Foreign Affairs Committee on March 31st, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you, Mr. Sarai and Ms. Dyczok.

Mr. Bergeron, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank both witnesses for their comments.

Mr. Breault, I was a bit surprised to hear you tell us—who had hoped for a quick resolution—that the conflict would likely last longer than expected, despite your fairly accurate analysis of the situation on the ground since the start of the invasion.

There are suggestions these days that President Putin isn't being properly informed of the real situation on the ground.

What do you think of this statement?

[Dr. Yann Breault]

It's perfectly plausible. Several years ago, we learned that President Putin wasn't even on social media. Every morning, he receives a briefing book with notes prepared by the intelligence service. Since the start of the COVID‑19 pandemic, it seems that he has been more isolated. I saw reports that he's in an anti‑atomic bunker, in Ufa, and that he's leading the conflict online. On a physical level, he's becoming more and more inaccessible.

It seems quite plausible that his generals are painting a picture of the situation that doesn't reflect reality. However, I'm not in the know. From an epistemological standpoint, just because a person has a doctorate and is a professor doesn't mean that they're in the know and that they're aware of the situation in the black box of the Kremlin. My comments should be treated cautiously.

That said, there are some telling signs. The fifth section of the federal security service, known as the FSB, has been reviewing the internal situation in Ukraine since 2008. The man who ran the section, Sergei Beseda, is currently under house arrest. President Putin is likely extremely irritated. In addition, seven generals have been killed in action, out of a total of 30. That's almost one quarter of the generals. He isn't happy with the situation and he's looking for people to blame. Personally, I doubt that this is affecting his determination to teach the lesson in humility that he dreams of inflicting on the west.

I also want to believe that we'll see a palace revolution, meaning that the oligarchs will join together to get rid of the man currently costing them billions of dollars. There's discontent within the military, including within the elite guard, the Rosgvardia, which provides security for the president and which was allegedly engaged in the fighting. Many have returned in a coffin. President Putin is annoyed. There are undoubtedly communication issues.

That's why I'm torn between the joy of seeing the Ukrainians lead such a heroic resistance and my concern about what will happen in the second phase of a confrontation that extends far beyond the Ukrainian theatre.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

I'm tempted to ask who is currently being taught a lesson in humility, but I won't go there.

I have a question about another issue of particular interest to me.

Don't you think that, by giving President Putin the impression from the start that, whatever happens, we won't interfere at any time, this gives him carte blanche to believe that he can basically do as he pleases?

[Dr. Yann Breault]

I absolutely agree with that.

Moreover, that is what President Putin has understood. In the American Congress, we even saw a general explain that two Russian ships had sailed away from the Black Sea ports just before the start of a battle. History may hold this against President Biden. From the outset, even before the intervention began, the Russians had already been told that we were not going to send troops on the ground. So we accepted, de facto, a kind of sharing of spheres of influence, a situation in which we concede that the heart of the Russian state is in Ukraine, in Kyiv—with all due respect to all my Ukrainian nationalist friends, who rightly hate this notion. Yet this is how things are understood in Russia, where they reject the idea that the heart of the Slavo-Orthodox civilization could one day end up in the American orbit.

This has been obvious since the Bucharest Summit in 2008. The French and Germans said that extending the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or NATO, alliance to Ukraine was out of the question, and the Americans insisted on a resolution promising that one day Georgia and Ukraine would be part of NATO. This red line, which President Putin has been talking about a lot recently, was already mentioned in 2008.

It is incomprehensible to think that Russia would stand idly by. Russia represents 3% of the world's gross domestic product, or GDP. How can we expect to have a dialogue of equals with a poor foreign power, a country that is essentially an exporter of natural resources?

The Russians have a large number of nuclear warheads. The figures vary according to sources, but they have about 6,000, of which 1,500 are deployed. They have invested heavily over the last 15 years in developing hypersonic technologies that are capable of defeating the elements of the missile shield that we have deployed on their doorstep, in Poland and Romania, as you know. So they have been preparing for this confrontation for a long time. They feel they can teach us a lesson in humility, and the feeling is mutual. It's like when two guys with big arms meet in a bar and each one thinks he is stronger than the other. It could end up in a tough fight.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Isn't it precisely this commitment to never do anything that risks prolonging the conflict?

[Dr. Yann Breault]

I don't know who will be responsible for the continuation of the conflict. For the sake of Ukrainian civilians, we would like to see an agreement. For there to be one, there would have to be recognition of Russian sovereignty over the Crimean peninsula and of the independence of the secessionist territories. However, how can one negotiate with a war criminal? This is completely unacceptable.

The only solution we have is to hope for regime change in Moscow. Mr. Biden said this explicitly in Warsaw. When he called for regime change in Russia, he came to give President Putin the tools he needed to mobilize public opinion in his country to demonstrate that it is not only about denazification of Ukraine, but also about securing a sphere of influence on the periphery of the country over which Russia will have the upper hand. The problem is that the west is not prepared to accept this.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you very much, Mr. Bergeron and Dr. Breault.

Madam McPherson, please go ahead for six minutes.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you very much.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for their testimony. This has been very interesting.

I'm going to circle back to the nuclear question a bit to start with. It's obviously extremely terrifying to think that Putin has control over nuclear weapons and may be feeling cornered enough to use those nuclear weapons.

Earlier today we were speaking to members of the Ukraine parliament. One of the questions we put to them was whether or not they felt that the Russian troops were pulling back from Kyiv because that may be a target. I'm interested in your perspectives on that.

They also brought up the point that, in fact, the Russian army doesn't need to use a weapon. They can just continue to attack the nuclear facilities in Ukraine. I'd love your perspective on that as well.

Finally, on the nuclear question—and I've done quite a bit of work in disarmament—one of my big worries with this is how being held hostage by a nuclear power sends a message to other rogue states that have access to nuclear weapons and how dangerous that is. Could you both comment on that?

Then I have some other questions on humanitarian issues and sanctions.

[Dr. Marta Dyczok]

I'm going to jump in first here. I'm not a military expert, but, on the nuclear question, we're all focusing on Putin, and I think military and nuclear experts know that this is not a decision that one person takes and can execute regardless of what's going on around him.

I think what we need to be paying attention to is what is going on in Putin's inner circle. I completely agree with my colleague that we don't have full information, because Putin is hiding. However, we do have information about discontent among his defence minister and various others. We shouldn't be focusing on whether Putin's crazy enough to use nuclear weapons, because he by himself can't make that happen. I think that's an important point to keep in mind. There's a process that would have to happen, and other people would need to be on board with that.

The nuclear facilities...I think everybody read that Russian troops were digging in around Chernobyl; they were digging trenches and they started getting ill, then started retreating. My impression is they don't actually know what they're doing. They don't have a clear strategy. That makes it simultaneously scary and...because mistakes could happen.

We saw the fire in Zaporizhzhia, where the nuclear power station was on fire and Ukrainian firefighters weren't allowed in to put the fire out. I cannot imagine that something like that is on the agenda, because if a nuclear power station blows, that will affect Russia much more than Canada or the U.S. I can't imagine they're doing that deliberately.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

However, they may be doing that by accident.

[Dr. Marta Dyczok]

We've already seen the Zaporizhzhia case. Watch carefully what's going on around Chernobyl and these other nuclear power stations. My impression is they're trying to deprive Ukraine of energy rather than trying to cause nuclear explosions, because Ukraine gets a significant part of its energy through nuclear power stations. They've been targeted for those reasons.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you.

Mr. Breault, did you have anything else that you wanted to add on that?

[Dr. Yann Breault]

I think the existence of nuclear power is one thing; a nuclear weapon is a completely different one. Securing the region around Chernobyl was dangerous, and it showed again how much disrespect they have for human considerations, sending their kids there to dig. Professor Dyczok was right to recall this. But what will come next? How do you expect the Ukrainian military to regain control over Chernobyl power without using weapons that might further endanger the situation?

It is extremely frightening, and this is precisely the objective the Russians are pursuing with this. They need us to freak out, and some of us were freaking out when there were 150 military stations around the borders and I was there telling the media, don't worry; this is part of a negotiation process; they're using intimidation to gain some leverage. Unexpectedly to me, they were crazy enough to move in with all the costs, both economically and militarily.

So now I'm freaking out—I'm sorry—about the use of nuclear weapons, because if they were crazy enough to do this, they could indeed go ahead, and this is something we need to keep in consideration.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

I'm sorry to interrupt, but I am running out of time really quickly. I want to ask you one last question before I run out of time.

One of the things we know there have been some moves on is looking at the multilateral systems that are in place and seeing if there are ways we can hold Putin to account there, so looking at the G20 and looking at the Arctic Council and other places where we can isolate Russia at this time.

I know you have only 30 seconds, but maybe each of you could give me a very short summary of how you would see using those multilateral institutions to further isolate Putin.

[Dr. Marta Dyczok]

Absolutely, those steps need to be taken. How effective they will be is questionable, but it's certainly demonstrable that being booted out of the G7 meant something. It cuts off access, and I think that needs to be happening on all spheres; it must be clear that if you behave like this, you're not a member of the international community. There are discussions around the EU of excluding them from a lot of those committees, so that needs to continue. I think that sends a strong message, mainly to people around Putin, because I don't think Putin actually really cares; it's about the people around him who don't want to be international pariahs, although that's what he's making them into.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Professor Breault, give a very quick answer, if you'd like to add to that.

[Dr. Yann Breault]

Kicking Russia out of the G20 is not going to happen. Too many states still support Russia at this stage.

China went as far as to give credence to the thesis that there were some bio labs sponsored by the CIA in Ukraine. When the issue was brought up at the Security Council of the United Nations, China said there should be an inquiry on that through a multilateral mechanism.

We could get satisfaction by excluding Russia from multilateral institutions, but that's not going to change the global picture we have right now, unfortunately.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you.

Thank you very much, Ms. McPherson.

Colleagues, we're at the beginning of round two. I would propose that we compress our time frame, because we have a second panel waiting for us. With your indulgence, we also have a few items of housekeeping to take care of for probably no more than five minutes at the end.

If it's okay with you, we'll reduce the allotments in the second round to three minutes each for the Liberals and Conservatives, and two minutes each for the Bloc and for the NDP, just to give everybody a chance to come in and ask this panel—

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Wouldn't it be four and two, so it's an equal proportion?

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

That would take us past. We would have to compromise the second panel, Mr. Genuis. I think there is interesting testimony there as well.

Let's try. It inevitably goes a bit past those allotments anyway.

For three minutes, please go ahead. The floor is yours.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you. I will be fast, then.

I want to ask about the possibility of political change in Russia. Linked to that, what is the process specifically around the launch of a nuclear weapon by Russia? What parts of the chain of command are engaged?

Russia has a long history of palace coups. I just want to understand the possible scenarios and the implications for nuclear weapons.

[Dr. Marta Dyczok]

I'm going to give the chain of command question to my colleague. I can take the palace coup question.

As a historian...we've seen Khrushchev peacefully removed from power. I think that would be the best possible scenario.

The mechanism to remove him is either assassination or a palace coup. I think a palace coup is more likely. We're not going to see it until it happens, because people who are plotting this coup....

Again, as a historian...there were attempts to remove Hitler. They failed and we learned about them only afterwards. Something may well be happening that we're not seeing.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

You would say that we can't assign any probability to that whatsoever. We have no—

[Dr. Marta Dyczok]

Absolutely. I think there is a probability.