It seems like the first point is really about issues within Canada. Taiwan has wanted to join the international organizations for some time, and there was a brief time under Ma Ying-jeou about 10 to 12 years ago when it was a bit more flexible on China's side, but that time's over. China is definitely more and more aggressive in showing that Taiwan doesn't have international space, and that's the strategy.
My only response to the second issue is that every country has to face a quandary. You have to decide how important the Chinese economy and the market in China are, and how much you want to jeopardize that, because China is more willing to push back and say no to partners now, if you want to engage with Taiwan. It's a high-risk business, and that's not an easy decision, because under Xi Jinping, I think there's greater clarity. There's no ambiguity now. You can't sit on the wall. You have to basically play with one or the other. I think this is strategically probably what Beijing is most likely to do—freeze Taiwan's position and make it more difficult in the international community. It has instruments to do that.
It is possible for people to say they'll go with Taiwan, but I guess the only thing they have to consider is that there are obviously quite high costs to that now, not just with security but economically. I wouldn't be blasé about that, because, obviously, economically the world is in a very difficult position now. That's the only thing I would really stress. Yes, you can make these choices to say you'll go with Taiwan rather than the PRC, but there will be increasingly high costs to that, and those shouldn't be obscured.