Foreign Affairs Committee on May 4th, 2017

[The Chair (Hon. Robert Nault (Kenora, Lib.)), Liberal, Bob Nault]

Colleagues, since we're always a little bit pressed for time, I think we'll start close to on time this morning. We're going to continue on with our study of the United States and Canada's foreign policy and, obviously, the importance of that.

Before us as a witness today we have, from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Mr. Charles Doran, professor of international relations, director of Canadian studies. Welcome.

From the Centre for International Governance Innovation, we have Mr. Fen Osler Hampson, distinguished fellow, director of global security and politics program. Thank you very much for coming.

The normal process, as I'm sure the staff have told you, is that we'll start with the presentations and then we'll get right to questions from our colleagues, members of Parliament who are here. I

I'm not sure who has decided to go first.

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson, Distinguished Fellow, Director of Global Security and Politics Program, Centre for International Governance Innovation]

We'll go in alphabetical order, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Okay.

The floor is yours, Mr. Doran. Thank you.

[Prof. Charles Doran, Andrew W. Mellon Professor, International Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University]

First of all, it's a distinct honour for me to be here to talk with you about something that is always important, Canada-U.S. relations, but that probably at this point is as important as it has been in a very long time.

I wasn't quite sure about my instructions, so I tried briefly to respond to each of the questions. I guess I was given the option to choose questions, but I didn't do that. I'm sure I have not responded adequately to any of the questions, but I'm going to give you my brief response. It's exactly as I printed the thing out.

First, Canada, in my modest judgment, ought to attempt to tread lightly with President Trump, especially in interpersonal relations. Despite his public image of disputatiousness, he doesn't like interpersonal antagonisms, especially in his physical presence. It makes him uneasy. On the other hand, Canada ought, in my judgment, to state its interests clearly and firmly. He listens. Be prepared for tough bargaining on issues of top priority.

I would think that trade and investment will get top attention. Industrial supply lines, as your parliamentary secretary very adequately, very nicely, and clearly expressed yesterday in Washington, are very sensitive. Mr. Trump needs to be reminded how important an open border is to both our countries. He also needs to know how well policed this border is in actuality, and what a record of co-operation and security it has established. I know he knows these things. He just needs to be reminded of the value of them. Yet—this is the bottom line here—some of the most important policy impacts for Canada will not have anything to do with foreign relations, but because of the integration of the economies some of the most important impacts will be from internal American policy decisions, such as the possibility of a large corporate tax reduction, vast increases potentially in infrastructure spending, and concerns over changes in immigration and refugee policy.

Here is my response to the second question. In response to concerns Canada might have with commercial relations with Trump, I think the Trump administration could usefully be reminded that trade deficits and financial imbalances must be dealt with in a multilateral fashion, not primarily bilateral. That said, when balances are large, persistent, and negative for the United States, this particular government in Washington will complain, especially when the imbalances are not just structural. But trade between the United States and Canada is quite balanced. Anybody looking at this in the last two years can see this. The larger U.S. problems by far are with Mexico and China.

In response to the third question, in the past Canada has sought a greater emphasis on bilateral relations with the United States. Fen Hampson and I have looked at this. He has actually been more involved in it, certainly on this side, but there's a history of discussion about it.

Although NAFTA renegotiation is starting, or at least is slated to start, these relations in many issues now are predominantly bilateral relations. It appears that the United States will seek to strengthen rules of origin provisions—at least it would like to. The United States may seek to alter dispute panel procedures. I may as well admit to you that as a strong proponent of NAFTA, I had something to do with the discussion of these dispute panels a long time ago. The current government in Washington is unhappy with them. The government has said something about giving greater attention to labour issues. I think I know what is involved there, but it really involves Mexico. It doesn't involve Canada and the United States.

With regard to the fourth question—again, truth in advertising—I have been a long-time advocate of enlarging the scope of NORAD NORTHCOM responsibilities in the Arctic and offshore. I do know that its responsibilities are only with surveillance and with monitoring, but that is key. That is absolutely key. No two other countries in the world have coordinated this with the level of trust that Canada and the United States have. Actually, I think almost 100% of Americans don't know anything about how it operates. I trust that you do. But I see little interest in moving in the direction that I am advocating.

On a different topic, the United States is very concerned that Canada spends only 1% of its GDP on defence. The United States puzzles over—and I'm sure I don't understand—how Canada could argue that it is unable to spend part of its proposed military budget, pushing forward these expenditures, as is it understood south of the border, over a 20-year period. From the U.S. side, from the U.S. perspective, these budgetary manoeuvres, I will candidly tell you as an academic, look like budgetary manoeuvres to try to avoid an increase in current defence expenditures, however wrong that interpretation may be.

Five, I believe the United States will continue to favour close coordination of monitoring and surveillance. There's just no doubt about that. I just got through with participating in an Arctic task force with the Council on Foreign Relations and we got into all of this. One of the things we learned is that there seems to be more disagreement bureaucratically inside the United States regarding how to respond to things than there is between Canada and the United States about surveillance. I guess that's good news. I don't know if it's good news or bad news, but I'll tell you this much: when push comes to shove, they always figure out which planes to send up. I don't think there's going to be a real problem there.

As the Arctic melts, more transits are occurring, more mining and oil drilling sites are opening up, and more commercial activity is taking place. Problems are multiplying. The Arctic Council has passed a forward-looking strategic statement on the preservation of Arctic fish stocks, yet the countries with the largest fishing fleets—China, Taiwan, and Japan—are not members of this agreement. I know there are parallel talks going on here about fisheries, but I can tell you, looking at the size of that Chinese fishing fleet and looking at the subsidies—we all subsidize, to some degree, the fishermen, because they're always complaining—the fact is that with the amount of subsidies the Chinese have poured into those fishing fleets, those boats are going to have to go someplace, and I think, unfortunately, they have their eyes on the Arctic.

Closer coordination of security is inevitable involving the United States, Canada, and Greenland. Let's not forget about Greenland and Denmark. Russia is rapidly moving forward with reopening all of its old airfields in the Arctic. It has, as you know, some 20 icebreakers, including heavy icebreakers. The United States has barely three. I say barely because I'm not sure they can all get out there at the same time. That's the way it is. Changes will be required, but so far the Arctic has not received a lot of attention from the Trump administration. That could change. Things change very fast down there.

Six, the Trump administration has, in my opinion, a first-rate set of appointments at the cabinet level and an excellent national security council. Now, all my academic friends say that's ridiculous; there are no academics there. How could that be? What kind of experience do these people have? Let me tell you: Tillerson has done more deals and talked with more people and thought about international politics more effectively than have most people who were nominees for that position. One shouldn't underestimate that kind of talent. They aren't very good at getting the other appointments in place. That's taking a while.

The Trump administration hopes for improved relations with Russia—shock—but so far has been quite disappointed in matters involving Syria. Of course, it all got involved in campaign issues. The press and the opposition—well, opposition comes from a lot of sides—have made this issue something that makes it very difficult to actually look at what is going on here. But I don't think the Trump administration is naive about this. They simply wonder why they have to have these battles with Putin all the time. They realize that part of it is over status, because previously it was said, by somebody, that Russia was only a regional power. Now, if you want to irritate the Russians, that's the way you do it. In my opinion, they're a great power that is on hard times, certainly in economic terms.

Russia is a controversial issue in Washington right now. Russia bungled the sarin gas affair. There's just absolutely no question or doubt about it. I don't know if they had previous information. I'm sure they wouldn't have supported it, not because they were morally concerned but because they thought it would have been bad policy. It happened, and then they ended up defending the Syrians. That made virtually everybody in Washington angry. That was a mistake. Nonetheless, the Trump administration is determined to continue to acknowledge Russia as an important member of the great power system.

NATO is now viewed by the Trump administration as a critical defence alliance, as opposed to what was said during the campaign, but the Trump administration would like the Europeans to do more to help defend themselves. Surprise? Hardly. Evidence exists that these preferences are beginning to be taken seriously.

Seven, the Trump administration is on record as getting even tougher with ISIS, whatever that will mean. The problem is that Russia and Iran are supposed to be partners in this fight. Regime change in Syria is not feasible as long as Russia unconditionally backs Assad. Iranian influence is growing in Iraq, but both Canada and the United States must continue to support the Iraq government even under these very trying circumstances.

Eight, I don't know know what the status of the joint comprehensive plan of action is. When government change occurs—this is my speculative judgment—some change, perhaps passive change, in such policy arrangements is to be expected.

Finally, funding cuts are taking place in the U.S. State Department and elsewhere in the U.S. government. It is only to be expected that mainline defence expenditures are likely to increase. Such cuts, the cuts I've talked about, are to be expected in the U.S. funding of some multilateral institutions. The question is about multilateral institutions. All I would say is that perhaps other democracies, especially those not meeting the 2% NATO defence spending threshold, will increase their level of funding of multilateral institutions—for those of us who know that they're important—in offsetting terms.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Doran.

We'll go to Mr. Hampson, please.

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

Thank you very much, and thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee.

I'm going to focus on NAFTA and the future of NAFTA. I'm not going to address all the many questions you prepared, which were answered so ably by my good friend Charles Doran.

The first point I'd make is that, in my view, the Trump administration is going to use the North American Free Trade Agreement negotiations as part of a larger strategic initiative to set the tone with U.S. trading partners where there is a real trade imbalance, namely China and Germany.

There's an old Chinese expression, “kill the chicken to scare the monkeys”, and I think that's exactly what they're trying to do. We've seen that in Korea's response to what they've seen happening in some of the statements the President has made about NAFTA.

I think it's entirely consistent with NAFTA's origins, which set both the tone and the substance of America's subsequent trade liberalization policies globally, only this time President Trump is throwing America's trade policies into reverse gear.

As we know, the pressures we're seeing now did not begin with Donald Trump. Softwood lumber is a perennial irritant. So is dairy, beef, and pork. Domestic pressures in the U.S. on trade have been building up for a very long period of time. Those of you with long memories will remember Ross Perot's candidacy for the presidency in the previous century.

At first blush, the balance of power in negotiations between Canada and the United States appears to be highly asymmetrical. They're the bigger economy by many orders of magnitude. They're also far less dependent on trade for economic growth than we are. Although trade is a two-way street and the balance, as Professor Doran pointed out, is currently in the U.S. favour, and even more so if you remove energy from the equation, and we're right to remind Americans of the facts, as we've seen, the facts are not necessarily a winner when you talk to the current administration.

As we look to the future of negotiations, the real question is this: what will be our negotiating strategy? There I would make three points. First, we have to recognize that the status quo is unsustainable. Second, we're going to have to make some concessions—the questions are over what, and when—but we also need to define comparable benefits from the U.S. In any negotiation, you don't give up something without getting something in return. Third, we're playing with a weaker hand, but if we're smart negotiators, we can level the playing field and advance our interests.

A long history of negotiating with the U.S. shows that Americans will negotiate with unannounced shifts in their position. You may remember the Nixon trade shocks of 1971. There will be an unexplained and sudden escalation of demands. That was the story in both the NAFTA and the TPP negotiations. They will violate previous understandings or promises, which was certainly the case with NAFTA dispute provisions. As well, they will use excessive pressure and threats, and will make demands that are well beyond our concession range.

Trump will negotiate no differently from his predecessors, although the big difference is that Ronald Reagan, both Bushes, and Bill Clinton were pro-trade. Trump is a nationalist mercantilist.

Our negotiating strategy should contain five key elements. First, be clear about our own interests and what we want out of the negotiations. Second, be prepared to play a strong offence-defence game. Negotiations are not about being nice. Third, don't rush into talks until U.S. and Mexican objectives are clear. They're not clear right now. Fourth, exploit real cleavages that exist within the administration and between the administration and Congress to our advantage. Fifth, use selective retaliation only as a last resort because of the dangers of escalation.

I would also say that “wait and see” is not a bad negotiating strategy at the outset. The administration is clearly divided between trade hawks such as Steve Bannon and more moderate voices, the so-called Goldman Sachs crowd, which includes Gary Cohn, the President's national economic adviser, whose star is rising.

Cohn has made it clear that he does not want a trade war with America's NAFTA partners. The administration is also not trusted by Congress, and it has yet to lay out its goals for trade talks. To get fast-track authority on trade pacts, including revisions to NAFTA, Trump will have to give Congress 90 days' notice. That includes laying out the administration's goals and undertaking consultations with both the ways and means committee and the Senate finance committee, which have jurisdiction over trade.

President Trump does not have full authority to do anything positive or negative on trade without approval from Congress. His rhetoric and that of Bernie Sanders' and Hillary Clinton's polluted attitudes in America and in Congress about trade, and that is the real problem for trade globally.

I also think that Trump is looking for a quick fix to NAFTA. As his other domestic initiatives stall, he's going to become more desperate to deliver on something. The easiest fix, quite frankly, would be to backfill NAFTA with some of the key provisions that were negotiated in the trans-Pacific partnership agreement, including improved standards for labour, environment, and e-commerce, and policies that eliminate export subsidies for agriculture.

The fact that Trump is in a hurry to make a deal, as has been said quite vocally by his commerce secretary, works to our advantage, because we can run down the clock. Furthermore, if delay or avoidance tactics on our part fail, we can also reduce the content and scope of any compromises we make as we run down the clock. That may mean conceding on some items that, quite frankly, are less important to the trade equation, such as, for example, dairy subsidies.

In the early stages of negotiation, we should avoid making explicit pledges and be sufficiently ambiguous until we have carefully reviewed and assessed both Washington's and Mexico City's proposals.

I would like to touch on something that Professor Doran mentioned. Although we are focused on trade, it's important not to lose sight of the bigger picture and where the U.S. appears to be going with its taxation and industrial policies. Our corporate tax regime has been very competitive vis-à-vis the United States. That may change. We're talking about raising our corporate taxes. Trump wants to lower theirs and has already introduced a proposal to lower taxes for individually owned businesses. The U.S. carbon policy, at least at the federal level, is doing a 180° from the policies of the Obama administration. Deregulation is the mantra of the day. Right-to-work legislation in some states has become a magnet for manufacturing and foreign investment.

The more we are out of sync with U.S. policies at both the national and state levels, the less competitive and attractive a destination Canada will be for investment, and our core competitive advantage will evaporate. Although Canada is working very hard under the current government to diversify its trade and investment ties with other countries like those in the Asia-Pacific, and the recently concluded CETA agreement, those policies of diversification will only work if they're based on a healthy core—namely, our open border and trading relationship with the United States.

Finally, we should also look to non-trade issues that we can use to advantage to underscore our broader strategic importance to the United States, especially at a time when national security is paramount to Americans. That may mean buying the F-35s and ramping up our military spending. We ignore the importance of defence and security in our bilateral relationship at our peril. I would simply like to underscore what Professor Doran has said on that point.

At all times, as we look forward to the negotiations that are soon going to start, we must also be ready to conclude that no deal is better than a bad deal.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Hampson.

Colleagues, we'll go to questions.

We'll start with Mr. Allison, please.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

Thank you very much, gentlemen, for being here.

Mr. Hampson, I am glad to have you back at committee again.

There is so little time and there are so many questions about both of your presentations. Mr. Hampson, you talked about how important NAFTA is, and Mr. Doran, you talked about the fact that maybe there are some bigger things at play in terms of China, etc. As we look at some of these things—when we talk about NAFTA and trade, for example—we talk about supply management and about some of these irritants, like softwood lumber, but the reality is that the U.S. subsidizes their agriculture like crazy as well, and that never seems to be the question. We talk about giving up something, whether it's softwood or.... They've taken us to the WTO four times. We've won every time. We solve these issues.

Both of you talked about raising defence spending, as an example. Is that part of the negotiation process? If we look at the overall picture of NAFTA, maybe we can say, listen, we're going to commit to spending more on defence or whatever the case is, versus just.... I think it's a false argument when we say that we're going to give up supply management so we can do better on softwood lumber. My question is this: what about all the other things, and the things that they actually subsidize as well?

[Prof. Charles Doran]

First of all, I agree with you that there are subsidies everywhere. I know a bit about agriculture, having grown up on a farm and still owning one. Agriculture is a complicated mess in terms of government policy on both sides of the border. I don't know what you can do or want to do about that.

Again, I don't believe that Washington thinks the major problems in trade lie with Canada. They know the size of the trade relationship. They know this, but they want to show that they will be quote-unquote even-handed, so they're even tough on their friends.

You asked about other things coming in. In the past, it was kind of a no-no to do this linkage across issues—especially with the United States, because that brings in Congress, and you just can't do cross-linkage with Congress. I'm sure you have similar experiences here.

So that's it; but this administration likes to do deals, or thinks it can do deals. I saw the interaction with the Chinese. It was public knowledge that when Mr. Xi left Washington after the recent visit, some really serious discussion went on, and it was said that if China could see fit to help us with North Korea, the trade negotiations would go a lot more easily. How much more clear can one be?

I don't know if there are going to be explicit linkages. I think that would be a disaster. But implicit ones—the winks and nods about what we are going to do elsewhere—those are all part of this relationship, without any question. The difficulty, of course, is knowing how the other side actually weights things, values things, and that is the art of negotiation.

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

I think a core proposition is that you don't give up anything unless you get something in return. If we are going to come under pressure to make concessions on dairy, which the President singled out when he was visiting Wisconsin, for reasons that still remain perhaps inexplicable, we have to ask for something in return. It could be in the agricultural sector. I mean, the most heavily subsidized agricultural sector in the world is the U.S. agricultural sector. We all know that.

[Prof. Charles Doran]

Have you been to Switzerland recently?

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

Well, there's competition, but they are playing the same game. I think that can be a basis for negotiation.

The problem with softwood lumber is that it's not part of NAFTA, as we know. That's an issue that has to be dealt with on its own, I think, and we have to get our own act together. The difficulty our own government faced in the most recent discussions on softwood lumber is that our own industry is not united. You need to at least have a common position if you're going forward in negotiations; otherwise, the other side will tear you apart.

When it comes to linkage tactics—you know, trade for defence—I wouldn't go there. I think it's fair to say that the history of our relationship with the United States is that we deal with issues on a discrete basis. We don't play linkage tactics, because quite frankly they'll work against us.

Having said that, if they want to get into a discussion about procurement and “buy American”, we shouldn't hesitate to say, look, we have a defence industrial sharing agreement with you that goes back many, many years; we're buying a lot from you when it comes to defence goods; and there are potentially major purchases coming down the pike, so you'd better look at your broader interests.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

I have one more quick question. I know there's no easy answer to this one.

Mr. Doran, you talked about North Korea a bit. It seems as if this administration is prepared to act, more than any other administration. What are your thoughts on what's going to happen, as you look into your crystal ball, with regard to North Korea and Mr. Trump?

[Prof. Charles Doran]

Well, I don't have any great sources of information. I just read the press very, very carefully and listen to a lot of people. My judgment is that it's not just the Trump administration. Everybody who seriously looks at defence recognizes that North Korea is going to be a problem. The question is how you deal with that.

I think the sense in Washington is that the people who really have influence over North Korea are the Chinese, but because the Chinese have that influence, they know they have leverage over us, so they don't do anything. Their interests are not to do anything, because they fear that the north might collapse and they'd have problems with that, or the north and south would be united with a South Korean type of regime and that would be a threat to them. They have all kinds of things they can bring to the table that concern them.

What I think they should be thinking about is this: if they do nothing, the North Koreans are going to have nuclear weapons and missiles. I sometimes say they'll probably aim at San Francisco and end up hitting Los Angeles—

[A voice]

Or maybe Vancouver.

[Prof. Charles Doran]

—or maybe Vancouver—but in any case, they'll get something over here. That is absolutely new and very problematic.

I think what's going to happen is that the North Koreans are going to have to cease and desist. The Chinese, as I said, have been reluctant, but they seem to be much more open to possibilities. What that really means is using sanctions against the north.

I have to tell you that I do not underestimate the firmness of resolve of the Trump administration. If you have any doubts about that, then look at the man he chose for defense secretary. Mattis is a very serious soldier.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Allison.

I'll go to Mr. Sidhu, please.

[Jati Sidhu, Liberal, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thanks to both of you for sharing your experience with us this morning.

I'm from B.C., so I have to touch on the softwood lumber issue.

Dr. Hampson, you touched on that issue. As we're all aware, recently Mr. Trump announced his intention with regard to countervailing duties of 24% on any lumber going from our country to his. Whereas the previous administration raised these kinds of issues discreetly, President Trump's approach is to condemn Canada, criticizing Canada publicly. I mean, negotiations are still going on behind closed curtains. How would it impact the negotiators, since the demand command from the President is very strongly condemning? At the same time, negotiators going into a room prepared...not knowing the climate. It's so uncertain. How would it pan out, in your view?

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

During the election campaign, I was scouring through then presidential candidate Trump's speeches. It may have gone unnoticed in Canada, but he gave a speech within, I think, 13 or 15 kilometres of the Canadian border when he was in the state of Washington. He didn't mention Canada by name, but he talked about the softwood lumber issue. It was clearly in his sights. As I mentioned in my remarks, this has been a long-standing perennial, and he has chosen to play hardball.

I think our biggest challenge, quite frankly, is to mobilize a core constituency in the United States, namely the home builders associations, because taxing imports is going to raise the cost of construction in the United States. In the past they have been important allies for us. I think it's fair to say we haven't heard a whole lot from them on this issue.

The second point I would make is that the economics of the lumber industry, particularly if you look at southern pine in the United States, work against us, because their sources of production are very close to market. Our sources of production are far from market. There are major transportation costs, even once you've got the trees down, to bring them south to market, and that's partly why we have the stumpage fee arrangements that we do.

Having said that, as we negotiate the future of softwood lumber, I think it will be absolutely critical—this is true more generally with NAFTA—that we mobilize key sectors of the industry that are sympathetic to us and do what we've done in the past, which is build a transnational constituency to promote our interests.

[Jati Sidhu, Liberal, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Do you have a different take, Professor?

[Prof. Charles Doran]

I think Professor Hampson has outlined the difficulties. I would just mention one thing. The tariff, as I understand it, varies with the province and with the costs. There is quite a range.

I think it's certainly the case that the average citizen is going to suffer from this arrangement. The average house might cost $2,000 more because of this arrangement. But I would just urge caution on what we've described as mobilization. I remember in an earlier period, when we were talking about acid precipitation, in other words acid rain, there was a sense that public diplomacy would be a good idea. In fact the then Canadian ambassador, who ultimately became one of the great ambassadors but was still in the learning phase, said that what Canada should do is advertise on radio how much damage acid rain was doing. This was in New England in particular.

Of course it was true that it was doing great damage there, but the response he got was exactly the opposite of what was anticipated. The stiff-necked New Englanders said, “What? The Canadians are going to tell us what our problems are? We know what our problems are. Why are they telling us this?” There was an absolute reaction against this. They quickly dropped the so-called public diplomacy approach.

There are probably ways of doing it effectively, but there are certainly a lot of ways of doing it without effectiveness.

[Jati Sidhu, Liberal, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Let's talk about the foreign policy. Lately Mr. Trump was engaging in a flurry of foreign policy ventures—attack in Syria, warship in Korea's peninsula, talking to Russia and China, and trying to mediate problems in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine.

What do you make of this? Do you think this hard power will prove to be effective, at the end of the day?

[Prof. Charles Doran]

If you have it, you can't conceal it. If you conceal it, you will in fact underplay your hand. It doesn't mean you have to use it, but people have to know that it exists.

Look at the response to the situation in Syria. Mr. Trump was rightly appalled by the use of sarin gas—the death of babies, the pain that they went through. He was very articulate. He explained that very well. They decided, on very short notice, to launch 59 missiles out of the Mediterranean. I should say that photographic evidence suggests that 57 missiles hit their targets. They warned the Russians in advance that this was going to happen. They knew that the Russians would inform the Syrians in advance. I know that the Turks had already known about this 20 minutes before it took place. This is general knowledge. Unfortunately, a few civilians weren't informed.

What was the purpose of all of this? Well, the purpose was to say that hard power does exist, and I think it suggests to Mr. Assad that if he tries to use this again, who knows? Maybe the palace will be the next target.

I think the message also got through to North Korea that the capacity exists to knock out those facilities that they have to quite a high degree. China understood this very, very well. This was announced in the middle of a luncheon meeting with the Chinese president.

Now, you people are professionals. You understand the symbolism of that.

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

I thought it was dinner.

[Prof. Charles Doran]

It probably was dinner—lunch, dinner, something like that.

The effect of that is not lost. In the matters you're talking about here, the high politics among the great powers, I think Russia and China take Trump seriously, partly because they don't quite know what he's going to do.