Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.
I would opine editorially that we're about 30 years late. We should have been having this discussion back in 1990. It's astonishing to me that the profundity of the transition from the Atlantic to the Pacific is only now effectively being addressed. President Beck captured, in his elegant tour of the horizon of the geostrategic and economic outlook in Asia, the fact that Asia is now appearing on our radar screen. It's astonishing when you think that back in 1980 China was the 17th largest economy on the face of the earth and now it's arguably the second- or third-largest economy on earth. Where were we? Frankly, ladies and gentlemen, we were asleep at the switch.
I would suggest that historically Canada's engagement in Asia has been tardy, inconsistent, and ineffective. We have simply not risen to the challenge. In defence of Canada, we could say that the overwhelming dependence on the U.S. market, ties across the Atlantic, and institutional responsibilities to NATO and other organizations have deflected us from Asia. However, ironically, within Canada the national centre of gravity is moving westward relentlessly, and Asia, as reflected in this very committee, has in fact arrived in Canada. The Asianization of the urban settings and complexes of Canada is very much a contemporary phenomenon, and it's a very good thing as well.
In defence of Canada, our involvement in Afghanistan and in NATO commitments have deflected Ottawa's attention from the magnitude of what's happening in Asia. As an organization, I would suggest that DFAIT, or DFATD, or GAC has become progressively weaker and less influential in shaping the nation's engagement strategy in Asia. We have not had vision and leadership. This is not for an instant to overlook the dozens of small and medium-sized enterprises that are in fact doing business in Asia. Asia is not an easy place to do business in many cases, but there are enormous opportunities.
I would suggest to you that there has been a disturbing paucity in the number of foreign policy statements over the years that have come to grips with Canada and Asia. The fact is that we live in a state of deficit now in terms of an overarching foreign policy. Our defence review is absent any foreign policy that focuses on Asia. Indeed, were we to look at the defence realm and go back to 1971, the paradox is that, when we analyze policy documents on Canadian defence, we see that by 1990, at the very time that Asia was taking off relentlessly in a stellar manner, references to Asia virtually vanished from defence department documents. There's almost nothing of substance about the importance of engaging Asia, and I suggest a little later in my presentation that the defence department has a key role to play.
The Prime Minister's recent sorties to Asia—Vietnam, China, India—can only be described as colossal failures. Someone should be hanged by the thumbs. This is appalling in this age and stage of our national engagement in Asia. This of course begs some serious questions. Who organized this? Who executed it? It's astonishing to me. To leave Prime Minister Abe standing at the altar in Da Nang was appalling in terms of establishing our credibility.
I would suggest that this government, perhaps more than the previous one, is trapped between a commitment to Liberal values and the practicalities of forging economic relationships with increasingly unsavoury polities in Asia. Asia is very dynamic, very attractive, and very seductive, but as we all know, the human rights record in some Asian countries is little short of appalling. To what degree do we allow our economic engagement to be held ransom by interlocking it with a values system?
Disaggregating these two strategies at a time when the global community is becoming increasingly polarized on the issue of values will be one of the government's greatest challenges. While the missionary impulse is powerful and deeply seated in Canada, it is doomed to fail. One of the greatest realizations to emerge from the past quarter century is just how naive western policy-makers were in expecting China's value system to be transformed along western lines as it grew economically. The very opposite occurred.
Should we abandon our values? Not for an instant. That's not what I'm recommending. What I'm suggesting is that we have to be extraordinarily clear in our minds in establishing our priorities of what agenda we are advancing when we engage certain countries in Asia. Certain countries in Asia are becoming more difficult, more unsavoury, every day.
As president Beck has suggested, while the amount of Asia-Pacific trade has grown steadily over the past quarter century, Canada's market share has continued to decline. We can see that it's barely the width of a pencil line, despite the efforts of many Canadian companies. One of the challenges, of course, is that Canada has a population equal to one of the major cities in China. There are no big corporations in Canada to speak of, perhaps the Bombardiers and SNC-Lavalins notwithstanding. It's difficult to compete, but that's the reality.
Pragmatism and prioritization should be the guiding principles in our engagement with the region. We have many other arenas in which to realize the values which underpin our Canadian democracy. I suggest that the Canadian Armed Forces and the Royal Canadian Navy—not because I work for the navy, but because it is a vehicle of national power that is remarkably flexible, in every sense of the word—should be instruments in telegraphing Canada's commitment to the region. It's not enough simply to send ships to Asia; we have to do it in an orchestrated way which maximizes the value in terms of a full array of other activities.
This is an era when interstate relations are being played out at sea in Asia, when there's a naval arms race under way in the region, and when militaries, serving or retired, play an extraordinarily important role in the region's affairs. This is something we tend to forget, the degree to which militaries, in and out of uniform, are in fact major opinion-makers in many of the policies we're dealing with.
I would suggest, ladies and gentlemen, that ASEAN, much to my regret, is roadkill. The irony to me is that at the very moment that ASEAN has achieved community status, it has in fact been hopelessly fragmented and undercut as a result of Chinese money and politics. One only has to look at the state of Laos, Cambodia, and increasingly Malaysia, and so forth, to realize that the community, which was one of the major balancing elements in the larger geostrategic landscape of Asia, has reached the point of near failure, at least to to my mind. That is not to suggest that there aren't economic opportunities for Canada. In fact, in many cases, the scale of ASEAN countries is much more attractive to Canada than, for example, China or even India. But my own feeling is that a tragedy is unfolding in ASEAN as we speak.
In conclusion, I would suggest that Canada has a profound branding deficit in Asia. Canadians are seen as nice people, but frankly irrelevant. The question asked in the region is, are the Canadians really serious about being engaged in Asia? We have not followed some simple precepts: you have to be there consistently, you have to build relationships, you can't butterfly in and out on the grounds that it's a long way from Ottawa, whereas London, Frankfurt, and Rome are just overnight trip away and that when you get off the plane you know people.
Sadly, Asia, in many cases, I think is subconsciously in the all-too-difficult file. It's so much easier when you're dealing with Houston or Milwaukee. You don't have to worry about language or the regulations or the currency, and so forth. It's not easy in Asia, but we're missing enormous opportunities, we're deluding ourselves, and this is the sort of discussion we should have had 30 years ago.
Thank you very much.