Foreign Affairs Committee on March 25th, 2021

[Mala Khanna]

Up to now, I think that Prime Minister Abiy had not said that. The fact that he is now saying it we see as a positive step.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I thought it was clear that they invited the Eritreans in and that what was now being said was that he recognized that there were human rights violations taking place, that this was the new piece, not that the Eritrean soldiers were there. Everybody knew that.

You're saying that his announcing this is progress. Is he being prevailed upon to change that situation? Is Canada calling for the Ethiopians to have the Eritrean forces out of Tigray?

[Mala Khanna]

Canada has, through the human rights statement, expressed that. In conversations between ministers and with officials, the presence of Eritreans in Ethiopia has been discussed, and I think now it is very clear that the Eritreans are there. I think there is—

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I thought everybody knew that the Eritreans were there. The idea is that this is the source of the problem with respect to increased tensions, human rights violations, atrocities, massacres that we've heard about. The international community is calling for something to be done about it.

Is there going to be a mechanism to actually prosecute? I know Mr. Abiy has suggested that people are going to be held to account, but how is that going to happen and who's going to be involved?

[Mala Khanna]

I do think that Canada has been calling for an independent and impartial investigation of the allegations of atrocity crimes by all...but I'll ask Ian if he would like to say anything more on this.

[Ian Myles]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Chair, we have been pursuing many different channels in terms of expressing concerns, but also looking at the elements of the conflict. In terms of diplomatic channels, these have ranged from prime ministerial level or ministerial level discussions with the Ethiopians, but also with key regional players, such as the President of South Africa, who until recently was chairing the African Union, an important regional organization, and who, since the very early days, has been attempting to offer assistance in terms of mediation.

We've also been working closely with like-minded countries and international organizations, so calls with the secretary-general, and working very closely with other democracies to look for solutions.

At the same time, we have made public statements. There have been many statements and tweets made by our ministers, but perhaps the most important one related to this issue was—

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

But are you joining...is the question. There seems to be something going on here.

Is the Government of Canada concerned about the fragility of the Ethiopian state over this? Is there something going on that we need to know about? You're not really saying that you're joining in calling upon the Eritrean forces to leave Tigray and hopefully find another solution to the stability and the future of Ethiopia.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Mr. Myles, could we have just a brief answer on that, please.

[Ian Myles]

Sure.

Mr. Chair, I would just bring to light a joint statement that we signed on to at the UN Human Rights Council on February 26, which was signed by 41 other countries as well, in which we specifically say, “Finally, we call for the withdrawal of all Eritrean troops from Ethiopia.” That was probably the most public statement where we said this, but certainly that message has been repeated many times.

The presence of Eritrean troops in Ethiopia is the source of concern and a potential source of destabilization. I think that the Prime Minister of Ethiopia has now acknowledged that publicly as well.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you very much, Mr. Myles. Thank you, Mr. Harris.

This brings us to a close with respect to the witnesses from our first panel and discussion on Tigray.

I'd like to thank our Global Affairs officials, on our collective behalf, for their testimony this afternoon and for their service.

Madam Clerk, perhaps we could suspend briefly to allow our second panel to connect, our first panel to disconnect, and to go ahead with the sound check before we resume our discussion.

Thank you so much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Colleagues, welcome back. We're now ready to proceed to our briefing on the current situation in Myanmar.

Once again, to ensure an orderly meeting, I would encourage all participants to mute their microphones when they're not speaking. When you have 30 seconds left in your questioning or speaking time, I will signal with this piece of paper.

Interpretation is available through the globe icon on the bottom of your screens.

I'd now like to welcome our second panel.

We have with us Paul Thoppil, assistant deputy minister responsible for Asia-Pacific; Peter Lundy, director general responsible for Southeast Asia; Cory Anderson, director of the Sanctions Policy and Operations Co-ordination Division; Mark Gawn, director of Myanmar and Philippines Development; and James Christoff, executive director responsible for Southeast Asia.

Mr. Thoppil, I will invite you to deliver opening remarks, for five minutes, please. The floor is yours, sir.

[Paul Thoppil, Assistant Deputy Minister, Asia Pacific, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Thank you, Chair, for the introduction.

Members, thank you for having Global Affairs Canada officials here today to discuss the tragic events unfolding in Myanmar following the military's seizure of power last month.

On February 1 the Myanmar military, also known as the Tatmadaw, overthrew the democratically elected government in a military coup, detaining the President, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and several politicians and officials from the ruling National League for Democracy, or NLD. Authority over Myanmar's governance has been sized by the commander-in-chief, and a state of emergency has been declared.

The Tatmadaw claims that it had to take control over Myanmar's governance, alleging large-scale election fraud in the November 2020 election. This election granted the NLD an overwhelming electoral victory that all but wiped out representation for the Tatmadaw's proxy political parties in parliament. The allegations of electoral fraud are without basis in fact. Domestic and international observers have certified that Myanmar's 2020 election generally met international election standards, with only minor irregularities. While we expressed our concerns regarding the disenfranchisement of some ethnic minorities, including the Rohingya, 70% to 71% of eligible voters exercised their right to vote in an election that was otherwise free and fair.

The actions of the Tatmadaw therefore represent a clear attempt to reverse the democratically expressed will of the people of Myanmar, in a bid to protect their political and financial interests and to reverse Myanmar's democratic transition. Over the last few weeks, we have witnessed the systematic and coordinated action against peaceful protesters, including the increasing use of lethal force.

As of March 24, more than 260 civilians across the country have been killed by security forces. The violence is part of a multi-dimensional campaign by the Tatmadaw regime to squash dissent and consolidate its power. More than 2,680 civil society leaders, journalists, protesters, civil servants, human rights defenders and politicians have been arbitrarily detained, with human rights organizations reporting that some detainees have been subjected to torture. At least five have died in detention.

The Tatmadaw has declared a state of emergency as cover to disrupt telecommunications, block Internet access, shut down opposition media and freeze and investigate funds of NGOs that criticize the regime. Journalists attempting to report on events in Myanmar have been subjected to intimidation, and in some instances arbitrary detention. The Tatmadaw has also introduced new laws to criminalize opposition to their rule.

In areas where popular resistance to the coup has been particularly strong, the Tatmadaw has declared martial law, transferring security and administration powers in these areas to the military and enabling them to try civilians in military courts, and even to impose the death penalty. Despite these crackdowns, resistance to the Tatmadaw continues. Civil servants launched and have continued a widespread and resilient civil disobedience movement that has crippled government operations.

The military is also targeting members of the now defunct parliament. Members elected primarily under the banner of the NLD party have formed the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the name for Myanmar's parliament, and referred to as the CRPH. They have appealed to the people of Myanmar to continue active resistance, including the use of violence in self-defence.

Ethnic armed organizations party to Myanmar's long-running civil wars, and who were until recently party to a national peace process, have been divided in response to the coup. Some have declared their support for the anti-coup protests, while others have aligned with the Tatmadaw, raising the possibility of wider civil conflict as the crisis deepens.

Since the outset of this crisis, Canada has been engaged in robust and nearly daily coordination with our international partners to ensure a strong, clear and unified condemnation of the military's actions. Canada released ministerial statements on February 1 and February 28 condemning the coup and violent crackdowns by the military. They called for the immediate release of those detained and the restoration of democratic rule. These sentiments were reiterated in two subsequent G7 statements, as well as at the UN General Assembly, UN Human Rights Council and World Trade Organization.

In direct response to the actions of the Tatmadaw leadership, on February 18, in concert with the U.K. and following similar measures by the U.S., Canada has imposed some sanctions on nine high-ranking Myanmar military officials. We are continuing to consider options for further targeted sanctions against military and military-appointed officials, as well as military-owned entities, enterprises and corporations.

It is also worth—

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Mr. Thoppil, I wonder if I could stop you there in the interest of time and turn it over to colleagues for questions. I'm sure there are lots. In questions, feel free to elaborate on the points that you weren't able to make in your opening remarks.

The first intervention goes to Mr. Genuis for six minutes, please.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Many of us were disappointed by the role that the NLD played and Aung San Suu Kyi during the Rohingya genocide.

Are we seeing signs of ethnic reconciliation among the anti-military elements? Is there collaboration among ethnic minority communities with the majority in the push to counter the coup, and what does this suggest about possibilities for the country's future?

[Paul Thoppil]

As I may have indicated earlier, the position of the ethnic armed organizations are [Technical difficulty—Editor] so it is not clear on the way forward.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Chair, on a point of order, could you protect my time here and have Mr. Thoppil go back and start his answer again? We're having some technical problems.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Mr. Genuis, I've stopped the clock.

There might be a problem with Mr. Thoppil's sound. There's a bit of a delay in the data transmission. I wonder if we could get a sense from the clerk as to whether there's any way to reposition the mike or if it's something other than that.

In any event, Mr. Thoppil, could we just ask you to repeat your last statement? We'll use that as a sound check.

Go ahead, sir.

[Paul Thoppil]

Sure. I will try again.

Mr. Chair, the ethnic armed organizations are split with regard to their support for the Tatmadaw, as well as for the civil disobedience movement.

The Tatmadaw, in order to take control of the country, has reached out to various ethnic armed organizations in order to try to acquiesce to their demands. [Technical difficulty—Editor] in the future, particularly those along the border with China, in order to ensure that their forces can deal with the population.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Mr. Thoppil, let me pause you and ask through the clerk if interpretation is good with the quality of the sound.

I detect a bit of a delay. The sound is [Technical difficulty—Editor] out, a digital transmission issue, potentially.

Madam Clerk, is the interpretation following well as it stands at the moment?

[The Clerk]

Mr. Chair, they're managing to follow at the moment. The sound is iffy. There seems to be some latency in his sound.

Mr. Thoppil, I'm not sure if you're using a VPN or if you have many things open on your computer. That might make a difference, if you could close some background stuff.

[Paul Thoppil]

Thank you. We'll take a look.

In the meantime, I will ask my colleague Peter Lundy to provide additional comments.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you, Mr. Thoppil.

Mr. Lundy, please.

[Peter Lundy, Director General, Southeast Asia, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

To follow on Paul's comments which were focused on ethnic armed organizations, I think the same conclusions apply across ethnic communities. It's a volatile picture with different groups, communities and regional differences in terms of approach and [Technical difficulty—Editor].

For example, what we have seen through our reporting from our mission and others is a very high focus on the NLD in Yangon, which is the largest city and largest commercial centre. Once you move out to the regions, you start to have different ethnic and political groups supporting the same general objective of wanting the military to reverse course, but the end state for some of them is slightly different in terms of the constitutional outcomes that they would like to see and their place in some sort of power structure.

To specifically respond to the question has there been any reconciliation—

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Sorry, because of my limited time, could you just clarify then, is there in the context of these complex discussions and negotiations an openness in the NLD to commit to a more federal structure going forward, if they're able to reverse the coup and retain power? Is there a negotiating posture from them to say, “Let's try to establish a democratic federal structure to bring more people on board”?