Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here, if only digitally.
I would like to take a few minutes today to share my thoughts on Canada's relationship with two of the states most commonly tied to contemporary debates on Arctic sovereignty. The first is our traditional partner and sometimes opponent in the Arctic, the United States. The second is the newest and perhaps one of the most assertive new entrants into the region, China.
While the United States has long been Canada's premier partner in the Arctic, it has also been the state with which we have most frequently quarrelled over the status of the region. The U.S. denies our historic waters claim and the applicability of the straight baseline doctrine to the archipelago, and insists on the existence of an international strait running through the archipelago.
Still, it's important to highlight that this disagreement has been very well managed since at least the early Cold War, largely because neither Canada nor the United States really stands to benefit from an open political confrontation. As such, a modus vivendi took shape in the 1950s that remains in place today.
This approach is best described as an agreement to disagree, a sort of tacit understanding that neither side will push the issue in a way that will damage the other's legal position. This set-up has long dominated Canadian-American Arctic relations and was even given legal form in the 1988 Canada-U.S. agreement on Arctic co-operation. This agreement and structure have worked very well.
Historically, the United States has actually shown very little interest in access to the Arctic waters per se. Rather, American concern has revolved around global freedom of navigation and the fear that acquiescence to Canada's interpretation of the status of the north might weaken America's position elsewhere. David Colson, the State Department official negotiating with Canada in 1986, put it very simply, saying, “we couldn't be seen doing something for our good friend and neighbor”—that's us—“that we would not be prepared to do elsewhere in the world.”
When the U.S. thinks about sovereignty and the Northwest Passage, it's thinking about the Russian Arctic and straits running through Indonesia, the Philippines, and other strategic choke points around the world. The fear of setting a precedent continues to be that country's primary concern, and it is represented in American policy documents.
Despite the political difficulties and somewhat tense exchanges, Canada and the U.S. have actually worked remarkably well in the region, putting sovereignty to the side to achieve practical objectives. The most obvious example is the activity of American nuclear attack submarines, which have used Canadian Arctic waters since the 1960s and likely continue to do so to this day. The available evidence actually suggests that far from being a sovereignty challenge, these missions were ones that Canada knew of and indeed participated in.
While this dispute is well managed, I would at least offer a word of caution on this note. The diplomatic balancing act that keeps the Northwest Passage from re-emerging as a political conflict has for decades and even generations been based on careful diplomacy, mutual respect and a willingness by both parties to avoid conflict rather than pressing for a legal resolution of the disagreement.
The current U.S. administration has a very different modus operandi than all of its predecessors, and is far more prone to seek short-term, even symbolic wins at the expense of long-term partnerships. It may be entirely speculative, but I think Canada should be ready for the question of the Northwest Passage to possibly re-emerge as a point of diplomatic conflict. To be frank, all that would be required for a renewed fight would be for the American President to learn of the dispute and to feel the need to attack Canada for some real or perceived slight. Five years ago this would have seemed absurd, but we live in interesting times.
One of the most important new actors in the Arctic, and the subject of much speculation, is China. China now calls itself a near-Arctic state, and there are concerns that Beijing may seek to challenge Canada's Arctic sovereignty, given its interests in northern shipping and resource extraction.
In January of 2018, China released its official Arctic policy, and its position on Canadian sovereignty was ambiguous. The relevant passage in that document says that China respects Canadian sovereignty “in the waters subject to their jurisdiction”, without specifying what those waters might be.
It goes on to say that China enjoys “freedom of navigation” in accordance with UNCLOS, which is a reference to the right of transit passage through international straits guaranteed in article 38 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
While this paraphrasing could be seen to imply a Chinese assumption of free navigation through the region and in the Northwest Passage in particular, there are other ways to read that statement. The ambiguity inherent in China's position is almost certainly intentional, with the waters muddied just enough to allow Beijing to skirt the issue, neither locking itself into recognition of Canadian sovereignty nor needlessly offending the Canadian government.
Domestic Chinese maritime interests actually make it unlikely that China will challenge Canadian sovereignty. China relies on straight baselines, as do we, to enclose the Qiongzhou Strait and the country's longest baseline. China's longest baseline is actually only eight miles shorter than the longest Canadian Arctic baseline, which stretches across M'Clure Strait. While the comparison here isn't perfect, it means that any challenge to Canadian sovereignty could be seen as a self-defeating precedent for China.
Increased Chinese activity in the region and potential shipping in Canadian waters more generally shouldn't require a radical shift in Canadian strategy. That has long been to exercise control over the Arctic waters while allowing the passage of time to strengthen the state's legal and political position. In fact, Canada can leverage increased Chinese and foreign activity in the region to strengthen its position. The acceptance of Canadian control by new entrants like China offers Canada a precedent of implied consent.
One of the fundamental prerequisites of historic waters, on which we base our claim to sovereignty, is the acceptance of Canadian control by those most affected. Historically, this has meant foreign governments, particularly the U.S. In the future it will mean shipping companies and independent operators. If Canada continues to regulate and assist foreign shipping, it simply reinforces that sovereignty position.
Crucial to this assumption is the idea that Canada can effectively assert its control over foreign activity in the Northwest Passage. Effective control is important. Exercising this control and providing Canadian support for maritime activity in the region not only demonstrates Canadian sovereignty but allows Canada to leverage its assets to ensure compliance. Icebreaking services, ice reporting and other infrastructure can support foreign shipping, and if a foreign ship fails to comply with Canadian instructions or regulations, it can be cut out of this system.
Conversely, the absence of such support may incentivize foreign actors to operate outside of Canada's reporting and regulatory framework on the assumption that there is little to lose by doing so. If foreign actors see no advantage to working within the Canadian system, they may begin to treat the Northwest Passage as an international strait in which Canadian control is nominal at best.
Canadian sovereignty is therefore not in the midst of any sort of crisis. Our legal position is well established, and the disputes that exist are well managed. Moving forward, however, Canada will have to make a real effort to maintain its effective control over the region. It must also keep an eye on existing disputes, which, historically speaking, have a habit of cropping up when least expected.
Thank you. I'm happy to take questions.