Foreign Affairs Committee on March 9th, 2017

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Good morning, everyone.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the study of the situation in eastern Europe and central Asia 25 years after the end of the Cold War, I'd like to welcome our witness, joining us via video conference today in Washington, Paul Stronski, who is a senior fellow for the Russia and Eurasia program.

Welcome. We're glad to have you here. You are our only witness in this hour, so we will get you to present your testimony over the next 10 minutes or so, and then we'll go back and forth among the members and ask questions and have a chance to follow up.

The floor is yours.

[Paul Stronski, Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]

Thank you very much.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you to speak about Russia, eastern Europe, and central Asia.

There are many questions that were posed to me, and I obviously cannot deal with them all in about 10 minutes, so I'm going to focus most of my comments on Russia, on Russia's impact on Europe and transatlantic security, and on central Asia, which are my three areas of expertise. I'm happy to take questions on any other topic, though, as well.

One thing I wanted to start by saying is that the west's relationship with Russia is at the lowest point it's been since the 1980s. The fault lines between Russia and the transatlantic community reflect major differences in interests and values, and this is not just about Ukraine. The relationship is cyclical, and there is no quick fix to the problems we face. Many western leaders, most notably former U.S. presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, tried to reset relations with Russia, and each saw the relationship end up in much worse shape than when they started. I certainly hope that President Trump now in the United States will come to realize that pretty soon.

When you look at Canadian-Russian relations, you see they've had their ups and their deep downs, as have U.K. and Russian relations, and I think you can apply that to pretty much any western state and notice that as well. But Russia's annexation of Crimea and its aggression in eastern Ukraine have upended the post-Cold War security landscape. Having lost much of its soft power in the region, Russia has been trying to carve out a sphere of influence in Eurasia using military force when it needs to, economic pressure when it can, as well as new hybrid tools.

Russia also wants to push back at western values and influences in Russia and in the former Soviet space, but it doesn't just want to do that. It wants to discredit western democratic political systems, and we saw a lot of this with what went on in the United States and what is going on in Europe now.

This is in part because the Kremlin and many other autocratic leaders in central Asia and elsewhere in the region see western democracy promotion and rule of law as security threats to their regimes. Russia today is no longer aspiring to be part of the west, as it did for the first 20 or so years after the collapse of the USSR, but it's seeking to rewrite the basic principles of international order and push back at a global system that has been dominated by the west for the last 25 years.

Russian meddling in the U.S. election has helped upend the U.S. political system, and it raises a lot of questions about Washington's commitment to NATO, to eastern Europe, and to Eurasia. We see Russian propaganda, information operations, and Cold War-style subversion going on in Europe as many elections approach. They are magnifying a dangerous wave of populism that is threatening European unity. It could help upend other European political systems, and this has brought repercussions for eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet space.

This poses deep challenges to Canada and to its friends and allies at a time when NATO and the European Union are all much less united than ever before. This is in part due to the Trump administration's uncertain commitment to Europe and NATO but also because of Brexit and the EU's own internal troubles. As well, this is occurring at a time when there's a lot of social and economic unease in the former Soviet space.

Now, regarding central Asia, there are two main issues that I think are worth focusing on that impact its foreign and security policy. The first is to just underscore that this has been a region that has been very poorly governed, with populations that have been misserved by their leaders since the collapse of the USSR. Many of the region's future problems, as with the current problems, are related as much to the challenges posed by the governments and the political elites in these countries as they are to external threats, whether that be Russia or international terrorism.

Central Asia is in a process of finally moving from its first-generation post-Soviet leaders to the next generation, and of all the autocrats, they've all been there at least 10 years and some have been there more than 25 years. As this transition occurs, the question of political stability remains a key one, and one that looms over the region.

In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which are the region's most powerful, wealthiest, and most populated countries, the transition is going to be key to overall regional stability. That process has begun actually in Uzbekistan with the death of President Karimov last fall. It is going unexpectedly smoothly, which is very good. But in Kazakhstan, which is the wealthiest of all of the central Asian countries, Nazarbayev is very old, and his successor is still not known. They seem to be in a process of trying to figure that out right now.

One of the things that I need to bring this back to is the fact that when the west and the U.S. and Russia have had the most difficult times in their relationship over the last 25 years, it generally has occurred when there have been leadership changes in other former Soviet states. The possibility for leadership change over the next five, 10, even one year in central Asia and in the south Caucasus, with these aging autocrats.... We also have elections planned in semi-democratic Kyrgyzstan as well as Armenia. The possibility for a leadership change is very high, and also the possibility for misunderstanding.

The Kremlin views any sort of popular socio-economic discontent and popular revolts not as something from the bottom up, as we in the west do, but as something that is orchestrated by outside powers. That is what led to a lot of the confrontation between Russia and the west over the Maidan in Ukraine, over the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, and the like. I think the possibility of some sort of misunderstanding between east and west is very high coming in the future.

Also, this leadership change is going to occur at a time of tremendous socio-economic difficulty for the region. Central Asia's main exports are all natural resources, things like oil, natural gas, cotton, gold, and other minerals, all of which are at historic low prices. Remittances from Russia are down, and high levels of corruption in the region are hurting the investor climate. We have a bad economic environment for the entire region, and the governments of central Asia are slashing budgets, devaluating their currency, leading to high inflation and growing poverty. This is pushing some people much below the poverty level.

The timing of this could not be any worse. We have a regional population boom. Half of the population of Uzbekistan now was born after the Soviet Union collapsed. These people need to find employment, they need health care, they need basic poverty alleviation, and this is a time when the governments have very little money to do that with.

Islamic extremism is another potential problem. It's not one right now, but it could be one in the future. The governments of central Asia and Russia all exaggerate the problem in order to justify authoritarian rule, but this exaggeration often muddies the waters about the true extent of whether this is a problem or will become one. What we do know is that central Asia has, for a long time, been a difficult recruiting ground for extremists due to the highly authoritarian nature of the region and the legacies of Soviet secularization. As I said, we have a population where about half of it was born after the Soviet Union collapsed. We don't have much public debate in the region about extremism, its causes, and its ties to socio-economic inequality, so it's really unsure how much of a problem this could be in the future.

We also know that the region has highly porous borders, a problem given that northern Afghanistan has become very unstable. There are reports of central Asian foreign fighters in Syria, who could easily move back. It's an issue that needs to be watched.

Finally, all of this is occurring in central Asia at a time when the west is disengaging from the region after drawing down from Afghanistan. For most western countries, central Asia is not a priority right now.

But that's not the case for China, which has become the major investor, focusing on infrastructure, mining, transportation, and telecommunications. China has surpassed Russia and the European Union as the main investor in the region. We see Russia, the former colonial power, still trying to use whatever soft power and residual economic influence it has. They're doing that through the Eurasian Economic Union, through bilateral arrangements and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. But the Ukraine conflict and Russia's heavy-handed approach to Ukraine has really unnerved many of the central Asian states. It makes them very nervous about what could come their way from Moscow, and they are keen to keep the west engaged in the region.

This is also occurring at a time when Iran is interested in expanding its influence and trade after the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal.

We have a very changing socio-economic and political environment in the region, and this is occurring at a time when there is a great geopolitical shift happening around it. I think it is a very interesting time and an important time to keep engaged on central Asia and Eurasia as a whole.

Thank you very much, and I'd be happy to take any of your questions.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much, Mr. Stronski.

We are going to start with the opposition.

Mr. Kent, you have the floor for six minutes, please.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Stronski, for being with us today.

I'll keep my preamble short because I have a number of questions I'd like to put forward.

First of all, I'd like your impression of the recent surge in the Russian-backed war in eastern Ukraine, whether it may be, as some said, a simple test of President Trump and the new administration, or it may signal a new attempt to carve out a greater territory beyond the current line of contact. What's your read?

[Paul Stronski]

I don't see it right now as trying to carve out new territory in eastern Ukraine. I don't see that the Russians need to do that. They pretty much have what they need. Right now they can keep Ukraine destabilized. They can keep the Ukrainian government disorganized and they have their hold over Ukraine the way it is. I don't think they really need to have more territory, but I do think it is a test of the U.S. administration. I also think it's a test of Europe and the west in general, where we have disagreements between various different states over what sort of response the west should have to this uptick in violence. It is a test of not just the United States, not just President Trump, but of all European and NATO unity at a time of tremendous unease in the west.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Thank you very much.

What would you advise to resolve this new dimension, this new problem arising from the blockade of coal and other material from eastern Ukraine to where it's needed in the west? It's a new economic crisis.

[Paul Stronski]

It is going to become a huge problem. It already is, and it does threaten the energy security of Ukraine as a whole.

I think the west needs to continue to help support Ukraine, particularly in its energy security. We also need to have very tough conversations with the Russians as well. There is some international assistance that needs to be given to Ukraine to help it deal with this problem. A strong and very robust diplomacy needs to be done at the same time.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

To your remarks in the paper that you co-authored “Illusions versus Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Towards Russia”, you and your co-authors stressed that the United States and allies will defend the norms that underpin European security and that the United States will continue its strong support for Ukraine.

In Canada this week, as you may know, the government announced the extension of Operation Unifier but did not respond to Ukraine's requests and recent appeals for an expansion of the training as well as defensive lethal weapons, anti-tank, and so forth.

Again, what are your thoughts? From one side, we have heard that adding new defensive weaponry will escalate the conflict. On the other hand, appeasement and turning aside will merely demoralize the domestic population and the army.

[Paul Stronski]

It's a very tough balance because I think not doing anything is demoralizing to the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian military, and both of them are trying to reform their government, really make Ukraine work, and hold their government accountable.

Having worked in government in the United States, one of the concerns that I have is, despite what we say rhetorically, the west traditionally has not been willing to back up its rhetorical support anymore. My fear is that this could easily become a proxy war and that, by giving these weapons, we could inflame the conflict more than it is without any real willingness to do anything else to try to resolve that.

It's a very tough dilemma. There's no easy answer. I think the reality is that Russia is always going to care more about Ukraine than any western government will, and we just need to be very cautious knowing that and knowing the consequences of providing that sort of assistance any time we do it.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

I have one final quick question.

We've also been told, on the committee's recent travels in eastern Europe and from some experts here, that despite Russia's bellicose talk and activities in Syria and Ukraine, in fact Russia is much weaker, both militarily and economically, than further possible adventures might allow.

What are your comments?

[Paul Stronski]

I would agree with that. I think the Russian economy is not in great shape. I don't think it's ready to collapse anytime soon, but it is hurting. We shouldn't expect it to collapse, and we shouldn't think that sanctions are going to cause it to collapse.

I think the political situation, and the entire structure of how that system works, is very brittle. The government knows it, and it is very careful in how it creates a very strong propaganda narrative for its own people, at the same time as it has become highly authoritarian. I think it knows that the system is not as strong as it was before. They know that there are people who question now, but they're keeping it very clear that questioning can only go so far.

I think we shouldn't expect the country to fall apart anytime soon, but we should always be expecting.... This place has a very brittle political, social, and economic system. It has the ability to absorb shocks, and I think it will, but the Russian people know very little about the setbacks that the government has had in Ukraine and Syria, or about the casualties the Russian government and military have had.

Most of the interactions the senior leadership in Russia has are very highly scripted. They're not like the ones in a western system, where a senior leader will have to go out and meet the population. That very rarely happens in an unscripted environment, and I think their government is very careful not to allow that to happen.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Kent.

We're going to move over to Mr. McKay, for six minutes.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you.

Thank you, sir, for your testimony.

I want to go back to the role that China is playing and the emerging role, if you will, of China in this particular area.

It's trite but true that power abhors a vacuum. For all the huffing and puffing by the Russians, they are, in some respects, masking a serious economic and demographic decline. There is actual population shrinkage. That makes them dangerous, but it also makes them vulnerable. The Chinese, on the other hand, are exactly the opposite. They are a growing economic power and they are starting to assert their influence.

I just want you to comment on two areas. First, do you see a larger game plan on the part of the Chinese government in that particular area, aside from simply economic influence?

Second, the Chinese government has been in continuous conflict with the Uighurs, a Muslim group of people in the west of China, which I assume receives some comfort from some of the central Asian republics as well. I wonder whether you could offer any observations with respect to those two things: the underlying agenda of the Chinese government and its relationship with Islamic people in its own country, and also with those in central Asian republics.

[Paul Stronski]

I think your question about the Uighurs in Xinjiang is very relevant for what China's overall ambitions are for the region. I actually was in Beijing and Shanghai about two weeks ago and had discussions there about central Asia with various government and private sector representatives.

There are two aspects to the Chinese involvement in central Asia. The most important one is to make sure that central Asia remains stable. They are very concerned about instability in Afghanistan, and instability in Afghanistan bubbling up into central Asia, and then from there having a very unstable border right next to its Uighur population. A lot of their investment and their efforts to promote economic development in the region is very much with a goal to make this region more stable and to provide economic opportunity to the region.

The problem is very tied to their domestic issues. The problem is the way the Chinese do this. They generally work through political and economic elites, and there's a high level of corruption in the way in which they invest in the region. They also very often bring Chinese labourers in to do their various projects. This idea that you can create stability, create greater economic prosperity when you are doing it in the typical way that they've done it in Africa and other places, I think is misguided. I do not think that it really is.... The way that the Chinese are investing, I think, fuels some of the corruption problems that the region has, and it really isn't trickling down to the average people. You can see this. There was a protest last year in Kazakhstan and it was over Chinese influence and fear that China was going to acquire land in Kazakhstan.

I do, however, think that Chinese influence in the region is not all that bad. The region wants as many different international power players as they can get. Many of the countries of the region are very nervous about the possibility of some sort of future Russian aggression, and they are actively seeking large, wealthy states to be involved. That includes China. We're seeing Kazakstan, and if you look at the Caucasus, Georgia, reaching out to the Gulf states. They view this as also a way to enhance their security by just raising the costs to Russia of any sort of intervention like the one they've seen in Ukraine.

I think that China is not doing it out of its own desire to help the area of central Asia. It's doing it to help keep its own country stable. I think it does have some positive impacts in that it does provide an extra layer of assurance to the central Asian governments that at least one larger power is involved.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

You used the word “misguided” with respect to Chinese labourers. Could you expand that concept?

I know they like to bring them in by the boatload. They do all the work and then leave. What resentments is that fuelling?

[Paul Stronski]

Even in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan over the years there have been some protests and socio-economic grievances aired—even in a place like Turkmenistan, which is a totalitarian state—about the fact that Chinese labourers are getting better jobs and Chinese labourers are getting better money. The local labourers are having delays in when they're being paid. Very often when these local people complain they lose their jobs. That's one part of the resentment.

These states reacquired their sovereignty 25 years ago. With so much investment coming in, there was a very big concern over the sale of land. Land was confiscated from the Kazakhs and from the Uzbeks during the Soviet era. A lot of this land has be given back to the sovereign states, privatized. There is concern about these countries “losing” or selling out their natural resources, their land, and the like. Some of this fuels some of the nationalist tendencies, some of the populous tendencies we've seen elsewhere. It's just playing out a little differently here.

Another reason that China is involved is that they're trying to also export their excess infrastructure industries and excess labour. They have huge populations in China that need to be employed, and this is one way they can do it. They've already built up China as much...so they're now doing this outside, and it's pretty close. It's right next door. It's not as difficult to get there as it is to get to Africa or Latin America.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thanks, Mr. McKay.

We're going to move over to Madame Laverdière for six minutes, please.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Stronski, thank you for your very interesting presentation.

You spoke about Russia's efforts to discredit democratic systems and the rule of law. On that note, during another presentation, the committee learned of the situation related to these issues in Central Asia, a region where things aren't very rosy.

We also know that Ukraine is facing many challenges, in particular when it comes to corruption.

Can you elaborate on this?

[Paul Stronski]

Yes, I would agree.

Much of the political systems of these countries is highly tied up with schemes of corruption. I think there's a very good article in this week's New Yorker about corruption in Azerbaijan. It's tied to the Trump administration and people tied to President Trump. It gives a very good insight into how closely governance and economic power are linked in this era, how in the early post-Soviet era they were very much courting privatization, and how the legal system is very often used for economic ends, not as a fair court system. These are huge problems.

There is really only one country of the former Soviet Union besides the Baltic states that has really started to address the corruption problem, and that's Georgia. It has gone a long way. Everything from getting health care to dealing with the traffic police, depending on what country you're in, is all tied to bribes. Georgia is the sole exception to that. There are other places that have started, but have just not been as successful.

Ukraine right now is struggling, and it's struggling deeply. I sadly think that it is not making this transition very easily. The corruption schemes, the power of the oligarchs, and the economic power of the president himself are very troubling, and it's very troubling for the ability of Ukraine to get beyond....

Georgia was successful in one way. Because it was a very small country, it is a much more ethnically unified country. For all the talk about Saakashvili, the former president of Georgia, being democratic, though he was democratic and built the transition, he could also at times rule with an iron thumb. He pushed some of these reforms through with an iron thumb, and I think that in bigger, more complicated societies that is much more difficult to do.

I think many of these countries are unnerved about the democracy and rule of law systems that western governments give, and the transparency and journalist assistance that western governments give, because this threatens to open up a can of worms and expose how the political system is closely tied with corrupt schemes. I think that is one reason they view any sort of popular movement, whether or not it's assisted by the west—which it rarely is—as a threat to their security.

This is what makes it so difficult to push the human rights, rule of law reforms and to do that type of assistance. There are very brave people in the population doing that, but the audience of people who are really willing to implement it is very small, and they face an uphill battle, even in countries that have made a direct decision to turn to the west, like Ukraine has.

I think this is something that we're going to struggle with. I'm happy to take any other questions if you have any follow-up.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

I have another question.

You mentioned that, in the Central Asian countries, the events in Ukraine were described as Russian aggression. According to other experts who have appeared before us, this fear of aggression is often somewhat exaggerated in the Baltic countries to ensure internal cohesion.

How legitimate is this fear of Russian aggression in the Central Asian countries? Is there any real possibility of Russian aggression?

[Paul Stronski]

I think it depends on the country. I would agree with the assessment that in the Baltics the fear of aggression is exaggerated. It does help to unify the countries and it does help—or tries—to unify NATO. At least for now, NATO remains a very strong organization. As long as NATO still remains strong and still shows its support for the far eastern flank of NATO, I think the Russians will realize that NATO membership does mean something. I think the Baltic states and Poland are in much better shape than some of the other former Soviet states.

On the plus side for other states in the former Soviet Union, as one of the previous members said, Russia is stretched thin militarily. It is in Ukraine and it is in Syria, so its ability to do something again is questionable, but I think that in certain places there is a greater threat. Small countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are pretty much are in Russia's pocket economically, so I don't see any huge switch. The transition in Uzbekistan so far has been going very smoothly, so I don't see that as a huge place....

The one place I'm a little concerned about is Kazakhstan. It shares a very long border with Russia. It does have a Russian-speaking population in the north. This is a country that has a very close alliance with Russia, and it's one that's very nervous. The people are nervous. When you go there, you hear concerns about the way in which the country is presented in the Russian media. If you watch Russian media, you can see that they talk about the threat, about the possibility of extremism coming right up to the Russian border. I'm not sure they would replicate the situation the same way that they did in Ukraine to defend Russian interests, but Kazakhstan also has uranium banks. It has a whole bunch of things that you want to make sure never get into the hands of terrorists.

I think that if there's ever an indication that Kazakhstan might look unstable, or if it's pivoting too close to the west, that's a time when Russia might do something and just to go in. I'm very impressed with mid-level Kazak government officials. Kazakhstan has invested a lot of money in sending its government officials for education to places such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, the United States, and the U.K. When you meet these people, you find that they might be at the deputy minister level, and they really kind of “get it” the way that we would get it.

I think Russia is probably very terrified that one of these people would gain a lot of power. Kazakhstan, given the long border and given the Russian media narrative that it is possibly a place that could be unstable, I think is a place to be concerned about as well.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much. That's all the time we have for that question.

We're going to move over to Mr. Saini.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Good morning, Mr. Stronski.

My question is geopolitical in nature. If we look at the three major influences in that part of the world, central Asia, we're talking about Russia, China, and the United States. Right now, there's some talk that there is going to be a grand bargain between the United States and Russia, and one of the elements of that grand bargain will be that Russia will maintain its “near abroad” or spheres of influence.

You mentioned this in your opening remarks. If we look at Turkmenistan, which has adopted a position of permanent neutrality, and if we look at Kyrgyzstan, we see both countries have now tilted towards China, for different reasons. Turkmenistan has done so because, as you mentioned, if you look at the remittances, you see that they have now dropped by half. One third of their GDP depends on remittances from Russia, so obviously China now is playing a bigger part. As you know, Turkmenistan was a hermit kingdom for many years, and now China has moved in to develop some of their natural gas fields.

To me, if the west recuses itself from that area, the two main players are going to be China and Russia. Russia, outside of military influence, has very limited influence. If China has a larger influence, especially with their one belt, one road initiative, will there ever be a flashpoint? Going forward, there has to be some point at which China and Russia may have a conflict. If Russia can offer only a military sort of mechanism, and if China is offering an economic mechanism, somewhere those worlds are going to collide.

Where and how do you see that falling out in the future?

[Paul Stronski]

I think that's the big question.

When you look at the U.S. policy in the region in the 1990s and 2000s it was all about trying to unleash the energy resources and get them flowing toward Europe [Technical difficulty—Editor].

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

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