Foreign Affairs Committee on June 6th, 2017

[Prof. Kim Nossal]

That's a very diplomatic answer.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

We can see the training.

[Prof. Kim Nossal]

The diplomatic service in Canada made an excellent decision in 1974 in rejecting me—

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[Prof. Kim Nossal]

—so I actually don't have to be as diplomatic as Mr. Robertson does.

I think the issue of the Russians and the Russian involvement in American politics is a story that has yet to be fully told. Despite the fact that there are strong forces in the United States seeking to squelch the story being told, I think there is a story there that will be told. It may well be a story that is intimately connected with the President's tax returns, which have been so carefully protected from release.

It seems to me, however, that we cannot ignore the fact that the interests of the Russian Federation, and in particular the President of the Russian Federation, have been well served by the election of Mr. Trump. The ability of the Russian Federation to sow some discord in the transatlantic alliance is something that will bring smiles to Mr. Putin's face, as Colin said. On that issue, we will need to see what the results are.

One of the consequences of Mr. Trump's declaring war on the intelligence community in the United States is that, as many people have said—so this is not at all original—it is entirely possible that what we will see emerge in the next year or so will illuminate whether there is, in fact, a Russian connection.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Madame Laverdière.

Mr. Saini, please.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you very much for your opening comments.

Mr. Robertson, I'm going to start with you, because you have the most experience with the Canada-U.S. trade file.

One of the things you didn't mention in your opening comments was the influence of the Mexican election next year. There was a very elegant timeline created by one of our previous witnesses, Mr. Carlo Dade, from the Canada West Foundation. What I gleaned from that timeline was that the earliest possible date, if everything works out well, the agreement would be signed, but not implemented, is August 28, 2018. That would be after the Mexican election.

If you look at the current state of domestic politics in Mexico, the leading candidate there, Mr. Andrés Obrador, from the left-wing AMLO party, I don't think is too keen on this deal.

We're putting a lot of emphasis on our bilateral negotiations with the United States, but we haven't looked at the possibility of actually.... We will be entering into a trilateral negotiation, and we don't talk about Mexico so much.

My question to you is this. If Mexico decides not to sign, what will be the ramifications of that? Also, there will be congressional mid-term elections in November. There are a lot of things we don't control. No matter how good our negotiating stance is, there might be factors beyond our control, ones that we don't have any influence over. What would be the repercussions? What would be the ramifications? What do you see happening if Mexico does not sign?

[Colin Robertson]

I read Carlo's testimony. He's a friend of mine and the timeline he points out is accurate. If you think about it, trade negotiations take a long time. The original Canada-U.S. free trade agreement took us about four and a half years to negotiate, and NAFTA, which was, in a sense, building on the free trade agreement, took us two and a half years.

The United States is only now in the legislatively mandated process of holding hearings in Congress, so the earliest they can begin is really mid-August. Do we think we can finish this up by Christmas? Given the breadth of the agreement, I'd be very doubtful, and again, as Carlo pointed out, there is a timeline that takes this forward.

Ultimately, what is important for Canada is to get a good deal for Canada. I do think we should be working in tandem with Mexico. That partnership is very important and I'm encouraged to see that Foreign Minister Freeland has stated, with her counterparts Minister Videgaray for trade for Mexico and Minister Guajardo Villarreal, the intent to work together and that she has been down to Mexico recently to do this. We should stay together because the Americans would like—I wouldn't say the American approach, but I would say the Trump approach is to divide and conquer.

On NAFTA itself, NAFTA remains intact, so the Canada-Mexico piece of that stays in place. There's nothing to stop us from upgrading it, if the United States pulls out. Also, there's nothing to stop us from bringing other countries into that. This is why it will be interesting to see how the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations play out.

Whatever happens, personal relationships really do count. The personal relationships now at the various levels between our negotiators, between Canadian and Mexican ministers, are strong enough that they will stay intact, even if, at the end of the day, the Americans insist on two separate bilateral negotiations, which is certainly the preferred approach of Mr. Trump. Wilbur Ross, the Secretary of Commerce, has said it's more important that we get a result than the format, so they seem to be wobbling a bit there, but we're still not exactly sure how that's going to play out. On the time frame, I do think the Mexican election is probably going to intervene. Whether the Mexicans will be in a position to do a deal quickly—there was talk of that back in January, but it didn't pay off. Within Mexico, there will be a lot of suspicion as well, if there's a quick deal done.

Most important, for both Canada and Mexico, is that we get a good deal, whatever comes next.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

The second question I have is more out of personal curiosity. The Americans have now left the climate change agreement. They have recused themselves from TPP, which was a bulwark designed by Obama against China, or to contain China. We have issues in the South China Sea. We have the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. We have the one belt, one road policy that's happening now. We have the Chinese influence in Africa. For me, as a political observer, if you look at the commentary right now in the press, it's more focused on Russia. However, the silent power that's working behind the scenes is China, and for the first time in my life, I am witnessing no commentary about a rising power.

I appreciate the fact that the President is the President, but the state department, other think tanks, other academics are not speaking about the relationship with China. Everybody is focused on this Russian relationship, but no one is actually keeping an eye on the Chinese relationship. I am wondering why there has been no focus on that because, for the last century, the Americans have always tried to be a rising power, but now China is on the move, so why is there no dialogue? Why is there no commentary on the Chinese question, as opposed to the Russian question, which is not as important as the media has portrayed it to be, in some cases?

[Colin Robertson]

This is trite, but empty vessels make the most noise. There really is a lot of attention behind the scenes on China. The Trans-Pacific Partnership really was an effort to secure a set of trade rules in the Pacific to match what was going on in the security side. Behind the scenes, there really is a lot going on, such as the dialogue last week at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue on the military front. I've just come back from Asia, where they are much more concerned about what's taking place with regard to China than they are necessarily about Russia.

I'd recommend a good book to read, Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century by Gideon Rachman, who is the lead foreign affairs correspondent for The Financial Times. It's just out. I think that would address a lot of what you're talking about.

I do think there is actually a fair bit of attention, as there should be, because I do think China is the rising power. The declining power, which is, in fact, probably the more dangerous one, is Russia.

[Prof. Kim Nossal]

Can I just add a very quick comment here?

It seems to me that part of what drives your question is, in fact, a very Canadian focus. In other words, we are not hearing in Canada the discussion, but if you go to the Asia-Pacific region, there is a lot of discussion about the role of China and how to deal with China.

Australians have been engaged in a national conversation the likes of which we just simply haven't seen in Canada. That's one of the reasons why I think Canadians should start thinking about precisely the dynamics that you have identified.

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Saini.

Mr. McKay, please.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you both for your very thoughtful and excellent presentations. I adopt Madame Laverdière's views with respect to how thoughtful you actually have been.

Power abhors a vacuum. It seems to me that the G7 and NATO meetings last week were maybe watershed meetings, particularly with respect to Chancellor Merkel's comments.

Are we witnessing a transference of real power to Germany? Since World War II, Germany has constrained itself in terms of its militarization. Given Chancellor Merkel's comments and the saber rattling by the more, as you rightly say, dangerous adversary, Mr. Putin, do you think we are in for a period of rearmament, particularly by the Germans, but more generally by the Europeans?

[Colin Robertson]

I don't think we're in for a period of rearmament because I'm not sure that's where Chancellor Merkel, if she is re-elected, wants to go. I think she very much remains a transatlanticist. She just doesn't, like many others, have a lot of respect for Mr. Trump.

I do think Germany is the most important power in Europe and has been for more than a decade now. I would subscribe to The Economist's characterization of Chancellor Merkel as “the indispensable European”.

I think what you saw was simply a reaction to a particular personality who isn't necessarily going to be in the field. That German-American relationship is very important, although Mr. Trump, as my friend David Frum tweeted, has done more to divide Germany from the United States—the goal of Russian policy since the Second World War, first by the Soviet Union and now Russia—than Mr. Putin or any of his predecessors, but I think that will pass.

I think Chancellor Merkel gets that. Her comments at the party rally were done, I think, in the context of the upcoming German election. She has to win that election and, not surprisingly, leaders often want to play to the hometown crowd. That's reasonable. However, her subsequent comments and those of the people around her were to say that she very much understands the importance of the transatlantic relationship, as do we.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

I don't disagree with you there.

[Colin Robertson]

I think there are real odds to rearmament, though, in Asia. That's where I would watch. If you want to see where a lot of money is being spent on arms, it's in Asia and, as we saw from Mr. Trump's visit, in the Middle East.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

I don't disagree that Chancellor Merkel is pretty reluctant and believes in the transatlantic relationship, etc., but we are in for a rough four years, in theory. We can't leave ourselves exposed.

I also want to pick up on Mr. Saini's question, and particularly on this one belt, one road concept. That road runs right through Afghanistan, which seems to be deteriorating into a pretty chaotic state once again.

I would be interested in your thoughts as to what “accommodation”, for want of a better word, the Alliance-U.S.-West should make with China vis-à-vis the security requirements of Afghanistan because One Belt, One Road will go nowhere if there's total chaos in Afghanistan.

[Prof. Kim Nossal]

The One Belt, One Road has a number of roads and a number of belts. Yes, indeed, one goes through Afghanistan, but Pakistan is the far more important bit of the belt in the road. The possibility of making some accommodation with China over Afghanistan does two things. First, it overstates Afghanistan's importance to this Chinese initiative. If you look at where the arrows are generally drawn in Chinese descriptions of this initiative, they go north and south and indeed partly through Afghanistan.

The second problem, it seems to me, is that it overstates the capacity of the People's Republic of China to actually do what might be necessary in Afghanistan to provide the kind of security that, bluntly put, we haven't really seen since the late 1970s. Because our attention as Canadians has been elsewhere since 2014, you claim that once again it's descending into problems. The reality is that it's always been there, including when we were there from 2001 to 2014. The capacity of the Chinese to solve the governance problems of Afghanistan is exceedingly limited, it seems to me. I don't think there is any willingness in Beijing to try to get into that particular mess. They will run their belt and roads in different areas if, in fact, Afghanistan continues to be the security problem that it has been and remains.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Finally, the government is releasing its suite of policies this week—foreign affairs, defence, and development. The defence policy review will be out tomorrow. What will we be looking for?

[Prof. Kim Nossal]

One of the things the defence policy review needs to do is to address some of the concerns that not only Mr. Trump but the Americans generally have to consider. You perhaps know what's in the defence review, and I don't. What I would be looking for is a resolution of the issue of ballistic missile defence, finally. I would also be looking to address the replacement of our legacy CF-18 fighter jets for the future of NORAD.

Whether we get to, as Colin says, the magic 2%”...I mean, think about it. To go from where we are now at 0.88% to 2%, we're talking about defence spending at close to 40% as opposed to 18% or so. Canadians can't spend like Australians on defence. Australians have no difficulty spending 1.9% of GDP, but I can't remember a Canadian government of either political stripe that could seriously consider spending 2% of GDP on defence. I will personally be interested to see how Mr. Sajjan squares this particular circle.

[Colin Robertson]

Money does count here. I'm looking to see if the trend line is going to move forward; I think that's important. Our navy patrols the longest shoreline in the world. I think the maritime domain in this age of uncertainty really does matter even more to how we're going to manage things. Are we going to take a different look at procurement practices, for example, not just for the F-35 but also for our shipbuilding? I'm looking to see what there might be in terms of peace operations. We heard a lot about peace operations with former minister Dion, but it seems to have slipped off the rails. Are we going into Mali, for example? Where are we headed there? It should always reflect Canadian interests. I'm interested in the direction of the government, where it wants to move in terms of security and defence for Canada have weight as a middle power.

I'm a Pearsonian, from the Pearsonian school. Pearson put great weight on diplomacy, but he always understood that you had to have the hard power to back it up. I think in this age of uncertainty it serves Canadian interests. Think of our forces, for example, as first responders. When it comes time to do humanitarian relief, being able to have the big planes that can go in to carry cargo is really important. It's also helpful to have amphibious ships when seas rise and there are floods.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. McKay.

Mr. Kent, please.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Thank you.

Just to pick up on Professor Nossal's last point about the resolution of the question of ballistic missile defence and the continuing conversation about whether or not NORAD should be updated to be more than an air defence program, with Canada playing a greater role in overall continental defence, what would your advice be to the government on BMD?

[Prof. Kim Nossal]

It's very simple.

Join.

[Colin Robertson]

I would say exactly the same thing, as I have said before in this committee. My view is that it is now a threat to Canada.

Kim Jong-un and North Korea now have the capacity with their missiles, and the trajectory.... The algorithms and the American interceptor systems now protect the west coast of the United States up to Alaska. They might protect Vancouver, but the danger is that cities like Calgary, Edmonton, and Saskatoon are not protected, so I think it's in our own interest to join. That's why you do these things. You don't do this because we're being doing something good for the United States; we're doing this from a Canadian interest perspective. I think the Canadian interest now demands that, as an insurance policy, we participate in ballistic missile defence.