Foreign Affairs Committee on Jan. 28th, 2021

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Welcome to meeting number 14 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion passed by the committee on October 22, 2020, the committee will proceed to a briefing session on the current situation in Venezuela.

To ensure an orderly meeting, I would encourage all participants to please mute their microphone when they are not speaking and address all comments through the chair.

When you have 30 seconds remaining in your questioning or speaking time, I will signal you visually with this piece of paper.

Interpretation is available through the globe icon on the bottom of your screen.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. We have with us this afternoon Michael Grant, assistant deputy minister for the Americas, and Sara Cohen, director general, South America and inter-American affairs.

We also welcome Mr. Claude Beauséjour, director of the Venezuela task force.

Welcome to the committee.

Mr. Grant, I understand you have a statement.

The floor is yours, sir, for seven minutes.

[Michael Grant, Assistant Deputy Minister, Americas, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for this very timely opportunity to provide an update on the situation in Venezuela, including an overview of the political and economic situation as well as humanitarian efforts to address the crisis.

As mentioned, with me today is the director general for South America and inter-American affairs, Sara Cohen, and the director of the Venezuela task force, Claude Beauséjour.

Venezuela's slide into turmoil began with and has remained centred on an erosion of democracy. Nicolás Maduro became president in 2013 in an election that was deemed free and fair. Since then, when public opinion and political fortunes went against him, a series of measures have served as the foundation of the crisis we see today.

In 2015, the opposition took control of the National Assembly in free and fair democratic elections. In 2017, Maduro created a parallel legislature, the constituent assembly, which he used to sidestep the legitimate National Assembly. In 2018, he advanced the presidential elections, which were neither free nor fair.

In 2020, in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections, the pro-Maduro Supreme Court stripped the National Assembly of its authority to appoint an independent electoral council and appointed a new pro-Maduro electoral council and a pro-regime ad hoc board of directors. It replaced the administrative leaders of three of Venezuela's four main opposition parties, continued to hold opposition members in prison, and tightly controlled the messaging of domestic media. It also added an additional 100 seats to the National Assembly within 90 days of the election, in violation of the Venezuelan constitution.

Amid this chaos, the regime went ahead with legislative elections on December 6, 2020, which were boycotted by the democratic opposition. In response, and in accordance with the Venezuelan constitution, the National Assembly democratically elected in 2015 extended its mandate until January 2022, or until free and fair presidential and parliamentarian elections are held in 2021. It will not continue as a plenary, but via a “delegated committee”.

Canada announced that it would continue to recognize the National Assembly democratically elected in 2015 as the legitimate legislature, and its president, as the interim President of Venezuela.

In the day-to-day, the regime controls Venezuela's political narrative by silencing all opposition and the free press, and maintains command of the military by permitting it to engage in lucrative illicit activity.

We are also witnessing an economic catastrophe. A few economic figures illustrate the scale of the crisis and its human impact. Since 2013, Venezuela's real GDP has contracted by 80%. By the end of 2020, oil production, which used to account for more than 90% of exports, fell to a 75-year low, with an average of 370,000 barrels per day, from a peak production of 3.5 million barrels per day in 2002. Hyperinflation reached 20,000% in 2020, rendering the local bolivar currency nearly useless.

The impacts of this crisis are multi-dimensional and have resulted in a large-scale humanitarian and human rights crisis. With over 5.4 million Venezuelans having fled their country, this is by far the largest migration crisis the region has witnessed, second only to Syria globally, with a trajectory to surpass it by the end of 2021.

The impact of this migration on neighbouring countries is very serious and is compounded by COVID-19. Venezuelans lack access to basic commodities and services. Minimum wage in Venezuela currently sits at around $2 U.S. per month. The cost of living is at least 10 times higher. One in three Venezuelans—or 9.3 million people—is food-insecure; 96% of Venezuelans live in poverty, and 79% live in extreme poverty, meaning they do not earn enough to purchase basic household goods.

These conditions only continue to worsen, exacerbated by the ongoing pandemic.

In addition to the dire humanitarian situation, the violations of human rights that occur every day in Venezuela are startling. The UN fact-finding mission on Venezuela published its report in September 2020, confirming that the Maduro regime has systematically committed crimes against humanity since at least 2014. This includes extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture and sexual violence at the hands of state forces.

This is consistent with the OAS' May 2018 report, which was co-authored by Canada's former justice minister Irwin Cotler. The findings in that report served as the basis for referral to the International Criminal Court by Canada and five other Lima Group members in September 2018. The bottom line of the fact-finding mission report is that this crisis urgently needs to be addressed, and a transition to democracy in Venezuela must be the foundation for that to happen.

Lima Group members were instrumental in securing the extension of the mandate of the fact-finding mission for another two years, until October 2022. These human rights violations have continued in recent months, as demonstrated by the regime's recent crackdowns on civil society organizations and independent media.

Addressing the Venezuela crisis is a foreign policy priority for Canada.

In 2017, Canada played a leading role in creating the Lima Group, a regional grouping that aims to restore democracy in Venezuela. Canada is seen as a valued convenor to bridge the positions and actions of key actors, including the European Union or the EU-led International Contact Group, the United States, and Lima Group members, as well as others, driving—

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Mr. Grant, could we ask you just to wind up quickly so we can go to questions from members?

[Michael Grant]

Very good.

In recent years, we have seen many initiatives on Venezuela, which sometimes has made it challenging for the international community. Going forward, one of Canada's objectives is to ensure cohesion in the international community and that it continues to work together.

We have also instituted a number of pressures against the regime, including sanctions on individuals, and we are beginning to work quite closely with the United Kingdom on the issue of illegal gold.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Mr. Grant, thank you. Let's leave it there in the interest of time, just to make sure that everybody gets their chance to get questions in.

We will go to our first round of questions, which are six minutes each.

This set of questions goes to Mr. Chong, for six minutes, please.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Grant.

I'd like to focus first on Mr. Juan Guaidó. As you know, to this point, many different countries around the world have recognized him as interim president. I understand that the European Union will no longer recognize him as interim president; however, the Biden administration reportedly will recognize him as interim president.

What is the Government of Canada's position on his status?

[Michael Grant]

First, it's important to go back in time just a little, to the end of the legitimate term of Nicolás Maduro. As I mentioned, he was legitimately elected in 2013 and his term ended at the end of 2018, in January 2019.

The elections that he had advanced and held in 2018 were seen by the democratic forces in Venezuela and by the international community as not being free and fair, and therefore, when his legitimate term ended, the Venezuelan constitution dictated that the interim president should be the president or the speaker of the National Assembly. That was Juan Guaidó, and that began in 2019.

If we go forward to December of last year, illegitimate National Assembly elections were held by the Maduro regime, not recognized by Canada and the majority of the international community.

Following that event, the legitimate National Assembly, led by Juan Guaidó, passed a resolution saying that because there had not been legitimate elections, their mandate would continue. They have taken the form of what's called a “delegated committee” and Juan Guaidó continues as the interim president.

It is our view that Juan Guaidó is the legitimate interim president of Venezuela, and Canada has recognized him as such.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you.

I have a second question. We have a new U.S. administration. How is American policy going to change with respect to Venezuela? What do you know about what's going on?

[Michael Grant]

It's early days. I, and others, watched with interest the confirmation hearing of Secretary of State Antony Blinken. He referenced in there...and there have been some references of administration officials since, indicating clearly that the United States will continue to recognize Juan Guaidó as the interim president.

Moving forward, it is essential that the international community, especially those like-minded with Canada—and the United States is definitely in that category—work together to try to inject some new momentum. It's early days for the United States. I think they're going to want to hear from their allies, and the message from Canada will be that we are prepared to do even more, working with them and working with others.

That's as much as we have at this point from the U.S. administration.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I have two quick questions. One relates to Juan Guaidó again, and the second is different.

First, how long do you think Canada can continue to recognize Mr. Guaidó as the interim president without having a legitimate election for the National Assembly? Are we talking years—five years or 10 years? I don't need an exact time frame, but what's your sense of how much longer that can continue?

Then I have a quick follow-up question.

[Michael Grant]

It's a very good question.

The way I would answer is to say that we have taken very good note in following the Venezuelan constitution, as has the legitimate National Assembly. The motion they passed extended their mandate for one year, so until early January 2022. From our perspective, we recognize his authority based on that, until that time frame.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

My last question is a broader question. Some people have suggested that the reason Maduro continues to cling to power is that he has no other option. There has to be an out for him in order to get him out of power and have a new head of government put in place.

What do you see as the path forward for him, if that assumption is correct?

[Michael Grant]

I think it's important to preface this with the foreign policy of Canada. The resolution to the crisis in Venezuela is for Venezuelans to determine. Yes, we have opinions and we believe it should be done peacefully. We oppose any talk of the use of military force.

I'm sorry, Mr. Chong. I missed the essence of your question. Could you repeat it very quickly?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Some people are saying that there has to be a clear path for him out of power in order for Venezuelans to arrive at a new head of government. Until there's a path laid out, he's going to cling to power to the last second.

[Michael Grant]

I don't dispute that assertion. He has certainly indicated that he has no intention of leaving.

I come back to what I just said. It's up to Venezuelans to determine the way forward. If we can get to the point of real, legitimate negotiations that are supported by the international community and involve the key parties, I think they'll find a way forward.

I wouldn't be surprised if some creative measures were put on the table, including the future of Mr. Maduro.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Mr. Grant, thanks very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chong.

The next round goes to Ms. Sahota, for six minutes.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Thank you.

It's kind of the opposite, in terms of.... The countries that are recognizing Guaidó as interim president are countries like Canada and the U.S. The countries that have been known to support the Maduro government have been China, Russia and Cuba.

In what ways do these countries support Maduro? Can you give a little bit more of an explanation as to why their support is important and how they're supporting his government?

[Michael Grant]

Definitely. I would say it's a mix of economic relations. Definitely China and Russia both have significant investments and trade significantly with Venezuela. The same goes for Cuba. They have a long-standing history of economic relations, which includes transfers of heavily subsidized, if not free, oil.

Also, it's geostrategic. I don't think it's a great surprise that certainly Russia, and to an extent China, sees its relationship with Venezuela as a geostrategic lever in the world.

I'd say those are the main reasons they are supporting the regime.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Are there any other major players that have come out and are providing support, now that the EU has figured that they can no longer recognize Guaidó as the interim leader?

What other countries are in line with the thinking of Canada and the U.S.?

[Michael Grant]

I'd say that while the EU has not stated in the same way as Canada that they continue to recognize Juan Guaidó, they have stated very clearly that they believe the elections of December 6, as well as the presidential elections of 2018, were not free and fair. They have also indicated that they believe that the democratic forces—the legitimate National Assembly and Juan Guaidó—are legitimate interlocutors. I'd say it's a nuance, but for the most part we see the European Union and its member states as very like-minded to Canada.

Over the last couple of years, depending on politics in different countries, there have been some changes. For example, Mexico and Argentina were both members of the Lima Group, but after changes of governments they've taken a slightly different position.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

What position is that?

[Michael Grant]

Mexico decided to depart from the Lima Group as it reverted back to a more traditional foreign policy for Mexico of non-interference. They have taken that decision.

Prior to these recent events, Argentina made it clear that it did not recognize Juan Guaidó as the interim president.

These are two examples of countries that have an important voice and an important role to play. As we move forward, we think it's essential that we engage with them as much as we're engaging with the countries that see it completely the same as Canada does. We're only going to move forward if we can have appropriate dialogue with all of the players, and that includes even the supporters of Maduro, such as China and Russia.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Coming to the issue of sanctions, Canada is imposing 113 different sanctions on Venezuelans implicated in these human rights violations, but the Americans are imposing other economic sanctions.

Why has Canada made this decision? Why is it better to link sanctions to individuals rather than to the economy?

[Michael Grant]

I'm not an overall sanctions expert, but I know that the sanctions regimes we have in Canada and the U.S. are quite different.

From a Canadian perspective, we base our decisions on information we have acquired that's in the public domain. A lot of it comes from reports, such as what was presented in the UN fact-finding mission or the OAS report that I referenced. These are targeted against individuals where it's clear that they have done wrongdoing.

At the same time, we are specifically targeting these individuals and our sanctions do not have an overarching impact on the Venezuelan economy. That is a significant difference between us and the United States.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

In an economy with the GDP shrinking at the rate you mentioned earlier, what kind of additional impact would the sanctions that the U.S. is imposing have on the people of Venezuela?