Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 2nd, 2016

[Thor Halvorssen]

What you've just said is music to my ears. I have no specific beef with just Russia. I'm an equal opportunity exposer and opponent of dictatorships and authoritarians and human rights violators. Most definitely, it would not take very much to alter the language, to expand the language to include any government in the world. It would be up to the government to issue the directives to make sure what constitutes a human rights violation and how one would define what fits into that. I would expand it beyond human rights violations to include acts of corruption. It's down to the directives, and the devil is in the details. It can definitely be done, and it can be done well.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

There are those who have criticized sanctions in many ways, and the Magnitsky Act particularly, but I'm impressed by the advocates who say that more multi-party, nationally customized sanctions built on the Magnitsky Act would have the effect of ostracizing, isolating, blocking, and perhaps one day, although I think it's a long shot, changing the behaviour of those in the Putin regime.

[Thor Halvorssen]

I don't mean to be flippant. I'm being rather specific. We're talking about visa sanctions and asset freezing, telling people we don't want them here. Some people may say that it doesn't matter, that they're going to enjoy their ill-gotten wealth elsewhere. However, these officials have children and they have grandchildren. If you wish to see a change, for instance, in a government in Latin America, you eliminate their visas to go to Walt Disney World. Believe it or not, that's the kind of thing—

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Yes.

[Thor Halvorssen]

There is a reason the dictator of Uzbekistan is so afraid of this: because his daughter likes to go shopping in Paris. The daughter of the dictator of Angola—the richest woman in Africa—greatly enjoys spending time in the French Riviera, and visiting places like Whistler, and going on shopping sprees throughout the world. I'm currently in London. If the British actually followed through on a lot of this, they would see a dramatic decline in their real estate prices, which are held up by people looting their own countries so they can buy expensive mansions here.

Perhaps some countries are willing to sell their integrity in that manner, and have overinflated real estate situations, but at the end of the day, these visas have an enormous impact in those countries. No official wants to be targeted by this. This also leads to something that is unseen, which is that a lot of these officials will not carry out an act in the future, because they've seen what was done to their comrade in government. They may choose to say, “That's not going to happen to me, so we are only going to play by these rules.” That's actually what we want more and more of. Let them be scared. Let them be the ones who are chilled in their behaviour, rather than doing whatever they want, when they want, simply because in their jurisdiction they can.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Kent.

I'll go to Mr. Miller, please.

[Marc Miller, Liberal, Ville-Marie—Le Sud-Ouest—Île-des-Soeurs, QC]

Mr. Halvorssen, I truly appreciate the emphasis in your advocacy. I think it moves forward a point that we are trying to study, at least when we break it down.

With great respect, where I do see quite a large disservice in your advocacy is the tendency to mix up the issues with the facts at hand. We are studying a legislative scheme. It's FACFOA and SEMA, which deal with the sanctions Canada may impose on states or actors at the request of states, and the potential holes, which you identified specifically in the area of gross human rights violations and in corruption.

What I tend to hear from advocates such as you and others, for which you are obviously not responsible, is a tendency to commit this confusion of proceeds of crime with the opposite of ill-gotten assets, assets that are not tainted by criminality, and say that there is a hole somehow in Canadian legislation.

I don't like doing this, but let me read from the Criminal Code, which states quite clearly that, in Canada:

Every one commits an offence who uses, transfers the possession of, sends or delivers to any person or place, transports, transmits, alters, disposes of or otherwise deals with, in any manner and by any means, any property or any proceeds of any property with intent to conceal or convert that property or those proceeds, knowing or believing that all or a part of that property or of those proceeds was obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of (a) the commission in Canada of a designated offence; or (b) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted a designated offence.

Clearly, this, along with our well-documented money-laundering legislation, provides a pretty important net to catch people who are trying to hide assets in Canada that are derived from or are the proceeds of crime.

You may have legitimate arguments about the ability to seize assets. We have our own questions with respect to our own officials. You may have legitimate arguments with respect to people elsewhere who have committed gross human rights violations—quite disgusting ones, and we've heard a lot of evidence of that—but when it comes to ill-gotten gains, Canada has quite a tight regime. When it comes to SEMA and threats against international peace, it is quite a tight regime. It's the same thing with FACFOA, although the hole you identified was designated by the nature of the legislative scheme.

I think that when you are trying to address a very important point, there is a very important disservice done by mixing apples and oranges.

Obviously, you are cognizant of the fact that we are a pluralistic democratic country. We are often dealing with state actors or non-state actors who live under a regime that isn't the same as ours. We don't necessarily have the same tools at our disposal that a so-called kleptocracy may have, and we do have to follow the rule of law. What are your concerns with people or institutions that we may consider putting on lists, freezing their assets, which may have been gotten by legitimate means in Canada, and their ability to use our judicial system to abide by a very important rule in Canada, which they have in the United States as well, and in Britain, which is the rule of law and due process?

Thank you.

[Thor Halvorssen]

Let me start start off by saying that obviously, I'm not responsible for the confusions or conflation of issues in terms apples and oranges said by people who preceded me in this conversation. I will, however, own up to everything I've said.

Now, if the system that you describe in place exists and is tight, how is it possible that a group of Venezuelans was able to put hundreds of millions of dollars into your system? These people were not hiding. There had been multiple news articles about their crimes. It would not take very long to realize, in fact, that some of these news articles were on front pages of financial newspapers looking at these people who came out of nowhere and just bought 20% of Pacific Rubiales in Toronto. So in that sense, the system has in fact failed, and they are a perfect example. There is no question that all of their wealth is ill-gotten; they had none before this began, and there is no question that the power plants that they built, which, by the way, don't function, are an enormous scandal.

As for due process, I think that, much like in asset forfeiture situations, there are many cases where people have had their wealth taken from them and held, particularly at the local level, by zealous prosecutors or police who simply don't like the idea of people having a lot of cash, or immediately have a question mark about it. I am the first to advocate for a lot of scrutiny on the state when it comes to asset forfeiture, but we're not talking about going after a supermarket owner or going after someone who operates a cash business who may be suspected of being engaged in drug money laundering. We're talking about going after people like the Bongo family, who have hundreds of millions of dollars in real estate, including in Canada, homes that are worth $100 million euros in France, and so on and so forth. That is what I am addressing in those particular cases. I think due process should most definitely exist in the case of Obiang in France or in the United States when his son was unable to provide an explanation for how, with an $80,000-a-year salary as minister of forestry, he was able to buy one of the largest houses in Malibu, California, or for that matter, 16 race cars, and a home worth in excess of $120 million.

I don't think I'm off base in pointing out that one example that I happened to be involved with, the Derwick case, was a signal of that failure. I do think there are gaps. One of the main gaps, I think, is that it's a state actor which has to initiate it upon receipt of a notice from a government. Why can't private individuals be enough? If Mubarak steals tens of billions of dollars and invests it in Canada, clearly the Egyptian government is not going to be blowing the whistle on its own dictator, but if a private citizen does, then it is incumbent upon Canada. Of course Canada may say, “We like our relationship with Egypt”, which is why we should have a situation where you have enough division of power and a civil service to actually follow through on these matters.

So there are things to be criticized in what's presently on the table. Now, I'm not an expert in Canadian legislation, and I'm here to help as much as I can. I was invited to do this three days ago, so forgive me, I actually flew yesterday evening from California to London, and as soon as I arrived, I went to another engagement, so work with me here. I'm happy to come back again in the future, too.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you very much, Mr. Miller.

Now we're going to Mr. Aubin, please.

[Robert Aubin, NDP, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

A country like Canada has a range of tools. At what point do you implement the sanctions regime? I have the impression that, when economic sanctions start being imposed, diplomacy begins to break down. In your view, are these two approaches complementary, or should one follow the other? We could also eventually talk about military involvement. How can we combine all these tools that seek to change a behaviour?

[Thor Halvorssen]

Let me begin by stating that we are not talking at present of sanctioning a government. We're talking about sanctioning individuals. I don't think it is a stretch or that it should be problematic for the Government of Canada to be willing to sanction specific individual officials of foreign governments who have engaged in gross human rights violations. In addition to sanctioning them economically, if necessary, through asset seizure, we're talking about removing visas in some cases—removing visas. Now, removing visas from a general in Venezuela who is engaging in drug trafficking and in human rights violations is very different from sanctioning Venezuela as a whole. So I hope that this adds some....

As for foreign intervention militarily, I don't see how one thing correlates to the other.

[Robert Aubin, NDP, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Earlier, in response to a question, you spoke of shortcomings in the Canadian approach without really explaining what you meant. I want to give you the chance to mention a few of those shortcomings and to specify whether they constitute shortcomings in the Canadian approach or an unwillingness to implement or use the tools we already have.

[Thor Halvorssen]

Well, in terms of the example that I gave of Derwick Associates, I would not know why the Canadian system has failed to look into this, and look into how it is these men were able to blithely buy all of this Canadian stock with stolen money and not raise a single eyebrow in Canada, despite there being a lot of publicity around it.

With regard to the specifics of what we're discussing here, I believe that the FACFOA sanctions come into place too late. They come into place when the government in question has already been removed from power and the new government requests Canada to seize the assets of the most recent set of thieves. Considering how that law is written, I believe it may actually even end up serving as a political tool for a new set of people in government in one of these jurisdictions. I think that law could be altered somewhat, and it could be tightened.

In addition, I believe there is a failure in limiting initiation of action to states. I think you should allow associations or others to be able to blow the whistle. You do, after all, have offices that can look into and investigate these issues, and once they investigate them, they can decide to dismiss them or not dismiss them. Law enforcement operates like this in democratic countries all the time. They receive denunciations and accusations. They choose to investigate, and they will either choose to continue the investigation or not investigate, and possibly even prosecute if the investigation is fruitful. I don't see why we cannot apply the same analogy to asset seizures, or to seeking visa denials from foreign officials.

[Robert Aubin, NDP, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Aubin.

Mr. Levitt, please.

[Michael Levitt, Liberal, York Centre, ON]

Thank you for your testimony today, Mr. Halvorssen. Going back to your earlier comments about human rights abusers and Canada's desire and commitment to stand up strong in dealing with these situations, I can assure you this is something that is shared by all members of the Canadian Parliament. We're engaged in a process here that involves more broadly looking at our sanctions regime. It was a review that was called for in legislation, and as part of that we are also looking at ways of being able to add or include gross human rights abusers in the legislation. It's certainly an option that's on the table.

I want to move your comments, though, from a hypothetical discussion to an instructive one, and in doing that, who's doing it right from your point of view? You've made a number of comments about the need to have multiple levels, municipal, state, federal, all buying in and having responsibility over this. Can you instruct this committee on who is doing this right? Can you give us some pointers in terms of where you've seen this working, so that we can educate ourselves on it?

[Thor Halvorssen]

Among the governments that I believe are using the might of government internationally to further discourage human rights abusers, different tools are being used by different governments.

I could enter into this from a different perspective, not from the point of view of sanctions. For instance, the Government of Sweden has been particularly excellent in using foreign aid or limiting foreign aid tied directly to corruption and tied directly to whether or not they believe that the government needs this money. In other words, if the government is putting most of its money in Swiss bank accounts or bank accounts in Andorra or Singapore, they certainly don't need Swedish foreign aid.

With regard to the sanctions regime, I do believe that in the last eight years the United States has made some significant progress. This progress is underlined by doing less of a country-broad approach and much more an approach aimed at specific individuals inside a government.

Again, I cannot stress enough how if you were to, beyond denouncing these individuals, have that tag, that scarlet letter, of being a human rights violator and being called that by a democratic government, it tends to set off a domino effect, because if they're denied visas to the United States, for instance, or to the United Kingdom or to France—if we're going to do the European Union—it sends a message that perhaps this is not someone we want.

Now, is there a risk that there might be a due process violation or that someone could be accused falsely? There certainly is that risk. However, a visa is a privilege. It's not a right for you to enter another country, so the bar certainly is lowered. That said, I do believe that directives can be written in such a way so as to ensure that if someone is unfairly smeared with human rights violations, as has occurred previously, this does not lead to a visa being pulled.

There are examples, such as the Magnitsky case, where it is beyond question that Sergei Magnitsky is dead, that he was murdered because he blew the whistle on a tax fraud case and that certain government officials were involved in his persecution, prosecution, and the cover-up. In going from the individual to the general, the Magnitsky case is excellent.

Again, I'm not someone who believes that government is in fact the answer to problems. My view is government tends to be the initiator of most problems and most certainly human rights violations around the world are committed mostly by governments. I'm wary of that fact, but I do think the United States has a large enough system and large enough structure that can be emulated and some of the best practices can be used and some of the worst, such as a very low bar for asset seizure can be reformed and made better.

[Michael Levitt, Liberal, York Centre, ON]

You're aware of the global Magnitsky legislation that's currently before the U.S. Senate, I presume, and the difference between the targeted list as opposed to the broader capture of global human rights abusers. Can you give us your feelings in terms of the differentiation there? I think there's really a feeling that being able to have something that's not limited and something that can have teeth beyond just one country...the problem being if individuals on a given list, should it be Magnitsky and the case with Russia or any other country, if they don't have assets that are capturable in Canada, there's not much we can do.

If it's a broader range, there's obviously something that we can look into further beyond just the named individuals.

[Thor Halvorssen]

I'm a great supporter of the global Magnitsky Act. I think it's an excellent idea. I think that in terms of these lists, again, we must underline these are not lists subject to criminal prosecution. These are lists of people who have been identified as having engaged in gross human rights violations in the case of the Magnitsky murder.

I would encourage more of such lists. I have such a list for Kazakhstan involving the massacre of more than 100 workers in a place called Zhanaozen. We published such a list in a one-page ad in Washington. This sent essentially a political earthquake into Kazakhstan because they were terrified what people seeing their names on the list would say, and now that their names were on that list were they going to end up somewhere else.

I do believe it opens up a question and it opens up a whole avenue of discussion. There is not enough name and shame. One can say that human rights violations occur in Gabon or Turkmenistan or Kyrgyzstan, but it's very different to be able to say they are occurring in this particular country and here are the names of the people doing it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you very much, Mr. Levitt.

We're going to Madam Zahid, please.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thanks to our guests for their testimony today.

Would you say there is concrete evidence to suggest that the imposition of unilateral sanctions are somehow more effective in dealing with human rights abuses as compared with multilateral sanctions?

[Thor Halvorssen]

By this do you mean Canada on its own as opposed to Canada with a bunch of other countries?

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Canada in relation to a bunch of other countries.

[Thor Halvorssen]

The problem with multilateral sanctions is that they tend to be watered down, or people tend to wait until it's far too late, or until really all the teeth are taken out. You're dealing with so many different considerations at the same time.

I think unilateral sanctions are a great way and it's absolutely incumbent on democratic governments, whether it's Denmark or Canada, to push them through and to lead the way. Sometimes these lists are not necessarily going to be the same. Sometimes they will overlap and sometimes they will not, but they will bring some enormous value.

With me today, waiting for me outside, is Abdul Aziz al-Hamza, who is a member of Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently, a collective based out of Syria. When someone like that knows that you are talking about these issues and that you are taking specific action against certain government officials, in the Assad government for instance, it's a sea change of transformation to people on the front lines of the human rights fight.

Once individual actors in this are being identified, it sends a very strong message to people in that country. No one wants to be on one of these lists.

I would encourage you to have a list for each country that you think is problematic and then let the court of public opinion, let investigative journalism, and if there is a process that can be had, determine whether or not these people should or should not be on the list. These lists have enormous power. We're not talking about putting these people in prison by being on a list. It could be a visa sanction or it could be asset seizures. I think it's a very good thing and I highly encourage you to keep looking more into this.

Canada can be a world leader on this subject, especially if it also goes after the cronies, the people who are looting. Remember, no human rights violations would occur if it wasn't for loot. These people aren't violating human rights because they wish to rule over others. They're violating human rights because they wish to rule over others while they take the natural resources from those countries and hide them away, many times with Canadian companies helping them to do so.