Foreign Affairs Committee on April 21st, 2015

[Bernard Trottier, Conservative, Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON]

Can you expand also on the training mission itself? There is some concern that the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian armed forces have been infiltrated by Russian-backed rebels.

How does the training mission work to make sure that some of the intelligence that is going to be transmitted in those training exercises doesn't get into the rebels' hands or into the Russian military's hands? What kind of security measures are being taken to make sure that's contained?

[BGen Todd Balfe]

The vetting of our training recipients is clearly very important. We've been doing that for many years in our other training ventures, pointing again to MTCP.

For this particular activity, it's important to note that the Canadian armed forces will be training only formed units of the Ukrainian armed forces. We will not be training militias. We will not be training ad hoc units, but only formed units of the Ukrainian armed forces for the Ministry of the Interior or eventually the Ministry of Defence.

In terms of the specific vetting, the Ministry of the Interior in Ukraine has a responsibility for vetting all of the individuals who will partake in this training. We have close association with the Ministry of the Interior. Going to one of the earlier questions on the composition of the embassy in Kiev, we have three Canadian armed forces personnel in that embassy: a very busy defence attaché supported by two talented individuals.

I was on the phone with him this morning to reconfirm our process. The MOI does two parts of the background checks. It checks for any association with criminality. It also does a loyalty check for every individual who's going to enter the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Interior. That's the first step of the vetting.

One of the many benefits of partnering with our American friends on this particular activity is the fact that the Americans also have a vetting process. We're doing this collectively with them. The Leahy Law mandates that the U.S. armed forces vet every individual who is going to receive their training. In this particular case the American training started yesterday, and we will soon join that training. They have vetted every individual in that initial training tranche that started yesterday. They go through to summarize the Ukrainian process and they are also put through a very rigid American process. Finally, I must emphasize that we will be training only formed units of the Ukrainian government.

[Bernard Trottier, Conservative, Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON]

In the time I have, I want you to describe the importance of the satellite imagery that Canada has been providing.

I'm told that it is of higher quality and more timely than the American satellite imagery. It's truly appreciated that Canada has in fact the best imagery in the world. We have top-of-the-line capabilities and the Ukrainian army truly appreciates the information we're able to provide.

[BGen Todd Balfe]

I'm happy to entertain that question, Mr. Chair.

I'm not qualified, unfortunately, to make a comparative analysis of our imagery versus our colleagues' imagery, and they probably wouldn't want me to make that comparative analysis.

Nonetheless, Radarsat-2 is a very effective product and DND/CAF is very satisfied with that.

The information packages we're providing to the Ukrainian Government are very much for their situational awareness regarding specific sites they have asked for the data on. We provide those to them on a regular basis. They are extremely satisfied with them, and our intention is to continue to do that as long as the Government of Canada wishes us to do so.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Mr. Garneau, go ahead, sir, for seven minutes.

[Marc Garneau, Liberal, Westmount—Ville-Marie, QC]

Thank you very much.

I can't help but say that Radarsat-2 is a fantastic satellite, and much of its development occurred during the time I was president of the Canadian Space Agency, so I'm doing a little bragging here.

What has been done by the Government of Canada in support of Ukraine, including the recent decision to involve ourselves with military training, is supported by the Liberal Party. I want to put that on the record and make that clear.

I do want to come back to Igor Sechin, because the Liberal Party, including my esteemed colleague Chrystia Freelandand me, have on numerous occasions raised the issue of Igor Sechin and Sergey Chemezov, who's the chairman of Rostec, and have asked whether or not they were on the list of people being sanctioned.

Let me get back to Igor Sechin. Many people consider him to be the second-most powerful person in Russia. He is that close to Vladimir Putin. I was told that sanctions had been applied against him, but I think it turned out they had, perhaps, been applied to Rosneft, the company of which he is chair.

Now, this is a comment, because, Mr. Levin, I don't think you're going to answer my question, but it is clear to me that Igor Sechin is not on the sanctions list. If he were, you would have told me. The point I want to make here is why isn't he? This is the second-most influential person in Russia. It seems to me that if we have principles, he should definitely be on that list, like Chemezov and many others. We say that we have some of the strongest sanctions, including those against 270 people, and I don't know whether some of those people are very minor figures. It is certainly not the numbers but the people themselves who make a difference.

I've had my little comment here.

On the diplomatic front, the last time I saw a diplomatic exchange between our Prime Minister and Mr. Putin, it was in Australia when Mr. Harper reportedly said “I'll shake your hand, but you need to get out of Ukraine.“

Has there been any bilateral diplomatic effort between Canada and Russia since that moment?

[Matthew Levin]

Mr. Chair, in response to the events in Ukraine, and shortly after Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and the initiation of aggression in eastern Ukraine, the government put in place a practice of severely, drastically curtailing engagement between the Canadian government and all of its officials and Russian government officials.

There is really very limited bilateral contact of any sort taking place. As you noted, the interaction took place on the margins of the G-20 summit in Brisbane, but apart from very few circumstances in which we feel that for the purposes of advancement and promotion of Canadian interests some normally low level of contact is required, we're not engaging in bilateral contact with the Russian Federation at the senior level.

[Marc Garneau, Liberal, Westmount—Ville-Marie, QC]

Mr. Metcalfe, you talked about something that's very important. Quite apart from us showing Ukraine that we are with them and we want to defend their sovereignty, which I think we've done through a number of different measures, you also talked about institution building, which is extremely important.

You mentioned the word “corruption”. Corruption, from what we hear, is a particularly significant problem in Ukraine at the moment. You mentioned that they're working with anti-corruption groups.

I have two questions. First, how does one cure corruption? Second, are there any signs at this early stage that we're making any progress on that?

[Dave Metcalfe]

Thanks for the question.

I'll go to my notes, because I have some specific pieces to respond to that question.

In the general sense, all of our programming has a corruption component within it. The technical assistance Canada is providing and the IMF assistance that's being provided through international experts all has corruption components within it at the lowest levels as it is being implemented.

At the broader levels, working with the anti-corruption bureau to set up the systems and the audits, there are two pieces. There's developing the pieces to stop corruption from happening in the first place, and there are the audit practices that can detect when something has happened or see what controls are missing within the system. We also assist specific ministries themselves in developing the public service.

We have specific projects that are working on anti-corruption. If you ask your other question, I can look through my notes and then get back to this.

[Marc Garneau, Liberal, Westmount—Ville-Marie, QC]

All right. I have a more general question. Sometimes one hears anecdotally about certain elements in Ukraine being either anti-Semitic or neo-Nazi. I really have no idea how big they are, but I suspect they're small.

I'd like to have a sense of the scope. Is this something that's hyped by those who are enemies of Ukraine? Is this a significant problem or a minor issue?

[Matthew Levin]

You're quite right, Mr. Garneau, on this point. Our view is that this has been a significant line of what I referred to as the hybrid aggression Russia is undertaking against Ukraine, one significant element or stream of which is disinformation.

Really from the very early days of the crisis in Ukraine and the popular overthrow of former President Yanukovych, as Russia began to perceive that their key allies in the Ukrainian government—people they were supporting, who were protecting their interests—were losing their hold, they began to develop a sort of leitmotif or thread of disinformation that characterized the entire Maidan resistance movement as being influenced and even dominated by individuals who they claimed were neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, or affiliated with movements that went back to Ukraine's experience in the Second World War and collaborationism. Since then, this has remained a theme of the coverage of events by Russian media in Russia, but also of Russia's engagement on the issue in multilateral fora. Whether it's the OSCE, the United Nations, or other fora in which the Ukrainian issue is discussed, they insist constantly on that theme.

Our view is that this is a fundamental mischaracterization and misrepresentation of what occurs. That's not to say—

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

We're almost out of time. I'm sorry to cut you off.

Mr. Metcalfe, give us just a quick response to the first question.

[Dave Metcalfe]

I'll be more coherent with my response this time.

In terms of supporting the national bank of Ukraine and the national anti-corruption bureau, we're working to improve transparency. I think transparency and accountability are the key pieces that are going to attack the issue of corruption. In other areas, we're working with the presidential administration to help the government develop their results-based framework so that people know what is expected and what they can see, and that will take away the power of the vested interests. That's basically our broad approach, but as I said, we also have corruption components within each individual project.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

We're going to start our second round. We'll have time for the full round. We're going to start with Mr. Goldring for five minutes.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

Going back to satellite imaging, I think the misinformation that everybody is told is very evident. Particularly when I speak to the Russian-speaking community and to members of the Russian Orthodox Church, they say to me that a picture of a tank could really be taken anywhere and at any time. I think it's fair to say that militarily, if it weren't for the fact that Russia is involved, the fighting would be over. There might have been a rebellion, but it would be long over. They would have run out of equipment and ammunition and run out of logistics a long time ago, because they would have had to rely on the existing military equipment that was in that territory, if Russia were not involved.

Given that, if we're doing this satellite imaging, is it not possible to produce some of these things for public consumption? In other words, can we not clearly indicate that these convoys are crossing the border? It seems to me that they pictured Osama bin Laden in his backyard from a satellite image. If they can do that, surely they can show a convoy of tanks crossing the border on a regular basis, in order to push back on Moscow's propaganda. Can we not do that?

First, would the problem be over if Russia were not involved, and therefore is not Russia clearly the problem? And second, can we not produce some of this to push back on Moscow's propaganda?

[Matthew Levin]

Mr. Chair, perhaps I'll start, and General Balfe may wish to add something.

With respect to the first part of your question, Mr. Goldring, our assessment is that absolutely the conflict is only and entirely being sustained by Russian support for the separatists. That is support as in materiel and training given to the separatists and the intervention of Russian units directly in the conflict. Absent that piece, it would have been possible to achieve a settlement to this issue a long time ago—well over a year ago, in fact.

With respect to the opportunities for sharing information that's gathered from satellite imagery, you mentioned the convoys. I would note that there's been a fair amount in the public domain, often gathered by media and other sources, that has documented visually and in other forms the entry of Russian convoys supplying various forms of—well, it's hard to determine what. Certainly the presence of convoys has been made clear and is well known.

It's also our impression, partly through information shared with partners in NATO, that the Russians are not actually trying very hard to disguise the volume and frequency of the support they're providing the separatists. Undisguised or barely disguised Russian units are present in Ukraine.

I'll turn it over to the general, if that's okay.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

As I said, I'm told that the pictures could have been taken anywhere or anytime, whereas if you had satellite imagery from on high, that would clearly delineate borders and border areas, and you could substantiate those with topography. That would give very clear evidence and remove this comment, this propaganda, that says the pictures could be taken anywhere, anytime.

[BGen Todd Balfe]

I would add to Mr. Levin's comments that it's not DND/CAF's position to issue a policy on whether the imagery should be released or not; that's a Government of Canada decision. Clearly in this case with Radarsat-2, I think it's important to point out that Radarsat-2 is a commercially owned enterprise, as many folks know. Mr. Garneau, of course, knows the best. The imagery that is provided is provided by the Government of Canada. The Government of Ukraine clearly has a stake in whether that imagery should be released for any reason whatsoever. Our position is that it's released for their situational awareness primarily and is not to be used for any other avenue. I think the decision as to how any imagery like that, along with other types of imagery or intelligence, could be used to validate what we perceive and believe Russia is in fact doing to perpetuate this conflict really has to be taken at a much higher policy level.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

With the religious freedom work, is there consideration being given? We're well aware of the interference by the Moscow patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. In fact, Moscow has even ordered no co-communion between the Orthodox churches. They are, in effect, building a wall between them as it is.

Is there any consideration being given to helping or assisting a Kiev-based church to be recognized by His Holiness in Constantinople to remove that foreign influence from the church in Ukraine?

[Matthew Levin]

On the issue of religious freedom and the Russian provocation seeking to create disunity via religious communities, there is work taking place through the Office of Religious Freedom and the religious freedom ambassador, Andrew Bennett. There is quite close interaction between his office and various partners in Ukraine, including, of course, the Kievan patriarchate. I'm not aware of a specific initiative along the lines of what you suggested, Mr. Goldring.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

We go back to Mr. Dewar for five minutes.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

I just wanted to touch on some of the other aspects that the government is involved in. One is the whole idea of energy. We had some hearings, and I was given some information about some of the focus at the natural resources committee. One of the issues that came forward was energy efficiency. I'm just wondering if anything is being done on energy efficiency.

[Drew Leyburne, Director General, Energy Policy Branch, Department of Natural Resources]

Energy efficiency is one of the areas in which we've been investigating further cooperation with Ukrainian officials. Last fall we sent the head of our office of energy efficiency to Kiev. Actually in Odessa she met with a number of mayors of municipalities and cities in Ukraine, and they identified some possible opportunities for work on energy efficiency. We have a number of programs that just off the shelf we've been able to share with those decision-makers. One thing we did discover through those discussions was that the decision-making around energy use was often happening in a very centralized way, perhaps not surprisingly, so we're doing our best to reach out to those decision-makers.

We don't have any active program right now on energy efficiency, but it is one area in which we're looking at doing more.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

So you're at the assessment point in looking at that?

[Drew Leyburne]

That's correct.