The United Nations, in terms of its support system for the sanctions regime that we've created against North Korea, I will put it mildly by saying it's under-resourced. By the end of this week, it's going to look even more under-resourced because we're expanding the sanctions again to include new obligations that the UN will have a role in assessing international compliance with.
At the UN level, the North Korea sanctions regime still benefits from a panel of experts which is composed of eight members, nationally selected, who spend all of their waking hours tracking global compliance with the North Korea sanctions regime. They initially started as a panel that was focused just on assessing compliance with an arms embargo that was fairly limited. They've expanded now to focus on everything from coal trade to vanadium trade, to North Korean cash smuggling to, again, weapons-related or proliferation-related activity. Their job has grown enormously, and the resources to support them haven't.
Similar things could be said for the sanctions committee at the United Nations, which is also related to the relevant resolutions. I think our problem is that we've, if you will, created a sieve—to continue the metaphor—and now we're just making the sieve much larger without necessarily increasing the resources necessary to monitor the situation alongside that expanded regime.