Foreign Affairs Committee on May 12th, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Good afternoon, honourable members.

I call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 20 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to the motion adopted on January 31, the committee is meeting today on its study of the current situation in the Taiwan Strait.

As usual, interpretation services are available during this meeting. You simply have to click on the globe icon at the bottom of the screen.

For members participating in person, keep in mind the Board of Internal Economy's guidelines for mask use and health protocols.

I would like to take a moment to remind participants that screenshots and taking photos of your screens are not permitted.

Before speaking, please wait until I recognize you by name. When speaking, please speak slowly and clearly. When you are not speaking, your mike should be on mute.

A reminder that all comments by members and witnesses should be addressed through the chair.

Colleagues, I would now like to welcome our first panel of witnesses back before the committee, and thank them for agreeing to return.

We have before us today Professor Kerry Brown, professor of Chinese studies and director, Lau China Institute, at King's College London; and Professor Steve Tsang, professor, SOAS University of London.

Welcome to the committee, both of you.

Also joining us is Professor André Laliberté, from the University of Ottawa. He will be listening in to the discussion with the first panel, but we will not hear from him until our second hour.

Welcome, Professor Laliberté.

Colleagues, with that we will turn to Professor Brown and Professor Tsang, in sequence, for opening statements of five minutes each.

Professor Brown, the floor is yours. Please go ahead.

[Dr. Kerry Brown, Professor of Chinese Studies, King's College London, and Director, Lau China Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you very much.

Thanks for inviting me today.

I suppose the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has made people think a bit more urgently about what the People's Republic of China's view might be towards some kind of resolution on the Republic of China, on Taiwan. This is a long-expected and feared issue.

Under the current leader, Xi Jinping, there has been, I suppose, an intensification of the idea that this is China's historic moment, that it's following a particular kind of narrative of its history and that part of this will be this idea of unification—that China is not complete and whole and it, therefore, needs to reappropriate what once belonged to it. That's the historical narrative, of course. That narrative is extremely contested, and I'm sure we could talk about that later, if people wish.

Xi Jinping, since 2014, has unambiguously said that the framework of talking about economic collaboration, of the softer kind of societal collaboration, between the two sides of the strait is not enough. He made a comment in 2014, I believe, to a visiting former Taiwanese political leader, that you can't keep on pushing this issue down the road and that at some point there will have to be a resolution.

Under the previous president of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou, in 2015, Xi Jinping actually held a bilateral meeting—the first since 1949—between the leaders of the two places. There seemed to be some kind of political momentum towards something, but under Tsai Ing-wen, who was elected 18 months later, because she represents the democratic, progressive party, she's regarded as a bit more antagonistic and independence supporting by Beijing. That kind of dialogue between China and Taiwan has definitely become much more difficult.

Part of that is because of the international situation. Part of it is because of relations between China and the United States becoming much tougher. Part of it has also been because of the deteriorating situation since the onset of COVID, although in some ways that's had impacts on everything, and part of it, I suppose, is because of this intensification of Xi Jinping's leadership, as he has continued in power, of a sort of nationalistic core.

It used to be that we assumed that in China it was all about the economics—“it's the economy, stupid”—but I believe it would be better to say, “It's identity, stupid.” Identity is a really crucial issue. On the cultural issues of identity and China's being a great, powerful, strong country on the global stage, this issue of Taiwan has become more domestically important for the Beijing leadership.

Finally, on the issue of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the appalling scenes we've seen there over the last couple of months and what this means for the issue of cross-strait relations, in some ways it has probably made the Beijing leadership, one assumes, much more circumspect about what an invasion entails and what military actions are. We have to remember that China has not had combat experience properly for many decades: Vietnam in 1979, but that was very limited; and probably really only in the Korean War, which was 70 years ago.

It has a big military, but it has not really used it beyond its borders, so when it sees a relatively experienced actor like Russia—with the Soviet Union being in Afghanistan for almost a decade—having such massive issues as it undertakes its operations in Ukraine, I suppose the Chinese leadership have to pause and think about this. An amphibious landing is not easy. I believe the last one was during the Second World War. It's a huge undertaking.

The second thing is that it will look at this and think of the “hearts and minds” issue, the fact that 23 million Taiwanese definitely don't see themselves remotely as having a wholly Chinese identity—surveys have proved that again and again—and the fact that they'll be facing a huge issue even if they were, heaven forbid, to think about military options.

The final point I'll make about that nationalistic kind of dynamic is that it's not easy to see it going away. If leadership have put so much into the idea of identity being the key thing, then the 2049 deadline is a very real one. The idea of what reunification might mean in the abstract, and I stress “in the abstract”, is very urgent. It is not likely that this particular leadership will radically change their minds about the idea for 2049, which is the 100th anniversary of the foundation of People's Republic of China. It's a big event, obviously. This has to be marked in some enormously important way. That obviously would involve Taiwan.

I don't see that disappearing. There are many ways you could talk about what would be possible within the parameters of reunification, but I think politically the commitment to reunification in the abstract will not go away in Beijing, even though it gets more and more difficult to imagine what that could possibly be, if you look from Taiwan's perspective, beyond a complete rejection of it.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Professor Brown, thank you very much for your opening remarks. I know that there will be great interest in following up on what you said.

We will now go to Professor Tsang for five minutes.

The floor is yours. Please go ahead.

[Dr. Steve Tsang, Professor, SOAS University of London, As an Individual]

First of all, thank you very much for inviting me.

Let me start off by saying that the situation in the Taiwan Strait is very tense, of course, but I do not see a war as something that is imminent. The war in Ukraine is a hugely important subject for Taiwan, and indeed for Beijing. Both capitals are looking at what happens in Ukraine and beyond to draw lessons and indeed to see what lessons the other side is drawing, and to try to, therefore, frame their own policy on that basis.

Let me perhaps start on the Taiwan side first. For the Taiwanese, they really want to see how western support for Ukraine goes and what lessons China will draw. Here I think we're looking at both military and economic issues. In terms of the military issue, the kind of incredibly imaginative way the Ukrainians have been doing this, and the supply and support that western countries have been giving Ukraine, have proven very important and valuable in getting the Taiwanese to think about what they should do.

They are also thinking about what lessons the Chinese are drawing. I think the obvious lessons for the Chinese on the military side is that the Russians really went in without proper planning and preparation. The Chinese will make sure that they will not make that mistake again themselves. It doesn't mean that the Chinese will change their determination about Taiwan.

In terms of the economic side, the important lessons here that both sides are drawing are in terms of what unity western nations have demonstrated in their response to Ukraine. The questions therefore would be this: Would the west, led by the United States, be able to respond in a similar way in the event of a Taiwan Strait crisis? Would the western sanctions on Russia, particularly over the Russian foreign exchange reserve, be something that could be applied to China? If similar kinds of sanctions on Russia were being contemplated for China, what kind of damage would it do to both sides? Would it be able to provide any kind of deterrence against China?

Shifting very quickly to the Chinese side, I think the key lesson they are drawing is quite simply this: Militarily, we can deal with it; we simply will get ourselves much better prepared.

In terms of the economic ones, it is a much more serious issue. It is still early stage in terms of whether western unity can hold. If western unity cannot hold, then they will draw very different kinds of lessons from it. In terms of what the endgame for Ukraine will be, if the endgame for Ukraine is essentially a Eurocentric one, then the Chinese will draw one set of lessons. If they see the endgame of Ukraine as a more global approach to seeing the issue, they will draw a very different set of conclusions. That could potentially deter the Chinese.

I will stop here.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Professor Tsang, thank you very much for your opening remarks.

Colleagues, just before we go into our first round, I want to remind our witnesses, and members also, of the method that we use to facilitate time keeping. It's very basic, but it's effective. It's a 30-second card that I will hold up, both in the room and also on camera, just to signal that your speaking time or questioning time is about to lapse. The allocations of time are very carefully negotiated among the whips and, in some cases, are as short as two and a half minutes.

If witnesses and colleagues could keep an eye on the time, that would assist the conversation greatly.

We will start with round one in six-minute segments.

Leading us off is Mr. Chong. Please, go ahead.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to both professors for appearing in front of us today.

My first question is with respect to President Xi. Is it safe to say that President Xi's number one objective as leader of the People's Republic of China is the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China?

Either one of you can respond.

[Dr. Steve Tsang]

I'm very happy to respond.

I don't think Xi Jinping's first priority is to take Taiwan into China. His first priority is to keep Xi Jinping and the Communist Party in power. That requires making China great again. Taking Taiwan is part of that.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Professor Tsang.

Professor Brown, do you have a perspective on that?

[Dr. Kerry Brown]

It depends on what you mean by “reunification”. That's a word that carries a lot of different meanings. Models talked about in the past were almost like having a holding company, and then you work out two sort of separate structures from a high degree of autonomy.

I suppose the thing that has changed the dynamics is Hong Kong. Treatment of Hong Kong by Beijing has had a big impact on Taiwan and its view of this.

I agree with Steve. The nationalist mission is all important, and this is part of that, but the nationalist mission is bigger. It's about delivering a vision of a country that is a great power at the centre of the world. That's why this part of that is important, but it's not the whole part of it.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you.

Both of you mentioned the importance of Ukraine.

Would you say that the success of the west and Ukraine, or lack of success in Ukraine, has a direct impact on Taiwan's security? In other words, the more success the west and Ukraine have in countering the Russian attack, the more hesitant Beijing will be to use military force to accomplish anything with respect to Taiwan. Is that a fair statement?

[Dr. Kerry Brown]

If I may, I think the sanctions, the speed with which those sanctions were imposed and the scale of them by North America and Europe in particular—and Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand—were a surprise. I think China will look at this, and it will make them think a bit.

We have to remember, those sanctions are not ones that Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and many other countries have joined. It has kind of made these geopolitical divisions between what I suppose we would call “the west and the rest” very evident.

I guess, also, that China will not welcome.... Of course, when Xi Jinping met Putin on February 4, they issued a joint communiqué. If you look at the language of that joint communiqué, it is very Chinese in terms of joint co-operation and it's very abstract. What Putin and Xi said to each other and how much Putin did say of what he was planning to Xi has been very controversial. It seems that the consensus is that he didn't really say much at all.

Although China has been neutral yet very friendly towards Russia, I don't think this situation in Ukraine is good for it. It doesn't want this kind of problem. It's destabilizing, and the way it's impacting on the global economy is unwelcome.

On the other hand, I'm sure it's not unhappy to see the west tripped up and distracted by this issue. That will probably be something that reinforces this narrative that China is on a winning streak, that the west is just busy fighting itself and that Europe is busy killing other Europeans. This is a narrative that's being reinforced by this.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you.

Professor Tsang, do you have a perspective on that question about Ukraine?

[Dr. Steve Tsang]

The issue here is three keywords: unity, success and sustainability. All three elements are being looked at by the Chinese. If the west shows all three, it will potentially have a deterrent effect on China. If one of them fails or is not being sustained, the Chinese may draw different lessons from it.

Chinese policy, to sum it up very briefly, is a policy of clear neutrality: support Russia and pay no price. Those are the limits of Chinese support for the unlimited friendship with Russia. It is China first.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you, Mr. Chong.

Thank you, as well, to the witnesses.

Go ahead, Ms. Bendayan. You have six minutes.

[Rachel Bendayan, Liberal, Outremont, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for their opening statements.

I'm very pleased to have you at our committee today. I would begin by saying what an honour it was to attend Taiwan night last night among many friends, including Representative Chen. Of course, many of us were there to stand in solidarity with Taiwan and the Taiwanese people, particularly in light of what we saw come out today in the news regarding ongoing military drills.

I'll take you to that, Dr. Tsang. On May 6 of this year, 18 aircraft, I believe, including fighter jets and bombers, entered Taiwan's air defence zone, prompting the scrambling of many Taiwanese jets in response. This week, on May 10, I believe, the United States Director of National Intelligence told the Senate's armed services committee:

It is our view that [the Chinese] are working hard to effectively put themselves into a position in which their military is capable of taking Taiwan over our intervention.

Gentlemen, I wonder if you could speak to this ongoing effort. Just today, the National Post referred to further military drills having been concluded in the southwest and southeast parts of the island.

Dr. Tsang, you made a parallel with the invasion by Russia of Ukraine, saying that China is closely watching the situation and would not make the same mistake as Russia in terms of not carefully planning any invasion.

I would put the question to you this way. Do you not see the consistent military drills being a form of planning?

[Dr. Steve Tsang]

It is definitely a kind of planning, preparation and intimidation. It's also testing the capabilities of the Taiwanese response and weaknesses. They are certainly part of it, but it doesn't mean that an attack or an invasion is imminent.

China can build [Technical difficulty—Editor] it requires to invade Taiwan relatively quickly, but training the people to use them effectively, particularly in a complex, combined operation, is going to take quite a bit of time. I would say that we are looking at 10 years at least, if not a bit longer, before China will really have the capabilities to do so. However, if and when it has the capability, I fully expect Xi Jinping to use it, but his approach will be one of demonstrating overwhelming force in order to force the government in Taipei to negotiate and surrender. Once negotiations start, there's no basis for America or anybody else to intervene.

[Rachel Bendayan, Liberal, Outremont, QC]

Thank you. That's incredibly insightful testimony.

I would like to take you into the psychology of President Jinping. On October 9, it was the anniversary of the 1911 revolution, as you very well know. Xi said, “Taiwan independence separatism is the biggest obstacle to achieving the reunification of the motherland, and the most serious hidden danger to national rejuvenation”. Later on, he added, “The historical task of the complete reunification of the motherland must be fulfilled, and will definitely be fulfilled.”

I hear you on the timeline that you believe is most likely, but can you enlighten us a bit about how that national rejuvenation goal should be understood and, perhaps, the planning that will be necessary in the next few years in order for him to achieve that goal?

[Dr. Steve Tsang]

Xi Jinping will do whatever it takes to take Taiwan. Because of the way he is using his own rhetoric and because of his own poor understanding of history.... Xi Jinping is somebody who doesn't know that the Communist Party of China, historically was one of the strongest and long-standing advocates of Taiwan's independence. Now if you say that, he would put one into jail for committing a crime of historical nihilism.

Now, what will he actually do? He will build up the necessary force that he thinks is needed to overtake Taiwan and to deter the United States from interfering, but calculating that the Americans potentially cannot be deterred and, therefore, will have to take out significant American forces as a way to push the Americans back.

I think he likes to talk much more simply in terms of national unification, but Taiwan is much bigger than the matter of national unification. Taiwan is strategically critical to China's overall global strategy. Taiwan is right in the middle of the first island chain, and it can only be taken by either deterring the Americans or defeating the Americans. With that being achieved, the Americans will effectively be pushed into the middle of the Pacific Ocean, fulfilling what Xi Jinping told President Obama in 2013 in Sunnylands, that the Pacific Ocean is a very big place and it's big enough for two—stick to your side and I will stick to mine.

In that scenario, we are looking at a fundamental change in the politics of the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN-10 would all have to do their deals with China, and so would South Korea. Japan will either have to go nuclear or do a deal with China, because Japan could no longer count on the U.S.-Japan defence treaty.

That will fundamentally establish Chinese hegemony in that part of the world, and basically remove the United States as an effective leader of the world. It is—

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Professor Tsang, I apologize. In the interest of time, I'll have to stop you there.

There will be an opportunity to come back to the points you're making at the moment, which are important.

Thank you, Ms. Bendayan.

Once again, thank you to the witnesses.

We now go to Mr. Bergeron for six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here today and for sharing their experience and research with us.

In the Minister of Foreign Affairs's mandate letter, the Prime Minister asks her to “[d]evelop and launch a comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy to deepen diplomatic, economic and defence partnerships and international assistance in the region…”. It is a fact that Taiwan plays a very important role and is inextricably intertwined with the global economy. Taiwan is Canada's 11th largest trading partner, the fifth largest in Asia.

The Government of Canada is currently negotiating an investment agreement with Taiwan and has said that it would support Taiwan's admission to a number of international organizations. Canada has already expressed its support for the admission of Taiwan as an observer to the World Health Organization, or WHO, and the World Health Assembly. However, on the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, the Liberal members objected to Taiwan's participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization, or ICAO, even though Taiwan is a major aviation hub in the Asia-Pacific region and follows ICAO standards and practices despite not being a member.

My first question is this. How do you explain the federal government's hot and cold attitude towards Taiwan's admission to certain international organizations?

Here's my second question. The People's Republic of China, or PRC, and Taiwan asked, within a week of one another, to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP, in late September 2021. We know that the PRC is less than upright in its adherence to international rules and that, if it were to join the CPTPP first, Taiwan would be permanently shut out of the partnership. Consequently shouldn't Canada support Taiwan's accession to the partnership first?

[Dr. Kerry Brown]

It seems like the first point is really about issues within Canada. Taiwan has wanted to join the international organizations for some time, and there was a brief time under Ma Ying-jeou about 10 to 12 years ago when it was a bit more flexible on China's side, but that time's over. China is definitely more and more aggressive in showing that Taiwan doesn't have international space, and that's the strategy.

My only response to the second issue is that every country has to face a quandary. You have to decide how important the Chinese economy and the market in China are, and how much you want to jeopardize that, because China is more willing to push back and say no to partners now, if you want to engage with Taiwan. It's a high-risk business, and that's not an easy decision, because under Xi Jinping, I think there's greater clarity. There's no ambiguity now. You can't sit on the wall. You have to basically play with one or the other. I think this is strategically probably what Beijing is most likely to do—freeze Taiwan's position and make it more difficult in the international community. It has instruments to do that.

It is possible for people to say they'll go with Taiwan, but I guess the only thing they have to consider is that there are obviously quite high costs to that now, not just with security but economically. I wouldn't be blasé about that, because, obviously, economically the world is in a very difficult position now. That's the only thing I would really stress. Yes, you can make these choices to say you'll go with Taiwan rather than the PRC, but there will be increasingly high costs to that, and those shouldn't be obscured.

[Dr. Steve Tsang]

Can I come in here?

I missed part of the first question, because I was slow in finding the English channel for that.

I think that both questions are really asking about the same issue, whether we're talking about the CPTPP or the international organizations for Taiwan to participate in. There are two issues here. One is that the Chinese government will use its economic leverage to make other countries follow what its government wants to do over Taiwan. If you like, they will come out and bully you if they can get away with it, and they think they will.

The second question, therefore, is this: How can something like this be responded to effectively? Apart from the United States of America, I don't think there is any one country that is at the moment strong enough and powerful enough to be able to, on its own, stand up to the Chinese government and not get punished. The U.S. can do that because China cannot afford to bully the U.S.A. yet. If Canada can unite or coordinate with a significant number of major trading economies that believe in your value system and in doing the right thing, then it can be done, because collectively, you are bigger than China, and they cannot punish you.

Collectively, you can do that. Until you can do that—

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Professor Tsang, thank you very much.

I apologize, again. We'll have to leave it there.

Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Did you take into account the time I lost because of the interpretation issues?