Foreign Affairs Committee on April 17th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting 103 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Therefore, members are attending here with us in the room today, as well as through the Zoom application.

Mr. Perron.

[Yves Perron, Bloc, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

Mr. Chair, I just wanted to check whether the audio testing has been done with the witnesses participating in the meeting remotely.

Was that done?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Yes, we have done the audio test. That is part of our preliminary rules of procedure here. Thank you for raising that, Mr. Perron.

Now I will make a few comments for the benefit of not only the members here in the room but also the witnesses, who are mostly appearing virtually today. Before speaking, please wait until I recognize you by name. You may speak in the official language of your choice. Interpretation services are available. You have the choice, at the bottom of your screen, of floor, English or French. If interpretation is lost, please inform us immediately.

In addition, I highlight that this room is equipped with a powerful audio system, but feedback events can occur. These can be extremely harmful to interpreters and can cause serious injury.

With regard to a speaking list, the committee clerk and I will do our best to maintain a consolidated order of speaking for all members, whether they are participating virtually or are actually in the room.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, January 29, 2024, the committee resumes its study of Canada's approach to Africa.

I now welcome our witnesses. We have with us today Professor Thomas Kwasi Tieku, who is a professor of international relations at King's University College at Western University. We also have Mr. Thierry Vircoulon, research fellow at the French Institute of International Relations. From the Center for Strategic and International Studies, we're grateful to have Mr. Cameron Hudson, senior fellow.

Each of our witnesses will be provided five minutes for their opening remarks. I ask that every once in a while you do look over. Once you're almost out of time, I will give you a signal, which tells you that you have approximately 10 to 15 seconds to wrap it up. That applies not only with respect to your opening remarks but also when members are asking you questions as well.

With all of that having been explained, we now go to Professor Tieku.

The floor is yours. You have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Dr. Thomas Kwasi Tieku, Professor, Politics and International Relations, King’s University College, Western University, As an Individual]

Thank you so much, honourable Chair and members of the committee, for inviting me to contribute to this important study.

This study is a signal to me that our Canadian political system is finally catching up with realities in our classrooms. Canadians, especially younger ones, want a stronger Canada-Africa partnership. This study presents a great opportunity to encourage the Canadian government to meet this expectation.

Mr. Chair, I want to submit that a study should help transition Canada from the traditionally firefighting, risk-averse and follow-the-crowd diplomatic posture to a more systematic, proactive and strategic approach to Africa.

Let me briefly outline what a systematic, proactive and strategic approach to Africa may look like.

A systematic approach to Africa requires a bipartisan policy framework that leverages Canada's strengths and aligns Canadian interests with Africa's priorities. Luckily for Canada, many of the policy priorities that the African Union has identified in “Agenda 2063” align nicely with Canadian interests. I will recommend that the Canadian government study that document and its progress reports carefully. The Canadian government can then use the Canada-AU high-level dialogue to agree on the mutually beneficial quality priorities that reflect long-term strategic interests of Canada and Africa. One such enduring interest is the maintenance and protection of the rules-based international order that has served both Canada and Africa very well in the last 70 years. Canada needs to work with the AU to counter threats posed by illiberal regimes to this order.

A proactive Canadian approach to Africa means better reorganization and investment in Canadian field missions and the Africa branch. Our missions in Africa and the Africa branch are woefully understaffed and spread too thin in Africa. For instance, we have just one foreign service officer, plus the ambassador, in the Canadian mission to the African Union in Ethiopia. These two individuals are supposed to engage with over 1,700 AU staff and nearly 120 embassies in Addis Ababa. How are these individuals supposed to do it? Maybe they are magicians.

Understaffing like this is part of the reason we are generally perceived in Africa as very cheap on the diplomatic front. We need to invest in Global Affairs Canada and help it reform some of its outdated practices, such as the division of Africa into sub-Saharan Africa and Arab Africa.

Honourable Chair, a strategic approach to Africa entails identifying the policy areas where Canada can make meaningful impact on the ground. Allow me to highlight a few of these areas.

Number one, leverage Canada's linguistic advantage in partnership with the African Union to nurture a new generation of African leaders who embody shared Canadian and African values as outlined in “Agenda 2063”.

Number two, utilize Canada's experience in conducting peaceful political transitions and multiculturalism to help African countries manage elections and diversity better.

Number three, leverage Canada's educational assets to help African states develop training programs that can transform Africa's youthful population into a demographic dividend.

Finally, capitalize on Canada's agricultural expertise and technological advancements and Africa's vast arable lands and young workforce to enhance food security and fight climate change.

Mr. Chair, it is my hope that this study marks the beginning of a new era, one where we act smartly, play to our strengths, stop hiding behind others and put our money where our mouth is to strengthen Global Affairs to do its best work.

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair, for the opportunity to contribute to this study.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Professor Tieku.

We now go to Mr. Vircoulon.

You have five minutes. The floor is yours.

[Thierry Vircoulon, Research Fellow of the French Institute for International Affairs, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank the committee for inviting me today to speak to the political and security situation in the Sahel. The situation is critical. Since I'm not an expert on Canadian politics, but rather on Sahel politics, I'll keep to my area of expertise.

Geographically, the Sahel covers a strip of land stretching from the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean, in other words, from Sudan to Mauritania, or a total of seven countries. Over the past few years, there have been three major and quite alarming developments in this region.

The first is the expansion of conflicts in the Sahel.

Of the seven countries I just mentioned, only three are at peace, namely Senegal, Mauritania and Chad. In addition, there are two theatres of conflict: one in Mali, Burkina Faso and the western part of Niger, and the other in Sudan.

The jihadism threat began in northern Mali in 2013, and it has now spread to all of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger through two al Qaeda jihadist franchises: the Islamist State in the Greater Sahara, or ISGS, and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM.

However, the jihadi insurgency is not the only conflict raging in the area of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger or west of Niger. We can also see that there is a whole system of conflicts, and a number of them are interconnected. There is a secessionist conflict in northern Mali between the Azawad Tuareg and the central government. There are intercommunity wars that particularly target the Fulani in that region, where a number of massacres have taken place; finally, there are drug wars, since this is a major trafficking zone.

The other conflict raging in the region is the civil war in Sudan, which began in April 2023 and has rapidly spread through the regions, and even across borders, to the point that we can now talk about a Middle Eastern war unfolding in Sudan.

The second major development, which I think is very significant in the region, is a democratic backsliding. A series of military coups began in 2020 in Mali, followed by more coups in 2022 in Burkina Faso and, last year, in Niger. This wave of coups has installed military regimes that replaced elected presidents.

The Sudanese transition to democracy began in 2019, but failed in 2021. Again, this is the result of a coup, with the military replacing the civilian government. In Chad, there is also a military transition under way, which should be completed this year.

Four out of seven countries are grappling with military transitions. For three of those countries, namely Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, there are no prospects of an election on the horizon.

The third development, which I think is extremely important in the region, is the reversal of diplomatic and security alliances.

Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have dismantled the security support measures that had been put in place to fight jihadism, specifically, the support provided by the United Nations, the UN, with a peacekeeping mission; by the European Union, with troops; by France, with troops as well; and by the United States, with a substantial intelligence apparatus.

They broke those security agreements and called these measures into question by demanding, as you know, the departure of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, or MINUSMA, for example. They have also accelerated efforts to come closer to Russia by agreeing to the deployment of Russian paramilitary groups in three out of seven countries and to their participation in combat in two countries, Mali and Sudan.

Finally, those three countries, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, have decided to break with the Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, and exit the regional organization in order to create their own alternative regional bloc, the Alliance of Sahel States, or AES. This is obviously creating tensions with the other ECOWAS countries, which are complaining about the contagion of insecurity along their northern borders.

In addition to the conflicts I mentioned, there are internal tensions in the area. Obviously, this has created a tragic humanitarian situation, with over 38% of all soldiers being killed in action in 2022 and 2023. There are now 11 million displaced people, and humanitarian needs continue to increase.

I thank committee members for their attention.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much. Perhaps you'll have an opportunity to address all the issues once we get into questioning from the members of Parliament.

We next go to Mr. Hudson.

The floor is yours. You have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Cameron Hudson, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak here today regarding Canada's approach to Africa.

You are examining this subject at a critical moment in Africa's history. You have no doubt heard, but it bears underscoring, that the continent will be home to one-quarter of the world's population by 2050. Its natural resources, including 30% of the world's critical minerals that will power our modern world and help drive our economies, are found there. Moreover, it is situated at the geographic centre of our world—along major sea lines in the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea.

The region holds three non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council and it represents the largest regional voting bloc at the United Nations.

With its median age of only 18, President Biden was correct when he said that Africa will shape the future—and not just the future of the African people, but of the world. Today, the world is keenly aware of Africa's growing importance, which is spurring countries large and small to expand their political, economic and security engagement with African states.

Make no mistake, African nations and their leaders understand well their growing importance in the world. They are demanding a greater voice in the global decisions that affect them and are leveraging their diplomatic courtiers to obtain better deals for themselves and their people. This influx of new actors and this renewed assertion of African agency are creating a highly dynamic and increasingly difficult to navigate environment for the continent's traditional friends, donors and partners.

At the same time, the region itself is undergoing significant transformations in its own socio-economic, political and security landscape. That massive youth bulge is creating the greatest spread among the average age of leaders and the average age of citizens. This spread of nearly 60 years is a factor in the nine coups d'etat that African nations have experienced in the last five years. It underpins the declining democratic trends across the continent today, which see fewer people living under democratic rule than at any time since 1991.

These developments, however, have been blunted by the convergence of growing incidents of armed conflict and terrorism, which today see Africa as a global centre of jihadism, climate change—which Africans rightly highlight they did not cause, but which they are paying for—food insecurity, and COVID-19 pandemic-induced health and economic woes that have set back development gains on the continent by 20 years.

In this potent mix of forces and trends, the People's Republic of China sees the region as an opportunity. From Beijing's perspective, Africa is an untapped consumer market and a source for the commodities it needs to drive its expansion. Decades ago, it also saw in Africa an important arena in which to challenge the rules-based international order and advance its geopolitical interests.

China's engagement is not linear and it would be a mistake to view it as wholly malign. Indeed, while China is perhaps seen as a global adversary across a host of important political, economic and security sectors, the use of Africa as a chessboard only serves to undermine western efforts to strengthen and deepen our partnerships there.

Russia, too, in recent years has found in the region a permissive environment for parastatals and private military companies, often fomenting instability for strategic and financial benefit. Russia uses its security and economic ties, as well as disinformation, to undercut Africa's principled opposition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and related human rights abuses and to sow dissent against Africa's traditional partners. It portrays Moscow, in the historical image, as siding with Africa's independence-minded leaders against what many on the continent see as a kind of western neo-colonialism.

Many African leaders see their countries as victims of the post-World War II international order. In their view, western powers use international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank to advance their interests while imposing painful conditionalities on African countries. Russian propaganda efforts did not create these views, but they do underscore them today to great effect.

Similarly, the west's long-time support for African strongmen, from Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko to Equatorial Guinea's Teodoro Obiang today, as well as its willingness to topple those opposed to its interests—as in the 2011 NATO war against Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi—have hurt the west's credibility with African partners that it now tries to sell on an agenda of shared values.

Both China and Russia are effectively using this history to advance their agendas. Make no mistake: China and Russia have identified and seized upon an opportunity in Africa, but they did not create it. The African Union has defined, in its own strategic document “Agenda 2063”, that the creation of a multipolar international system is in Africa's interest. Multiplying its partnerships and requiring those partners to compete for African influence is a benefit.

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Mr. Hudson.

We will now move to questions from the members. The first member up is MP Aboultaif.

You have five minutes.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Thanks to the witnesses.

Mr. Hudson, we know that China has invaded most of Africa without having to fire a single bullet. We know that it's a region that is rich in resources such as minerals, as you said, and population. How can we—Canada and the U.S., not just Canada—navigate our way through, with China and Russia well established there, specifically with the competition that comes from China? How are we going to navigate our way through? China hasn't fired a bullet, and they were able to do what they did.

What is the single recipe for us to be able to get through and establish ourselves for a future that is going to affect the world and is going to be shaping the world, as President Biden said?

[Cameron Hudson]

It's obviously a question that we in Washington are struggling with as well, and I think all of our Western partners and donor countries are struggling with it right now.

I would say a couple of things. Number one, it isn't so much what you can do, but what you shouldn't do. What you shouldn't do is withdraw from Africa. We are seeing budget cuts and personnel cuts. We are seeing a disengagement, not just of Washington, but of all Western partners, from Africa. That was certainly not the moment to step back. In fact, we need to be redoubling our efforts, as my colleague said, redoubling our embassy staff and our budgets.

In the process of doing that, one thing we need to be doing is treating African countries as equals. In the Western world, we're wedded to this lexicon of seeing ourselves as donor countries, but this donor-donee relationship is something that Africans are trying to break away from. There's a parochialism there that is not helpful to the relationship.

China sees Africa as, in many ways, where China was 30 or 40 years ago in its development. In China, Africans see what their future could be, a future of moving successfully from a poor, agrarian society to a more advanced, industrialized, urbanized society. We have to find ways to create common cause, not separate ourselves through language, and certainly not separate ourselves by painting China or even Russia exclusively as a malign influence whose only interest is preying on poor, susceptible African communities.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Were we caught by surprise in dealing with this issue? Time is not on our side, obviously, and we need to find a way. I believe the African Union is one of the representative organizations that carry on some business on behalf of the region. In the meantime, the African Union has been criticized for its inability to connect to and impact the lives of Africans directly in its action through better promoting Africa on the international stage.

We seem to be working mostly with the African Union. Is that correct? Is this the right strategy?

[Cameron Hudson]

I think the African Union has emerged as the preferred partner, but I think that what we're seeing now is the subcontinental level, the regional economic organizations, demonstrating a greater ability to organize themselves and a greater ability to impact their own region and to police their own region.

To the extent that it is possible, what we've seen with the African Union is that it tends to rise and fall on the quality of its chairmanship. When you have strong leaders from strong countries, when you have a President Ruto or a strong Nigerian or South African leader, or when President Kagame was the chairman of the AUC, the AU uses the reins and the secretariat of the AU to great effect, but when you have a president like the president of Comoros, the last chairman, or now the president of Mauritania, coming from weaker states, the quality of the governance that comes from AU leadership is not often there in the same way.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Do you recommend that Canada go on its own or go along with its G7 allies, especially the United States, Europe and Japan? Would that be a more effective strategy, re-entering Africa on a different ground, rather than what we have been doing in the past?

What would your recommendation or advice for Canada be?

[Cameron Hudson]

I can give you a window into how Washington approached it in part of the francophone African world.

Washington has been trying very discreetly to put distance between its policies and France's policies in francophone Africa. It has not served Washington particularly, and we haven't benefited from that distance. You saw just in the last month that Washington was invited to leave Niger.

I think Canada really needs to think about creating its own path in Africa.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We'll go to MP Zuberi next.

You have five minutes.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here today.

I'd like to start with Mr. Tieku.

You talked about the AU's “Agenda 2063”. You touched upon it at a very high level. Do you mind elaborating a bit on its strategy for us at this committee?

[Dr. Thomas Kwasi Tieku]

For me, “Agenda 2063” is a very important document that opens up the window for anyone who really wants to engage with the African continent, because it's seen as Africa's strategic document.

Within Africa's “Agenda 2063”, there are a few things that I think are very important for Canada to pay attention to.

Number one is the emphasis on education, especially if you read the second report. There's a clear emphasis on how they want to invite people to come and partner with them in providing good-quality education. This is what we have. We have some of the best educational institutions in the world—not just in Canada, but in the world. Africans who are educated in Canada, whether they are here or, particularly, when they go back home, underperform. You can see it in the medical sciences, the humanities and everywhere. We can partner with them to be able to enhance that.

They emphasize the idea of transforming agriculture into a mechanized industry. We have the technology to be able to do it. It's roughly a hundred-billion dollar industry. We have the expectation to be able to leverage it and gain from it.

I could go on and talk about a number of other initiatives that are under “Agenda 2063”. We just need to study that document and align it with our interests, and I think the Africans will welcome it.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

I think that's really helpful. The point on education is really salient, especially since, from the testimony, we know that the average age on the continent is 18.

You touched upon “Agenda 2063”. In terms of other strategies and frameworks—this is for all the witnesses—are there any that you want to highlight for us? Could you name them and identify salient elements of them, aside from what has already been mentioned in your testimony?

I open this up to all of the witnesses. We have about two and a half minutes, so I'll ask for brief responses.

[Dr. Thomas Kwasi Tieku]

If I may go first, I just want to add a bit to it.

I've heard a number of other witnesses emphasize the importance of bringing the regional economic communities. I would also emphasize that for me, it will be very important to also have a permanent delegation to these regional economic communities.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

That's a very good way of looping into the testimony we heard last time.

Focusing on the five regional areas, do you think we should have a presence in each of them?

[Dr. Thomas Kwasi Tieku]

We don't have enough. We're only present in about 17 of them, and we are spread too thin.

If we are strategically positioned in all of the regional economic communities and use them as a contact point for those countries, it will free us up to be able to then strategically position other missions in the areas that reflect our core interests. No one would complain about that.

With the way we have done it until now, everyone is asking why Canada is establishing a mission here, but not a mission there. We don't have the money to be everywhere. In almost 60% of African countries, we are not present. Strategic group positioning is the way to go.

Thank you so much.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Mr. Hudson, you spoke about the challenges in the Sahel. Aside from what you already mentioned, do you want to add anything on how we can constructively contribute to addressing those challenges?

[Cameron Hudson]

I think it was Mr. Vircoulon who spoke about the Sahel.