Thank you.
Mr. Chair, vice-chairs and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today.
The granting of export permits is important not only to the industry, but also to Canada as a whole. Like the previous witness, I want to recognize the very important work that industry and government have done on this issue so far. The matter is certainly complex.
Over the past two decades, I have had the opportunity to conduct research and give presentations on the industry, which is strategically important to the country.
My remarks will focus on the industry side. I would like to give you some food for thought in three areas.
First, the government needs to consider the temporary suspension of controlled equipment exports, because robust controls are necessary for the use and re-export of military goods and related intellectual property.
Second, the government should introduce a predictable and efficient review framework for the export of military goods to other countries, one that includes pooling and risk-sharing mechanisms vis-à-vis industry.
Third, Canada should advance a systemic approach alongside its allies and partners to establish an oversight mechanism for possible violations by consignees of military goods.
Why am I making these three recommendations?
A look at global competition in the defence industry reveals a tremendous amount of nationalism, industrial policies that strongly favour national interests. It also reveals a large number of emerging players, in particular, India and China; Russia, too, still has a very significant presence. Moreover, Turkey has become a major exporter in recent years, signalling a geostrategic shift in defence. Through their companies, these emerging exporter countries of military goods are significantly increasing their domestic capacity.
That said, defence equipment supply chains are increasingly globalized, in terms of both inputs, subsystems and systems—a fairly globalized layer of the chain—as well as more complex platforms, an area that is becoming increasingly globalized. A trend is emerging: the use of commercial off-the-shelf inputs and end products.
Canada's defence industry exports the bulk of its products. Exports account for roughly 60% of industry sales, and even Canada's defence policy recognizes the importance of co-operation with the defence industry and export opportunities. Why? Because the Canadian market is too small to sustain the industry.
Consequently, the defence industry has to carve out a place for itself in global value chains, so that Canada can preserve extensive strategic industrial capability, while remaining a leader in defining platforms for the future and the technologies on which they are built.
The industry's prosperity is at stake, as Canada tries to secure its place as a leading supplier of lethal and non-lethal defence products, services and technologies. What sets the industry apart from other sectors is its very high value-added contribution to the Canadian economy, not to mention the extremely high-tech jobs it generates.
When it comes to Turkey and the issue before the committee, it is clear that Turkey is not only an advanced country, but also a NATO ally. It also exports drone platforms, mainly the Bayraktar drone, which is also sold to the Ukraine. At issue are electro-optical imaging sensor systems, an important part of the added value in this type of platform. Another important consideration, however, is the global market for these types of devices and platforms, a market with a significant civilian component and clear strategic value.
Although Turkey recently indicated that it no longer needed Canadian equipment, that is not necessarily true. As far as the platform technology is concerned, Turkey's domestic capacity is not yet sufficiently advanced for its desired use of the platform.
In addition, a very important question needs to be considered. What impact does the current suspension of military exports have? Suspending export permits does not mean that other providers will be able to step in to fill the void created by Canada.
All of that informs the thought process around Canada's defence and aerospace industry. If the government does not approach the export restrictions carefully, it could increase the cost of doing business and undermine the sector's competitiveness. It could also lead to supply chain diversions, in other words, the substitution of Canadian inputs with those of foreign competitors.
That could speed up the pace at which foreign competitors—both friendly and not so friendly—copy Canadian technologies. According to sources who have examined the situation in the United States, export restrictions intended to strengthen national security can sometimes have a negative impact on national security and competitiveness.
Increasingly, states are circumventing dual-use export permits and restrictions, going through civilian channels when similar technologies already exist. That means dual-use high-tech goods are being exported to countries through other means. India and others have taken advantage of that option through their space programs. This problem has given rise to input substitutions in industry supply chains.
In conclusion, for the sake of its own security, Canada should preserve a strong industrial base with the capacity to safeguard its interests. The corollary is that the defence sector must continue to grow its exports, or substantially and quickly increase sector-allotted resources to keep its technological edge. By doing nothing, Canada risks losing market share and the base of cutting-edge technology it currently enjoys.
There are ways for Canada to ensure that export consignees behave in a manner that is consistent with the letter and spirit of relevant agreements, while upholding Canadian values. That is crucial.
Canada has a number of options. At an industry level, Canada could more efficiently and effectively monitor, or oversee, the critical components of the value chain, including the technology links, to help Canadian companies become an essential part of users' business models. That would give Canada more sway over how end users behave.
Another way to solidify the essential role of Canadian companies and limit the likelihood of Canadian expertise being copied is to develop a service- and equipment-based business model. Likewise, this would prevent copied products and technologies based on Canadian expertise from entering the value chain.
On a government level, it is obviously important to adopt a system-based approach alongside allies, because unilateral actions to stop exports vis-à-vis a platform do not necessarily prevent that platform from being used. Internationally, multiple types of suppliers have the capacity to produce electro-optical modules, among other technologies.
Furthermore—