that's what is causing these and generating the uprisings and the extreme reaction on the part of ISIL which represents, at least partially, the Sunni society's response to that encroachment on Arab territories.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Schellenberger.

We're going to move over to Mr. Garneau for a couple of questions.