Foreign Affairs Committee on Sept. 7th, 2022

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I have no further questions, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Mr. Chong.

Mr. Sidhu, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Maninder Sidhu, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank the witnesses for joining us this afternoon.

My first question is for Mr. Kolga. You have previously spoken to the opportunities for trade and stronger relations between Canada and the Baltic states. I was hoping you could speak to the importance of building these ties in the context of Russia's aggression in the region, and why it's key for Canada to expand its diplomatic and military presence in the region.

[Marcus Kolga]

There certainly is demand in the Baltic states, and there has been, for quite some time, for the export of Canadian energy. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, Canada and Estonia have just recently signed an agreement to develop a program to build small-scale nuclear reactors in Estonia to wean that country off Russian electrical supplies. Lithuania, about three or four years ago, built an offshore LNG terminal, and officials in all three Baltic states have clearly stated that they would welcome Canadian gas in those countries.

There are opportunities for Canada to begin exporting gas quickly. There was previously a question about the timelines to build some of this infrastructure. In the United States, there is technology available right now to build offshore export LNG terminals off the coast of Canada. These could be built within 12 months, and we could start exporting LNG to the Baltic states and other European countries quite quickly.

There are other trade opportunities, of course, in the IT sector. Estonia is a leader in developing e-government technologies and such. They've recently set up shop here in Canada, and I think that Canada could greatly benefit from working with Estonia to develop our own technologies here.

So there are plenty of opportunities, and the fact that Canada has established and has announced that it will establish full embassies in all three Baltic states is certainly a positive sign.

[Maninder Sidhu, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Thank you for those insights, Mr. Kolga.

Dr. Devlen, you have written about the threat posed by President Lukashenko and his grey-zone aggression against NATO and the EU. Are you able to speak to his role in the current conflict and how you see Belarus's role evolving as this conflict continues?

[Balkan Devlen]

Effectively speaking, Belarus is a de facto colony of Russia right now under Lukashenko's rule. It has been and it continues to be a staging ground for Russian forces. During the first phase of the war, they did invade from Belarus as well. They continue to carry out missile strikes from Belarus. The Russian planes and air force continue to attack Ukraine through Belarus, and Belarusian ammunition-deposed missiles and artillery shells, etc. are being basically transported and used by Russia in this war.

Perhaps the only silver lining is that, partly because of the resistance of the Belarusian people, Lukashenko could not enter the war in full force on the side of Russia knowing that there is huge resistance, a significant resistance, to such a clear, open intervention, but that does not necessarily mean that it will not happen in the future. Particularly if the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south goes well, Russia might end up using the available strategic resources, particularly long-range missiles and others, in Belarus to threaten and attack Kyiv more, not necessarily with ground troops but with missiles and artillery shells and the air force. That might bring Belarus in to fight more, but we have to treat this and assume that Belarus, under Lukashenko, continues to pose a threat to European peace and stability.

[Maninder Sidhu, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Thank you, Dr. Devlen.

I have a minute left. What do you see as the next critical phase of this war? What should we be watching for that would suggest positive or negative momentum for Ukraine?

That's open to all panellists.

[Balkan Devlen]

I'm happy to jump in.

This will be a long war. I think one of the biggest threats today is to resist the attempts by Russia to freeze the existing status quo when and if the Ukrainian counteroffensive is successful and Russia tries to freeze the current battle lines instead of withdrawing. I see that as one of the biggest threats in the next three to six months.

[Benjamin Schmitt]

I'll say just one line. One of the biggest threats outside of Ukraine and outside of the conflict directly is losing western support, which we absolutely can't do. We have to make sure that western support is maintained so that Ukraine is supported with all of the weapons and all of the sanctions that are needed to make sure that the Putin regime cannot succeed in Ukraine.

As we're going into this energy crisis—it's been a crisis for almost two years now—we absolutely need to make sure that Putin cannot weaponize energy in order to diminish western resolve to defeat the Russian Federation, and we need to make sure that Ukraine is victorious.

[Maninder Sidhu, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Mr. Sidhu.

Next, we'll go to Mr. Bergeron. You have six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for being with us and enlightening us with their words.

Mr. Schmitt, I found it refreshing, to say the least, to hear a few words in French from a friend who is from south of the border. It was ironic at the very least. Thank you very much for that short interlude in French.

My question is for Mr. Kolga. If the two other witnesses would like to comment, of course, they are welcome to do so.

Two former U.S. generals, David Petraeus and Wesley Clark, praised the Canadian government's decision to return the turbines to Germany so as not to threaten NATO cohesion and unity. Canada's former chief of defence staff Rick Hillier has argued that the decision would be seen as a signal that sanctions on Russia will weaken.

Didn't we get the worst of both worlds, having perhaps undermined cohesion between the allies, while also opening the door to weakening sanctions on Russia?

[Marcus Kolga]

I completely agree that we have the worst of both worlds. We've arrived at a lose-lose situation.

The fact that we have compromised on these sanctions opens the door to other allies doing the same. They can justify that action by pointing to our decision to provide that exemption to Gazprom. That is problematic.

Publicly, our NATO allies are going to be supportive of any decision that we take. We worked with the Germans on this issue. Privately—certainly among our eastern European NATO allies and in the Baltic states, Poland and beyond—our decision raised eyebrows. This decision also raised eyebrows among Russian opposition leaders. They all understand that what Putin is very much hoping for is a return to business as usual. The erosion of sanctions, as he clearly mentioned today in Vladivostok, is one of his primary goals at the moment.

I think that Canada still has an opportunity to correct that decision by cancelling that permit to Gazprom and rebuilding confidence in our sanctions regime. That's vital today to maintain that cohesion among our allies, but also to maintain trust in our own defence policy, foreign policy and sanctions policy.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you very much.

I'd like to ask Mr. Schmitt a question.

Germany has reportedly already achieved 75% of its winter storage objective, and you said on Twitter that Germany's continued momentum could help counter Russia's weaponization of energy.

Do you have any concerns, given the decision announced by Mr. Peskov that they are going to permanently cut off supply until sanctions are lifted?

Do you fear that they can't keep up with storage at the anticipated rate?

[Benjamin Schmitt]

That's an incredibly prescient question. It's something we'll have to monitor over the next several weeks and months.

The bottom line is it's one thing to have storage—you absolutely need to have this storage built up as high as possible before the winter—but there also have to be latent LNG imports or natural gas flows backing that up throughout the winter. It's not just “fill it up to 100% and then you're good for the winter”; you really need to have additional flows of that resource going on.

That means if you can't increase the flows very much because Russia is actively cutting off gas flows, you also have to do a lot for energy efficiency. That's exactly what the German government and German people are doing right now. It will have to continue and it will have to continue across Europe. Partners and allies need to supply as many energy resources to Europe as possible, especially in the next few months, to make sure that they get through the winter.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Several experts reject the idea that Siemens turbines are absolutely needed to operate Nord Stream 1. Other models could well have done the job. It seems that Russia may have more stockpiled.

In your opinion, are these assessments credible?

[Benjamin Schmitt]

No, they're not. The bottom line is we have to have policies that are based on science and technology that undergird our decision-making. Simply to set up this scenario in which we're pushing back on disinformation to call someone's bluff...the fact of the matter is that the German government several times pointed out that this was not backed up by technical reality—the Bundesnetzagentur, the Wirtschaftsministerium, etc. Siemens just this week said about this purported oil leak that “such leaks do not normally affect the operation of a turbine and can be sealed on site. It is a routine procedure within the scope of maintenance work.... In the past...the occurrence of this type of leak has not led to a shutdown of operations.

The bottom line is we need to turn back these waivers to restore sanctions unity because Putin will enact as much as possible energy weaponization to open up where he's really being hurt right now, which is in technology-calibrated sanctions that are undermining his ability to get systems that can drive his economy, energy technologies and things of this nature, and also dual-use weapons technologies—things like semiconductors. There have been any number of reports of Ukrainian military personnel opening up captured Russian military equipment and, lo and behold, inside are commercial semiconductor products that are stripped out of products like washing machines and dishwashers and things like this. That means our technology sanctions are working. That's why we can't allow energy weaponization to push back on this technology-calibrated sanctions approach. That's why, as global democracies, we collectively have to have foreign policy that is driven by technical reality.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you for that.

We'll now go from Mr. Bergeron to Madam McPherson.

Ms. McPherson, the floor is yours for six minutes.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank our witnesses today. It's been very enlightening. Before I start I just want to take a moment. One of the biggest issues for me has been the efficacy, the transparency and the ability of Canadians to understand how our sanctions regime is working. I think that probably some of you saw that I brought forward a motion in the previous session, but I think it's important to note.

Mr. Kolga, you were one of the key witnesses for the 2017 study, but we also had another witness who testified for this committee. Vladimir Kara-Murza was one of the witnesses. He was arrested in Russia in April and he's facing 10 years. Today is his birthday. I just want to take a moment to acknowledge that he has testified for this committee and that he is in a very difficult place looking at 10 years in prison for criticizing the war in Ukraine. I am sorry, Mr. Kolga, and those who know Mr. Kara-Murza.

I would like to start with you, Mr. Kolga. You were a key witness in 2017. You have talked about how this particular waiver has harmed our sanctions regime. There were recommendations that came out of the study of the sanctions regime in 2017 that have not been acted upon. Can you talk a little bit about how we could strengthen our sanctions regime and how we should be making it more transparent, more accountable and easier to understand for Canadians?

[Marcus Kolga]

I think there's a lot that Canada could be doing to make our own sanctions regime more effective.

First and foremost is working with our allies to harmonize our policies and legislation with the United States, the EU and the U.K. We should be stepping up the enforcement of our sanctions policy. To date, since the start of the war, the RCMP has seized $122.3 million worth of Russian assets. We know for a fact that Russian oligarchs have billions of dollars of assets hidden well in plain sight in this country. We need to be doing a heck of a lot more. If we intend to use our sanctions policy as a consequence and a cost for these foreign regimes, we need to make sure we're using that legislation properly.

During the past six months, the Canadian government enacted new legislation and an amendment to the Special Economic Measures Act that would also allow our government to repurpose some of those assets that have been frozen. We need to start using that legislation. We need to start repurposing some of those billions of dollars that are hidden in this country. We could use some of those funds to help support Ukraine in its struggle to push Russia back past the February 24 border, to reclaim Crimea and to rebuild the country.

We could also be introducing a measure of transparency to the entire process of how those sanctions are imposed, who they're being imposed on and what sorts of assets these targeted individuals have. There should be some accountability through regular reporting.

I would also suggest that this committee be given the power to nominate candidates for our sanctions list. You are experts in Parliament. You've heard from experts and you know who these human rights abusers are, those who threaten the stability of western democracies even in their own countries. You know who these people are. Giving this committee more power to designate individuals and entities for our sanctions list is also important.

One of the most important things that you could do is have that review of our sanctions legislation as you've proposed. I and, I think, a lot of other human rights activists in Canada and elsewhere would very much support this as, I'm sure, Vladimir Kara-Murza would.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you.

You talk about transparency and accountability. I've asked about it multiple times in the House of Commons and I've put in Order Paper questions through access to information, and I cannot get the answers I need. In fact, I've been told that because they can't give a pure or 100% accurate answer, they won't give me an answer at all.

We asked to have representatives from the CBSA and the RCMP attend this committee so that we could get a better understanding of that. I fully agree with you when you talk about the need for us to do that.

In terms of that review and the Magnitsky sanctions, are there other people who should be added to those lists? Is there more that should be done using that tool? We know that some are being used, but is there more that should be done using the Magnitsky tools?

[Marcus Kolga]

Certainly. There are several thousand political prisoners in Russia today since the war began. In the first few months of the war, thousands of Russians took to the streets to protest this war. They were all brutally arrested. The entire Russian opposition, the ones who remained in Russia, have been detained. That includes Vladimir Kara-Murza, Ilya Yashin and others. They are likely going to be in prison, as you mentioned, for 10 years or possibly more.

We should be looking at those individuals and those Russian officials who ordered their arrest from the Kremlin, all the way down to those officials who were involved in putting them into jail. We should be looking at all of those individuals and placing sanctions on them.

There's a lot more that we can do with our Magnitsky legislation which, of course, targets specific human rights abusers in regimes like those in Russia.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Kolga.

Mr. Chair, I believe that's my time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Ms. McPherson.

We will now go to the second round.

Mr. Genuis, you have four minutes.