Evidence of meeting #44 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was artsakh.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Shahen Mirakian  Co-President, Armenian National Committee of Canada
Taline Papazian  Researcher in political science, Lecturer at Sciences Po, École de l'Air, As an Individual
Robert Avetisyan  As an Individual
Gegham Stepanyan  As an Individual

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

Good afternoon. Welcome to meeting number 44 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Today’s meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of June 23, 2022. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mike, and please mute yourselves when you are not speaking. Interpretation for those on Zoom is at the bottom of your screen, and you have a choice of floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

I will remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

Today we are meeting on the topic of the current situation between Azerbaijan and Armenia. I would like to welcome the witnesses, who will each have five minutes for their opening remarks.

Witnesses, when you are speaking and you have 30 seconds remaining, I will hold up a red card to let you know that you should be wrapping up your remarks. The same goes for questions posed by members.

We're very happy to welcome, for the first panel today, from the Armenian National Committee of Canada, Shahen Mirakian, co-president.

Welcome back, Mr. Mirakian.

We're also grateful to have with us Ms. Taline Papazian, lecturer and researcher, Sciences Po, Paris.

Go ahead, Mr. Bergeron.

Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC

Mr. Chair, I would like to make three brief points of order.

Firstly, you said that today's meeting was about the situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I don't want to be picky, but I thought it was primarily about the Lachin corridor.

Secondly, I wanted to make sure that the sound tests had indeed been successfully carried out for the witnesses appearing by videoconference.

Thirdly, Mr. Chair, you were aware that we had requested that the Minister of Foreign Affairs be with us. Can you give us an update on the minister's availability?

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

Thank you very much, Mr. Bergeron.

On the first issue you have raised, you are absolutely correct: This is pursuant to the 106(4) that was submitted by you and other members. It is about Lachin road.

On the second question you posed, yes, we did check, and we ensured that sound checks were undertaken for everyone who is joining us by Zoom.

Third, yes, I was assured by the clerk that an invitation was extended to the minister, but regrettably, given the short notice that was provided, it was not possible.

Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC

We can come back to this, Mr. Chair, but if we cannot hear from the minister, let us hope that we will at least have the opportunity to hear from representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development on this important issue that we are dealing with today.

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

Now we will go to our first witness, who is Mr. Mirakian.

Mr. Mirakian, thank you for joining us. You have five minutes.

Shahen Mirakian Co-President, Armenian National Committee of Canada

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for inviting the Armenian National Committee of Canada to provide evidence to you today.

My name is Shahen Mirakian, and I am the co-president of the Armenian National Committee of Canada. I apologize for not being able to join you in person today.

Today's meeting is to study the present situation of the blockade of the Lachin corridor. My evidence today will not go into detail about the background and current circumstances of the blockade of the Goris-Stepanakert highway through the Berdzor-Lachin corridor by groups directed by the Azerbaijani government. Instead, I will discuss the impact of the blockade on the Armenian Canadian community and Canada's role in preventing this ongoing genocide.

To fully appreciate the evidence I am providing, it is necessary to understand that this road, through this narrow corridor, is the only land connection between the Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, or Artsakh. This highway is used to transport the necessities of life to Artsakh, including food and medical supplies. It is also used to transport patients to better-equipped hospitals in Armenia, which is particularly important during the current global pandemic.

In addition to the Goris-Stepanakert highway, the Lachin corridor contains a pipeline supplying natural gas from Armenia to Artsakh. The connections providing electricity and telecommunications connectivity from Armenia to Artsakh are also in the area of this corridor, though not necessarily directly within its territory. Therefore, in addition to blocking the transport of supplies on the highway, Azerbaijan also has the ability to block the supply of gas and electricity to Artsakh and to block Artsakh's ability to communicate with the outside world.

In the most basic terms, the safety and survival of Artsakh's 120,000 current residents is entirely dependent on the Lachin corridor and surrounding areas remaining free of any disruption of the free movement of people and supplies from and to Armenia.

Since December 12, 2022, there has been an almost complete cessation of the movement of traffic on the road and periodic, significant disruptions of the supply of gas, electricity and communications. This has resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe that has had a significant impact on the Armenian Canadian community. Every member of the community has a significant connection to at least one person in Artsakh. These are their relatives and friends who are trapped, starving and freezing.

For our community, this is not some peripheral story about the waning of Russian influence or some philosophical argument about how to enforce international law. For us, we know that, despite the defiance and unbreakable spirit of our friends and relatives, the Azerbaijani blockade is a serious and constant threat to them and to the survival of Artsakh's people.

This is exactly the kind of situation that requires intervention from the international community, including Canada. For us, the time for patience or debate has long since passed. The issue is long past the need for further study.

On December 14, 2022, the Canadian government called on the Azerbaijani authorities to open the road and said that it was following the closure of the corridor closely. I am almost certain the Canadian government completely underestimated the gravity of the situation at that point. The government probably thought that Azerbaijan was just putting some pressure on Armenia. They assumed that someone else would take care of it, and they believed that their concern would be sufficient.

At that time, the Armenian Canadian community warned the government about the gravity of the situation. We explained that, without actual concrete action from the international community, the Azerbaijani government would never end the blockade. Unless there were real consequences, there would be no end to the Azerbaijani threats to the lives of the people of Artsakh and Armenia.

Today we are repeating those concerns, this time backed up by the experience of the past six weeks. We call upon the Government of Canada to use its moral standing and considerable international influence to work with our allies to immediately end the Azerbaijani blockade and put in place the necessary conditions to assure the security of the people of Artsakh. Canada must raise this issue in all international bodies where it and Azerbaijan are members, including the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Canada must treat this situation as a foreign policy priority.

We are confident that the Government of Canada will be more receptive, and this time we expect to see tangible steps taken immediately.

Thank you.

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

Thank you very much, Mr. Mirakian.

We now go to Ms. Papazian.

Ms. Papazian, you similarly have five minutes.

Dr. Taline Papazian Researcher in political science, Lecturer at Sciences Po, École de l'Air, As an Individual

Ladies and gentlemen, honourable members of the committee, good morning.

As Mr. Mirakian said a moment ago, a five-kilometre corridor is the only connection between the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and the outside world. In fact, the outside world is itself a half-landlocked area, as two of Armenia's four borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey are closed and have been for 30 years.

Since its military victory in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, Azerbaijan has unfortunately undergone extremely rapid radicalization. The objectives are twofold. On the one hand, Azerbaijan wants to finish with the remains of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Instead of toning it down, the autocrat Aliyev has on the contrary strongly turned up the volume of his militaristic rhetoric. Military blitzkrieg operations have already taken place several times in 2021 and 2022, whether on the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russian interposition forces have been stationed since November 9, 2020, or on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

On the other hand, they are seeking a second corridor. I am using the terminology officially put forward by Mr. Aliyev. This corridor, which he wishes to see in the south of Armenia, would allow Azerbaijan to have a land connection between the Azerbaijani mainland and the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan, which has the status of an autonomous Azerbaijani republic.

Mr. Aliyev wants to establish a corridor that is equivalent to the Lachin corridor. Yet the very real situations and threats to the population of Latsar have no equivalent for the Azerbaijani population of Nakhichevan. The creation of, or demand for, an extraterritorial corridor that Armenia would cede to Azerbaijan, depriving itself of sovereignty over this part of its territory, is unacceptable to Armenia. We can come back to this during the question rounds, if you wish.

The means used by Azerbaijan is the systematic use of ultraviolence by its armed forces. This ultraviolence is supported by a very large majority of Azerbaijani society, since this society has been fed Armenophobia since its earliest childhood, for several decades. The result is unfortunately to deny any human status and any potential victim status to Armenians, based on their ethnicity.

Militarily, Azerbaijan is infinitely stronger than Armenia. Azerbaijan has invested huge sums of money modernizing its military and weaponry, since the 2010s, thanks to its hydrocarbon export revenues. Its two main suppliers, known for the quality of their weapons, are Turkey and Israel; the former meets NATO standards and the latter uses state-of-the-art technology. Military co‑operation between the Turkish and Azerbaijani armed forces is also extremely strong and extensive.

In contrast, Armenia is becoming increasingly estranged from Russia, an ally, but only on paper. Indeed, Armenia very recently refused to allow military exercises by the Collective Security Treaty Organization, of which it is a nominal member, to take place on its territory. Russia last supplied arms to Armenia in 2019. The Armenian prime minister openly complained two months ago about Russia's monumental pressure on Armenia, both for the opening of the so‑called Zanguezur corridor and for a possible request for Armenia to join the Union of Russia and Belarus.

My final point is that Armenia suffers from international isolation that puts it at the mercy of its neighbour's appetites. By contrast, Azerbaijan has international partners, including trading partners, because of its oil and gas production, and accomplices. It was enough to hear the Belarusian autocrat Lukashenko tell the Armenian prime minister in late October 2022 that Aliyev is their man, and he should understand that.

In fact, two days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on February 22, 2022, Azerbaijan and Russia had signed a strategic agreement that enhanced diplomatic and military co‑operation between the two countries. According to Aliyev, for Azerbaijan, this brought the relationship with Russia to the level of an alliance.

Azerbaijan has become, since Russia's war against Ukraine, an important tool in circumventing international sanctions against Russia.

In this respect, Gazprom's press release of November 18, 2022 is quite explicit. Indeed, a new contract with SOCAR will increase Russian exports to Azerbaijan to 1 billion cubic metres of gas between November 2022 and March 2023.

With Russia rapidly weakening in Ukraine, destabilization of the South Caucasus is increasingly underway. There you have the most volatile ceasefire in the former ex‑Soviet region. This ceasefire has been, until very recently, completely off the radar of the international community and any monitoring system.

It seems, however, that in recent weeks there is an international awareness of the gravity of the situation in Artsakh, which has been under blockade for 44 days.

The UN Security Council attempted to get a declaration adopted. This attempt, although supported by 11 out of 15 states, was nevertheless rejected...

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

Ms. Papazian, I would ask you to conclude your opening remarks in the next 30 seconds, please. Thank you.

11:20 a.m.

Researcher in political science, Lecturer at Sciences Po, École de l'Air, As an Individual

Dr. Taline Papazian

Yes, definitely.

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations and Defense committees are speaking out regularly, and the U.S. Secretary of State has been calling for a reopening.

Two options are slowly emerging. The first would be the replacement of the Russian interposition forces with another type of peacekeeping force. The second option would be the opening of an air bridge.

If no one acts, the Artsakh blockade will continue, or it will end as dictated by Azerbaijan, with the suitcase or the coffin.

Thank you for your attention.

Rob Oliphant Liberal Don Valley West, ON

On a point of order, Mr. Chair.

It was almost impossible to hear the witness's statement, in both French and English.

Does the witness have notes for her speech? It was almost impossible for me to understand, both in French and English. I switched channels between the two languages, but it was going too fast for me.

Are there notes?

11:20 a.m.

Researcher in political science, Lecturer at Sciences Po, École de l'Air, As an Individual

Dr. Taline Papazian

If the interpretation was not clear, I have some draft notes I could pass on to you after the meeting.

Rob Oliphant Liberal Don Valley West, ON

May I also say bravo to the interpreter!

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

Mr. Oliphant, I've just been advised by the clerk that they will be raising the sound, so maybe that will assist.

Rob Oliphant Liberal Don Valley West, ON

The problem was not one of sound, but of speed, in both French and English.

Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC

That's always the case for us. The witnesses are always speaking fast. We are faced with that situation even more than you are.

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

I would just ask the witnesses to slow down a bit, not only so the interpreters can follow but also so members can benefit from your remarks.

Now we will follow with questions from the members. For the first round, each member has six minutes. Again, for the benefit of our witnesses, just so you know that you should be wrapping up your responses, when there are only 30 seconds remaining in a member's question and answer time, I will hold up a red sign.

For our first member, we go to Mr. Chong.

You have six minutes, sir.

11:25 a.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Protesters characterized as environmental activists have reportedly been blocking the Lachin corridor since the 12th of December 2022, so my first question for our witnesses is this: What exactly is the nature of the physical blockade? How many protesters are we talking about here? Are we talking about transport trucks being used to blockade the corridor? Is it a barricade that has been erected?

What exactly is the nature of the physical blockade of the Lachin corridor?

11:25 a.m.

Co-President, Armenian National Committee of Canada

Shahen Mirakian

Mr. Chong, if I could suggest it, that question would probably be better put to the people on the next panel, who are both present and much more familiar with exactly what's happening.

11:25 a.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

I appreciate that. Thank you.

Perhaps Madame Papazian would know the answer to that question. If not, that's fine. I have other questions too.

11:25 a.m.

Researcher in political science, Lecturer at Sciences Po, École de l'Air, As an Individual

Dr. Taline Papazian

We have glimpses of what is going on from the media, but I would say, like Mr. Mirakian, that people who are really physically present, close to the Lachin corridor, would answer that much better.

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

I appreciate your candour on that.

What do we know about these protesters who are blockading this road, this corridor? Are they singular in their demands, or are there different groups involved with different demands?

11:25 a.m.

Co-President, Armenian National Committee of Canada

Shahen Mirakian

Again, Mr. Chong, I would recommend that possibly the next panel would provide a more specific answer to that.

The demands were very singular when this first began, but they have evolved over time to encompass a longer list of grievances. What at one time may have been about a very specific issue has since evolved to be about a variety of issues. You often hear things like, “Well, we need to have inspection of metals extraction in Artsakh by Azerbaijani natural resources officials.” Moving on, it became, “We need to have customs checkpoints in order to prevent weapons from making it into Artsakh.” Further on, they said that there have been foreigners visiting Artsakh without obtaining Azerbaijani visas, so they have to obtain those visas, which turns into that there have also been people from Iran who are fomenting dissent and so forth, who are coming into the Artsakh Republic. Finally, it was that there has been Russian influence and there have been all sorts of provocateurs.

The list of grievances gets longer by the day. I'm not sure if there is necessarily a singular aim at this point.

11:25 a.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

Thank you. I appreciate that.

What explains the timing of the blockade that began on December 12? Why did it start at that point? What is your opinion as to why the blockade was erected at that time?

11:25 a.m.

Co-President, Armenian National Committee of Canada

Shahen Mirakian

I can give a very personal opinion, and I don't know if that necessarily matches what everybody else thinks.

My only view is that, on December 2, 2022, there was a very temporary blockade of about, let's say, 12 to 24 hours. The Russian peacekeepers made concessions to remove that blockade. At that point, I think there were some feelings by some people that the Russian peacekeepers were no longer in a position to actually keep this road open through any means, whether stick or carrot. At that point, there was much more of a decision that this could be done.