Again, I think with Magnitsky the question is always, what do you want to get out of the sanctions? In other words, do you see the sanctions as a tool of punishment for prior bad acts? This, in some way, is what the Magnitsky sanctions did.
Part of the problem in terms of evaluating their success is that essentially they took place in a steadily worsening state of Russian-American relations. As I said, in some ways the expectation of a future conflict between Russia and the United States...the Magnitsky Act was simply one element of it that further increased the conflict between the two countries. Any time you increase the idea that there's going to be conflict, you decrease the likelihood that the target will make any concessions, even if the target is an individual citizen. I have to say I would not define the Magnitsky sanctions as all that much of a success in terms of the effect on Russian officials who have been placed under sanction.
There is one other possibility, however, although this is an extremely nebulous category and it's extremely hard to nail down, which is you can look at the Magnitsky sanctions as an example of potentially sanctioning as a form of deterrent, which is that imposing those sanctions will not necessarily alter the behaviour per se of the individuals under sanction, but it might cause other officials in the same country or other countries to recognize the implications of deciding to engage in similar behaviour. That could lead to one of two effects. It could actually successfully deter them or it could cause them to take countermeasures to make sure that even if those kinds of sanctions are imposed, they, as a result, do not suffer as much.
I cannot stress enough that this is extremely difficult to identify. As a scholar, it's hard for me to say we conclusively can show that this takes place. There is some limited evidence that this has occurred in certain categories of sanctions, that you see other actors responding to it. But I do know from my conversations with state department officials that another thing that's going on is that Russian officials, once being placed under sanction, are trying to figure out ways, obviously, to circumvent them in terms of depositing money or assets with relatives or known friends, and so on and so forth.
As a result, there's a constant arms race in terms of financial intelligence, to be able, if you're going to impose these sanctions, to see not just the effect on the intended target, but also the penumbra of relationships that this intended target possesses.