Foreign Affairs Committee on Sept. 28th, 2022

[Andrew Turner]

I can say that Azerbaijan's role as an energy supplier is particularly important in offsetting some of the disruptions caused by Russia's illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine, but I am not involved in the detailed working group discussions, so I don't have any further information in terms of the detailed talks.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

How much time do I have left, Mr. Chair?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

You're over.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I'm over? Okay.

Well, thank you very much. I appreciate those answers.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Mr. Chong. We now go to Dr. Fry.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you very much.

Thanks for the update.

As you well know, talks under the Minsk process have been going on with regard to Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, as we well know, when the 2020 agreement was broken, Russia played a huge role in that. Given that Russia has a defence agreement with Armenia and given that Azerbaijan and Turkey have been closely aligned—and we know the long-standing geopolitical history between Turkey and Armenia—should either of those two groups be involved in this kind of negotiation? That's my first question. Should we not just go back to the OSCE Minsk process and get this done by three so-called neutral groups, like France, the United States and the United Kingdom? Should that be what we're talking about?

I ask because this was a very short-lived 2020 ceasefire, and the 2,000 troops that Russia was going to be putting in there to make sure that peace was being kept and that the corridors were kept open actually didn't work, because Russia is now totally distracted by their war in Ukraine. What do you see as a process to move this agenda forward? There has to be some way.

I know that the European Council and the European Commission have been involved, but in theory, this has always been under the OSCE agreements and process. What do you see as the best way to talk about a ceasefire, to deal with looking at a process and to deal with looking at certain agreements, given the history with Russia and Armenia, the history with Turkey and Azerbaijan and the failed 2020 agreement?

[Andrew Turner]

Certainly the fact that the invasion of Ukraine has put the three Minsk Group co-chairs on different sides has greatly complicated the work of the OSCE Minsk Group.

What I'll do is turn to my colleague Alison, who deals directly with the OSCE, to answer in more detail.

[Alison Grant]

Thank you.

Mr. Chair, certainly the OSCE has been the pre-eminent regional security organization managing this conflict for decades, or trying to manage it. It is, however, quite sidelined at the moment. We will always support the OSCE and we will continue to advocate for a role, but it is sidelined due to current realities.

Azerbaijan really rejects much engagement from the OSCE at this point; they believe that they haven't helped solve the conflict in the last 30 years. That's their position. Also, Russia has not been engaging constructively as a Minsk Group co-chair since their invasion of Ukraine in February.

There are, however, a number of other mediation tracks by our partners. The EU is quite involved. They had a surge in mediation efforts last April where they brought leaders together, and foreign ministers also agreed on setting up a border demarcation commission. That progress has now been stalled with the current hostilities, but we hope we can get back there, so we certainly support the EU's work, as well as the OSCE's, in trying to solve the conflict. We also have partners, such as the United States and France, that are actively trying to mediate and meeting all parties involved.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Can I ask if too many cooks are spoiling the broth? If too many people are talking to try to negotiate something, shouldn't there be one negotiating process that is supported by everybody?

My other question is with regard to Turkey and Turkey's role as a supporter of Azerbaijan. How is that playing in the region?

[Alison Grant]

I'll answer the question, Mr. Chair, on the parties and turn it over to my colleague, Mr. Turner, on the role of Turkey.

I think that indeed there are a number of different mediation tracks on the go, but as the United Nations representative mentioned last week, they support all the various mediation tracks going on. We hope for success. Sometimes it's helpful to have a couple of different channels. There are a number of countries involved. Despite the difficulties we have with Russia and the tensions and their lack of constructive engagement, they are very obviously a major power in the region. As well, they signed the trilateral agreement that ended the 2020 war, which is being implemented now, so it would be difficult to move forward without their involvement in some way.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Are they deploying the 2,000 troops they said they would to keep peace? Have they been deployed?

[Alison Grant]

Yes, they have, after the end of the 2020 war.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Yes, but are they still there or have they been redeployed to the Russian war with Ukraine?

[Alison Grant]

Mr. Chair, the Russian so-called peacekeepers are still located in Azerbaijan. I have seen some open-source reports of redeployments out. I wouldn't be surprised if there have been some levels of redeployment, but the peacekeepers are still stationed in Azerbaijan.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you.

Do I have time, Mr. Chair, to get an answer from Mr. Turner with regard to Turkey?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

You have 30 seconds, Dr. Fry.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Mr. Turner, would you comment?

[Andrew Turner]

While we obviously have concerns with Turkey's role in the provision of the drones, in all of our discussions with Turkey, they have emphasized that they are working to encourage Azerbaijan and Armenia to resolve differences through dialogue. We are also encouraging them to continue the progress we have seen with regard to normalization talks between Armenia and Turkey.

Turkey's overall role continues to be that of a strong NATO ally playing a vital role and helping manage the response to the Ukrainian crisis, including a key role in negotiating the grain initiative. We continue to work very closely with Turkey as a NATO ally and partner.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you.

I will just quickly note that there are a lot of conflicts of interest going on. The European Commission is mostly interested in—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Dr. Fry, you're way over. My apologies.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you, but there is a lot of conflict going on in terms of conflict of interest. I just wanted to note that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Mr. Bergeron, you have six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the witnesses for their participation.

I confess that I had hoped to see you in person, now that the COVID‑19 restrictions are behind us. However, it is your privilege to appear virtually. Having said that, I must admit I was a little disturbed to see you in that reddish-light environment, Mr. Turner, which gives the impression that you're in the room of a warship or a submarine from which operations are being conducted. Perhaps that gives us some context at the moment.

Be that as it may, the April 2022 special report entitled “Supporting Armenian Democracy” prepared by Stéphane Dion, the Prime Minister's Special Envoy to the European Union and Europe, states: “At present, Armenia is the archetype of a democracy under intense pressure, which is striving to improve itself and, therefore, deserves Canada's full support.” Indeed, there is a provision in this report that emphasizes the importance of supporting Armenia, a fledgling democracy, which needs the support of a country like Canada.

Other than the opening of an embassy in Yerevan, which I will come back to if I have some time, what measures is Canada putting forward to support Armenia?

[Andrew Turner]

I apologize for the lack of lighting. I'm trying to take advantage of the natural sunlight, but it's a bit cloudy, so I'm more in the shade today.

As I said, as a former page, I intend to return to Parliament in person.

With regard to our support for Armenia, several measures have been put forward. You have already mentioned the most important one, in my view, which is the announcement of the forthcoming opening of the embassy, which we are working hard to make happen as soon as possible.

In addition, we have already started the bilateral consultations, which were recommended by the special envoy, Mr. Stéphane Dion. Just a few weeks ago, the Armenian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs was here in Ottawa to begin these consultations. We are considering new initiatives.

Also, we already have programs in place, including the Arnold Chan Initiative for Democracy, which supports civil society organizations and continues to grow in value. This year we are supporting five projects, with a total budget of just over $200,000.

We are also working to support the Armenian Parliament, in conjunction with the Parliamentary Centre here in Canada. We continue to have discussions, as I said, to find other ways to assist Armenia, including our support for programs to resolve the landmine conflict.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Freedom House considers Azerbaijan, which has been ruled by the same president since 2003, to be in the grip of an authoritarian regime. Without wishing to generalize, Armenia seems to be surrounded by more or less democratic regimes and is under pressure from a country that is clearly not. How can Armenia be helped to cope with these pressures?

Before you answer this question, I would like you to consider the following. During the 2020 conflict, when you spoke to the committee about the situation, you said that you were not in a position to know what was happening on the ground, whereas we have seen that the minister at the time was clearly more aware than you were willing to acknowledge.

In addition, you came back to us today saying at the beginning of your appearance that you don't really know who started the hostilities, which makes it all the more urgent to open the embassy in Yerevan. However, given the speed with which, after raising the flag, we finally opened the embassy in Kyiv, you will allow me to be a little worried.