Okay.
Right. That makes sense.
In terms of the costs on the imposing country, it gets complicated. There have been far fewer studies on the costs of sanctions on the sender country, the sanctioning country. The few studies I have seen on these are not all that good, frankly, mostly because what they tend to measure at this point are trade effects. They usually don't take into account the notion that if, let's say, the United States sanctions Russia, which then leads to a decline in trade between the United States and Russia, it's possible that the United States compensates for not trading with Russia by trading more with Ukraine or Belarus or what have you.
I would say that in fact there is actually a fair amount of data that one could try to use to study the systemic effects of sanctions on the sender country, but not a lot of research has actually been done. Part of this might be due to the fact that an overwhelming number of the sanctions that are imposed are by large economies, such as the European Union or the United States, on relatively small economies. As a result, usually the effects on the sanctioning country are negligible.
That said, if you're talking about a case like Russia, I think it would be appropriate to talk about some general equilibrium effects of those sanctions. There are a few studies that I believe the government accountability office has tried to do in the United States on the effect of those sanctions on the Russian economy, but I'm not actually sure there have been any studies done on the effect on the U.S. economy.