Foreign Affairs Committee on Jan. 28th, 2021

[Michael Grant]

They're U.S. sanctions, so I'm not sure I'm the expert to answer it.

Certainly, some of the sanctions they have imposed have attempted to restrict the Maduro regime's ability to export, including petroleum products. Clearly, that will have an impact on the revenues of the government and also on how the government is able to deliver its services. So there would be an impact.

Again, I'm not speaking on behalf of the United States. At the same time, no sanctions have any impact on humanitarian assistance whatsoever.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

I guess that's all the time we have.

Thank you so much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Ms. Sahota, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Grant.

Mr. Bergeron, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank the witnesses for being with us today and for enlightening us on the situation in Venezuela. Indeed, it is an extremely complex situation, and the varied reactions of the entire international community in this regard demonstrates this.

My concern—let me put it bluntly—is that the position of Canada and the recent members of the Lima Group rests on an increasingly shaky basis, given that since the election took place in 2015, this assembly was to be dissolved in December 2020.

On the one hand, I question the fact that we continue to support a leader who no longer has the democratic legitimacy to pursue his mandate. On the other hand, I see that not only is the support of the Venezuelan people for Mr. Guaidó diminishing, but also that important international bodies, such as the European Union, are beginning to distance themselves from him.

Isn't Canada just supporting a straw man?

To take up the question asked by Mr. Chong, how long do we think we will be able to hold this position, which seems to me to be more and more untenable?

[Michael Grant]

Thank you for your question.

According to our policy and position, we follow the Venezuelan constitution. I believe that it is rules 193 and 196 which say that the Venezuelan National Assembly can create this delegated committee, and that is exactly what it has done.

I understand your questions, but I believe that Canada and many other countries have this policy. It is not only the Lima Group, but also the United States and Great Britain. There are members of the European Union who also follow this policy, but the position of this group is not exactly the same. I think Canada has taken the right position.

Let's see what happens in 2021. It is urgent to make progress through negotiations so that there can be a democratic transition in Venezuela.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Let me go through it again in order.

First of all, I think it is correct, as most of the international community has done so far, to say that the last election may not seem very legitimate given the conditions in which it took place. Having said that—again, perhaps you should shed more light on the constitutional context of Venezuela—how can we recognize the elected representatives of an assembly that, in any case, should have been dissolved in December 2020?

What is the democratic legitimacy of this assembly that, theoretically, no longer exists? Moreover, as I mentioned, support for Mr. Guaidó among the Venezuelan population is far from assured. Rather, it seems that he has been gradually abandoned, not only by the Venezuelan population, but also by a number of traditional allies on the international scene, including the European Union, indeed.

[Michael Grant]

First, Canada or the Lima Group are not the only ones to have said that the elections were not fair and free.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Yes, absolutely. There's no disagreement on that, Mr. Grant.

[Michael Grant]

Okay.

Concerning the legitimacy of Mr. Guaidó and this delegated committee, the Venezuelan constitution provides that the National Assembly of Venezuela may create such a committee. In our opinion, these acts...

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Let me stop you right there, Mr. Grant, I'm sorry. This is information that you gave us when you answered my previous question.

Here is my question: what is the legitimacy of this committee appointed by an assembly which, for its part, no longer has legitimacy?

[Michael Grant]

The assembly was still there in December. Its mandate ended in January 2021. It was therefore during that mandate that it adopted the resolution to create this committee.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

However, I ask you the following question. Let us try to transpose the situation into the constitutional context of Canada. Let us assume that this minority government goes to the ultimate deadline set by law. On the eve of the statutory dissolution, let us then assume that the government decides to establish a parliamentary committee that would continue to exist after the election...

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

I'm sorry, Mr. Bergeron, but your time is up. You will most likely have the opportunity to come back to it in the second round.

The next series of questions goes to Mr. Harris.

You have six minutes, please.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I want to follow up on some of the questions that were asked by Mr. Chong and Mr. Bergeron, because I think the consensus seems to be that the position of Mr. Guaidó is being steadily eroded. Apparently, he does not have a lot of support for his boycott of the 2020 elections, even in making the decision to do so. We just heard about a quasi-legitimate—I think that was the expression Mr. Grant used—setting up of a committee, which doesn't seem to me to be a government, and support for Mr. Guaidó popularly in Venezuela is somewhere in the 20% to 25% range, which doesn't give much confidence to me and to many people. He seems to be a bit more popular around the world with international governments than with the Venezuelan people.

Why is Canada persisting in holding him out as the legitimate leader of a country and, at the same time, saying that it's up to the Venezuelan people to decide their future? How do you square that circle?

[Michael Grant]

I'll make a couple of points.

First, with regard to the elections, the elections were boycotted by virtually all opposition parties. There were—

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Not all, sir.

[Michael Grant]

No, not all. I was going to add that. But all of the major—

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

And those that didn't were critical of Guaidó for doing so.

[Michael Grant]

All of the major political parties, opposition parties, did boycott the elections, certainly those that have been forming the coalition with Mr. Guaidó and others over the past year.

In terms of his legitimacy, first, I think it's important to state that legitimacy is not because of the individual. It's the position that he holds. In 2019, he was the speaker, the president of the National Assembly, and the Venezuelan constitution clearly says that if there is no legitimate president, then the interim president—

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

That's how we got to where we are, but that term of office expired. Now we have some Internet committee set up of delegates only decided on by the opposition—that no one else participated in—claiming to be a legitimate government.

If we want to see a situation where the Venezuelan people have a say in the future, having the international community or parts of it propping up one side and meanwhile ignoring the humanitarian crisis within Venezuela and for those who have left.... It seems to me that this is not a pathway to a negotiated solution. I think it's time, perhaps, that Canada and other countries started finding other ways to assist the situation in Venezuela.

Let me give one example. You talked about the economic conditions in Venezuela and the humanitarian crisis, but you didn't mention the effect of the sanctions on that humanitarian crisis. I don't mean the Canadian ones, because the Canadian ones are aimed at individuals—quite legitimately, by the way. I have no quarrel with that, and the International Criminal Court is pursuing and should continue to pursue the criminal acts that it has under view.

However, I think the strategy of what Mr. Trump called “maximum pressure” on the Venezuelans by oil embargo and other economic sanctions has exacerbated and affected—as the Washington Office on Latin America has said—the most vulnerable Venezuelans. The foreign currency revenues have dropped, of course. Oil production has dropped because they don't have any customers, and this is not achieving the results that the United States had hoped for.

Perhaps another strategy is in order.

[Michael Grant]

I would agree with you that, in the last few years, the international community has failed. We have put a lot of effort into this, and the situation in Venezuela has gotten worse. We are no closer to a political solution. I think we have to be honest about that.

With regard to the legitimacy issue, I think, from a Canadian perspective, we believe the way out of this crisis is a negotiated solution by all of the parties that leads to a full return of democracy. The conditions for democratic elections in Venezuela don't exist, and that was proven in December. When that happened, the legitimate National Assembly decided to take action, and it decided, basing itself on the Venezuelan constitution, to extend its mandate for one year to create this committee. In Canada's view, we believe that it followed the constitution, and we continue to support that.

Is this a sustainable situation? Absolutely not. We need to get back to finding a solution.

With regard to the issue of the humanitarian situation and the economic situation, I think we have to recall what the genesis of Venezuela's decline is.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Well, we understand the genesis of the decline, but it's been exacerbated by the sanctions at the expense of the most vulnerable people in Venezuela. Now, isn't there some opportunity here to provide and encourage a withdrawal of some of these sanctions, to allow the Venezuelans to have access to their money in foreign banks on the condition that it be used to alleviate the humanitarian crisis?

It seems to me that there are ways Canada can help. Canada has given $55 million only. I say “only” because there is all sorts of evidence that other countries and other crises have been dealt with much more generously by Canada and other nations than the Venezuelan people who are suffering. It seems to me that we're withholding, or the countries are withholding, humanitarian aid, punishing the most vulnerable for the acts of the government. Somehow that seems to be very wrong, and I don't think Canadians support that notion.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Mr. Harris, I'm sorry. We'll have to leave it there. You are past your time, but you have a chance to go back in the next round.

We will now go to the next round, which consists initially of two five-minute slots, the first of which goes to Mr. Diotte.

Mr. Diotte, the floor is yours for five minutes, please.

[Kerry Diotte, Conservative, Edmonton Griesbach, AB]

Thanks very much.

I guess the bottom line is that we can debate the legitimacy of a government or a president, and it's very important, but the most important thing is the people. I guess the struggle I'm having is this: What is Canada's best option to help those people? I mean, it appears that we have five million-plus people fleeing Venezuela. You have them streaming into Colombia, etc. What can Canada do right now to help those people? We've been told that this is the biggest humanitarian crisis next to Syria, yet it doesn't seem to be on the radar, relatively speaking, of the world.

[Michael Grant]

It's a very good question, and you're absolutely right. It is the second-largest migrant crisis, and it could very well be the first by the end of this year. If you look at a per capita basis in terms of funding, it is dramatically too low.

Canada has been contributing. We are one of the largest donors, focusing a lot of our effort on supporting the migrant populations that have left Venezuela. As you can imagine, operating within Venezuela is a little bit difficult. We have had some small humanitarian projects, but even those actors within Venezuela are doing so in very difficult circumstances. There had been an agreement between the regime and interim president Guaidó for the delivery of aid coordinated by the United States. Some of it has worked. Some of it hasn't. We have concerns about what the regime is doing, but more is needed.

In terms of Canada, what I want to mention is that, in June of this year, Minister Gould will host a conference of solidarity for Venezuelan migrants and refugees. This will be the third, and Canada took on the leadership last summer, specifically because we feel that more is needed to support Venezuelan migrants who have fled their country. We are also the chair of a process called the Group of Friends of the Quito Process. The Quito Process is the group of countries that have been the recipients of Venezuelan migrants. The Group of Friends is the group of donor countries that work very closely with those recipients to see what more can be done.

I agree completely with you that more is needed, and Canada is taking a clear leadership role.