Foreign Affairs Committee on April 11th, 2019

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

That brings us to the end of our time on this first panel.

Gentleman, I want to thank you for your insightful testimony and for joining us here in Ottawa and from Washington.

With that, we will suspend briefly while the other panel is set up.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

We are resuming the meeting.

I want to thank our second panel of guests who are joining us this morning. Zoe Dugal, deputy director of field operations for CANADEM is joining us from Kiev, Ukraine, and Dr. Lucan Way, professor of political science at University of Toronto, is joining us from Moscow, Russia.

I want to thank you both for being with us this morning.

Perhaps, Ms. Dugal, we can start with you and then we can go to Dr. Way. Then we'll open it up to questions from the members.

If you could each take around 10 minutes, that would be fantastic.

[Zoe Dugal, Deputy Director, Field Operations, CANADEM (Canada's Civilian Response Corps)]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee, for giving me this opportunity to address you today.

I will make a brief statement. I'm calling you from Ukraine. This is where I'm working now, implementing some projects for the Canadian government. I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have at the end.

In my opinion, the main threat to liberal democracy in Europe today is a crisis of identities. Over the past 70 years, Europe has moved from the chaos of World War II and the tensions of the Cold War to a period of economic and social progress under the governance system of the European Union. In the context of globalization and world co-operation from the 1990s on, the European Union expanded and opened itself to the world through trade and diplomacy. Individual national identities incorporated into a global European identity. European countries that were not part of the EU aspired to join.

This has led a number of European leaders to complacency over democracy. They took for granted that, after the defeat of fascism and communism, Europeans had universally accepted that liberal democracy was the only possible form of governance. The EU became mired in bureaucracy and the European Parliament failed to bring enthusiasm in voters. The 2008 financial crisis brought resentment against liberalism in countries most affected by the crisis. As well, the influx of migrants and refugees has tested, and continues to test, the limits of European openness.

In some European countries this crisis of identity is exacerbated by Russian aggression. The Russian Federation still considers many states to be within its sphere of influence. Therefore, the fear of seeing these states turn to the European Union, NATO and other symbols of western democracy has pushed the Russian Federation to intervene militarily in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova and to offer veiled threats to the Baltic States.

The reaction has been a turn to populism in a lot of European countries. In most cases, voters have turned to far right movements. What these movements offer voters is an identity that is defined, constrained and familiar, promoting traditional values and a limited place for women in society. However, they also advocate for the fight against corruption, which makes them popular with a number of sectors of the population. They generally take an anti-establishment stance and promote a narrow vision of national identities that excludes all perceived “others”, which often means national minorities, immigrants, refugees, LGBTQ, etc. In some of the countries experiencing Russian aggression, far right movements use the threat of invasion to promote nationalism, order and the repression of dissenting voices, a kind of movement to rally around the flag.

The younger population in particular, representing the next generation, is becoming more and more attracted to these far right movements. This stems from being on the “losing” side of the status quo, disenfranchised by economic and political structures of society. As we see in Ukraine, youth have become highly skeptical of traditional politics and political parties. This is due to the slow pace of reform and the loss of the fight against corruption.

Many Europeans are at a crossroads today, where they need to make a decision about the kind of society they want to live in. This choice is between inclusion and diversity on the one side, and exclusion and uniformity on the other side. If I may use a metaphor, European societies must choose between being Canada or being Serbia.

Canada can play an important role in the promotion of liberal democracy around the world and in Europe by, first and foremost, leading by example. Canada has a history of promoting inclusion and diversity. However, this has not always been an easy and straightforward road, with many setbacks, even violent ones—for example, Quebec in the 1970s. It is also still a work in progress on many fronts, with the full integration, respect and [Technical Difficulty—Editor]

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

We can still hear you.

[Zoe Dugal]

I'm sorry. The video had gone off. Thank you.

I was saying that it is still a work in progress with the full integration, respect and recognition of our indigenous peoples not yet achieved.

In my opinion, this is why Canada is a good example to the world. We should not be shy to show our successes, be open about our struggles and discuss our experiences with liberal democracy. In other words, in my opinion, we can show the world that the path to diversity, openness and inclusion is difficult and requires hard work and compromise, but that it is both possible and highly desirable. Canada's federal system of governance is a good example of how to recognize and promote diversity while also creating a national identity that inspires all citizens.

The Canadian government can promote liberal democracy in Europe by supporting democratic reforms in emerging democracies. This can include the fight against corruption, for example, transparency of government processes, the promotion of free elections and a responsible role for parliaments. For example, through funding from Global Affairs Canada, CANADEM is currently managing an election observation mission in Ukraine to observe both the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2019.

In addition, Canada should invest and play an active role in international institutions such as the UN, the OSCE and other multilateral organizations. Canada's role in peacekeeping in history under the UN banner and its support to the OSCE's special monitoring mission to Ukraine are good examples of this. These mechanisms, while imperfect and requiring improvement, are crucial to a world order based on liberalism and democracy.

I thank you for your time and I'm ready to answer any questions you would like to ask me.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Thank you very much.

Dr. Way, please proceed.

[Professor Lucan Way, Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto, As an Individual]

I'm in Moscow—rather apropos.

Liberal democracy is under a threat in Europe and the world today. On the one hand, it's worth pointing out that the number of democracies in the world has not declined by a significant number. There were 86 democracies in 2000, 87 in 2010 and 86 today. The number of democracies in the world is still at a historical high. I think that's just important to keep in mind to temper some of the pessimism. Nevertheless, there are real reasons to worry.

First, countries such as Hungary that were once considered consolidated can no longer, in my opinion, be called democracies. In such cases, the main threats to liberal democracy come less from violent attacks on the opposition or obvious democratic violations, but instead arise from less visible, but systematic, attempts to create an uneven playing field by packing the courts and buying out opposition media in order to eliminate alternative sources of information.

While such measures rarely inspire headlines, they create a fundamentally uneven playing field that reduces political competition and seriously harms the democratic process. For example, Viktor Orbán in Hungary has not engaged in large-scale vote fraud or killed any journalists, as has occurred here. However, his government has used a variety of legal mechanisms—gerrymandering and the selective distribution of government advertising—to seriously undermine critical media, as well as the opposition's capacity to compete for power. As a result, I do not think that Hungary can be called a democracy.

At the same time, in many western European democracies, politics have been infected by the rise of populist forces that often rely on racist, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic appeals. Such appeals foment intolerance and intensify polarization, undermining the compromise that is critical to democratic governance. The rise of populism clearly presents a threat to the the transatlantic alliances. A number of these parties, including the National Front in France and the far right alternative for Germany, opposed NATO, as well the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement. In turn, many have, of course, received support from Putin in the form of misinformation campaigns on the Internet or, in some cases, direct funding.

Russian money has also been used to undermine pro-EU and pro-NATO forces in Macedonia, Montenegro, the Czech Republic, Ukraine and many other cases. How do we explain the emergence of such populist threats to liberal democracy? It's helpful to distinguish between bottom-up and top-down factors.

Bottom-up factors include the resentment and fears generated by immigration, which were just mentioned, and a backlash against perceived changes in European culture. A number of studies have demonstrated a link between immigration and support for far right political forces. In particular, the refugee crisis of 2015 increased the salience of immigration and strengthened the hand of right-wing parties. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán's decision to build a fence on the Serbian border in response to the refugee crisis contributed to a dramatic increase in support for his party. Similarly, in Poland, the refugee crisis appears to have bolstered support for far right parties.

Furthermore, the presence of immigrants with different languages and cultures reinforces the impression that traditional norms and values are disappearing. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris argue that such perceived threats to traditional European culture, both from immigrants and from shifts in cultural values among the young, have generated what they call a “cultural backlash” among older and less educated parts of the population that has motivated them to support far right parties. At the same time, many studies suggest that the political attitudes fuelling support for far right populism—anti-immigrant attitudes, disenchantment with democracy—have remained relatively stable since the early 2000s. Indeed, a range of studies show that overall tolerance of differences in race and sexuality has increased over the last 50 years.

This fact points to the importance of top-down factors in explaining the rise of populism—namely the increased use of culturalist and xenophobic appeals by parties such as Fidesz in Hungary. Such parties have likely emerged less because attitudes have changed and more because political entrepreneurs have figured out how to tap into a reservoir of populist sentiment that existed all along.

In several ways, the traditional centre-left in Europe has created an opening for populist appeals. First, populists have been aided by the fact that many mainstream centre-left parties have adopted liberal stances on lifestyle questions, thereby distancing themselves from less educated and older cohorts who support more traditional views on heterosexuality and gender roles.

Furthermore, as Sheri Berman has argued, nationalist appeals have been indirectly facilitated by the left-right consensus on the economy that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s over support for deregulation and neo-liberalism.

Dalston Ward argued that when parties cannot differentiate themselves on the economy, they activate other non-economic issues around which to compete. The economic consensus has encouraged some parties to make environmental appeals, but many other parties to foment resentment towards minorities. In Poland, for example, parties now differentiate themselves along what can be called the “axis of values” between secular liberal cosmopolitans and religious authoritarian nationalists, more than by differences in economic policy. The left-right consensus on economic issues can also encourage the emergence of new anti-liberal parties, such as the Alternative for Germany, created in 2013.

The left-right consensus on the economy has also meant that the traditional left was unable to capitalize on the resentments generated by rising inequality and the financial crisis, thereby creating an opening for populist political forces. Indeed, the mainstream centre-left has witnessed significant declines in recent years in France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and even Scandinavia.

In many cases, populist parties have filled the void by combining authoritarian nationalism with left-wing economic appeals. Thus, a number of far right parties—the Freedom Party in Austria, the National Front in France and the Alternative for Germany—have shifted from supporting lower taxes and cuts in the welfare state to now supporting greater social protections.

More generally, the rise of populism can be seen as a result of failures by mainstream parties to sufficiently address the legitimate concerns of those left behind. In turn, this analysis points to ways in which Canada can support liberal democracy and reduce the appeal of populism. First of all, I agree with everything that was said in the previous talk. I just want to add one other thing, which is that the rise of populism has been driven in part by voters who feel that their concerns are not represented by mainstream parties and who are, therefore, attracted to populist alternatives.

With this in mind, the Canadian government should support democratically minded forces that represent a diversity of views on the economy and economic reform in emerging democracies. After the Cold War, there was a temptation in places like Russia to exclusively back political leaders who supported radical economic reform, and to pay little or no attention to those who opposed or were hurt by economic changes.

Today in Ukraine—which I think is on everyone's mind—the natural focus has been on groups from western Ukraine that are the strongest proponents of much needed economic reform. I completely understand the focus on this group. However, the recent rise of the outsider comedian Volodymyr Zelensky, who actively courted votes from southeastern Ukraine, shows the potential dangers, in my view, that arise when the political class ignores significant parts of the electorate. Ultimately, democracy will be most stable when mainstream democratic parties exist that represent all groups in society.

Thanks.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Thank you very much. Let's move straight into questions. We'll begin with MP Kusie, please.

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you very much, Ms. Dugal and Mr. Way, for being here today. My interest, in addition to the examination within this committee, is also to evaluate Canada's position from an executive level, in communication and coordination with other nations and other multilateral organizations, to determine how we can support these flailing democracies as well as developing democracies.

First, I would turn to what is now referred to as the great power struggle between, of course, the historic power of the United States and the more recently emerged Russia, as well as China. What role do these three great powers play in either encouraging democracy or defeating democracy? Russia, obviously, is a more obvious example, as Ms. Dugal and other witnesses have alluded to, but perhaps we can focus more on the United States and China.

Again, I reference it a lot here but certainly in Venezuela.... I was a diplomat for 15 years, most of the time in the Americas. We've seen Maduro's success. When I say “success” I mean that any semblance of governance he has maintained is largely the result of receiving resources support from two or three of these great powers. Would you comment on the role of those, please. I'll start with Ms. Dugal, please.

[Zoe Dugal]

I must say I am not an expert on the role of China so I will not touch on that. The role of the United States has been historically to promote democracy around the world. Having said that, they've had a very interventionist approach to things throughout the Cold War and beyond. With the new administration in the U.S. we feel like this is changing. The support for democracy has not been necessarily at the top of the agenda of the U.S. administration in the last two years. This has been seen here in Ukraine whereby there is less pressure from the U.S. government to push reforms and to look at how democracy can be pushed forward and supported.

The case of Venezuela, I think, is.... We used to have these doctrines around the UN and things like that, for example, the responsibility to protect, which Canada was instrumental in developing. These things have been falling a bit by the wayside in the last few years. For me, it's unfortunate because I think we had a number of mechanisms that were in place to support the populations directly when there was a case that warranted such intervention by a multilateral mechanism, without infringing necessarily on sovereignty, but in a way to “responsibilize” the world on a humanitarian crisis, for example.

The case of Venezuela would have been, in my mind, something that would have called for a “responsibility to protect” in terms of how the Americans could respond but also the world through the UN.

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Dr. Way, can you comment, please?

[Prof. Lucan Way]

Yes, I can.

Both Russia and China have been increasingly active on the world stage as you know. Russia especially has been interfering in the domestic politics of the former Soviet Union since the early 1990s—in a number of Ukrainian elections, in 1994, 2004 and others. What's remarkable in the last four or five years is that Russia, for the first time, has begun to intervene in western elections. Since 2014 we've counted, in my study, 20 different elections in western Europe and North America where they've intervened in a variety of ways by promoting misinformation campaigns and the like. Obviously, Russia represents an existential threat to Ukrainian democracy. I don't have to tell any of you that.

At the same, for China, it had intervened but for the most part I think it's rather agnostic when it comes to regime type. I think both Russia and China are primarily interested in promoting the development of pro-Russian or pro-Chinese governments, rather than imposing authoritarianism per se. I think that's important to keep in mind.

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Thank you.

I will move on to my next question. As a Conservative, and comparative to many of my official opposition colleagues, I still do believe in the purpose of the UN. I just believe that the necessity for a significant United Nations reform remains. However, I don't see any other organization with such an international reach of presence, so I prefer, myself, to work within it albeit with major reforms.

Do you feel that this organization would have any role to play in terms of enforcing democracy internationally? This is to both of you, please.

[Zoe Dugal]

Yes, absolutely, I feel exactly like you. The UN is the only game in town, let's say. It is the only place where all of us are represented. Of course it needs reform, and most of these multilateral organizations do need reform, but they are the only way to go, in my opinion. It's always, in my opinion, better to talk about things and try to resolve them in a collegial manner throughout the world rather than going it alone.

I always find it a little interesting that people say that the UN is irrelevant, and I don't see how this is possible in today's world. The UN is even more relevant than it has ever been because the crises are mounting. It's not just the threats to democracy. It's also climate change and other topics where we need more collaboration rather than less.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

I'm going to have to cut it off there because we're over time.

We will now move to MP Saini please.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Professor Way, I would like to start with you because in your opening remarks you spoke a lot about Hungary and about Fidesz. I have a few questions for you on using Hungary as a sort of test case for the rest of Europe.

In Hungary there has been a democratic erosion, but it has been done in a very subtle way and sometimes in a very overt way. As for some of the overt ways that are done, you mentioned gerrymandering, that the opposition doesn't have an outlet, and that the ruling party does advertising and controls some 500 of the news outlets in Hungary. They control the mass media and a lot of times even companies or corporations in Hungary have stopped advertising on opposition stations for fear of any retribution.

The picture you've described is one where the opposition really has no chance to compete in a free and fair election because the tools that are offered to the ruling party are not offered to the opposition party. Is that a trend line throughout the countries where we see this type of process? How is the opposition ever going to have a chance to succeed if the tools for that success are limited to them?

[Prof. Lucan Way]

I completely agree with you. I don't think that's the only problem with the opposition in Hungary. It's also quite split. It's not just the government's fault, but certainly, with these more subtle legal mechanisms, I don't think they mean that the elections are meaningless. The vote is still counted and, in principle, I think if the opposition was able to unite, they would have a chance of winning, but it's obviously quite hard, and in that sense, undemocratic.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

One of the things, which I'm sure you can appreciate, is that a lot of these autocratic leaders, whether they're in Visegrád nations or across Europe, are very close to each other in one way or the other. It seems that there has been no motivation for the opposition in different countries to also come together, because I think that the problems they're facing in Hungary are similar to those they're facing in Poland and other places.

Why has there been no unification of the opposition as there has been in the leadership of these countries?

[Prof. Lucan Way]

That's the $100,000 question. I'm not an expert on Hungarian politics, but I suspect that Orbán might be involved. It's very much in his interest to divide the opposition. This was a similar tactic used by Milosevic in Serbia in the 1990s, where they would sort of buy off certain members of the opposition basically to encourage splits in the opposition and prevent any kind of unity.

I should also add that the EU has played a pernicious role in Hungary partly because of Hungary's membership in the European People's Party. At the European level, there's been very little pressure on Hungary to democratize. I think the EU deserves some blame for the failure of democracy in Hungary.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

You led me to my third question because, as you know, last year the European Parliament voted to invoke article 7 to censure Hungary, and now that question is going to the European leadership of the 28 countries. As you know, to censure, to provide sanctions or to do anything against Hungary, they need unanimity. Right now Poland has been very vociferous in saying that they will not provide that unanimity. If this carries on, if one country defends another country because of their domestic political situation, you've created a new normal now in Europe, have you not?

If this is what it takes to get elected, then any opposition party will have to confine themselves to the political dialogue of the day, whether it's right or not. We're also seeing the same consequence in the European Parliament or even in certain other countries where you have the radical right parties. Because of the political situation there, the main party must depend on the radical right to maintain power. How is that going to go forward? It seems to me that across Europe this has become the new norm.

[Prof. Lucan Way]

I completely agree and I think that's deeply troubling.

When they see that Hungary gets away with it, it encourages other potential autocrats to behave similarly. I'm in full agreement with your pessimism.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Thank you.

Do I have more time?

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

You have a minute and a half.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Okay.

I didn't know I was going have a chance to ask, but I have a final question.

When you look at the Schengen agreement because of the immigration, what is your opinion on that? Should it be strengthened? Should it be changed? Should there be better border controls, less border controls? I'm surprised that the Schengen agreement is in place, but some countries adhere to it and some countries don't.

[Prof. Lucan Way]

In general, my own research has shown that integration greatly facilitates democracy, and the best way to ultimately redemocratize places like Hungary and to encourage greater democracy in the former Soviet Union is by strengthening ties between them, which includes immigration and so on. I'm not an expert on the Schengen agreement, but in principle I think it's important to encourage as much openness as possible.