Diversion isn't necessarily super uncommon, and it has negative impacts. The proliferation of weapons obviously has negative impacts and is a fuel for conflict. However, other countries, allies of Canada, have gone above and beyond to try to stem the threat of diversion. We've seen some positive examples of how to do this in other state parties to the ATT.
An example we could look at is the regime of post-shipment verification. For instance, Germany and Switzerland have an instrument kind of baked into their authorization. When they're authorizing export permits, there's a clause essentially where, if risk is interpreted, then officials from the country exporting the weapons can go to the recipient and essentially check in and do an on-site investigation to make sure that everything is sound. That is one step that Canada could take immediately to bridge this knowledge gap.
As my colleague Cesar was mentioning, this was an abject failure in Canada's risk assessment. If civil society can dig up examples of diversion occurring from Waterloo, Ontario, then certainly Global Affairs with umpteen times our resources could also do so.