Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 5th, 2020

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank you for joining us once again this week. I hope we'll manage to go deeper than we did last time.

One of the things that mystifies everyone a bit is Russia's motives in this conflict. We know that there's no chemistry between Mr. Lukashenko and Mr. Putin. During the first moments, the first days of the popular uprising in Belarus, we saw that Russia hesitated between taking the side of Mr. Lukashenko or opposing him.

Mr. Lukashenko went to Moscow. There was an exchange between the two men and, at the end of the discussion, Russia, it seems, took Belarus's side.

In your opinion, strategically or tactically, what led Russia to choose to support Mr. Lukashenko rather than be part of a process like the one that most OSCE countries seem to want to follow on this issue?

[David Sproule]

I believe that Russia is very anxious most of all for security on its border. It has long-standing cultural, economic and historical ties with Belarus and is anxious to keep it within its sphere of interest. With respect to the role that Russia plays in this situation, we take a lot of guidance from civil society and opposition leaders. As Ms. Tikhanovskaya indicated, it is her firm hope that Russia will play a positive role in promoting dialogue. She even offered for Russia to help in offering assistance.

We, Canada, are very keen that Russia play a role. We disagree with Russia that Lukashenko should continue to be in power. He has lost his legitimacy. The holding of the elections and the repression after the elections have excluded him from any right to continue in power. We have a strongly different view from that of Russia's with regard to his continuing to be in power, along with those in his regime.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

I think Ms. Tikhanovskaya is right to think that any resolution of this conflict cannot be achieved without Russia's agreement and participation.

That said, if it's true that Russia has security concerns at its borders and has long-standing ties with Belarus, the question is why did Russia choose to support Mr. Lukashenko rather than Ms. Tikhanovskaya, who is very willing to work with Russia? Why did Russia go so far as to issue an arrest warrant for Ms. Tikhanovskaya?

How can Russia's attitude, which is difficult to understand, to say the least, be explained when the country could very well have followed in the footsteps of the entire international community and demanded that Mr. Lukashenko leave office and that Ms. Tikhanovskaya be allowed to take power?

[David Sproule]

It is interesting. Indeed, Ms. Tikhanovskaya has indicated that the current problems are not European-Russia problems; they're domestic problems that have to be resolved domestically amongst the Belarusian people.

In terms of Russia's motives, it's always difficult to ascertain what is motivating Mr. Putin and the Russian government. Overall, they would like to judge how best they can maintain the influence they do, and we as a country would like to see Russia exert their efforts in a positive way to bring about a resolution that is satisfactory to the Belarusian people, not to Mr. Lukashenko.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

In that regard, what kind of contacts do you have with Russia, and what responses are you getting from Russia in terms of the pressure you're putting on Russia to bring Ms. Tikhanovskaya to power in Minsk, instead of keeping Mr. Lukashenko there?

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Could we have a brief answer, please, Mr. Sproule?

[David Sproule]

To date, we have coordinated closely with our like-minded partners insofar as this crisis is concerned, and we will have to consider how to engage with Russia. We will look at that, depending on the circumstances as they evolve, and make a decision about the best way forward, keeping in mind, over and above all, that we're here to support the aspirations of the Belarusian people, and certainly not the aspirations of Russia vis-à-vis their relations and their ongoing influence in Belarus.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you, Mr. Sproule.

Our final set of questions in this first round go to Mr. Harris, for six minutes.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Chair.

Mr. Sproule, this is a most intriguing situation. Did the Canadian government decide that the elections in Belarus were fraudulent prior to the elections or after election day?

Was there something that happened on the day that caused the decision to be made, or was it the activities prior to that? Was it the outcome of the vote that gave rise to the notion that it must have been fraudulent? No explanation has really been given about that.

[David Sproule]

There were strong indications and those raised grave concerns for Canada and our like-minded partners about whether or not those elections could be free and fair. Indeed, we didn't have observers from the OSCE who were able to be part of that, which would give some reassurance.

There were the reports that we received in terms of the behaviour of the government officials and their permission to allow people to vote freely and fairly without any sense of pressure, the outcome, which was completely out of sync with everyone's estimations of the support that was enjoyed by opposition party leaders, and then, of course, there was the immediate repression and clamp-down on media reporting. All those together made it so there could be no other conclusion than that this was a fraudulent election process.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Obviously, the repression afterwards was clearly indicative of a repressive state. There's no question that it was outrageous and to be condemned. It seems curious that, prior to that, there wasn't any public condemnation of the behaviour of the Belarusian officials.

What did Canada make of the fact that in July, there were 33 Russian mercenaries arrested by the Belarusian government authorities, accusing Russia, presumably, of trying to destabilize the election? What did you make of that? What do you make of that?

[David Sproule]

Mr. Lukashenko must have been in a very difficult position, after being so critical during this disruption between Russia and his government insofar as that allegation was concerned, when, upon the election being held, he had to reach out to Mr. Putin for support to maintain his power.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

The attitude toward Russia seems to be odd, given the fact that in 1999 there was an agreement between Russia and Belarus to undertake the state union, which was recognized as a soft annexation of Belarus by Russia. If followed through, it would amount to the same common currency, parliament, defence and foreign policies, according to the briefing note we received. That seems to me to be part of Russia's plan.

What confidence does anyone have that Russia has either changed that plan or no longer wishes to have the kind of influence that would imply over Belarus, regardless of who's in power?

[David Sproule]

Since 1999 Mr. Lukashenko has exerted an effort to distance himself from that kind of control, where he finds it possible. As far as Russia's motives are concerned about Belarus, they're very difficult for us to judge, except that Putin's actions since the election have indicated that he's quite determined to maintain a very close relationship regardless of who's in power in Belarus.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

That would be either him or Tikhanovskaya. Would he be equally interested in a close relationship with her, if she were the leader?

[David Sproule]

It's doubtful, given his support for Lukashenko and her opposition to Mr. Lukashenko. So far, he has sided with the Lukashenko regime.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Why would Mr. Putin or Russia, in general, be able to help in ensuring that the civil society in Belarus was going to have some sort of control over the future?

[David Sproule]

It is quite possible that the opposition and civil society will seem to be overcoming in their opposition to Lukashenko and the repression, and they may be the side that prevails. Canada, for its part, would like to see everything set right democratically and for free and fair elections to be held. If that trend starts to continue, it may well be that Russia has to reconsider the position it's taken in continuing to support Mr. Lukashenko.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

It sounds like wishful thinking to me.

I have one last question concerning the state of play.

Are the sanctions that have been imposed actually effective, or are they symbolic? Do these individuals actually have any economic relationship with Canada or any stakes in the results of those sanctions?

[David Sproule]

We expect that some do, but what is really important is that these sanctions be imposed in solidarity with like-minded countries. After all, if you look at the countries that have imposed sanctions—the U.K., the United States, the EU and its member countries—that suggests, of course, a large area with countries that people like to travel to, invest in and do business with. It will have a personal impact on those people.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you very much, Mr. Harris and Mr. Sproule.

We'll now go on to our second round of questions.

I just want to remind colleagues and witnesses that we have a couple of two and a half minute slots in that round, so be mindful of the time.

Our first round of questions is for five minutes and goes to Mr. Genuis.

The floor is yours.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Sproule, my colleague, Mr. Chong, asked you about the use of the Special Economic Measures Act as opposed to the Magnitsky act, and you said that the criteria were clearly met for the Special Economic Measures Act.

I just want to probe that a little bit. Is the implication that the criteria were not met for the Magnitsky sanctions? Are the criteria different for those different sanction vehicles? What are the practical consequences of choosing one sanctions vehicle over the other?

[David Sproule]

Perhaps for this question I would defer to my colleague, Ms. Grant, who is more active on these issues and could offer a better answer than I could.

[Alison Grant]

Sure. Thank you.

In this case, sanctions under SEMA are imposed in relation to the actions of a foreign state. This is appropriate here because it's the actions of a foreign state that we've seen in terms of the human rights violations committed by the Belarusian state against its people, whereas Magnitsky is based more on the individual. In this case, SEMA has been completely appropriate. The trigger that's provided in SEMA is where we find gross and systematic human rights violations to have occurred and to have been committed by a foreign state—in this case, by the Belarusian administration. I think that speaks to why we used the SEMA mechanism.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you.

If I understand correctly, though, because SEMA is not a sanction against individuals, it would still allow individuals who are in senior roles within the Belarusian state to travel, to move their money and to own assets in other countries.