Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 2nd, 2017

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I thank both of you for your presentations.

Mr. Butcher, I'd like to ask for your advice. On two occasions, I have proposed the creation of a Canadian parliamentary arms exports committee along the lines of the British model, but both times my proposal was rejected by the government representatives. Should I try a third time?

[Martin Butcher]

I think it would be a very good idea to try a third time. I'm sure that in whatever international fora exist for the discussion of ideas between British and Canadian parliamentarians, parliamentarians on the arms export control committees would be only too happy to discuss with you how it works in the U.K. and why it would be a good thing for the Canadian Parliament to have such a system.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

I should probably visit you.

Mr. Jaramillo, the fact that there is no prohibition in the law at this time is a problem, since this respects neither the spirit nor the letter of the treaty. Someone also told me that this situation was a problem because the minister is not protected. The minister may be subject to diplomatic or political pressures of all kinds, and not have the power to say that he or she cannot do this because it is prohibited by law.

Do you agree with that analysis?

[Cesar Jaramillo]

Thank you, Madame Laverdière.

I would agree with that assessment. It would be beneficial for the minister himself or herself to have those hard limits on the discretion for arms export authorization.

I want to clarify this point because I have the sense that perhaps we're focused on the rightly important point of whether it's a policy or a law. That is a valid point and it is a very important point whether it's by regulation or lower guidelines, but the central question is what is the obligation that we're talking about? Whether it's by policy or whether it's by law, what is the obligation? If you look at it—and this is really in the end what we consider to be the main problem of Canada's export control regime—it gives the illusion of strength. You will find scattered references to human rights. You will find scattered references to not exacerbating armed conflict. You will find scattered references to hard obligations, and the emphasis on not being a guideline but a hard obligation, but again, what is the obligation? At the end of the day, it is merely to consider certain factors.

This is incompatible with the Arms Trade Treaty, and I would emphasize this is not a matter of personal opinion or the opinion of Project Ploughshares. You will find that “shall not authorize” language in the Arms Trade Treaty itself. What we're saying is that if Canada truly wants to align its regulations with the specific provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty, there must be some hard prohibitions on certain exports when triggers related to human rights, exacerbation of armed conflict, genocide, etc., arms embargos are met, certain exports shall not proceed. This is nowhere to be found in the legislation. Again, the minister will retain nearly unchecked discretion to authorize any and all arms exports as long as certain factors are said to be considered.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

In addition, we are told that most of the criteria will be included in the regulations because this will provide greater flexibility should we want to add criteria. However, this also means that there will be more flexibility if we want to remove criteria. Many people say that it would be preferable to include the treaty criteria in the bill and keep the door open through other mechanisms to the possibility of adding criteria if need be. We consider that the elements that are a part of the treaty should be in the bill.

What do you think of that position?

[Cesar Jaramillo]

Thank, you again, Madame Laverdière. That's a great question.

First of all, I've heard this notion about retaining flexibility as being a key rationale for doing it through regulations because we need to be flexible in situations as circumstances change, etc. It's a seductive argument, but it simply doesn't hold because the types of items that we say must be matters of law and not regulation are top-level items. These are things that are not realistically going to be affected by the weather or the political environment or the economic upheaval in this part of the world or whatever.

We are not saying it's always as a matter of law to not sell to Saudi Arabia, for example, because consensus could change. Saudi Arabia could be a beacon of human rights or something like that. What we are saying should be a matter of law is that there are certain exports that cannot proceed, period. That sort of top-level parameter, which is not process-related or procedural, but rather sets out again the hard limits of what's acceptable for Canadian arms exporters should be a matter of law and not subsequent regulations, among other reasons, because the public's and your own ability to scrutinize the content of the regulations is very limited.

The way we are headed, the bill may get royal assent without our knowing a single word of what is going to be contained in those regulations, so how can we properly assess the merits of the changes when they are not fully known?

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Mr. Wrzesnewskyj, go ahead please.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

As legislators, we spend a lot of time parsing through the phraseology of legislation, through the words, and we try to get it as right as possible, but we are human beings. We don't necessarily always get it 100% right. Sometimes in that work, we lose focus of what we're dealing with. That's why I'd like to come back to Mr. Levitt's line of questioning.

When you referenced Africa and 95% of the arms in Africa, the small arms being illegal, could you also quantify from the other end—the DRC as a particular case—but generally, annually, how many lives are lost because of this illegal trade in small arms?

This question is for Mr. Butcher.

[Martin Butcher]

In the Congo specifically, no. Globally about 500,000 people a year lose their lives as a result of irresponsibly or illegally traded arms in conflict and armed violence. That fluctuates somewhat, but it's roughly that level.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Would a majority of those individuals be civilians?

[Martin Butcher]

The vast majority would be civilians.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Every day, as we spend time parsing through, trying to decide whether or not we should proceed, approximately 1,500 civilians are dying because of this trade, which takes me to the next point.

I find it interesting that there seems to be a correlation. The Ottawa treaty, the land mines treaty, was referenced earlier in testimony. There seems to be a correlation between the countries that have not signed or acceded to the ATT and those that haven't acceded or signed onto the Ottawa treaty on land mines. I'd like to note that we are soon approaching a very important anniversary, the 20th anniversary of the Ottawa treaty on land mines. That is something in which we in Canada can all be proud that we played such a critical role.

We shouldn't find ourselves on a list of countries that haven't signed or acceded to the ATT, which seems to correlate with the list of countries that haven't signed onto the Ottawa treaty: Cuba, the Russian Federation, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. I have to tell you that it is an uncomfortable place, as a Canadian legislator, to find oneself in that position.

Do you believe that we should move forward expeditiously at this point in time? We spent years on this. Should we move forward in acceding to the ATT?

Mr. Butcher.

[Martin Butcher]

Oxfam certainly believes that it would be a very good thing for Canada to accede to the ATT. The universalization of the treaty is extremely important.

We also believe that the strong and robust implementation of the treaty at the national level is extremely important. The full implementation of the control of all exports within the meaning of the treaty is very important.

I would say yes. We would love for Canada to accede to the treaty. We will very much welcome that when it happens. We look forward, as we do with all state parties, to examining implementation and working to make that the strongest it can possibly be.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

That leads us into the second point. You've raised this intriguing idea of parliamentary committee oversight. Once again, taking into account that, as hard as we try, legislation is rarely perfect, sometimes you come back to it, take a look and try to fix things, perhaps where conditions have changed, etc.

I would like to have a little clarity on that committee. Does it meet regularly or is it a case-by-case situation where there's a major trade in arms and the committee would meet to review decisions or is it based on this annual report? Could you provide a little clarity on how it has been structured?

[Martin Butcher]

Yes. In general, for most of its existence it has met in a fairly short number of months in the year to look at or review the government's report on the arms that it has exported over the previous year and its policy for doing so. It has held maybe three hearings each year—one for civil society, one for the arms industry, and one for government ministers—and has accepted a certain number of written submissions.

I should say that this is not along the lines of the U.S. model, whereby a lot of major arms deals have to get permission in advance from Congress. This is a retrospective analysis of what policy is and the way it has operated, with a view to improving that policy and practice in the future. These are not monthly meetings.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you very much.

We'll go to Ms. Vandenbeld, please.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you very much to both witnesses.

Mr. Butcher, I was very interested to hear what you were talking about in terms of specific defence and security arrangements between EU countries. My understanding is that, within the ATT, having expedited procedures for low-risk countries and having these kinds of agreements and partnerships are not inconsistent with the ATT. Is that correct?

[Martin Butcher]

That is correct. The ATT stipulates there must be a procedure for all exports, but it doesn't say what that procedure has to be. As long as you follow the framework of the treaty, you're free to come to your own arrangements as long as they comply with that framework.

The EU is a very specific example, because you have 28 sovereign states with a single market for a lot of goods. The intra-community transfers directive on arms allows for light-touch transfer. Belgium can transfer arms to Luxembourg without much regulation, but there is still some and, importantly, there is the possibility for government to audit the transfers that have been made and to report on them publicly should they choose to do so.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you.

With regard to Canada and the United States, I've listened very carefully to the letters and other criticisms from certain civil society organizations.

As a committee, we were in Washington and visited with the office of regional security and arms transfers at the Department of State. I put these questions to them. They outlined brokering controls and end-user controls that in many ways are stricter than those of many countries. They even told us that they were designed to be consistent with the Arms Trade Treaty.

In fact, in certain areas like the see-through provisions for dual-use technologies and mergers and acquisitions and the sale of companies to others, they're actually in advance and are working with other countries to try to bring other countries up to it, so that kind of an agreement, if we were to have an expedited procedure with the U.S., would be consistent with our compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty.

[Martin Butcher]

I would say that one problem the U.K. has had with the transfer of parts and components to the United States to be incorporated into weapons systems for onward transfer is that we then lose control of what is done with those arms or armed systems once they're transferred to that third country. Had the transfer been direct from the U.K. to the third country, there are many occasions when we would have put conditions on the transfer of parts, components, or arms that the U.S. does not necessarily impose. There is some loss of control.

As long as that kind of thing is allowed, and as long as there is a Canadian process, then.... I'm not an expert in the existing Canadian process, but as long as there is a process that is compatible with the ATT, that would be allowed.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

I think it's very important that Global Affairs Canada is working very closely with the U.S. to make sure that we have an ongoing dialogue there rather than just saying that we can't have an exemption, and then no longer work together to try to strengthen these rules.

I was very interested in what you were saying in terms of clarification about the U.K. and other Westminster democracies, the policy regulation versus the actual legislation and the text of the legislation, because I know that you mentioned that, in the U.K., a lot of this is done through regulation.

The Arms Trade Treaty is binding on those who have acceded to it. Regardless if it's regulation or through the wording of the legislation, the country Canada would be bound by the Arms Trade Treaty.

[Martin Butcher]

Yes, absolutely. The treaties are binding on the countries as state parties to them, absolutely.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Several countries have chosen to do it one way or the other. In either way, we would be legally bound.

You mentioned a word, and it's very interesting, “universalization”. There are those who have said that the Wassenaar Arrangement and other existing agreements are enough, that there is no need to go further and sign the Arms Trade Treaty. The fact that the Arms Trade Treaty is legally binding and universal, how important is that?

[Martin Butcher]

I think it's extremely important. Oxfam worked hard to achieve the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty because we thought it was necessary. There was a gap in international regulation. There are many other kinds of regulations. The Arms Trade Treaty works with and alongside those. It's complementary to things like the Wassenaar Arrangement. It's also complementary in Africa, for example, to things like the ECOWAS convention and other sub-regional agreements. They all have their part to play, but certainly for us the Arms Trade Treaty is an essential part of international law in the control of arms.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Ms. Vandenbeld.

The last question will be by Mr. Aboultaif before we call it an afternoon.