Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 28th, 2016

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

Absolutely.

In this case, I am referring to the unilateral dimension, given that Canada, in general terms and in the case of Iran, follows other countries at the multilateral level.

When the UN Security Council decided for instance to adopt sanctions against the United States, Canada followed suit. For all practical purposes, we have no influence in this regard.

This is not a reproach against the current government or the previous government. We are quite simply not an important player. We do, however, have a bit of flexibility unilaterally and in our direct bilateral relations with Iran.

I would stress once again that there are not that many missed opportunities, but there are some.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

There are some though, and I can tell you that I am among those who consider engagement and dialogue absolutely necessary.

Should the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act be reviewed?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

In my opinion, the answer is an unqualified yes.

I did not say so specifically in my presentation, but I think my assessment was clear and that this act has a negative impact on Canada's national interests.

The main thrust of my presentation, however, is that it is a very complex situation. Not only is it complicated to remove Iran from the list of states that sponsor terrorism, but repealing or significantly amending the act involves a process that is politically much more complex. That is what I was getting at.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Okay.

Purely out of curiosity, Syria and Iran have been identified as countries that sponsor terrorism, but other countries could have been added to that list at the time.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

Yes, potentially. As to Syria, we can scarcely refer to it as a country right now. So we can set it aside.

In my opinion, the problem with this act is not so much the countries that are not on the list because, given the definition of sponsoring terrorism, there could clearly be others. Iran sponsors terrorism. There is no doubt of that. That is not problematic to my mind. What I am concerned about is the way the act disables Canada.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Okay. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Merci.

Mr. Levitt, please.

[Michael Levitt, Liberal, York Centre, ON]

Thank you all for your testimony.

Professor Juneau, I want to dig down a little into your hypothesis that our government's decision to not eliminate sanctions is some sort of political trap that we're caught in and not an act of principled policy, because that's certainly the way I see it.

In making the announcement when the P5+1 sanctions were eliminated, Minister Dion framed it as follows. He said that our eyes are wide open. He went on to say:

Canada will lift its sanctions but will maintain a level of mistrust for a regime that must not have nuclear weapons, a regime that is a danger to human rights and is not a friend to our allies, including Israel.

He also pointed out the state sponsor of terrorism, that there must be an accountability for those things before any reduction in Canada's additional sanctions would be taking place.

I'm wondering if you could look at the situation with Iran now. Are we not seeing Iran as a country that has increased its rate of executions under Rouhani, and they've actually gone up over the last couple of years?

In terms of incitement against Israel, rocket launches with kind of cryptic messages on the side targeting the State of Israel. In terms of state sponsor of terrorism, Hezbollah, Iran's proxy, is functioning on the ground in Syria adding to the catastrophic situation being faced in areas like Aleppo and others. With all of these things, given the state of intention, that the additional sanctions would not be lifted until there was accountability for Iran's human rights record, and its record of the state sponsor of terror, and it's record of incitement against the State of Israel, does that not suggest we have a principled policy that we've chosen to follow, rather than just a political statement?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

Thank you. That's a good question. That human rights in Iran are bad is undeniable. You did not hear me deny that, or challenge the individual pieces of your question. One small point that I would emphasize, though, is to say that executions under Rouhani increased is factually true, but not very useful in the sense that the president in Iran is not the one who determines policies in terms of human rights and political reform. That is from the supreme leader, who is obviously not elected, but the president doesn't decide these things, so to say that it increased under him is certainly true, but it's not.... I don't want to say relevant, but it's not—

[Michael Levitt, Liberal, York Centre, ON]

I think we could add to that list of human rights abuses that are continuing and increasing there the treatment of LGBTQ and also women, not to mention foreign nationals that are being imprisoned and tortured in jails.

I'm sorry. Continue.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

You don't have to convince me that human rights are bad in Iran. I absolutely agree with you on that.

Where I do think the discussion at a foreign policy level is useful is that from my perspective, there's nothing to gain from shunning a country like Iran. It is a nice pat on the back to say we are taking a principled stand and we're not talking to that regime, but there are things to talk about with that regime. It's an absolute cliché to say it, but we talked to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and there were things to talk about.

Engagement...and I'm not a member of the Liberal Party and I'm not endorsing them politically, but on a technical basis, I do agree with what was said on multiple occasions that engagement doesn't mean agreement. The point of diplomacy is to discuss things we disagree with.

[Michael Levitt, Liberal, York Centre, ON]

Let me point something out. I am a member of the Liberal Party for what it's worth, and we're not talking about the engagement here. The engagement is something we are doing, and we're delivering the hard messages on some of these issues.

I'm questioning your statement that the decision to not remove further sanctions is something you see as our being stuck in a political situation. I'm saying to you that I believe our policy of engagement includes keeping the principled position on sanctions in place until some of these other issues are resolved, and not rushing into it.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

We can agree to disagree on this one, but ultimately, my view is that foreign policy is about the calibration of multiple priorities. For human rights to be the only priority in the relationship with a country like Iran, or any other for that matter, is not optimal.

As small a country as Canada is, as limited as its impact on the world scene is, it can, along with allies.... The best impact in terms of improving, promoting, and encouraging political reforms on democracy, human rights, and other fronts will come when engagement on human rights comes with other aspects, whether it's trade, whether it's diplomatic relations, and so on.

I don't see any proof that engaging only on the basis of human rights and therefore, not engaging...that making decisions only on the basis of human rights can lead to optimal outcomes from our perspective.

The other point I would add is on the plain inconsistency of that. Canada has relations with Saudi Arabia, and I think I'm safe to say that human rights in Saudi Arabia are worse than in Iran, or certainly not better. Are human rights raised in our issues with Saudi Arabia? Of course they are, but we have other interests too: business, strategic, consular, educational, and so on.

From my perspective the argument that we shouldn't engage with Iran solely on the basis of human rights is widely inconsistent.

[Michael Levitt, Liberal, York Centre, ON]

Let it be said that I was pretty clear it wasn't just the human rights issues. It was also the issues that are very serious in terms of the state sponsorship of terror, and we're seeing that play out on the ground in Aleppo right now with Iran's proxy Hezbollah.

I'm just saying to you it's not purely a human rights issue. We've also seen leadership by Canada at the UN annually in terms of holding Iran accountable for some of these things, working with like-minded allies.

Again, it was just the positioning of this as our being somehow trapped and not able to move for political reasons as opposed to what I believe to be our foreign affairs minister taking a principled stand, engaging, but also not reducing all sanctions until we're at a point where Iran has changed its behaviour in the international forum.

Thank you very much for that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Levitt.

Mr. Miller, please.

[Marc Miller, Liberal, Ville-Marie—Le Sud-Ouest—Île-des-Soeurs, QC]

Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today.

I want to continue on the human rights path, although on a different tack. Richard, perhaps the first question is for you.

Generally, the realm of sanctions, whether unilateral or multilateral, has been reserved for areas of high politics, nuclear interests, interests where the behaviour of an actor in question to be sanctioned has threatened international peace and security. The migration towards sanctioning individuals and not states on the basis of a level of human rights violation that is deemed to be intolerable generally answers to a call to condemn based on a moral imperative, as Mr. Levitt alluded to.

I'm wondering what the limits to that approach are intellectually, and even from an idealist perspective. We have disagreements with our closest ally as to the death penalty. We have disagreements with the way certain European countries behave. I'm not talking about a relativist moral slippery slope. I'm simply talking about where we draw the line. Effectiveness is one argument, but it doesn't necessarily counter the moral imperative.

There is also a beauty in freezing someone's assets that are situated here where they have committed a gross indecent act. It would be reprehensible to let them derive gain from those assets.

I'd like you to take a few minutes to reflect on that sort of tension that we're facing, from a geopolitical and trade perspective.

Thanks.

[Richard Nephew]

I'm happy to. I think this is a great question. It's the kind of question that, as a former State Department and White House sanctions person, I wrestled with all the time.

I don't think there is a perfect answer here, but I'll give you my sense of both the effectiveness but also the moral dimension here. In my view, it's perfectly reasonable for sanctions to target individuals for gross human rights violations, to freeze their assets, and to deny them access to one's country. I see no reason why Canada should let the head of Evin prison or the lead torturer for the judiciary of Iran into Canada, or, frankly, into the United States.

The issue I have had is when the desire to target individuals for individual bad acts comes up to the state level. Here, like the other witness, I have some real concerns with making a decision that because there are human rights violations, we will not permit other kinds of issues to be addressed, or with putting all the various different world geostrategic issues on the balance for human rights. In my view, that's a decision that could be made, but I think that then you have issues of uniformity and of common global standards, which I think become a problem.

As you say, there is a bit of a dispute over the death penalty between us, and ultimately, I think that if you were to condition your ability to do business with the United States on that, it would be counterproductive for Canada and counterproductive for the United States.

To my mind, we need to decide the level of effectiveness that we think sanctions can bring, attached to the kind of global harm we see. In my view, human rights have not been proven at a state level to be an effective prompter of sanctions, and sanctions haven't been effective in resolving them. We've had very significant sanctions on Iran for its nuclear issues but also more broadly, and human rights in Iran are as bad as they've been. I don't think that is going to change because of sanctions being imposed from the outside.

Frankly, the sense of risk that a country faces over human rights, sanctions, regime change, and so forth could actually create an impetus for more human rights violations. I don't think that's necessarily a cycle that anyone wants to engage in.

In my view, in summary, I think that human rights on a personal level are a perfect reason to impose sanctions. I don't think anyone needs to invite into their country someone who's accused of gross human rights violations and so forth, but when it comes down to whether there are geostrategic issues that we need to sort out, as we've done with Saudi Arabia, with China, and with countries around the world, we sometimes have to hold our noses to deal with those larger issues. As the other witness said, that's where foreign policy prioritization comes into effect.

[Marc Miller, Liberal, Ville-Marie—Le Sud-Ouest—Île-des-Soeurs, QC]

Thank you.

Mr. Juneau, you said that closing the consulate and our sanctions against Iran have hurt us a great deal, particularly with respect to trade with that country. You said that we are practically behind the wall.

Can you elaborate on this with examples of the negative impact this has had on Canada?

I would also add that you can sign up for a membership on our party's site at liberal.ca, and it is free. Just joking, of course.

I will let you answer my question.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

I must say that I am rigorously non-partisan in my analyses.

It is very difficult to answer your question specifically because very little is known, at least publicly, about consular issues. That is why, in the case of Homa Hoodfar, which was resolved earlier this year, we do not know why she was imprisoned by the Iranian authorities—taken hostage, for all practical purposes—or why she was released.

Was she taken hostage simply because of disputes between the factions in the Iranian regime, given that hardliners wanted to obstruct the moderates' efforts to engage?

If that is the case, it is independent of any action by Canada. The fact that she came from an English-speaking country is actually a plus. There are often people from Australia, Britain, the United States, and Canada, but there are also cases of people from France. If Homa Hoodfar was released owing to the evolving disputes among the various factions, that is relatively independent of any Canadian action and, as a result, of the presence or absence of a Canadian embassy in Iran.

I maintain that it is in our interest to have an embassy in Teheran for consular, diplomatic, trade, and other reasons. I am not prepared to conclude, however, as regards consular disputes and on an ad hoc basis, that not having an embassy did in fact harm us. It is impossible to determine that since there is so little public information about these cases. First of all, we do not know why they occurred, or how or why they were subsequently resolved.

In the case of Ms. Hoodfar, there is a plausible hypothesis. Without the slightest evidence, it is possible that the Iranian authorities feared that she might get very sick in prison. The Iranian authorities are not angels. They have no regard for human rights, but they are aware of public relations issues.

The death of Zahra Kazemi 13 years ago was a public relations disaster for the Iranian government. At the highest level of the Iranian government, the decision might have been made to make sure this kind of thing did not happen again where a person with dual citizenship died in prison. On the other hand, Iranian citizens very often die in prison, and that will not stop. To my knowledge—and perhaps I am mistaken—, this was the last case of a person with dual citizenship. Homa Hoodfar was ill and older, and that could be why she was released. We cannot be sure, however.

[Marc Miller, Liberal, Ville-Marie—Le Sud-Ouest—Île-des-Soeurs, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Miller.

Mr. Kmiec, go ahead, please.

[Tom Kmiec, Conservative, Calgary Shepard, AB]

I am going to start with you, Professor Juneau.

I want to start on Iran and pick up some of the questions Mr. Levitt had. I have a problem, because he took all my questions, and the comments I was going to make as well.

I think one of the good things the government has done is continue the previous government's policy on Iran. It's not just human rights; it's their nuclear weapons program, the aggression they've shown towards our regional allies in that particular area of the world, and the continued support for terrorist groups. It's basically complete ignorance when it comes to ceasing the defence, promotion, and support they give not just to Hezbollah and Hamas, but also to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. They played a role in the attempted bombing of an Israeli diplomat on February 13, 2012. In Bahrain, there was a bomb plot on September 30, 2015. It's consistent. They have not stopped doing this, both to our allies and to other interests that we have in the region. They have Quds militiamen in southern Iraq. They played a role in Afghanistan, and they are playing a role in the civil war in Yemen.

Why should we make it simple for them to rejoin the international or western world and have access to finance and travel for members of their regime? On one side, I guess, our sanctions have worked to constrain them and delay their weapons programs, and have maybe given them food for thought in the relations with others. Why should we restart our relations with them in full and reward them with an embassy?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

First of all, I do agree with your starting assessment that Iran's foreign policy has not fundamentally changed, before and after the JCPOA, so I think at that level we are in agreement.

I would make a side point that I find—and this has been one of my big areas of research—that critics of Iran, to put them into a very broad category, tend to exaggerate the extent of Iran's influence in the region. Iran has extremely limited influence in Bahrain. Its support for some opposition factions is very limited and doesn't make a difference on the ground. It's the same thing for Yemen. The Houthis are not proxies of Iran. The Houthis are not puppets of Iran. Iran has a very limited influence in Yemen.

Other elements you mentioned I would agree with, but I did want to make that point.

I would disagree with the conclusion that reopening the embassy in Iran is making things easier for Iran, which is the way you phrased it. I think that's a mis-characterization of diplomacy, to be perfectly blunt. The point of diplomacy is to try to promote our own interests. We do have interests in Iran. We have consular interests. There are trade interests in Iran, and there are other reasons to be there. I don't think that by simply shunning them we can advance these interests. Having an embassy in Iran, having a limited trade.... We are never going to have big trade relations with Iran, not just for political reasons. They are far; we are far. We're not a big economy, so let's keep that in mind.

We are not advancing these interests just by taking the moral high ground.

[Tom Kmiec, Conservative, Calgary Shepard, AB]

Mr. Nephew, since you have worked for the State Department, I have a question about your interaction with the Magnitsky Act in the United States. Here we have Bill C-267, a piece of legislation that was introduced by one of our colleagues. It's a slight rewrite of a bill that was proposed by Irwin Cotler, a well-respected former Liberal member of Parliament, and he's a well-respected human rights activist internationally.

What were your dealings with the Magnitsky Act? Does it work in the United States? What's the policy environment there? Is it widely seen to be an extra tool in the tool kit that policy-makers can use to try to put pressure on specific members of a regime in order to get some type of concessions during diplomacy? Has it served its purpose there?

[Richard Nephew]

I think you described the purpose accurately. It's designed to put particular pressure on particular individuals so that they'll stop doing things they've been doing, which in this case is the oppression of human rights specifically inside Russia. There is talk about expanding the Magnitsky Act to be a global issue and to then target human rights around the world.

From the limited perspective of imposing costs on particular individuals, it can have an impact, but I don't think it's going to change state policy. This is the key issue for me. The degree to which human rights violations in Russia come from the top, and they come from the Kremlin, we haven't seen a single indication that Magnitsky has changed that decision-making or changed the direction of Russian policy on human rights and justice in the country.

I think, frankly, that would be the same situation if we applied the Magnitsky Act globally. We'd see certain individuals not be able to come to the United States because they wouldn't be able to engage in banking. However, by and large, unless we've decided that we're going to make it a fundamental issue of geostrategic importance for the United States vis-à-vis Russia, as in directly threaten Russian corporate entities' ability to operate in the United States, invest and trade there, I don't think it's going to have the kind of punch necessary to change the top-level human rights policies.

From my perspective, that means it's still in the class of "feel good". It feels good to do it and it has some degree of moral impact, but in terms of application and real punishment, frankly, I haven't seen it yet.