Foreign Affairs Committee on March 31st, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

I call the meeting to order.

Good afternoon, colleagues.

Welcome to meeting number 13 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to the motion adopted on January 31, 2022, the committee is meeting on its study of the current situation in Ukraine.

Colleagues, we're still waiting for our second witness. She will, I'm told, be connecting within a few minutes, and we will roll her on board as we progress, in the interest of time.

As always, interpretation services are available through the globe icon at the bottom of your screen. For members participating in person, please keep in mind the Board of Internal Economy's guidelines for mask use and health protocols.

Please also note that you are not allowed to take screenshots or photos of your screen. Before you speak, please wait for me to call your name and when you do speak, please speak slowly and clearly. When not speaking, please mute your microphone.

I would like to remind you that all comments from members and witnesses should be directed to the chair.

We will welcome our first witness. Our second witness, as I said, will join in a few minutes.

We have with us Mr. Yann Breault, assistant professor at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean.

Mr. Breault, you have the floor. You have five minutes to make your opening remarks.

[Dr. Yann Breault, Assistant Professor, Royal Military College Saint-Jean, As an Individual]

Good afternoon, and thank you all for your attention. It is my pleasure to address you.

The last month has been difficult. I am just recovering from sleepless nights watching the humanitarian drama that is the war in Ukraine unfold before my eyes. There is immense geopolitical uncertainty hanging over us. I am one of those who believe that this drama will affect the future of the Ukrainian nation, but also that it goes far beyond Ukraine. This is perhaps one of the first points I would like to ask you to bear in mind. When we look at the situation, we see many very disturbing images. We have concerns and sympathy for the Ukrainians and their desire to freely choose their own geopolitical direction, which is quite understandable.

We are all horrified by the armed aggression perpetrated by a regime which until recently could be considered authoritarian, but which in recent weeks has taken on all the forms of what should be called a dictatorship. There is a tightening of the information sphere and the closure of a whole series of social networks. The last two free media outlets, the Echo of Moscow and Novaya Gazeta, shut down for good last week.

One drama is unfolding in Ukraine and another is threatening the future of democracy, even in Russia. However, an even greater drama is looming, namely the geopolitical divide that is in danger of widening at breakneck speed, and not just between Russia and the west. In the current situation, we need to get out of the information bubble we are in to some degree as a G7 country, with our allies Japan and South Korea, who are standing in solidarity with a wave of economic sanctions against Russia that are completely unprecedented.

That said, I am among those who are concerned about the fracturing of the international order. The sanctions adopted against Russia are supported by our partners in the other continents of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and especially by the vast Eurasia. On the other hand, although 140 states denounced Russian aggression at the United Nations General Assembly—which, of course, brought us great satisfaction—a good number of states, and not the least among them, abstained from voting or did not show up. Among these countries, as you probably know, are China, but also India, Iran, Pakistan and several others. This leads me to believe that the effect of economic sanctions on a country that is mainly an exporter of natural resources will unfortunately not really limit the Russians' room for manoeuvre in the long term. This is the view that currently exists in Russia.

My colleague Anatol Lieven spoke of a sibling rivalry existing between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, whose discourse and identity constructions could not be more antagonistic. There is therefore a certain dynamic in Russian-Ukrainian relations. However, there is another, even greater dynamic that explains the incompatibility and difficulties that the west has to face in its relations with Russia. These difficulties do not date back to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, but to a much earlier time. Some would say they go back to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. At that time, there was criticism in Russia of western foreign interference in Ukraine's internal affairs.

In my view, the deterioration in relations between Russia and the western world may have started the year before, with 2003 being a turning point, when Russian opposition figure Mikhail Khodorkovsky, owner of what was the biggest oil company in Russia, Yukos, was imprisoned by Russian President Vladimir Putin. It is really from this moment that, in the name of the state's desire to regain control over what in Russia are called “strategic resources”—which include, of course, natural resources such as hydrocarbons—there was an attempt by the political apparatus to regain control of the economy. This is exactly the opposite balance of power that we have in the west. It is a kind of incompatibility between two modes of governance, the one favoured by Russia, but also by China, Iran and several others, who want to play by different rules of the game.

The emerging picture in this theatre, in Ukraine, is also the reconfiguration of the balance of power between increasingly distant geo‑economic areas.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you, Professor Breault.

Since our second witness isn't online yet, I suggest that we begin the first round of questions.

As usual, I'll let you know when you have 30 seconds left to speak.

Colleagues, we will start round one with Mr. Chong, for six minutes.

Mr. Chong, go ahead.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you. I believe the second witness has just appeared.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Okay. That is good timing.

If we could perhaps do a very quick sound check, we will ask Professor Dyczok to present next.

[Dr. Marta Dyczok, Associate Professor, Departments of History and Political Science, Western University, As an Individual]

Hello, can you hear me?

[The Clerk of the Committee, Ms. Erica Pereira]

Yes, we can hear you.

[Dr. Marta Dyczok]

Thank you.

I have had a bit of a technical issue, but I am very delighted to be here. I'm sorry I missed the beginning, so could you fill me in on where we are?

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Yes, Professor Dyczok. Thank you very much. It's great to have you here. Welcome aboard.

We are just at the point now where our first witness has presented his opening remarks. We'll pass the floor to you momentarily.

I was just saying that I will signal, in the course of our discussion, with this piece of paper when 30 seconds remain in testimony or questioning time.

Looking ahead, in terms of IT challenges, if you could keep your mike close to your mouth when you're speaking, as you have a portable mike, that will assist interpretation services greatly.

Without further ado, I will give you the floor for your opening remarks, for five minutes, please.

Go ahead.

[Dr. Marta Dyczok]

Thank you very much.

Today is day 36 of Russia's unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine. This has been the 36 most difficult days of my life, but this is nothing compared to the 36 days Ukrainians have faced and these last three days.

They have been doing an unbelievable job, but they need more help. This is a David and Goliath struggle. Ukrainians have impressed me and the world with how they have been defending themselves, but they cannot win this war alone. It would be as if the United States attacked Canada. No matter how brave, well equipped and powerful Canadian soldiers are, there's no way they could withstand an assault from a superior military force.

Canada has a very important role to play in this, both as an independent actor and as part of a coalition. As everybody on this committee knows, Canada and Ukraine have a special relationship that goes back 30 years.

In 1991, I was working as a journalist in Ukraine, and I remember being in the room in December, when then Canadian representative to Ukraine, the chargé d'affaires, the Honourable Nestor Gayowsky, walked into the room and read the telegram wherein Canada announced that it recognized Ukraine's referendum and welcomed it as an independent country. I felt so proud at that moment, as a Canadian of Ukrainian origin, and I would really like to feel that pride again.

What we've seen over the past 36 days and more is that the international institutional infrastructure that was created at the end of World War II is not functioning. It is not able to stop the war, and this is the time for new ideas.

I've often thought about our previous prime minister, Lester B. Pearson, who came up with the idea of peacekeeping forces and resolved the Suez crisis. This is one of those moments in history when we need to come up with new ideas.

In the various media interviews that I've been doing over the last while, I keep being asked what I think about Canada's role and how Canada is doing, and that's what I'd like to speak to. I would like to use Ukrainian President Zelenskyy's words. I think many people on this committee were in the House when he addressed it through Zoom. He thanked Canada for everything we were doing, but said Ukraine needed more help.

I would like to focus on five areas where I think Canada is doing well but could be doing more: diplomacy, military, economics, humanitarian and information.

I'll start with diplomacy. Overall, again, I think Canada has done a very good job. It has been coming out with statements in support of Ukraine and criticizing the war in Russia. Where Canada could take more of a role is in the peace talks, because the way this war is going to end is in part through negotiations. A number of European leaders have visited Ukraine as a sign of solidarity, and this is something Canadian leaders could be doing. They've been going as far as Poland, but nobody's been to Ukraine yet, which would show strong support for Ukraine.

In the field of diplomatic relations, Canada could be scaling down its diplomatic relations with Russia. They need to keep the embassy and consulates open—diplomatic channels need to remain open—but the size of its diplomatic missions does not need to be the same as during peacetime. We've seen this with a number of European countries, which have scaled down and said that this is not business as usual. They say, “Their country is perpetrating war; therefore, all of these diplomats and their families are not welcome in our country.” That's in the area of diplomacy.

In the military area, even before this escalation, Canada had been supporting Ukraine through training and arms supplies, but again, as Ukraine's President Zelenskyy said, they need more help. You'll remember that when he addressed the EU and the G7 last week, he asked them to give 1% of what NATO has, which would really help them. I am perfectly aware of the—

I have 30 seconds. Oh my God, that went so fast.

On economic sanctions, focus on the energy sector.

In the humanitarian sector, please give health care to the refugees who will be coming.

On the information front, please be aware of the language that is used. There's been a huge improvement, but it's not “Ukraine”; it's “Ukraine”, and it's not “the Ukraine crisis”; it's “Russia's war against Ukraine”.

Words are very important, and journalists from Ukraine are constantly appealing to journalists in Canada and to Canadian politicians to use the correct terminology.

I've been racking my brain for new ideas. I think it's time to set up a task force of all the brains in Canada to come up with new ideas on how to end this war and future wars.

Thank you very much for your attention, and I'm sorry I went a little over time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you very much, Professor, for being with us and for your testimony.

We'll go straight into round one of questions. Mr. Chong has the floor for six minutes.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

There was a reference to economic issues. It's one of the five points from our last witness and was also referenced by Mr. Breault in terms of the geopolitical situation.

I'd like to ask two sets of questions. The first is on food security and the second is on nuclear issues.

Synthetic nitrogen fertilizer accounts for, some have estimated, about half of the world's crop production. There have been suggestions in publications like Nature that without synthetic nitrogen fertilizer we can really feed only about three and a half billion people on the planet, rather than the seven billion we currently feed. I raise that because Russia is a major exporter of synthetic fertilizer made from natural gas. Russia accounts for about a quarter of global exports of ammonia and about 15% of global exports of urea, both of which are synthetic nitrogen fertilizers.

There are some who say that, as a result of this, there could be major food shortages in six months. In fact, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization issued a statement several weeks ago, saying that food prices could skyrocket by up to 22% in the next several months, because of these nitrogen shortages.

In southern Ontario, where I live, farmers are becoming somewhat panicked about this, because much of Ontario's synthetic nitrogen fertilizer comes from Russia. Sanctions could be imposed on that fertilizer, which would result in either its unavailability or its reduced application. That in turn would lead to significant drops in crop yields in the coming months.

Could our panellists comment on this issue?

[Dr. Marta Dyczok]

I'm not sure what the procedure is for speaking. Do we raise our hands or do we unmute ourselves?

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Let me push pause here for one second on Mr. Chong's time.

It's basically at the discretion of the member how to direct his or her time. You can respond directly back to them, and they can direct the questions to either or both witnesses. It's at their discretion.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

As per the chair's direction, if you feel comfortable responding to it and you have the background to respond to it, I'd be interested to hear your perspective. If not, I'm happy to move on to other questions.

[Dr. Marta Dyczok]

Thank you.

I'm not an agricultural expert, but you raise a very important point. The discussion around sanctions is about reciprocity. Sanctions always come at a cost. We all know that.

It seems that one particular item cannot be solely responsible for food shortages. Food supplies are complex. That particular item that you mentioned is something to be concerned about.

The other issue is that Ukraine is a major exporter of food. Ukraine's capacity to.... The spring season is coming, and they're being bombed. Their capacity to plant crops and therefore to supply the food that they.... I'd have to look up the statistic—

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Ukraine accounts for about 10% of the world's wheat exports, 14% of its corn exports and about 17% of the world's barley exports.

Mr. Breault, do you want to comment on this topic?

[Dr. Yann Breault]

That's indeed one of the major fields on which the power negotiation process is being played out by Russia. I think they have a view of a long confrontation ahead. It's not going to be solved in the coming weeks or in the coming months. Of course we're going to have to expect much higher prices. That will lead to terrible food insecurity within the southern hemisphere.

How it will play out exactly, we don't yet know, but it's something the Russians are definitely taking into account, and that gives them a sense that they will still have lots of leverage against the west in the coming months and years. We're under-evaluating the costs of this confrontation, and they think that in the coming months we will see the real price and public opinion, which is overwhelmingly supporting the just and right cause of the Ukrainians, will at some point be challenged.

I'm not getting into the details of the fertilizer, but that indeed.... Don't forget that Russia—the USSR—was a wheat importer. This country was not able to feed its own population. Now Russia is the number one exporter of wheat. I'm thinking also about the situation in Belarus. Belarus, I think, is the second-largest exporter of potassium, so the fact that the sanction also concerns Belarus is definitely something that will very much need to be looked into.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you.

I'll leave my nuclear question for maybe a subsequent round. I'll just note that Russia and Belarus, as you pointed out, Professor Breault, account for 40% of all global exports of potash, one of the three critical fertilizers that are used for crop production. Russia has 16% of the world's wheat exports, as you've also highlighted.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Mr. Chong, thank you very much.

We'll go straight to Mr. Sarai for six minutes.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to both of the professors.

My first question is for Mr. Breault. You on your own were very shocked at the speed and the resistance of Ukrainian forces. I think on March 24, in an interview, you acknowledged that, and I think all of us were pretty impressed by the Ukraine resistance.

Can you share, in your opinion, why and how the Ukrainian armed forces have been able to put up such a strong resistance?

[Dr. Yann Breault]

Since I'm working here at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean, I've been in contact with some of our officers, who have been training many thousands of Ukrainians for the past year. I wish I could say we've been providing helpful training to them.

I would pretty much also like to point out the fact that the Russian military, the guys who were there for two months, freezing, at the border in Belarus, thinking they were on a military exercise, at the very last moment were informed that they must accomplish this military operation, as they call it in Russia. I think there is a lot of evidence of low morale of the troops.

They were not angry at the Ukrainians. They didn't understand exactly what they were doing there. They were probably extremely surprised by the lack of enthusiasm of the Ukrainians. They were told this was about getting rid of a pro-western, bad Nazi government, and they were expecting some of the population to welcome their arrival, which was not the case.

I think for military analysts for years to come, in terms of the logistical failure and communication problem.... The support of the population for their fighters on the ground has been higher than expected, and the motivation of the Russians lower than expected.

I was among those who were predicting a three-day victory and Zelenskyy leaving Kyiv. I turned out to be absolutely wrong about it. Still, some further analysis will be necessary down the line to explain that military surprise we're witnessing on the ground. Even if my heart is with the battle the Ukrainians are fighting, it makes me dreadfully fearful of what is coming next, because if the conventional Russian forces cannot cope with Mr. Zelenskyy, they are in a very bad situation.

Their allies—China, India, Iran and others—support Russia because they thought they would give a humility lesson to the west by showing the limits of the western sphere of influence. Now that they are failing in that, there is a temptation to move further down the road of de-escalation, and the only playground where there is a strategic balance is in nuclear and the prospect of a full-fledged nuclear war. This is the only type of confrontation in which Russia can expect to find some balance and renegotiate a power relation with the west.

What I see now in the strategy the Russians have been carrying on for a few weeks is the increased intensity of the horror, the human rights violations and so forth. We think he is mad enough that he could possibly eventually consider using a nuke. A nuclear weapon is a weapon of dissuasion, but it has a dissuasive effect only if you think the guy who controls the button is crazy enough to use it. When Mr. Yeltsin was threatening us with a nuke in 1999, because he disagreed with the illegal NATO aggression against a country called Yugoslavia, everyone was laughing at him. “Come on, Boris,” they said, “You're not going to really think about using these types of weapons.”

Now, the persona that Putin is creating for himself is demonstrating that he's crazy enough, so he could possibly think about losing. He sent a Kinzhal missile. This is a new type of hypersonic weapon. It travels at 15 times the speed of sound. He used it to bomb the city of Lutsk, where the foreign military are training and rolling.... Of course, there were no nuclear warheads on this missile, but it could be used to carry nuclear weapons.

You see talk inside the Russian media on different types of low-yield nuclear weapons—tactical, strategic, etc. This is becoming part of the language we're using. This is the direction. Russia has no choice now but to move down that path, because it's the only way for them to achieve what they are aiming for, which is to challenge the unipolar moment.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

Perhaps I could quickly ask you one more question. I was very interested in your comments.

Do you think Russia's current movement, both figuratively and physically, is a setback, or is it a play that the Russians are using in order to either negotiate or militarily syphon off one part of Ukraine versus the other?

[Dr. Yann Breault]

The first part of the battle was a total disaster, so this is a strategic setback, but the battle they are engaging in is not something new. It's something they have been publicly engaged in for many years: Remember the Munich speech in 2007, but it goes back to the Primakov doctrine in 1996, whereby they intended to challenge the unipolar world.

This is not going to end very soon, even if we strike a temporary ceasefire agreement that would provide some relief for civilians in Ukraine.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

Thank you.